JOINT STOCK LAND BANKS-Continued
II. The decided cases established the principle which was applied in Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 225 U. S. 180, that an instrumentality of the United States, although not an obligation of the Government, may be exempt from State taxation when, in the exercise of a constitutional power, it is authorized and used by Congress as a means or agency for carrying out a governmental function. The Joint Stock Land Bank bonds involved in the instant suit were instrumentali- ties of that class. Id.
III. The legislative history of the Farm Loan Act of 1916 shows that Congress considered and discussed the matter whether, under the terms of the Act, the bonds would be obligations of the Government, and also whether they should be expressly made such obli- gations, and Congress accepted and agreed upon the conclusion, with which every one seems to have agreed, that the bonds were not such obligations.
I. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction and authority under section 145 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 250) to apply equitable principles where applicable in suits against the United States; this being such a case, since the claim made by plaintiff, as receiver, arose under contracts with the United States, and the statute ex- pressly provides that the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all such claims "in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law, equity or admiralty, if the United States were suable.” See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286. Munsey Trust Company, 131.
II. The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the causes of removal of a person in the classified civil service of the United States if the procedural require- ments are complied with. Eberlein v. United States, 53 C. Cls. 466; Arthur S. Kellom v. United States, 55 C. Cls. 174. Culligan, 222.
III. Plaintiff, then a lieutenant in the Army of the United States, after being arrested a few days before, was informed at 12:40 p. m. on September 3, 1943, that he would be tried by court martial, 35 to 40 miles from the place where the charges had been served, at 2 p. m. the same day, at which time the court martial was held and plaintiff's motion for a continuance of seven days on the ground that his counsel had not had sufficient
time to prepare his defense was denied; and the plain- tiff was put to trial and convicted at 5:30 p. m. that afternoon and sentenced to dismissal from the service. The sentence was approved by the convening authority and by the President, and plaintiff was dismissed by the Secretary of War. It is held that the constitutional rights of the plaintiff were violated and that the judg- ment of the court martial was void, and the dismissal based upon that judgment was illegal. Shapiro, 650. IV. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which pro- vides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel, apply to military tribunals of the United States as well as to civil ones. Schita v. King, 133 Fed. (2d) 283; United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt et al., 141 Fed. (2d) 664. Id.
V. The right afforded by the Sixth Amendment has been denied when counsel has been refused an opportunity to prepare his defense. Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45. Id.
VI. The court martial had originally undoubted jurisdiction of the case against an Army officer on charges that he had violated the Articles of War and any verdict rendered by the court martial, even if erroneous, would ordinarily not be void, but the Supreme Court has held (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458), that while jurisdiction of a court may be complete in the begin- ning, it may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction by a court without jurisdiction is void. See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329; McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. (2d) 445; Levine v. Hudspeth, 127 Fed. (2d) 982. Id.
VII. The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to review the valid judgment of a court martial legally constituted and conducted but where the verdict of the court martial was absolutely void, for denial of the accused's con- stitutional rights, as in the instant case, the Court of
Claims has jurisdiction to hear and render judgment on plaintiff's claims for the pay of which he was illegally deprived, and the defendant's demurrer is overruled. Id.
VIII. Where grantee in deed which conveyed easement for the purpose of widening a river transferred grantee's interest to the United States, grantor retaining resid- uary interest in the land, the relation between grantor's successor and the United States in relation to their respective rights in the land involved was a con- ventional or contractual relation within the meaning of the statute giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction of such relations. (28 U. S. Code 250.) Deterding, 686. See also Employes, Discharge of, I, II; Just Compensation IV.
I. Just compensation must be determined on the basis laid down by the authorities. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 13 Sup. Ct., 622; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246; United States v. New River Col lieries Co., 262 U. S. 341; Brooks-Scanlon Corporation v. United States, 265 U. S. 106. Illinois Pure Aluminum Co., 1.
II. The United States as a wartime measure has the right to fix a maximum price at which goods can be sold but when it takes a citizen's property or goods the Govern- ment is obligated to make just compensation therefor, and as a general rule, it has not compensated him justly unless it pays him an amount sufficient to take care of the loss inflicted as the result of the taking of his property. United States v. New River Collieries, 262 U. S. 341. Felin & Co., 155.
III. The rule that the Government is obligated to put the citizen whose property is taken in as good position pecuniarily as he was in before his property was taken when applied to a case where he must replace the property taken, in order to carry on his business, is interpreted to mean that the defendant must give to plaintiff enough money to enable plaintiff to buy other property in place of that taken so that he will not sustain a loss. Id.
IV. In the instant case, it is held that the ceiling price fixed by the Office of Price Administration for the goods taken does not afford just compensation for the loss sustained by plaintiff by reason of the taking, and plaintiff is entitled to recover on the basis of what it
JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
would have cost plaintiff to replace the goods taken, at the time thereof. See Walker et al. v. United States, 105 C. Cls. 553; Coombs v. United States, 106 C. Cls. 462; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373. Id.
V. The instant suit does not involve an attack on the Maxi- mum Price Regulations, which can be made only be- fore the Emergency Court of Appeals, since the plain- tiff did not sell his goods to the Government, but they were taken by the Government, and suit for recovery of just compensation under the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Id.
VI. Plaintiff was the owner and operator of a railroad con- sisting of 63 miles of track, which in 1942 was in opera- tion. Under the Act of October 16, 1941, the Govern- ment requisitioned the rails, track fastenings and other metal material of the entire line, less 2 miles resold to plaintiff. In a suit for just compensation the court determines that plaintiff is entitled to recover on the basis of fair market value of track-in-place for two sections of 13 and 5 miles, respectively, for which at the time of taking negotiations for sale were in prog- ress, and on the basis of fair market value as metal of the remaining 43 miles, with interest as part of just compensation. Arkansas Valley Railway, Inc., 240. VII. The court is not satisfied that OPA ceiling prices are the proper measure of just compensation. Id.
VIII. In determining the amount of just compensation, the court uses as a basis fair market values.
ery is the excess of this over the payments made by the defendant, with an appropriate percentage of in- crease at an interest rate for the period during which just compensation was withheld; and the interest rate is fixed at 4 percent. Id.
IX. Just compensation for a taking is to be determined on the basis of fair market value as of the date of taking. Id.
X. There is no rule or statute fixing any particular rate of interest to be allowed as part of just compensation; and since the determination of just compensation un- der the Fifth Amendment is exclusively a judicial func- tion, it is for the court to fix the rate to be allowed. Id.
XI. In arriving at a fair and reasonable value of a vessel taken during the war period, the Court takes under consideration the war conditions that prevailed and
JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
the intrinsic value of the vessel. Illinois Pure Alumi- num Co. v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 1. Seven-Up Bot- tling Company, 402.
XII. While before Pearl Harbor there was a market for ves- sels of the type of the vessel in suit, the restrictions which the Government placed on the use of waters after December 7, 1941, were such that there were practically no commercial sales after that time and therefore no well-established market; and if the owner had retained possession, upkeep and depreciation would have been expensive to him, all of which is taken into consideration. Id.
See Overtime Pay VI.
LAND GRANT RAILROADS.
See Transportation Act of 1940 V, VI, VII.
LEASE, EXPIRATION OF.
See Rental of Property By Government I, II, III, IV, V, VI. LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENT.
See Transportation Act of 1940 I, II, III.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts III, IV, V, VI, XXI.
MILITARY EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORTATION OF.
I. Motor vehicles designed and constructed in accordance with specifications for military use and designated in the requisition made by the Republic of China upon the Government of the United States, under the Lend- Lease arrangement, as for "Army use"; were for mili- tary and not for civil use within the meaning of the Transportation Act of 1940. (54 Stat. 898, 954.) Southern Pacific Company, 167.
II. Furnishing of military equipment for the use of the Republic of China Army, under the Lend-Lease pro- gram, was a sovereign act based on military considera- tions, and where the same object, the defense of the United States, could be obtained by supplying the Chinese Army with military equipment as by supplying it to the United States Army, at home, there is no distinction to be made in the nature of the transporta- tion under the land-grant acts. Id.
III. The terms "civil" and "military" as used in the Trans- portation Act are mutually exclusive. Id.
MILITARY PROPERTIES.
See Transportation Act of 1940 V, VI, VII.
MISLEADING DRAWINGS.
See Contracts XVIII.
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