Page images

107 C. Als.


II. The decided cases established the principle which was

applied in Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 225 U. S.
180, that an instrumentality of the United States,
although not an obligation of the Government, may
be exempt from State taxation when, in the exercise
of a constitutional power, it is authorized and used
by Congress as a means or agency for carrying out
a governmental function. The Joint Stock Land Bank
bonds involved in the instant suit were instrumentall-

ties of that class. Id.
III. The legislative history of the Farm Loan Act of 1916

shows that Congress considered and discussed the
matter whether, under the terms of the Act, the bonds
would be obligations of the Government, and also
whether they should be expressly made such obli-
gations, and Congress accepted and agreed upon the
conclusion, with which every one seems to have agreed,

that the bonds were not such obligations. Id.

I. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction and authority under

section 145 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 250) to
apply equitable principles where applicable in suits
against the United States ; this being such a case, since
the claim made by plaintiff, as receiver, arose under
contracts with the United States, and the statute ex-
pressly provides that the court shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine all such claims “in respect of
which claims the party would be entitled to redress
against the United States, either in a court of law,
equity or admiralty, if the United States were suable."
See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286.

Munsey Trust Company, 131.
II. The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to review

the causes of removal of a person in the classified civil
service of the United States if the procedural require-
ments are complied with. Eberlein v. United States,
53 C. Cls. 466; Arthur S. Kellom v. United States, 55

C. Cls. 174. Culligan, 222.
III. Plaintiff, then a lieutenant in the Army of the United

States, after being arrested a few days before, was
informed at 12:40 p. m. on September 3, 1943, that he
would be tried by court martial, 35 to 40 miles from the
place where the charges had been served, at 2 p. m. the
same day, at which time the court martial was held
and plaintiff's motion for a continuance of seven days
on the ground that his counsel had not had sufficient

107 C. Cls.


time to prepare his defense was denied; and the plain-
tiff was put to trial and convicted at 5:30 p. m. that
afternoon and sentenced to dismissal from the service.
The sentence was approved by the convening authority
and by the President, and plaintiff was dismissed by
the Secretary of War. It is held that the constitutional
rights of the plaintiff were violated and that the judg.
ment of the court martial was void, and the dismissal

based upon that judgment was illegal. Shapiro, 650.
IV. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which pro-

vides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, and the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees that the accused shall
enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel, apply
to military tribunals of the United States as well as
to civil ones. Schita v. King, 133 Fed. (20) 283;
United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt et al., 141 Fed. (20)

664. Id.
V. The right afforded by the Sixth Amendment has been

denied when counsel has been refused an opportunity to
prepare his defense. Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S.

45. Id.
VI. The court martial had originally undoubted jurisdiction

of the case against an Army officer on charges that he
had violated the Articles of War and any verdict
rendered by the court martial, even if erroneous, would
ordinarily not be void, but the Supreme Court has
held (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458), that while
jurisdiction of a court may be complete in the begin-
ning, it may be lost in the course of the proceedings
due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth
Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty and
whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement
of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the
court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The
judgment of conviction by a court without jurisdiction
is void. See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329;
McCleary v. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. (20) 445; Levine v.

Hudspeth, 127 Fed. (20) 982. Id.
VII. The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to review the

valid judgment of a court martial legally constituted
and conducted but where the verdict of the court martial
was absolutely void, for denial of the accused's con-
stitutional rights, as in the instant case, the Court of

107 C. Ols.


Claims has jurisdiction to hear and render judgment
on plaintiff's claims for the pay of which he was
illegally deprived, and the defendant's demurrer is

overruled. Id.
VIII. Where grantee in deed which conveyed easement for the

purpose of widening a river transferred grantee's
interest to the United States, grantor retaining resid-
uary interest in the land, the relation between
grantor's successor and the United States in relation to
their respective rights in the land involved was a con-
ventional or contractual relation within the meaning
of the statute giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction

of such relations. (28 U. S. Code 250.) Deterding, 686.
See also Employes, Discharge of, I, II; Just Compensation


I. Just compensation must be determined on the basis laid

down by the authorities. Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. United States, 13 Sup. Ct., 622; Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299; Olson v. United
States, 292 U. S. 246; United States v. Nero River Col
lieries Co., 262 U. S. 341; Brooks-Scanlon Corporation
v. United States, 265 U. S. 106. Illinois Pure Aluminum

Co., 1.
II. The United States as a wartime measure has the right

to fix a maximum price at which goods can be sold but
when it takes a citizen's property or goods the Govern-
ment is obligated to make just compensation therefor,
and as a general rule, it has not compensated him
justly unless it pays him an amount sufficient to take
care of the loss inflicted as the result of the taking of
his property. United States v. Nero River Collieries,

262 U. S. 341. Felin & Co., 155.
III. The rule that the Government is obligated to put the

citizen whose property is taken in as good position
pecuniarily as he was in before his property was taken
when applied to a case where he must replace the
property taken, in order to carry on his business, is
interpreted to mean that the defendant must give to
plaintiff enough money to enable plaintiff to buy other
property in place of that taken so that he will not

sustain a loss. Id.
IV. In the instant case, it is held that the ceiling price fixed

by the Office of Price Administration for the goods
taken does not afford just compensation for the loss
sustained by plaintiff by reason of the taking, and
plaintiff is entitled to recover on the basis of what it

107 C. Ols.


would have cost plaintiff to replace the goods taken,
at the time thereof. See Walker et al. v. United States,
105 C. Cls. 553; Coombs v. United States, 106 C. Cls.
462; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S.

373. Id.
V. The instant suit does not involve an attack on the Maxi-

mum Price Regulations, which can be made only be-
fore the Emergency Court of Appeals, since the plain-
tiff did not sell his goods to the Government, but they
were taken by the Government, and suit for recovery
of just compensation under the Constitution is within

the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Id.
VI. Plaintiff was the owner and operator of a railroad con-

sisting of 63 miles of track, which in 1942 was in opera-
tion. Under the Act of October 16, 1941, the Govern-
ment requisitioned the rails, track fastenings and other
metal material of the entire line, less 2 miles resold
to plaintiff. In a suit for just compensation the court
determines that plaintiff is entitled to recover on the
basis of fair market value of track-in-place for two
sections of 13 and 5 miles, respectively, for which at
the time of taking negotiations for sale were in prog-
ress, and on the basis of fair market value as metal
of the remaining 43 miles, with interest as part of Just

compensation. Arkansas Valley Railway, Inc., 240.
VII. The court is not satisfied that OPA ceiling prices are the

proper measure of just compensation. Id.
VIII. In determining the amount of just compensation, the

court uses as a basis fair market values. The recov-
ery is the excess of this over the payments made by
the defendant, with an appropriate percentage of in-
crease at an interest rate for the period during which
just compensation was withheld; and the interest rate

is fixed at 4 percent. Id.
IX. Just compensation for a taking is to be determined on

the basis of fair market value as of the date of taking.

x. There is no rule or statute fixing any particular rate of

interest to be allowed as part of just compensation ;
and since the determination of just compensation un-
der the Fifth Amendment is exclusively a judicial func-
tion, it is for the court to fix the rate to be allowed.

XI. In arriving at a fair and reasonable value of a vessel

taken during the war period, the Court takes under

consideration the war conditions that prevailed and
736172-47-vol. 107- 49

107 C. Cis.


the intrinsic value of the vessel. Illinois Pure Alumi-
num Co. v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 1. Seven-Up Bot-

tling Company, 402.
XII. While before Pearl Harbor there was a market for ves-

sels of the type of the vessel in suit, the restrictions
which the Government placed on the use of waters
after December 7, 1941, were such that there were
practically no commercial sales after that time and
therefore no well-established market; and if the owner
had retained possession, upkeep and depreciation would
have been expensive to him, all of which is taken into

consideration, Id.

See also Taking IV.

See Orertime Pay VI.

See Transportation Act of 1940 V, VI, VII.

See Rental of Property By Government I, II, III, IV, V, VI.

See Transportation Act of 1940 I, II, III.

See Contracts III, IV, V, VI, XXI.

I. Motor vehicles designed and constructed in accordance

with specifications for military use and designated in
the requisition made by the Republic of China upon
the Government of the United States, under the Lend-
Lease arrangement, as for “Army use"; were for mili-
tary and not for civil use within the meaning of the
Transportation Act of 1940. (54 Stat. 898, 954.)

Southern Pacific Company, 167.
II. Furnishing of military equipment for the use of the

Republic of China Army, under the Lend-Lease pro-
gram, was a sovereign act based on military considera-
tions, and where the same object, the defense of the
United States, could be obtained by supplying the
Chinese Army with military equipment as by supplying
it to the United States Army, at home, there is no
distinction to be made in the nature of the transporta-

tion under the land-grant acts. Id.
III. The terms “civil” and “military" as used in the Trans-

portation Act are mutually exclusive. Id.

See Transportation Act of 1940 V, VI, VII.

See Contracts XVIII.

« PreviousContinue »