Congressional Abdication on War and SpendingThe balance of powers among the branches of government is the defining structure of American democracy. The Founders assumed each branch would jealously guard its own prerogatives to prevent tyrannical power. Were they wrong? In recent years Congress has progressively abdicated its role in two crucial areas: war powers and the budget process. The result is a chief executive with too few constraints and too little restraint, to the detriment of national policy and democratic processes. How has this come about, and what are the implications of this changing balance of powers? Louis Fisher addresses these pressing questions in a carefully argued study of congressional power. He examines how attempts by Congress to reassert its will in the wake of Watergate ultimately resulted in further surrender of legislative power to the presidency. This book will engage students of the governmental process and help them to understand not only the issues at stake in balanceofpower questions, but also how to conduct civic discussion and reasoned argument. In the end, Fisher advocates a return to constitutional principle on the part of lawmakers and the education of citizens who will insist that Congress protect those principles. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 90
Page xiv
... authority to the president is not meant to be complete or irreversible . There may be an element of legislative irresponsibility with both abdication and delegation , but there are crucial differ- ences . Delegation of power to agencies ...
... authority to the president is not meant to be complete or irreversible . There may be an element of legislative irresponsibility with both abdication and delegation , but there are crucial differ- ences . Delegation of power to agencies ...
Page 4
... authority to amend them . ' He allowed the executive a veto to reject legislation , but opposed any other participation in the legislative process . On all those points , and others , the framers rejected Montesquieu . Yet they agreed ...
... authority to amend them . ' He allowed the executive a veto to reject legislation , but opposed any other participation in the legislative process . On all those points , and others , the framers rejected Montesquieu . Yet they agreed ...
Page 10
... authority did not extend to taking the country into full - scale war or to mount an offensive attack against other nations . As John Bassett Moore , a noted scholar of international law , remarked : " There can hardly be room for doubt ...
... authority did not extend to taking the country into full - scale war or to mount an offensive attack against other nations . As John Bassett Moore , a noted scholar of international law , remarked : " There can hardly be room for doubt ...
Page 13
... authority over the com- mencement of war . " 52 He concluded that the years following ratification of the Constitution helped reinforce the view that Americans " originally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate , and ...
... authority over the com- mencement of war . " 52 He concluded that the years following ratification of the Constitution helped reinforce the view that Americans " originally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate , and ...
Page 14
... authority to initiate war . ” 55 Michael Glennon said that it " is clear that the Constitution's textual grants of war - making power to the President are paltry in comparison with , and are subordinate to , its grants to Congress ...
... authority to initiate war . ” 55 Michael Glennon said that it " is clear that the Constitution's textual grants of war - making power to the President are paltry in comparison with , and are subordinate to , its grants to Congress ...
Contents
LVI | 122 |
LVII | 125 |
LVIII | 127 |
LIX | 130 |
LX | 132 |
LXI | 134 |
LXII | 137 |
LXIII | 140 |
LXIV | 142 |
LXV | 143 |
LXVI | 146 |
LXVII | 147 |
LXVIII | 149 |
LXIX | 151 |
LXX | 153 |
LXXI | 155 |
LXXII | 158 |
LXXIII | 162 |
LXXIV | 163 |
LXXV | 165 |
LXXVI | 166 |
LXXIX | 167 |
LXXX | 168 |
LXXXII | 169 |
LXXXV | 170 |
LXXXVI | 171 |
LXXXVII | 173 |
XC | 175 |
XCI | 176 |
XCII | 179 |
XCIII | 182 |
XCIV | 185 |
XCV | 209 |
XCVI | 213 |
XCVII | 215 |
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Common terms and phrases
action administration agreed amendment American appropriations appropriations bill approval argued Armed Forces asked attack authority balanced bill billion Bosnia branch budget Bush called citizens claimed Clinton commit Committee Cong Congress congressional constitutional continued court debate decided decision defense deficit delegated Department effect emergency enacted executive federal force foreign framers funds give gress ground Haiti hearings House Ibid impoundment increase initiatives institutional interests Iraq issue item veto John Justice language later leaders legislative limited majority means members of Congress military military force necessary never objected operations Panama passed political prerogatives president presidential procedure proposed protect Reagan Relations representative resolution responsibility Security Council Senate separate sess Source spending statute statutory tion treaty troops Truman United unless veto vote wanted Washington World
Popular passages
Page 5 - ... that the legislative, executive and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of each other as the nature of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity.
Page 3 - The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Page 8 - Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.
Page 6 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Page 37 - X., or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty...
Page 59 - Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.
Page 6 - The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
Page 39 - Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
Page 141 - ... competence of the speaker to suppress as if it were against order. For were he permitted to draw questions of consistence within the vortex of order, he might usurp a negative on important modifications, and suppress, instead of subserving, the legislative will.
Page 17 - Congress ex majore cautela and in anticipation of such astute objections, passing an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, etc., as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.