Congressional Abdication on War and Spending

Front Cover
Texas A&M University Press, 2000 - Law - 220 pages
The balance of powers among the branches of government is the defining structure of American democracy. The Founders assumed each branch would jealously guard its own prerogatives to prevent tyrannical power. Were they wrong? In recent years Congress has progressively abdicated its role in two crucial areas: war powers and the budget process. The result is a chief executive with too few constraints and too little restraint, to the detriment of national policy and democratic processes. How has this come about, and what are the implications of this changing balance of powers?

Louis Fisher addresses these pressing questions in a carefully argued study of congressional power. He examines how attempts by Congress to reassert its will in the wake of Watergate ultimately resulted in further surrender of legislative power to the presidency.

This book will engage students of the governmental process and help them to understand not only the issues at stake in balanceofpower questions, but also how to conduct civic discussion and reasoned argument. In the end, Fisher advocates a return to constitutional principle on the part of lawmakers and the education of citizens who will insist that Congress protect those principles.

From inside the book

Contents

II
3
III
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IV
6
V
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VI
11
VII
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VIII
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IX
15
XLVIII
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XLIX
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L
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LI
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LII
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LIII
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LIV
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LV
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X
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XIII
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XIV
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XV
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XIX
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XXVIII
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XXX
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XXXI
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XXXIII
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XXXIV
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XXXVI
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XXXVII
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XXXVIII
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XXXIX
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XLI
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XLII
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XLIII
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XLV
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LVI
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LVIII
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LIX
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LXI
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LXIII
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LXV
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LXVI
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LXX
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LXXIII
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LXXVI
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LXXIX
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LXXX
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LXXXII
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LXXXVI
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LXXXVII
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XC
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XCI
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XCII
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XCIII
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XCV
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XCVI
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Copyright

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Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 5 - ... that the legislative, executive and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of each other as the nature of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity.
Page 3 - The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Page 8 - Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.
Page 6 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Page 37 - X., or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty...
Page 59 - Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.
Page 6 - The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
Page 39 - Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
Page 141 - ... competence of the speaker to suppress as if it were against order. For were he permitted to draw questions of consistence within the vortex of order, he might usurp a negative on important modifications, and suppress, instead of subserving, the legislative will.
Page 17 - Congress ex majore cautela and in anticipation of such astute objections, passing an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, etc., as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.

About the author (2000)

LOUIS FISHER is a senior specialist in separation of powers with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Previous books include Presidential Spending Power and Presidential War Power. Texas A&M University Press published the fourth edition of his Politics of Shared Power in 1998.