Mr. YEAGLEY. My previous comments at the earlier hearing were based on the fact that the standard of "in the national interest" is the standard incorporated in Executive Order 10865 under which the program is presently being operated. It has been operated now for over 8 years, and this particular problem has not to my knowledge been raised as a serious one. I would have to admit, on the other hand, that the question of establishing a criterion, whether the one you suggest, the one in the bill or the one that is being used, is extremely difficult and one that someday will be resolved by the courts. In the personnel screening program of the Government the standard is "clearly consistent with interests of national security." Of course, under the present standard in the Industrial Security Program, if the Defense Department in its operation and application of the criterion would apply it in some of the ways pointed out by you as possibilities, I think then we would lose one of the requirements essential to such a determination. The Government must show that it has a legitimate concern and interest in a particular position that the employee occupies. We must show that we have a legitimate concern over the particular employee in that position; and, if we fail to make that application of the standard, then, of course, the particular case, and perhaps the program, would fall.

Mr. LIEBLING. This is exactly the point. There is no loose application, and it has been working well. We understand it. We are taking care of the Government's interests as well as the individuals. We take tremendous pride in our executive judgment.

Mr. Tuck (presiding). I understand the gentleman from South Carolina wishes to be recognized.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CULVER. I want to just thank the witnesses, Mr. Watson, for the very helpful information which I think perhaps will improve our ability to properly consider this legislation.

(The additional questions submitted to Mr. Yeagley by Mr. Culver and Mr. Yeagley's responses follow :)

Q. For individuals who will not have access to classified information, could not the relevant national interest in military security be reasonably adequately protected if inhibitions of their employment were made operative only during time of a formal state of war or a national emergency declared by the President? Particularly in the case of standby facilities, in which case the further argument could be made that no employment inhibitions should be enforced until such facilities are in fact converted to the purpose for which they had been designated? Would it not be reasonable to limit administrative discretion so that employment at a given facility could be inhibited only for particularly sensitive positions at that facility? (Revised page 3 of Yeagley's prepared statement indicates that employment restrictions should apply only to persons in "sensitive" positions.)

A. Someone connected directly with security in the Department of Defense could answer this better than I. However, I would think the answer to the first part of this question would be yes.

It is difficult to answer the question re clearances of employees of standby facilities on a hypothetical basis. It would depend on the facts, and it might be difficult to find a sound legal basis for such a program. On the other hand if the program is not initiated until the war or emergency begins, the time required to initiate and complete such a program may well result in a delay in the facility being activated or in its employees not being cleared.

The courts have indicated that if the position involved is not sensitive then the Government's interest in the person who might occupy that position is substantially reduced. It might be extremely difficult today to sustain a denial or

dismissal for security reasons of one in a nonsensitive job although such action could conceivably be sustained where disloyalty is involved. Of course when disloyalty exists it is rarely discovered prior to some overt act by the employee; further it is extremely difficult to prove.

I hesitate to venture an opinion as to what sort of a screening program the Supreme Court would sustain. The Court has said it recognizes the right of Government to protect itself yet it seems reluctant to uphold security programs. The Court has said the Government can protect itself against saboteurs and espionage agents, but that seems to relate only to persons who are known to have committed espionage or sabotage. Such persons wouldn't be hired in the first place.

If the Court is going to hold that active membership in an organization that advocates anarchy or overthrow of Government by force and violence is insufficient to support a dismissal, then our screening programs will be that in name only. If the Court intends to require the Government to also prove that the particular employee intends to advance or carry out the illegal purposes or objectives of the organization of which he is an active member then the Government will not be able to successfully bring charges against employees it has reasonable grounds to believe are disloyal or who may commit serious offenses against the Government. In this area evidence of intent is practically never available until after some overt act has been committed.

For example, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) has for years taught and advocated the necessity of resorting to violence to overthrow the United States Government or the Government of Puerto Rico or any subdivision thereof and to use violence against established governmental authority. However, based on present Supreme Court decisions as we understand them, if in the summer of 1950 the two Puerto Ricans who in November attempted to assassinate President Truman had been employees of the Federal Government, we would not have been able to discharge either of them on security grounds even though they were active members of the NPPR. We had no evidence whatever that they intended to carry out the purposes and objectives of the organization.

The same would have been true in the case of the Puerto Ricans who fired shots from the gallery in the House of Representatives in March of 1954. Had they been on the Government payroll shortly before that event and subject to a screening program, we could have shown only that three of them were active members of the NPPR. We could not have proved that any of them had specific intent to carry out the objectives of that organization.

The same problems of proof exist as to members of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or the American Nazi Party or the Klan or any group of anarchists. Even when we can prove a person is an active member of such a group, evidence that he intends to carry out the objectives of the organization simply isn't available. The more dedicated an organization is to the proposition that this Government or any of its subdivisions must be destroyed or overthrown by force and violence, the more difficult of course it is to obtain usable evidence regarding it and its members.

Q. What evidence is there, if any, that American citizens are more likely to commit acts of espionage and subversion for ideological reasons than for other reasons such as monetary gain? To the witnesses' knowledge, how many acts of espionage or subversion have been committed by United States citizens who had not been cleared by screening programs similar to those now in effect or proposed to be authorized by the pending legislation?

A. I don't know that there is much evidence, certainly there is no conclusive evidence, that American citizens are more likely to commit acts of espionage for ideological reasons than for other reasons such as monetary gain. Up until a few years after the war it appeared that most Americans who had engaged or attempted to engage in espionage against their own country had done so for ideological reasons. Since that time increasing numbers seem to be motivated by monetary reasons. Frequently it is a combination of the two. We know of a few instances in which American citizens turned over classified information to representatives of a foreign government rather than to submit to exposure of a comprising situation in which they had been caught. When a defendant refuses to testify or a subject refuses to be interviewed, it is not easy to determine what his motivation had been.

Acts of espionage are seldom committed by persons who had not been cleared under a screening program since some sort of screening is usually involved if a person has access to sensitive information. However, shortly after the Second

World War several Americans who had not been subject to a screening program were prosecuted for espionage because of their efforts to get national defense information through or from other people who had access to it. For example, the Rosenbergs, Harry Gold, and the Sobles.

On the other hand, most of the persons prosecuted for espionage in recent years have had some sort of a security clearance. For example, Irving Scarbeck, Nelson Drummond, John Butenko, George Gessner, Robert Johnson, James Mintkenbaugh, William Whalen, and Herbert Boechenhaupt.

Mr. WATSON. At our last session some statements concerning President Truman's veto message of the Internal Security Act were used to cast doubt on the utility of the entire statute which the bill that we have under consideration seeks to amend.

In fact, as I recall, I believe my good friend from Iowa, who is certainly an able man, made the statement that it had some "very prophetic observations" concerning the Subversive Activities Control Board. And since I am sure we would like to make a complete record so that the House might have the benefit of the hearings on this particular amendment, I would like to ask a few questions of Mr. Yeagley.

Let me make it clear, first, that I regret that President Truman was brought into this picture. He apparently is enjoying pretty good health, and I think ex-Presidents ought to enjoy a little peace and prestige during the waning days of their lives. Certainly my questions would not reflect, and intend no reflection, upon him in any way. But since he was been brought into it, at least so far as his veto message is concerned, I think that the record ought to be clarified, or at least should give the full benefit of questions on both sides of the issue.

I would like to say also before propounding a few questions that in my judgment, at least from the best information I have been able to receive, some folks have questioned whether or not the President actually wrote that veto message.

I think, primarily predicating it on the fact that the statement was contained in the message, and I did read the message in its entirety last night, that there were many statements offered as incontrovertible truths. Later on, when the Senate and House overruled the President's veto, they firmly controverted the statements made in the veto message.

I know one columnist, Arthur Krock, who is highly respected and a former Pulitzer Prize winner and long a correspondent for the Times in Washington, had an interesting column on that. I think it might be helpful for the committee to read that particular article.

Mr. Yeagley, the veto message stated that the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State were all agreed that the bill "would seriously damage the security and intelligence operations" for which they were responsible.

Of course, you have been very close to this situation in your very strategic position heading up the Security Division of the Department of Justice.

Let me ask you, can you think of a single proceeding initiated under the Internal Security Act which has seriously damaged the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. YEAGLEY, Pardon the time for reflection, but I don't want to be careless or make a misleading statement. In this brief effort to recall

the different cases and the sort of testimony produced and the kind of witnesses that were called, I don't remember any proceedings now that we thought at the time or since may have had an adverse effect upon the Central Intelligence Agency; nor do I recall them having raised any question with us about any of those proceedings.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, sir.

Now can you think of any Internal Security Act proceeding that has seriously damaged the security or the intelligence operations of the Department of State?

Perhaps Mr. Liebling can better answer that question. Can you think of any proceeding under that act which has seriously damaged your security or intelligence operations?

Mr. LIEBLING. I would have to answer off the cuff on that, Mr. Congressman. I am not aware of any. I wasn't in this position. I am acquainted with the position that the Defense Department gave on the bill in 1950, and our concern was specifically confined to section 5 at that time, where we objected to a public divulgence of the sensitive facilities which would then become a means of targeting intelligence information for a foreign government and indicate and disclose certain vulnerabilities, and this is what we confined ourselves to at the time, and I personally am not aware of any as far as your question is concerned.

Mr. WATSON. And of course oftentimes we are apprehensive about things, but they never materialize. And, so far as you are concerned, nothing, so far as any proceeding under this act, has seriously damaged your security or intelligence operations?

Mr. LIEBLING. My experience has indicated no knowledge of any. Mr. WATSON. You don't know of any. All right, sir.

Mr. Yeagley, can you think of any Internal Security Act provision or proceeding which has done serious damage to both the intelligence and the security operations of what was formerly known as G-2-I don't know what they call it now-or the Army's intelligence unit? I am sure that they would have conferred with you about that if there had been such a serious problem arise.

Mr. YEAGLEY. I don't recall any proceeding that was brought before the Board which would have conceivably had an adverse effect upon the operations of G-2. I suppose they could have had the same concern for the publishing of the list of defense facilities that Mr. Liebling referred to.

I believe that provision was amended in 1962, however, for that very purpose, because they thought it was a problem, in order to do away with the requirement of publishing this list.

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir. Rather than ask these individually, we will make them collectively because I verily believe that the answer will be the same.

What about the Office of Naval Intelligence, what about the Office of Special Investigations, OSI, of the Air Force's Security and Counterintelligence Unit, and the Air Force Office of Intelligence? Can you think of any provision or proceeding of the Internal Security Act which has done serious damage to their operations?

Mr. YEAGLEY. I believe the answer would be the same, Mr. Congress

man.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, sir.

As far as the FBI is concerned, and that was definitely included in the message because it is the intelligence and security arm of the Department of Justice, I would like to state for the record that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover has testified before an Appropriations Subcommittee of the House every year since the act was passed in 1950, a period of nearly 18 years. And in the course of his testimony he has made numerous references to the Internal Security Act and he has not once hinted, Mr. Chairman, intimated, or even suggested that the act has in any way hampered, hurt, or interfered with the FBI's security operation.

Mr. Yeagley, I know, the FBI being under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice, that Mr. Hoover has never made any reference to that. Has he, or have any of his subordinates, ever brought any instance to your attention of this act seriously impairing or damaging their security operations?

Mr. YEAGLEY. I think only in the context that I mentioned in my earlier testimony, that whether it's a proceeding under this act or whether it's an espionage case, we always have the problem of whom are we going to use as witnesses and, if they come from the FBI, will it reduce their coverage in a certain area or will it be detrimental so as to raise a serious problem as to the advisability of using that witness. That problem does exist.

I suppose some people may have thought at the time the Internal Security Act was pending that, with the Communist Party having then many thousands of members, if they gave the Attorney General the authority to file many thousands of petitions, it would require the testimony of many thousands of informants of the FBI whose services thereafter would be lost.

Mr. WATSON. I appreciate your answer, Mr. Yeagley, but would not the same criticism apply to any action under the Smith Act, our espionage statutes, or all other security laws, none of which can be implemented without the use of either defected Communists or espionage agents or FBI informants? Would not the same criticism apply to all of our security acts?

Mr. YEAGLEY. In every case that we have that comes from the FBI we have to consider the nature of the witnesses and what effect it will have on the Bureau. Where we have a question as to whether there may be an adverse effect, we discussed it with Bureau representatives to determine what the problems are and what the decision should be.

Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir; but the same criticism, if there be any, or the same danger, if there be any, would apply to the Smith Act and all other security measures as it relates to the disclosure of informants?

Mr. YEAGLEY. The problem is the same, Mr. Congressman. I was merely supposing that when the bill was being considered some people may have thought it opened up the area to bring maybe hundreds or even thousands of cases, which has not happened.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Yeagley, I would like to ask you about another allegation which was made in the veto message:

"It would deprive us of the great assistance of many aliens in intelligence matters," and again, "The bill would deprive our Government and our intelligence agencies of the valuable services of aliens in security operations."