restructuring next year, our bill will look different. Little did we know that September 11th, God forbid, would intervene.

The point is that when we come out of the joint inquiry, lessons learned there, there is a Scowcroft Report to the President on Restructuring that addresses some issues about the Intelligence Community. At that time, we will be better equipped to make some determinations.

I do not, just speaking myself, I do not see any situation under which we will be including the CIA and the FBI under the Homeland Security Department. But we certainly will be restructuring the Intelligence Community, improving selection analysis and dissemination of information.

Mr. Goss. I certainly associate with those remarks, and I come to the same conclusion. I cannot foresee a time when we would be putting a whole agency into the Department of Homeland Security. There are actually some, I guess 14, depending on how you count agencies that have an intelligence component, some are 100 percent, some are a lot less than that, to make up our foreign Intelligence Community.

The CIA has a great deal more responsibility and function than just terrorism. Terrorism is obviously top of the list. That is where the war is now, that is what we are focused on now. It is highest priority. But there is a whole bunch of other stuff that is critically important to us, too; just defending our communications at the government level, those kinds of things, those kinds of chores that are routinely taken up by people that are a lot harder than you would think.

So when you take a look at the total work that needs to be done and the way the Foreign Intelligence Service works for us, it seems very appropriate that it stay outside of this Homeland Security piece, to give the reassurance that we are not spying on Americans in part, but also to take advantage of the full range of capabilities that the foreign intelligence collection and analytical capability that we have can be brought to bear on the homeland security, and still do all the rest that it is assigned to do, which is a very large amount of work on a global basis, as you know.

With regard to the FBI, I think I have just received 12 pages of reforms that are going on in the FBI. I haven't even had a chance to digest them superficially, but I believe it is fair to say as our chief Federal law enforcement agency in the country, it also has a very full menu that goes beyond prevention of terrorism. And I think it is appropriate that we not subsume all of the other activities to terrorism, but we provide that terrorism has the priority. It is the first among equals of the law enforcement challenges right now. I think that was the reasoning. And we will be looking at the architecture of the Intelligence Community once we get through with the immediate task at hand.

Ms. PELOSI. If I may add to that, Mr. Frost. Force protectionone of the primary responsibilities of the Intelligence Community writ large, not just the CIA but Intelligence, is force protection of our young men and women in uniform around the country. So there is such-the scope of the responsibilities is so broad and go well beyond homeland security, as central as that is to us in this hearing today.

Mr. FROST. Mr. Goss, if I could, there has been a lot of discussion in the press that the FBI is very good at catching people after the fact but that it has not been always very good at prevention. And I would hope that your recommendations, both as a part of this and then your later recommendations, will address that.

Mr. Goss. Indeed, Mr. Frost, they do. And we are well aware of that, and it is not a criticism of the FBI. That was their mission. Their mission has changed and it has been reinforced. The understanding of that mission change is very clear to them. And I think they are doing their best to adapt to it. And I am satisfied that they are trying.

Mr. FROST. Thank you. Thank you.

Chairman ARMEY. The gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. WATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In this new Intelligence Analysis Center, Congressman DeLay mentioned civil liberties, which I think we all are concerned about. And I think not only do we have to be concerned about that, but we have to be concerned about duplication as well. And in this new Agency, given that the Center would take detailees from other agencies like CIA, FBI, NSA, is there any possibility that the Center would perform functions that duplicate some of the activities of the existing agencies? Mr. Goss. I think that the idea is to bring into focus the terrorist target and terrorist threat and the vulnerability and bring them all together and fuse them all together in one place. We have counterterrorist centers, as you know, in other agencies-without going too far into details in a public hearing.

And, yes, I think there is a possibility that information will come in and get analyzed in one area and then say oh, my gosh, this would be of interest to the Homeland Security people, let's channel that right down to them now. So I think you will see more than one pair of hands handling some of this. But I think that is of necessity, because I don't think anybody is suggesting that Homeland Security should be running intelligence operations overseas.

So inevitably as information comes in, goes through the analytical process, I would believe that it would get a value added from the Intelligence Community. But as a customer, it would be receiving a good piece of information that would be of particular interest to it; because people will know that if you have got something that involves terrorism or counterterrorism or the terrorist threat or the vulnerability of our infrastructure here, the customer that is interested, in addition to the President of the United States, are these folks in the Department of Homeland Security.

Our Intelligence Community is actually pretty good at understanding who their customers are and getting information timely, whether it is the Defense Department or State Department or whomever.

Ms. PELOSI. I would only add that some of us, post-September 11th, wanted to assess the performance of every agency that had any responsibility for preventing a act. And some of these agencies are well beyond what you would say-the CIA, the FBI and that. You have INS, FAA, and the rest of that. And the Office of Homeland Security and the White House, of course, will be the ultimate place which will see all. But some of this information that you are talking about and the analysis that would go on at the Department

of Homeland Security that is different from at the FBI and the CIA, is that the Secretary would be seeing it within a larger context of the other agencies under his purview. And, of course, the director at the White House, if that is the title, advisor to the President, whatever the title is, would be seeing it even in a broader context, which I think would be valuable to the American-protecting the American people.

Mr. WATTS. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman ARMEY. The gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for your work and your testimony.

I just want to focus on one element of this which I think is so crucial, and that is information sharing. And in that regard, you know, I think there is a difference-which is part of what I have tried to bring out over the various witnesses we have between providing for information sharing and having mechanisms that guarantee information sharing.

And I would just ask, Mr. Goss, I read your statement as well as what you verbalized, and you expressed what the committee was concerned about in terms of the President's proposal, leaving unclear what raw intelligence would be made to the new Department. And I think the line that I like here the most is, "Given that the Secretary does not know what he does not know," you know, it is very telling.

Could you and Ms. Pelosi address, do you think that what the Intelligence Committee has done provides goes beyond providing for information sharing and gives us some mechanisms or guarantees of information sharing and at what levels?

Mr. Goss. Well, we certainly tried to take what we felt was an uncovered part in the President's proposal and reinforce it with a mandate that information will be shared; because without getting into other work that we are doing too much, we have found that information sharing-no secret to anybody-has not been our brightest success story as we have gone along.

And breaking down what in the lingo they call the "stovepipes," so that one agency really wants to get a piece of information and polish it and guard it jealously and take it up to the top and say, see what we at this agency have contributed, which quite often you get a better product for timely if you are coordinating horizontally at lower levels-that is what we have tried to do.

So the answer to your question I hope is that we have mandated sharing, but we hope in that mandate we have encouraged the opportunity for, at the working level, people to use the common sense to know that this is not about promoting our agency and sticking our logo on a piece of paper that says this is our product and you cannot have it until we get our logo on it; that people will be protective in sharing information.

Part of our problem, honestly-you have hit on a very important point is that there has not been a lot of reward for that kind of initiative among the working people. It is high risk. You get caught doing something like that, and you risk the ire of your bosses. We have had some cases where we saw some what you will call commonsense initiatives taken by some people saying, I know a guy at

another desk in another agency who ought to know this right now, and they have gotten themselves in some difficulty.

We have to change that culture that everything has to go all the way up before it can go out. And I hope that we have tried to get some forward progress on that. But I cannot tell you that any amendment that we do or anybody else, any words that you write on a paper, is going to make that happen. That is a cultural change that is going to take leadership to make that happen. That is my view, anyway. But I think we are pushing the right way. Do you agree?

Ms. PELOSI. I agree with what the chairman has said. I alsostop me I think that it is okay to talk about what the current law is?

Mr. Goss. Sure.

Ms. PELOSI. The current situation is now-and perhaps one of these times we should sit down in a closed session to talk about some of this as well-but right now the President of the United States retains the power to give, for example, the Secretary of Homeland Security, when that person is sworn into office and is confirmed, raw data. Raw data.

The committee will be receiving reports, the committee I mean the Department will be receiving reports. The committee will be doing its own analysis. And so the question is, can the committee task back out to say I need more information about this, I want you to pursue this further? Or I want the raw data that supports what this report, this finished report says?

Right now, it is the President who makes the determination. The President is obviously a busy person. I think that what we suggested strengthens the hand of the Secretary of the department who has the responsibility, who is accountable, to get access to more raw data, as is his due, rather than having to make a strong case on why he or she should have it.

Mr. MENENDEZ. In this regard, while we have often talked about the FBI and the CIA, I assume we are also talking about Defense Intelligence, NSA, the whole litany of different elements of the Federal Government that have intelligence procuring abilities? This would be part of your information sharing?

Mr. Goss. Very much so. We have tried to create enough flexibility so that anything that is relevant to what the DHS mission is, is available to them.

Mr. MENENDEZ. And very, very briefly, Mr. Chairman, are there any penalties, is there you talked about incentivizing and changing the culture so that people share. Are there consequences if you do not share?

Mr. Goss. Yes. The World Trade Towers.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I understand that. In the legislation, are there consequences so that people understand, hey, if I do not share this, there is some form-.

Mr. Goss. Not in our legislation. We have not gone that far.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Do you consider that something of value?

Mr. Goss. I think you need to provide an incentive, you know, whether you should provide a stick. Nobody wants to suggest, in my view, that we are creating a penalty for trying to do an honest job. But I think that there are ways to, already on the books, that

if you are malfeasant or misfeasant in your job that there is a penalty for that.

So I suggest what we do is set the guidelines for the positive and let the normal guidelines or the normal standards that we have for malfeasance or misfeasance pertain. But we did not focus on that, to my knowledge.

Chairman ARMEY. The gentlewoman from Connecticut.

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both very much again. Your years of experience at this important function are really demonstrated here today.

Let me just pick up a quick follow-on question to my colleague from New Jersey. Can the Secretary of DHS request that there be a particular kind of intelligence gathered? Or can it work in the opposite way? In other words, they are not collecting the raw data, they have access to raw data, as I understand it. But can they request FBI, CIA, to move in directions to gather intelligence in particular areas that may seem relevant to looking at national security issues?

Mr. Goss. The answer is, under our proposals they can do that. There are obviously management controls involved in that. But the answer is, yes, we specifically do provide that the DHS can task the Intelligence Community.

Now, tasking the Intelligence Community again, without getting too far into this, the Intelligence Community is asked to provide a lot more than it can possibly do. There are lots of customers that are always asking it to do things. So DHS would become a customer. But DHS would become a specialized unique customer in the area of terrorism and terrorist threats. So my answer is yes, they would have tasking capability to the community, but that would be weighed against the other tasking requirements that the community has to deal with.

For example, if we happen to be in a war at the time, a shooting war, or there happened to be a need for a national technical means for certain other higher priorities that the administration feltthen it might be that their task wouldn't be handled immediately or would be put on a shelf or would be watered down or something else. But they have the right to get into the tasking competition. And if there is a problem there is a referee provided for.

MS. DELAURO. They are a unique customer. But if we are talking about the uniqueness of the issue and a Department of Homeland Security, probably the single biggest issue that potentially has prompted a Department of Homeland Security is the issue of intelligence and intelligence gathering, sharing what we know when we know it, when can you respond? I am not clear about what the lines are in terms of if you were in a shooting war, is there the potential for there to be a terrorist attack accompany that kind of thing?

So I don't know,among equals, how do these lines of management, these management controls work? What is the thought process of all of that? Help me; this is very new.

Mr. Goss. What I am trying to tell you is that the DHS will have the unique requirement under this proposal to task the community to get more information about something of interest to them that they think is critically important. They will have that capacity.