question we now discuss is the same under a new name which was discussed in the convention. A question of power between states and general government and large

and small states. What was lost in constituting is to be regained by construction. What states refused to give up, is to be cozened out of their agents. In all the conventions however, our misguided ancestors considered the senate as the last remnant of the federative features of the old government, and that senators represented distinct sovereignties, and were on the footing of ambassadors or the members of the old congress as to their constituents, and only legislators as to the general government. *

One remark of Judge H. will finish our consideration of this portion of his letter. "This (right of instruction) found not to be chosen for too long a time. They are, says he,

to assist the executive in the designation and appointment of officers; and they ought to have time to mature their judgment. If for a shorter period, how can they be acquainted with the rights and interests of nations, so as to form advantageous treaties?" If this is not our doctrine in full, we give it up. Here is length of term advocated, not to strengthen in disobedience, but to mature judgment as to officers, and acquire information as to treaties; but as to legislative proceedings, "if they are found erring, instruct them." Instructions are given as the remedy for a term too long for legislators, but necessary to enable them to execute properly their executive duties.

A similar view was taken by Mr. Parsons of Newburyport, who thought "suitable checks had been provided to prevent an Of this, abundant evidence may be adduced. Mr. Ames, in abuse of power, and to continue their dependance on their conthe Massachusetts convention, assigned the ambassadorial cha-stituents." Mr. Neal asks, "If we should ratify the constitution racter of senators as a reason for the length of their term. and instruct our first members to congress, &c. &c., is there not "The senators represent the sovereignty of the states; in the the highest probability that every thing which we wish may be other house individuals are represented. The senate may not effectually secured?" Mr. Symmes finally withdrew his oppooriginate bills. It need not be said that they are principally tosition, and would, "especially as the amendments were to be a direct the affairs of war and treaties. They are in the quality of standing instruction to their delegates, until they were obtained, ambassadors of the states, and it will not be denied that some give it his unreserved assent." permanency in their office is necessary to a discharge of their duty. Now, if they were chosen yearly, how could they perform their trust? If they would be brought by that means more immediately under the influence of the people, then they will represent the state legislature less, and become the representatives of individuals. This belongs to the other house. The absurdity of this, and its repugnancy to the federal principles of the constitution, will appear more fully, by supposing that they are to be chosen by the people at large. If there is any force in the objection to this article, this would be proper.

So in the New York convention, Mr. Hamilton says, "It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates." He then argues at length to prove that the will of the people must prevail over that of the members of congress, and thus speaks: "If the genetal voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubt edly must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them."

In the same convention, Mr. Jay says, "The senate is to be

certainly choose those who are most distinguished for their general knowledge; I presume they will also instruct them; that there will be a constant correspondence supported between the senators and the state executive, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them all that particular information which particular circumstances may require." He seems to have consi

"But whom in that case would they represent? Not the legis-composed of men appointed by the state legislatures: they will latures of the states, but the people. This would totally obliterate the federal features of the constitution. What would become of the state governments, and on whom would devolve the duty of defending them against the encroachments of the federal go vernment? A consolidation of the states would ensue, which it is conceded would subvert the new constitution, and against which this very article, so much condemned, is our best security.dered senators in the light of ambassadors, and never to have Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation. The state governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people. They are the safeguard and orna. ment of the constitution-they will protract the period of our liberties-they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights.

"A very effectual check upon the power of the senate is provided. A third part is to retire from office every two years. By this means, while the senators are seated for six years they are admonished of their responsibility to the state legislatures. If one third new members are introduced, who feel the sentiments of their states, they will awe that third whose term will be near expiring. This article seems to be an excellence of the constitution, and affords just ground to believe that it will be in practice, as in theory, a federal republic."

The remarks of Mr. King in the same convention, upon the same subject, lead irresistibly to this conclusion, although it was attempted to be reasoned away by Judge H. in his first letter-"The senators," said Mr. K. "will have a powerful check, in those men who wish for their seats, who will watch their whole conduct in the general government, and will give the alarm in case of misbehavior." (This is one distinct check and Mr. K. proceeds.) "And the state legislatures, if they find their delegates erring, can and will instruct them. Will not this be a check? When they hear the voice of the people solemnly dictating to them their duty, they will be bold men indeed to act contrary to it." (This makes obedience a duty, and the boldness and hardihood not of that virtuous kind which the Judge supposes.) "These will not be instructions sent them in a private letter, which can be put in their pockets; they will be public instruc. tions, which all the country will see; and they will be hardy men indeed to violate them." (This seems to suppose meanness enough to violate secret instructions, but not audacity enough to violate them in the face of day.) "The honorable gentleman said, the power to control the senate is as great as ever was enjoyed in any government; and that the members thereof will be

contemplated the contingency of a state executive's refusing to send instructions to senators!

There was an attempt made in this convention to carry an amendment, making senators ineligible for more than six years in a term of twelve, and subjecting them to a power of recall, but it was negatived-its opponents alleging that the states had as much power of control as any constituents ought to have, or as the people had in the other house, and that to render senators ineligible a second term would be highly impolitic-excluding useful and experienced citizens from office.

In the convention of North Carolina, Mr. Davie, in giving the reasons for the introduction of a vice president, says: "It was owing with other reasons, to the jealousy of the states, and particularly to the extreme jealousy of the lesser states, of the power and influence of the larger members of the confederacy. It was in the senate that the several political interests of the states were to be preserved, and where all their powers were to be perfectly balanced." Hence, he concludes, the casting vote ought to be in the hands of a man, possessing the confidence of all the states in a great degree, and responsible to no particular one.

In the convention of Pennsylvania, Mr. Wilson, in answer to the fears of some as to the independence of senators, says: “In the system before you, the senators, sir, those tyrants that are to devour the legislatures of the states, are to be chosen by the state legislatures themselves. Need any thing more be said on this subject? So far is the principle of each state's retaining the power of self-preservation, from being weakened or endangered by the general government, that the convention went further, perhaps, than was strictly proper, in order to secure it; for in this second branch of the legislature, each state, without regard to its imporhe says: on, tance, is entitled to an equal vote." Further truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not the states only, but the people also shall be here represented." Again: "States now exist and others will come into existence; it was thought proper that they should be represented in the general government."

،، The

is practically to give the legislatures a power to recall | side. First, because states are represented as such, in their senators, as instructions may always be given, their sovereign capacity; and apart from general reprewhich must be disobeyed by an honest man." Such could sentative principles, their ambassadorial character renot be given by an honest man. This supposes a ma-quires obedience. Secondly, because small districts elect jority of each legislature always dishonest, and ready to for vast regions in England, and here power is equally pass dishonest instructions, not to effect legislation, but distributed, for the avowed purpose of equal represen merely to eject an honest senator. What could induce tation and protection. And thirdly, because in England this? only one could take the place, and the rest must a member of the House of Commons has no constitube prostrated, unless the people too be dishonest. A tional right of resignation; it is prohibited; and by our new election would place honest men in power, they rule, he must there obey in all cases. would give honest instructions to the dishonest senator, and by our rule he must obey and honest measures pre-of Parliament ought to obey if they represented sepavail, or give place to an honest man. So that the rule is likely to work as much good as harm in any contingency, unless honest men are necessarily corrupt state legislators, or a dishonest man an honest senator, or the people thoroughly corrupt. If the latter is true, unless we could find an honest king, we must be con-gress and the diet of the United Provinces.* MR. tent with a corrupt government.

As to the first, even Blackstone admits that members

rate communities, and did not serve for the whole realm. He says, "every member is chosen for the whole, and hence is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, to consult his particular constituents." But here they are elected for states, by analogy to the old con

HAMILTON says in the Federalist, (No. 9,) "The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves to their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. MR. MADISON says, in No. 45, “The state governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government." MR. LanSING, who had been a member of the federal convention, said in the New York convention, "I believe it was undoubtedly the intention of the framers of this constitu

In his former letter the Judge complained that there was no mention of this right in the constitution,* and now declares that "not a syllable can be found any where from any body which hints at this right." I trust this popular periodical now bears many syllables from high authority having an “awful squinting” that way, and visible to the naked eye. But there is still higher evidence, not only of the knowledge of this right by our ancestors, but of the high value and sanctity of it in their estimation. It was incorporated into the first Virginia bill of rights, thence copied verbatim by the Virginia convention on the federal constitution, in a billtion to make the lower house the proper, peculiar repre of rights which that body proposed to attach to the federal constitution, and copied again verbatim in the recommendations of amendments by the North Carolina convention on the constitution.†

JUDGE HOPKINSON "has not referred to the opinions of MR. BURKE, because the argument stands here on a different and stronger ground." Yes, stronger-on our

sentative of the interests of the people—the senate of the sovereignty of the states." For this reason he wished a power of recall to make them more dependent upon their states, "of whose independence it was designed by the plan that they should be the bulwark, and check to the encroachments of the general government." Mr. SMITH, in the same convention, was also very apprehensive of senatorial disobedience, and advocated Mr. Lansing's amendment. He says, "with respect to the

Such were the opinions of those who "assisted in framing the government;" but the idea now is, that senators represent and protect, not their own states, but the whole union, even in oppo-second part of the amendment, I would observe, that sition to the interest or safety, and expressed wishes of their

as the senators are the representatives of the state legislo tures, it is reasonable and proper that they should be under their control. When a state sends an agent commissioned to transact' any business, or perform any service, it certainly ought to have a power to recall him." I presume this authority, with that in a previous note, will sufficiently establish this point.

II. As to the second reason, it received sufficient consideration in my former number.†

"In Switzerland and Holland the different parties (states) send deputies, commissioned and instructed by themselves, who debate, but have no other power than what is conferred only by the people, or may be subsequently given." (Harrington, Oceana, 51.) This bears a close resemblance to the powers of the old congress.

Judge Hopkinson is against all instructions, but thinks his reasoning stronger in the case of senators, because the right is not reserved. I am for all instructions, and especially those to senators, because of their character as ambassadors, represent

In Virginia convention on the federal constitution, Friday, 27th June, 1788, Mr. Wythe, from the committee on amendments, reported the Virginia bill of rights, with this preamble, "That there be a bill of rights asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and unalienable rights of the people, in some such manner as the following. (Here follows the bill, including the fifteenth article.) The same clause, with others, was carried in the North Carolina convention, by a vote of 184 to $4, the mi-ing sovereignty, and because it is a reserved state right, secured nority objecting to other clauses. This proves that the right was known and valued, as a natural and unalienable right of the people, and of course the states when constituents, and considered a different thing from consultation, petition, advice or remonstrance. Every freeman may petition or remonstrate, but the people must

instruct.

by our international compact, in which all is reserved which is not given, and in which a representation of sovereignties, as such, was insisted upon and yielded. But even as to popular instructions, the case is much stronger here than in England, for reasons intimated in my last. Let us see how it has stood there, long before the reform bill, and long before the American

III. If any thing could render a relaxation of our | their constitution which will not permit resignation. rule tolerable in England, it would be that feature of As that constitution "will not intend a wrong," it must suppose constituents utterly incapable of giving instrucrevolution brought up all the questions of representation and tions "which no honest man can obey”—and it must taxation for discussion and decision. In the most ancient times, hold a member entirely irresponsible, morally and lewhen the connection between vassal and lord was very close,gally, for a vote in obedience to them. Such is the and the vassal had little to which the lord could not lay claim, fact, and this arrangement prevents that possibility of the commons were considered as represented in the commune concilium, by the lords and great barons under whom they held; the defeat of their wishes by resignation, which the but the king's tenants in capite, holding immediately from the judge so much deprecates, and which he sets up as a crown, could not be considered, by the most liberal construction, reason or excuse for wilful disobedience. This absence as thus represented, and they were therefore admitted into parlia of a constitutional privilege of resignation renders memment, in propria persona, in their own right. When these became too numerous thus to be admitted, they of their own accord, bers, when once elected, indebted entirely to the courto avoid inconvenience, appeared by proxy. As the towns, cities, tesy of the crown for their escape from their seats when and boroughs began to receive incorporations, to grow in im- disagreeable. Another feature of their constitution portance and wealth, especially personal property, an aliquot makes the acceptance of office under the crown, (except part of which was always granted, they too being unrepresented a few offices of state) ipso facto vacate a seat in parliaby the lords, were required to send proxies; and it was subsequently extended to knights for the shires, as the feudal fetters ment. Hence we often hear of gentlemen's accepting wore away. These proxies had no power but that conferred by the Chiltern Hundreds.* their constituents. (See Pettyt's Antient Right of the Commons of England, p. 14; 1 Gordon's History of Parliament, 215)-past the crown has oftener been misled; and we must conclude (Lex Parliamentaria, 113 and 117. "And Note, If any new that it was more apt to be misled in future, than we can suppose project was proposed in Parliament for raising subsidies or sup- the people to be." (See Com. Debates VIII, pp. 172, 183. The plies, the commons usually replied thereto that they were not whole debate might be read with advantage by many modern instructed by their principals in that matter, or that they durst republicans.) Here, whatever right the crown had to control not consent to such tax, &c. without conference with their coun- parliament, is vested in the legislatures as to senators, and the tries." "And Note, Blackstone (Book I, 168) says, a member of people as to legislatures, as they are sovereigns; hence, whe the house of commons cannot vote by proxy, because "he is him-ther whig or tory rule prevails, we ought to have the right of self but a prory of a multitude of other people." Representation in the Parliament of Scotland went through a similar process. (See Lord Somers' Tracts, vol. 12, p. 610.) In the seventh parliament of the reign of James the First of Scotland, (1427) "the small barons were allowed to send commissioners, and were charged with the fees of their deputies," and this was the first instance of elective members to the Scottish parliament.

In Burgh's Political Disquisitions, (London, 1774) the American doctrine in its most rigorous extent is found applied in full vigor to members of parliament, and sustained by an abundant series of precedents from the earliest times, and quotations of the strongest language from members of Parliament in sustaining the duty of obedience, and the advice and opinions of the best English authors, to the same purport. (See vol. I, from p. 180 to 205-many instances of instruction and obedience against the sentiments of the representative, a few of which are in Mr. Leigh's report of 1812.)

instruction.

The immortal Sidney, in his discourses on government, goes to the full extent of our present doctrines. "Many in all ages, and sometimes the whole body of the commons, have refused to give their opinion in some cases till they had consulted with those that sent them; the houses have been often adjourned to give them time to do it; and if this were done more frequently, or that the towns, cities and counties had on some occasions given instructions to their deputies, matters would probably have gone better in parliament than they have often done." He seems satisfied with subsequent rejection as sufficient punishment for violation of duty, but does not hence infer that there are no duties. "Whensoever any of them has the misfortune not to satisfy the major part of those that chose him, he is sure to be rejected with disgrace the next time he shall desire to be chosen. This is not only a sufficient punishment of such faults, as he who is one of five hundred may probably commit, but as much as the greatest and freest people of the world did ever inflict upon their command

Government, section 38.) This rejection from office is the only punishment provided by our constitution in cases of impeachment of the highest officers.

Quotations might be multiplied, but "this little taste shall suf fice." It must be remembered that these doctrines prevailed under a constitution which allowed of no resignation, and where

In the Irish parliament, which met in November 1767, there was scarcely a town or county which had not instructed its rep-ers that brought the greatest losses upon them." (Discourses on resentative to vote in favor of a limitation of their parliaments to seven years; and so eager were they, that all required the most positive assurances, and some even exacted an oath from their members to vote for the bill. The bill was passed, and its subsequent history affords a curious instance of legislative cunning and popular firmness. (See London Magazine, 1768, p. 131.) In the session of 1733-4, (An. 7, Geo. II) Sir William Wynd-fifty-six members (or about a ninth part of the English repreham, in the house of commons, in a speech on Mr. Bromley's sentation) were elected by only three hundred and sixty-four motion for repealing the septennial act, said of an opinion of votes--where one man sent a representative from Sarum, and Mr. Willes, (afterwards chief justice) of a character very simi- one from Newton, and two sent one from Marlborough--and the lar to that advanced by Judge Hopkinson, (to wit: "After we elective franchise was so unequally and unjustly distributed, are chosen, and have taken our seats in this house, we have no that parliament never truly represented the wealth, population, longer any dependance upon our electors, at least so far as re- or wishes of all England, or any section, or even a single elec. gards our behavior here; their whole power is then devolved tion district, or any class of persons or property, unless the repupon us, and we are in every question to regard only the public resentatives of the single freeholders of Newton and Sarum good in general, and to determine according to our own judg-constituted an exception! When our "novel doctrine, conjured ment. If we do not-if we are to depend upon our representatives, and to follow blindly the instructions they send us, we can. not be said to act freely, nor can such parliaments be called free parliaments. Such a dependance would be more dangerous than a dependance upon the crown")—that it was "not only a new doctrine, but it was the most monstrous, the most slavish doctrine that ever was heard, and such a doctrine as he hoped no man would ever dare to support within those walls. He was *"A member when duly elected, is not only compelled to serve persuaded that the learned gentleman did not mean what the in parliament, but he cannot at any future period either resign words he happened to use seemed to import-for though the his seat or be expelled from the house except by some legal dispeople of a county, city or borough may be misled, and may be qualification. In order, therefore, to meet the views of those induced to give instructions which are contrary to the true inter-members who may wish to resign their seats, it has been the est of their country, yet he hoped he would allow that in times practice, ever since the year 1750, for such members to accept

up for party purposes," has prevailed there time out of mind, who shall deny its propriety here? Lords have proxies, and may instruct them, though the absent principals may be gamb ling in Brussels, or revelling in Parisian debauchery, and nei. ther hear or read the debates; shall that be denied to the majes ty of the people which is yielded to the dignity of a half fledged lordling, sunk in vices which disgrace the human character?

In England no one seems to have objected to this | pected of him. All they asked was, in a question of right, that it cannot be enforced, or disobedient delegates expediency, that he would substitute their judgment punished, although there, delegates may alter or refuse to alter the constitution itself, in despite of their constituents-still less is the want of power to recall, or the length of term urged against it. If this last was a sound reason, then it would follow that members of the old parliaments were bound to obey, but not those elected since the septennial act! That is, the stronger the reason for the right the weaker it becomes, which militates against every principle of British law.

The sublime and eloquent BURKE appeared before the electors of Bristol in all the proud consciousness of lofty virtue and commanding intellect. But strip his arguments of the gilded cloud of drapery flung around them by the magic of his fancy, and his sophistry, naked, unadorned, loses half its force by losing all its beauty.* The most powerful and legitimate argument he uses, applies only to the expediency of disobedience in that particular case, and if his facts were correct, ought to have excused him, if such an offence can ever be excused. "Was I not to foresee, or foreseeing, was I not to endeavor to save you from all these multiplied mischiefs and disgraces." He then artfully asks, if the “little, silly canvass prattle of obedience to instructions would save them from the 'pelting of the pitiless storm."" Thus presenting them only the awful alternatives of destruction or disobedience, and appealing to subsequent developements to prove that disobedience was their preservation. By placing it in this position, he ventures to ridicule instructions. His next best argument also applied only to special cases. He appeals to "near two years tranquillity” to prove that "the late horrible spirit was in a great measure the effect of insidious art, and perverse industry, and gross misrepresentation." In a word, any thing but the deliberate sense of the people. From this it seems the people ought not to be tranquil under insult, or their deliberate will may be mistaken for a "fashionable gale." After thus fortifying himself by all the strength which his ingenuity and eloquence could give to his own peculiar position, he ventures to fire his gilded shot at the sacred citadel. He contends that if the "dislike had been much more deliberate, and much more general than it was," he ought not to make the "opinions of the greatest multitudes the masters of his conscience," unless they were the standard of rectitude," which was not ex

66

the office of steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, which being an appointment under the crown, their seats are of necessity va cated. The office, however, is a merely nominal one. The stewards who accept it desire neither honor nor emolument from it, the only salary attached to the appointment being twenty shillings a year. The Chiltern Hundreds are districts in Buckinghamshire belonging to the crown. The appointment to the office of the steward of these Hundreds is vested in the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, as a matter of course, grants it to every member who applies for it."-Random Recollections of the House of Commons.

"On the 2d of March, 1623, (!) it is agreed, That a man, after he is duly chosen, cannot relinquish."

See this and other precedents, and the reasons for the principle on which this part of the parliamentary constitution stands, collected in "Volume II of Hatsell's Proceedings and Precedents in the House of Commons." The rule is firmly established, but thus easily evaded when inconvenient.

for his own. He doubts if "Omnipotence itself can alter the essential constitution of right and wrong," much less such things as his constituents and himself. This was pretty gilding for their chains merely. They never attempted to alter the constitution of right and wrong, but to judge the one from the other; and the question was not between them and Omnipotence, but the electors of Bristol and the "sublime and beautiful” BURKE.

He next contends that the delegate owes his judg ment as well as his exertions to his constituents—which is true-and the debt is paid when they ask to set aside his judgment for theirs. He admits the delegate should sacrifice his will to his constituents, but that government is a matter of judgment and of reason—not of inclination; and asks, “What sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion-one set of men deliberate, and another decide-and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?" I might ask what sort of a will is this conceded, which is never to prevail? Can there be no reason or judgment—no discussion-no deliberation—no arguments out of parliament? Can the people neither talk, or think, or read? This argument wholly falls, when the instructions are given, after both popular and parliamentary discussion has spread all the light upon the subject through the country.

Now what remains of MR. BURKE's great defence of disobedience? His arguments all go to expediency in particular cases, and not the right, when stript of the difficulties he throws around its exercise. Take him from his position, and strip him of his gorgeous and dazzling armor, and he must stand a pigmy confessed before all, as he was before the electors of BRISTOL

JUDGE HOPKINSON finds fault with MR. TYLER for resignation. "He had sworn to support and defend the constitution against wrong from any quarter,” and he violated his duty and his oath, it seems, by resigning. "Where is the difference," he indignantly exclaims, "between the sentinel who turns his own arms upon the citadel he was bound to defend, and one who gives up his trust to the enemy, that he may do the work of ruin which the conscience of the latter forbids." The difference is rather between the sentinel who, being ordered to shoot a traitor brother from the battlements, turns and kills his commander-and one who, with the same orders, retires with leave from the service, and suffers another to do what affection for a brother, or perhaps participation in his designs, will not permit him to accomplish.

This new theory makes every resigning senator res ponsible for all (or none) of the unconstitutional acts of his successor. MR. TYLER must bear MR. RIVES' expunging sins, to avoid which he resigned; MR. Leigh must suffer if his successor establishes a bank or other form of monarchy; MR. TAZEWELL is responsible for MR. RIVES' vote on the force bill, and Mr. Rives for MR. LEIGH's vote censuring the President, to escape which he resigned. Political parties have been censu ring the wrong men. This new light, like an ignis

"And vice itself loses half its evil by losing all its gross-fatuus, will lead them into a direction opposite to the ness."[Reflections on the French Revolution.] one they wish to pursuc. The incumbent is never res

ponsible when his predecessor has resigned. Resigna- | election, which the stupid constitution has put it into tion in a senator is at all times as criminal as desertion of his post by a sentinel, and when he is succeeded by a senator of different opinions (which he cannot prevent) it is equivalent to treason. To what a labyrinth of error are we led, by forcing reason to follow a foregone conclusion?

their power to make, without the guardian care and saving disobedience of some kind senator to protect us from their rashness. The more the Judge exaggerates the crime, the less worthy he makes the guardian; the more frequent the offence, the less infallible the senatorial wisdom and virtue. If senators commit these high crimes, they ought to be controlled by the ordinary guardians of the state-the legislature. We have now had this crime committed by a senator of each party in each manner, and promised by a third. Mr. R. resigned when first instructed by this wicked majority, and Messrs. Tyler and Leigh obeyed. The second time MR. TYLER resigned, and MR. LEIGH promised to resign, and MR. RIVES obeyed. When senators thus differ, what has become of the firmness and guardian care and infallibility which was to protect us? Which shall we follow? One or other of the two has in every instance,

Let us examine it. Because senators are sworn to protect and defend the constitution, if they quit their posts and thus make room for another who may, or certainly will violate it, they themselves violate their oaths, their duty and the constitution. These are Judge H.'s premises. But Mr. Tyler's resignation was of such a character, therefore he violated the constitution. But any senator who will ever violate that instrument is not a fit guardian for it, and ought instantly to resign. Mr. Tyler did so, therefore he ought to have resigned. Then his resignation was right because it was wrong! Again. Mr. T. violated the constitution by resign-by this theory, violated the constitution. How shall ing-not by the act itself, but by enabling Mr. Rives to do it; but the guilt could only be incurred by one person, by one vote, and as Mr. T. had clearly incurred the guilt by a previous act, Mr. R. was innocent. But if Mr. R. did not violate the constitution, and Mr. T.'s guilt depended upon that, he too is innocent, and there was no violation because there was a violation! But any reasoning which makes a man both right and wrong, or the constitution not violated because it is violated, must be intelligible and acceptable to those who make two persons who come to "opposite conclusions upon the same case" both right, and only infer from the dif-lature becomes and must continue knaves or fools. It ference that some one else is wrong!

we act? They are right and we are wrong, but how can we avail ourselves of the superior wisdom they have developed? What complexity—what difficulty—what a mass of error and confusion in the legislatures-what a waste of inexplicable and incongruous wisdom on the part of senators! Oh that our short-sighted ancestors had so ordered it that the guardian should instruct the ward, instead of the reverse!

This doctrine of non-resignation for fear a successor should violate the constitution, assumes that immediately after a senatorial election, a majority of each legis

operates with much more force against a new election than instructions. It proves that senators ought to hold office for life; that all legislatures after the first have been incompetent, and all to come will be incom

Who shall be impeached-who punished under this new doctrine? Resignation is not unconstitutional, but is made criminal by an ex post facto act. As the subsequent acts could not be committed without the resig-petent, from want of honesty and discretion to elect nation, all the guilt attaches to the resigning member. senators. But as it is admitted by all to be the best Neither MR. RIVES or MR. LEIGH can thus commit any body for that purpose, and was selected as such by the sin in propria persona. MR. TYLER Sins in Mr. RIVES, convention, it follows that no body, since the first senate and MR. RIVES is responsible, not for his own acts, but perhaps, ever has been or can be competent to elect those of MR. LEIGH. This is a roundabout responsi- senators. The state legislatures can only be incompebility with a vengeance, which makes no one responsi-tent because the people want honesty or capacity enough ble until he resigns, and is beyond the reach of im- to elect men capable of electing senators. A fortiori are peachment.

they not sufficiently honest or capable to elect presidenBut upon the Judge's own grounds, what better argu- tial electors, or the house of representatives, which are ment could be offered against senatorial infallibility, even more important. The government must lapse than this violation of the constitution by Mr. Tazewell, into anarchy because there is not sufficient honesty or Mr. R. and Mr. T. and the promise to violate it by capacity in it to govern it. And it must continue so, MR. LEIGH? Four successive guardians of the state because an ignorant and corrupt people without a gohave betrayed their trust. They have deserted their vernment cannot better their condition. Nor can any posts, and left the constitution at the mercy of the legis-form of hereditary government be established, because latures, as "a rag floating upon the winds." What it is absurd to say that chance is a better guide than the can the legislatures do when thus left unchecked, un- simplest reason; and where the wisdom of all combined guarded, and the constitution a prey "to wild demo-is not sufficient, it is absurd to look for greater wisdom cracy?" The high criminality of the senators is enhanced by the fact that he is instructed by "a majority of six or eight out of one or two hundred, and he knows a large proportion of the majority to be men of little knowledge, of strong passions and prejudices, with a servile adherence to party purposes-men whom he would not regard in any concern of his own of the value of a dollar," and in the minority he knows all to be eminent statesmen. Of what a stupendous violation of duty are these men guilty? They leave the state and the statesmen a prey to these vile demagogues in a new

in a few or in one. Thus it seems to me that a denial of the right of instruction is not only inconsistent with a representative government, but the reasons on which it is founded are inconsistent with any government.

MR. TYLER admits our principle and says he would obey, but for constitutional scruples, but having these he resigns. This seems a simple, intelligible, respectful course; but Judge H. "whose political metaphysics surpass my understanding," loses himself in a labyrinth of doubt and obscurity. He says in effect "I will do as I please," makes the matter simple enough. All des