Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third Wave View
In this jointly authored book, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein defend the controversial thesis that phenomenal consciousness is realised by more than just the brain. They argue that the mechanisms and processes that realise phenomenal consciousness can at times extend across brain, body, and the social, material, and cultural world. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein offer a state-of-the-art tour of current arguments for and against extended consciousness. They aim to persuade you that it is possible to develop and defend the thesis of extended consciousness through the increasingly influential predictive processing theory developed in cognitive neuroscience. They show how predictive processing can be given a new reading as part of a third-wave account of the extended mind.
The third-wave claims that the boundaries of mind are not fixed and stable but fragile and hard-won, and always open to negotiation. It calls into question any separation of the biological from the social and cultural when thinking about the boundaries of the mind. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein show how this account of the mind finds support in predictive processing, leading them to a view of phenomenal consciousness as partially realised by patterns of cultural practice.
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First, we identify an “external” element taken to perform a functional role in
intelligent behaviour. Second, we imagine a scenario in which the same
functional role is realised by an “internal” mechanism. Finally, we ask the
question, should we ...
argue that such a functional difference militates against treating extended and
internal cognitive processes as different realisations or occupants of the same
functional or causal role. A sticking point in the debate has thus been settling on
It stresses different but complementary functional properties, whereas the first
wave insists on similarity in functional properties. Props and artefacts have
different formats: dynamical properties and functions as compared to internal,
External representational systems do not make a similar functional contribution to
that of internal neural processes. They bring about cognitive transformation
precisely because their integration yields a “different kind of functionality” that can
one hand, stressing the transformation that cognitive integration brings about and
, on the other hand, maintaining that internal and external elements make
different but complementary functional contributions. The latter idea of
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From extended mind to extended consciousness?
Extended dynamic singularities models processes
Flexible and openended boundaries Markov blankets
a role for cultural practice