us to transport general commodities, which would include shipments of department and specialty stores. Such carriers probably do not serve the entire territory served by the applicant or render all the incidental services provided by it to the department stores and large specialty shops; nevertheless, to some extent, they are competitors of the applicant. To require the applicant to file copies of all of its contracts with the Commission would not prove detrimental to its interests or of those of other parties to such contracts, since under the provisions of section 220 (a) such contracts may not be made public, except in certain circumstances as provided in that section.

As the evidence fails to warrant any relief from compliance with the orders in Filing of Contracts by Contract Carriers, supra, the application to the extent it seeks such relief will be denied.

With respect to the application for relief from filing schedules containing minimum rates or charges, the contentions and argument of the Philadelphia company are substantially the same as those previously considered in connection with the application for relief from filing contracts. All but 15 of the 112 effective contracts are with small specialty shops and provide a definite rate basis. As to these contracts, no sound reason has been advanced why schedules containing the minimum rates and charges actually maintained and charged should not be filed with us as required, and applicant has no objection to filing such schedules. Furthermore, if the contracts with the 4 department stores and 11 large specialty shops are revised so as to show the carrier's actual rates or charges or to provide some definite formula by which charges can be determined, there is no sound reason why schedules containing minimum rates or charges actually maintained and charged applying to such revised contracts should not also be filed.

In our opinion, it would not be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy to grant the applicant any relief from filing schedules containing the minimum rates and charges actually maintained and charged, and accordingly the application to the extent it seeks such relief will be denied.

Pursuant to section 220 of the act, the Commission, by order entered November 29, 1937, as amended, prescribed the uniform system of accounts for class I common or contract motor carriers of property subject to the provisions of the act, and required the carriers to keep all accounts in conformity therewith, effective January 1, 1938. By order entered August 1, 1938, the Commission required all class I common or contract motor carriers of property, subject to the provisions of section 220 of the act, to file quarterly reports of revenues, expenses, and other statistics within 30 days after the close of the periods to which they relate. As previously stated, pursuant to the application

filed by the New York, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia companies, these were informally granted relief from complying with the requirements until otherwise ordered.

In support of the relief sought, the applicants contend that the filing of quarterly and annual reports and the keeping of accounts in accordance with the uniform system of accounts would be of no value to the Commission, but would place an undue burden and expense on the applicants. The applicants again emphasize their highly specialized service for selected department stores and specialty shops, rendered entirely under contracts, some of which are effective for 5 years. They contend that the service rendered is in effect a part of the operations of the stores themselves, and is in reality competitive only with the service of those stores which render their own delivery service within the same general territory.

The conclusion previously expressed herein, that the specialized character of the service of contract carriers affords no adequate basis for relief from complying with the provisions of the statute or the orders such as those entered in Filing of Contracts by Contract Carriers, supra, applies with equal force where, as here, applicants seek relief from the requirements relating to the filing of annual and quarterly reports and to the keeping of accounts in accordance with the uniform system of accounts. Our reasons for that conclusion have been previously stated. Most of the applicants' effective contracts are not with department stores but with small specialty shops, of which few, if any, operated delivery departments. We do not find that the applicants act as the delivery departments of such shops or that the service is in effect a part of the operation of the shops themselves.

Another reason urged by applicants is that much of the information called for in annual and quarterly reports is essentially part of the confidential financial data of the stores and shops served, and that not only applicants but also the stores and shops desire that this information remain confidential, undisclosed to the public, and particularly to competing stores with their own delivery service who file no report with us. Applicants appear to be unduly apprehensive, as the information they are required to furnish covers their operations as a whole, and does not reflect data of the individual stores or shops.

The accounting systems at present maintained by the applicants are designed to meet the particular needs of their businesses. The systems have approximately 134 accounts covering specific classifications. Some of the classifications are similar to those prescribed in the uniform system of accounts. It would not be difficult for the applicants to coordinate their accounting systems with that prescribed in the uniform system of accounts, although it would require added time and effort.

By the provisions in section 204 (a) (7) of the act, Congress specifically directed the Commission to keep itself informed of the operations of carriers subject to its jurisdiction. If the continuation of the exemption is granted, the Commission will be without valuable information concerning the applicant's operations. The evidence presented herein fails to warrant the continuation of the exemption granted to the applicants, and accordingly the application will be denied.

In No. MC-C-383 we find that the relief from the provisions of section 218 (a) of the act would not be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy. We further find that the evidence fails to warrant any relief from the requirements of the orders in Filing of Contracts by Contract Carriers, supra. The application will be denied.

In No. MC-C-388 we find that the evidence presented fails to warrant the continuation of the exemption granted the applicants from the requirements relating to the filing of annual and quarterly reports and to the keeping of accounts in accordance with the uniform system of accounts prescribed for class I motor carriers of property. The application will be denied, effective January 1, 1945. The effective date has been fixed sufficiently in the future so as to enable the applicants to comply with the requirements without placing any undue burden upon them. Pending the filing of quarterly and annual reports with us as required, they will be expected to file with us a copy of such reports as they at present file with the State regulatory authorities. An appropriate order will be entered.

43 M. C. C.

581984-45-vol. 43- -46

No. MC-17711

THE CONSOLIDATED CARTAGE & STORAGE COMPANY ET AL. DUAL OPERATIONS

Submitted March 16, 1944. Decided July 27, 1944

1. Holding of a permit by The Superior Transfer Company, a Delaware corporation, and the holding of certificates by The Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Highway, Inc., and Motor Express, Inc., an Ohio corporation, to the extent that dual operations in the same territory are involved, found inconsistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy. These respondents given certain elections for removal of objections to holding dual authority.

2. Proceeding in respect of other respondents discontinued.

Paul E. Hergenroeder for respondents other than Akron Parcel Delivery, Inc., and G. H. Dilla for Akron Parcel Delivery, Inc. W. E. Hanley and F. C. Culkin for interveners.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 5, COMMISSIONERS LEE, ROGERS, AND PATTERSON

BY DIVISION 5:

No exceptions were filed to the order recommended by the examiner but it was stayed by us. Our conclusions differ somewhat from those

recommended.

This is an investigation instituted on our own motion for the purpose of determining whether the holding of permits by Akron Parcel Delivery, Inc., of Akron, Ohio, and by The Superior Transfer Company, a Delaware Corporation, of Toledo, Ohio, hereinafter called Parcel Delivery and Superior (Delaware), respectively, and the holding of certificates of public convenience and necessity by The Consolidated Cartage & Storage Company, a corporation, of Cleveland, Ohio, by Daniel Creedon & Sons Trucking Company, a corporation, of Cicero, Ill., by Buffalo Delivery, Inc., of Buffalo, N. Y., by Detroit

1 This proceeding also embraces No. MC-1772, Daniel Creedon & Sons Trucking Company, a corporation; No. MC-1773, Buffalo Delivery, Inc.; No. MC-1774, Detroit Delivery, Inc.; No. MC-1775, Akron Parcel Delivery, Inc.; No. MC-1776, The Superior Transfer Company, and Ohio Corporation; No. MC-1777, The Superior Transfer Company, a Delaware Corporation; No. MC-1778, Motor Express, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation; Nos. MC-3419 and MC-3419 (Sub-No. 1), The Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Highway, Inc.; Nos. MC-3420 and MC-3420 (Sub-No. 1), Motor Express, Inc., an Ohio Corporation; and Nos. MC-28813, MC-28813 (Sub-No. 1), MC-28813 (Sub-No. 2), MĊ-28813 (Sub-No. 6), and MC-28813 (Sub-No. 7), Motor Express, Inc., of Indiana.

Delivery, Inc., of Detroit, Mich., by The Superior Transfer Company, an Ohio corporation of Cleveland, by Motor Express, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, of Chicago, Ill., by The Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati Highway, Inc., of Cleveland, hereinafter called C. C. & C., by Motor Express, Inc., an Ohio corporation of Cleveland, hereinafter called Motor Express (Ohio), and by Motor Express, Inc., of Indiana, of Indianapolis, Ind., results or will result in dual operations by carriers under a common control, and, if so, whether such permits and certificates, under section 210 of the Interstate Commerce Act, may be held consistently with the public interest and the national transportation policy. Rail carriers and a motor carrier intervened but offered no evidence.

All of the respondents, except Parcel Delivery, are controlled by U. S. Truck Lines, Inc., of Delaware. All of the outstanding stock of Parcel Delivery, which at one time was owned by Superior (Delaware), all of the stock of which is owned by U. S. Truck Lines, Inc., was sold and transferred in August 1936, to one H. B. Kurtz, who is neither a motor carrier nor connected with any motor carrier. On November 20, 1943, Parcel Delivery filed a petition setting forth the facts relative to the change in ownership of its stock and requesting deletion of its name as a respondent herein. In view of the foregoing, no further action in the involved matter is required in so far as Parcel Delivery is concerned. The term "respondents" as hereinafter used will exclude this carrier.

The sole question to be determined here arises under section 210 of the act which provides:

Unless, for good cause, shown, the Commission shall find, or shall have found, that both a certificate and a permit may be so held consistently with the public interest and with the national transportation policy declared in this Act

(1) no person, or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such person, shall hold a certificate as a common carrier authoriz ing operation for the transportation of property by motor vehicle over a route or within a territory, if such person, or any such controlling person, controlled person, or person under common control, holds a permit as a contract carrier authorizing operation for the transportation of property by motor vehicle over the same route or within the same territory; and

(2) no person, or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such person, shall hold a permit as a contract carrier authorizing operation for the transportation of property by motor vehicle over a route or within a territory, if such person, or any such controlling person, controlled person, or person under common control, holds a certificate as a common carrier authorizing operation for the transportation of property by motor vehicle over the same route or within the same territory.

The term "person" as used in part II of the act, means any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, or joint