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ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

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Lovell, James A., Commander of Apollo 13.
Lunney, Glynn S., Apollo 13 Mission Director_
Paine, Thomas O., Administrator, NASA..
Petrone, Rocco A., Apollo Program Director__

Swigert, John L., Jr., Command Module Pilot of Apollo 13.

Figure:

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Electrical power system....

2. Enlarged scale of service module.
3. Cutaway of oxygen tank..

4. Sequence of events.

5. Astronaut photo of damaged area.
6. Description of mission.

7. Summary of events.. 8. Start of problem....... 9. Consumable status. 10. Summary of events. 11. Sequence for entry

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APOLLO 13 MISSION

FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES.

Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 1202, New Senate Office Building, the Honorable Clinton P. Anderson (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Anderson, Symington, Stennis, Young, Holland, Smith of Maine, Curtis, Hatfield, Goldwater, and Saxbe."

James J. Gehrig, staff director; Everard H. Smith, Jr., Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Craig Voorhees, and William Parker, professional staff members; Sam Bouchard, assistant chief clerk; Donald H. Brennan, research assistant; Mary Rita Robbins, Rhea Bruno, Patricia Robinson, Ruby L. Hamblen and Carol L. Wilson, clerical assistants.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Exactly one week ago we were holding our breaths praying for the safe return of Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and John Swigert. Today it is our honor to welcome Captain Lovell and Mr. Swigert to appear before this committee. Unfortunately, Mr. Haise is slightly ill and unable to be with us today.

I wish to convey my heartiest congratulations to the entire NASA organization for the successful return of the Apollo 13 crew. Their performance during a period of great difficulty demonstrated the superb capabilities of the NASA team and of the Apollo system.

Apollo 13 will be considered by some as a failure, because it did not accomplish its objective of a lunar landing and return with new scientific information. But in a real and larger sense, it was a human success-a triumph of the human spirit, an exoneration of the human mind, a tribute to human perseverance, a victory for all mankind. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss with NASA officials the Apollo 13 mission and its problems. We are anxious to learn what happened, and what must be done to reestablish the Apollo launch schedule. Towards this end, we will begin today with testimony from Dr. Thomas O. Paine, Administrator of NASA, then we will hear Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, Apollo Program Director, Mr. Glynn S. Lunney, Apollo 13 Mission Director, and Astronauts Lovell and Swigert.

At a later date, after the review board has completed its investigation and made its recommendations, the committee will meet again with Dr. Paine and other NASA officials to discuss the future of the manned lunar exploration program.

Senator Smith?

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SMITH

Senator SMITH of Maine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join in paying tribute to the astronauts of Apollo 13 for their very great courage and coolness in times of great stress.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the entire NASA team for what I consider one of the greatest achievements made in the space program, for the way initial adversity was turned into dramatic

success.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Paine?

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS 0. PAINE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY ASTRONAUT JAMES A. LOVELL, COMMANDER OF APOLLO 13; ASTRONAUT JOHN L. SWIGERT, JR., COMMAND MODULE PILOT OF APOLLO 13; DR. ROCCO A. PETRONE, APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR; AND GLYNN S. LUNNEY, APOLLO 13 MISSION DIRECTOR

Dr. PAINE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to give you a preliminary report on the Apollo 13 mission, America's fifth lunar expedition and third landing attempt.

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS FOLLOWING ACCIDENT

This morning we will summarize for you our current understanding of:

The accident aboard the spacecraft Odyssey while outward bound for the moon 55 hours and 54 minutes after launch;

The immediate steps taken by flight controllers at Mission Control in Houston and the flight crew to contain the situation; The ensuing 300,000-mile voyage around the moon and back to earth using the lunar module Aquarius as a lifeboat;

The investigative measures which were initiated within NASA immediately after the successful splashdown; and

Our view of the impact of the Apollo 13 accident on the U.S.

space program.

Dr. Rocco Petrone, Director of the Apollo Program, will give you his present best estimate of the principal events prior to and during the accident which apparently led to the rupture of oxygen bottle No. 2 in the service module. The actions taken on the ground to recover from the accident and return the crew safely back to earth will then be described by Mr. Glynn S. Lunney, who was flight director in Mission Control during much of the critical period following the accident. Astronaut James A. Lovell, the commander of Apollo 13, and Astronaut Jack Swigert, the command module pilot, will then describe to you the events that took place in the spacecraft during this period.

We thought it best that Astronaut Fred Haise, the lunar module pilot, not accompany his crewmates here today. As we informed the committee yesterday, the astronauts' physician asked that Mr. Haise

be excused from the trip to Washington to facilitate his prompt recovery from the minor infection he has been suffering from since the flight.

REVIEW BOARD INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT

Before Dr. Petrone begins, I will take a few moments to summarize for you the actions Dr. Low and I have taken to assure a prompt, vigorous, competent, and objective investigation of the causes of the Apollo 13 accident and the effectiveness of the mission recovery actions so that appropriate corrective actions can be taken. Copies of the documents involved are appended to my statement. (See p 52.)

Immediately after the splashdown, Dr. Low and I established an Apollo 13 Review Board chaired by Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, director of NASA's Langley Research Center. Seven members were named to the board-all highly qualified senior individuals from NASA, the Air Force, and AEC who have had no direct responsibilities for Apollo 13. The board's assignment is to make a full and complete investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident to the Apollo 13 spacecraft, to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident, assess the effectiveness of the recovery actions, and recommend appropriate corrective or other actions. The board reports directly to me and Dr. Low, and has been meeting in Houston since Tuesday evening, April 21, delving into every aspect of the accident and recovery. The charge to the board and the memorandum naming its members were forwarded to your committee upon issuance and NASA will continue to keep the committee fully informed as the investigation proceeds.

We also announced immediately after splashdown that we had requested NASA's statutory Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel to review the Apollo 13 Review Board's procedures and its findings when they become available, and to submit an independent report directly to me and Dr. Low. The Chairman of this Panel, Dr. Charles D. Harrington, is president of Douglas-United Nuclear, Inc. The Panel consists of six non-NASA members and one NASA member: Mr. Bruce Lundin, Director of the Lewis Research Center. The Panel met in Washington on Tuesday, April 21, and is carrying out its assignment as the work of the Review Board proceeds.

A third assignment was made to Mr. Dale Myers, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, in two parts: First, his organization will provide all data and technical support required by the Review Board from the three Manned Space Flight Centers and OMSF Headquarters. Secondly, the Manned Space Flight organization will move forward immediately with the required in-depth studies, analyses, and other steps to provide me and Dr. Low with the best possible plans and recommendations for eliminating the problem encountered in Apollo 13 and proceeding with Apollo 14 and future manned space flight missions. This work also got underway at Houston immediately after splashdown.

Thus, findings and recommendations from three sources will be available to help NASA management make timely decisions on the corrective and other measures that should be taken prior to Apollo 14 and subsequent manned flights.

IMPACT ON FUTURE MANNED FLIGHTS

Now let me say a few words on the impact, as we now see it, of the Apollo 13 accident on the future of U.S. manned space flight activities. As Dr. Petrone's presentation will show, we expect that the large quantity and high quality of the telemetered data received from the Apollo 13 spacecraft at the time of the accident will permit a precise and early identification of the causes of the failure. The oxygen thermos flask believed to be involved is a relatively simple component and corrective action should not prove to be a major task. If this turns out to be the case, we should be able to move out promptly with the necessary alterations and proceed with Apollo 14 and subsequent flights on approximately the same schedule we have presented to you before.

I think it is important that your committee understand clearly our view in NASA of the Apollo 13 accident and recovery. The Apollo 13 mission was a failure. We did not succeed in America's third lunar landing attempt, and we were, therefore, unable to explore the moon's Fra Mauro formation. This hilly region remains a high priority objective in our lunar program. Its exploration should add much to our understanding of the moon, its origins, and its relationships to the earth. We cannot yet say which of the remaining Apollo missions will be sent there. Although the Apollo 13 mission failed, we regard the recovery actions that followed the accident as a gatifying success which will contribute greatly to the Nation's space flight competence. The Apollo hardware, the contingency planning, the training of flight and ground crews, and the backup systems for emergency use appear to have demonstrated their flexibility and soundness. However, as I have stated, our charge to the Apollo 13 Review Board includes not only a critical review of the cause or causes of the accident, but also a critical assessment of the effectiveness of the recovery measures taken. We intend to learn everything possible from both the accident. and the safe recovery of Apollo 13.

APOLLO 13 EFFECT ON FUTURE PROGRAMS

Finally, let me state my view as to how the Apollo 13 accident should affect the future of the space program. I see no reason why this setback should be-or should be made to be-the occasion for a major change in the course of the Nation's space program. We have clearly demonstrated the basic soundness of the Apollo system and of our operational procedures with the successful manned flights of Apollos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Since the start of manned space flight, NASA's astronauts have safely flown a total of 70 million miles in space. From a technical standpoint, there is no question but that we are prepared to move forward in the 1970's with the space program we have outlined to you in our previous appearances before you.

I am happy to be able to report that the President fully shares this view. During our flight to Honolulu last Saturday to meet the astronauts, he expressed his strong support for a vigorous on-going U.S. space program, particularly in manned space flight. Worldwide reaction has been the same. Virtually all editorial comment from coast to coast has strongly supported the position that the United States should not respond to this accident by cutting back or lowering its sights in space.

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