SERMON II*.

IN our last discourse we considered the various reasons and inducements, that lead many persons to make a profession of religion, even while they are contradicting it in their lives and practice. To which one more might have been added; and that is, they have a foolish thought that by the good they profess, they shall some way or other expiate the badness of their conduct. Such a hope as this, as fond as it is, too apparently obtains with a great part of the world. And this I mention, not only as a thing too evident, and considerable in itself, but as it most fitly leads to what I intend in this discourse: which is,

IV. To shew the vanity of such a profession, and by consequence the fondness and folly of such a hope as is here spoken of. And in treating on this subject I shall shew, that such a profession in persons of so immoral a character, signifies nothing either to procure them the reputation, or the rewards of the religion that they profess, or unto which they pretend; I would be understood to say, that it is of no avail to entitle them to the reputation of it amongst men, nor to any reward of it from God. These two things we shall distinctly consider.

*Preached January 23, 1680.

1. Such a blasted, self-confuted profession as this, of which we are speaking, is of no significancy for securing the reputatation of being religious amongst men. If it were indeed so far available as to secure them such a reputation, or to procure them that esteem from men, which is due to those who are in reality, what they profess themselves to be, that would be but a poor thing, and very little to their service. It is a small thing, says the apostle St. Paul, to be judged by man's judgment, 1 Cor. 4. 3. All must finally stand or fall, by the judgment of a superior Judge, whose judgment will controul and reverse all false judgments passed before. Every man must then give an account of himself to God. He is not a jew who is one outwardly, but he is a jew that is one inwardly, whose praise is not of men, but of God, Rom. 2. 28, 29. If one could never so effectually recommend one's self to man, it is not he who commendeth himself, that is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth." 2 Cor. 10. 18. And therefore I should not think this much worth insisting on, but only with design to lay the ground of an argument from the less to the greater that if such a profession of religion cannot do that which is less, to wit, entitle one to the reputation of it amongst men; much less can it do that which is greater, that is, procure the rewards, which God has promised to the constant and sincere.

We must understand here, that by such evil practices, as can be supposed to overthrow a profession, and annul the significance of it, cannot be meant such things as are reasonable to be imputed to the infirmities which are incident to the best, and consistent with the most perfect human character: but it must be understood of open hostilities against Christ and his religion; for doubtless the words abominable, and disobedient or unpersuadable, as the word us. signifies, amount to so much. By the former is to be understood, the heinousness, and grossness of their wickedness; and by the latter, their obstinacy in an evil course. It is true, though the last expression the apostle makes use of in describing the persons whom he censures as reprobate to every good work, denotes an evil habit of mind, not always falling under human cognizance and censure; yet there is enough in the two former, besides the symptoms there may be of the latter, to shew what the men really are. A profession therefore, I say, in men of such a character, can signify nothing, even to this lower purpose, that is, to entitle them to the reputation of religion amongst men. And this will appear from being viewed in several lights.

(1.) Such a contradicted profession is not wont to do so in

'other cases. No man can take him to be a friend, who calls himself one against a continued series of actions, which manifestly import habitual hatred, enmity, and malice. No one will call him a good subject, whatever he pretends, who is at present in open hostility against his prince.

(2.) Such a profession in other cases not only gives no reputation amongst men, but brings a disgrace, and casts a reproach upon the person making pretences. When a man's actions are continued, palpable and manifest against his profession, as in this case, it brings, I say, a reproach upon him for pretending to it. And it is so far from being to his reputation that he draws upon himself the suspicion of being either false, or foolish of being false, that he would design to deceive; of being foolish, that he could hope to succeed in such a case, or, indeed, of both these together.

(3.) A mere profession among men, in every common case, is so far from securing reputation to him who makes it, that it even sinks the reputation of the man that credits it. A very judicious person this to be so easily imposed upon! Therefore he who attempts in such a way to impose upon another, either he, upon whom he makes the attempt, will but regard him as a fool; or will be so accounted himself, because it is supposing him to be one who is capable of being so imposed upon. Which is no less than an attempt to blast the reputation of him, whom he endeavours to deceive.

(4.) A series or course of actions is always to be taken as more significant and expressive of the habitual sense and temper of a person's mind, than words can be thought to be. Words only speak a man's present sense of things, but a continued course of actions shews his habitual sense of them; and is therefore the far greater, and more considerable thing on all accounts.

If I am to form a judgment of another man, it is of more importance to know what the bent of his mind is now, than to know what it was, at this or that particular time. It is manifest that a series of actions is more significant and expressive; whether you compare words and actions together with relation to the same thing, or apply them severally to contrary things.

If you apply words and actions to one and the same thing, let it be for instance to kindness and good-will: suppose then you have for your object a very indigent and distressed person, one exposed to cold and pinched with hunger; let one say to him in this case, "Come be filled, be warmed;" pray what would that signify in comparison of giving him the things which are needful for the body, as the apostle speaks in the

same case. Jam. 2. 16. pression, such fair words,

Which is the most significant ex

or such effectual actions?

Again; Let words and actions be applied together to the same thing and to signify ill-will. An unkind word may signify but a sudden passion, and no one will infer habitual hatred from an angry word: but a course of actions may import not only unkindness, but a malicious temper of mind.

Then if we apply these two ways of expressing a man's mind, that is, words and actions, to contraries, the one to signify kindness, the other unkindness; if it be manifest that words are less significant and actions more, surely then that which has less significance in it, is never to be believed against that which has greater. Again,

(5.) No man's words are to be believed against his works. If a man should say and unsay the same things, it may be a hundred times in a day, would you give any credit at all to his words? It is impossible you should. For in any case where I am to exercise human faith, if there be much to be said for and against the thing, I must believe, according to the greater evidence, and cannot do otherwise; I necessarily must take that side in my belief on which the stronger probability lies. But in this case what shall I do? I can here take neither side: for how can a thing be greater or better than itself? I have therefore nothing to do here. I can exercise no faith; for I am not to believe a man's word against his word; when there is equal evidence on the one hand and the other. I am much less to believe his word against his actions, for that would be believing according to the less evidence. And further,

(6.) If a profession were to prevail amongst men, against a series of actions, it would take away the ground and foundations of all public human judgments. For suppose a mau arraigned of murder, the business to be inquired into is, what -evidence there is of malice prepense. This is the matter to be tried. For the bare taking away the life of a man, is not the crime to be punished. But the thing to be inquired into is, what evidence there is, or what inducements to believe that the thing was designed or purposely done. If against plain facts, and apparent circumstances, to the contrary a man's word should be believed, there could then be no such thing as a human judicature in the world.

(7.) Actions cannot be opposed to a mere verbal or a scenical profession, with greater absurdity, in any case whatsoever, than in the matter of religion. You can suppose no case wherein actions can be opposed to actions, and words or a profession to a course of actions with greater absurdity than in this present case. If we were to think of things manifestly absurd,

we could advance nothing that is more so. Suppose, for instance, a person upon a journey should pretend to be in his right road, and he is told he is going a quite contrary way, and one should follow him, from day to day, and still see him going wrong, though he still says he is on his journey and is going right; what can be more absurd? Now let us use our understanding and consider, whether there be not as ridiculous an absurdity in pretending to religion, against a series of actions, which have a contrary tendency. Do we not all know that religion, in the common notion of it, has a tendency to blessedness; even to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever in glory, as the end? Can there be a greater contrariety supposed in any one thing to another, than there is in a course of wickedness to the glorifying and enjoying God? Or can any man think, without as palpable absurdity as is possible in any case, that whoredom, drunkenness and debaucheries of all sorts, are means and instruments for the glorifying God, and saving a man's own soul? To say, I am a christian, is to say, I am going to God, to glorify, to enjoy him for ever. But you can suppose no case wherein contrary actions can be opposed to a profession, with more adsurdity than in this.

(8.) We are expressly forbidden, in the Holy Scriptures, to treat, and behave ourselves towards christians that are only so in name and profession, in the same manner as we are obliged to act towards those that are sincere. We are even directed to turn away from those who have a form of godliness but deny the power of it. 2 Tim. 3, 5. When persons are unpersuadable and obstinate in an evil way and vicious course, and will not hear the church they are to be counted as heathens and publicans, (Matt. 18, 17.) and are not to enjoy the reputation of christians, even amongst men, according to the law and judgment of Christ himself in this very matter.

(9.) And lastly. The common profession of religion, in which they seem to bear a part, suffers by their inconsistent conduct and behaviour; and it is very unreasonable, therefore, they should gain by it. They would gain honour from the profession of Christianity, and yet bring a reproach and scandal upon it. And is it to be supposed that their profession, in such a case, should honour them? They do the greatest indignity imaginable to the worthy name which they profess; nay it is blasphemed by them, and through their means is evil spoken of by others.

But yet it may be said, as to all this; "Are we not then to call such christians as profess themselves to be such? Are we not to give them the name ?" Truly controversies about names are always to little purpose. It is no great matter by what