against the folly of giving up to the enemies of France a hundred and eighty-nine fortified places, in the Low-Countries or in Italy, in return for the three insignificant towns of St. Quintin, Ham, and Catelet. They considered it as an indelible stain upon the glory of the nation, to renounce in one day territories so extensive, and so capable of being defended, that the enemy could not have hoped to wrest them out of their hands, after many years of victory.

But Henry, without regarding the sentiments of his people, or being moved by the remonstrances of his council, ratified the treaty, and executed with great fidelity whatever he had stipulated to perform. The duke of Savoy repaired with a numerous retinue to Paris, in order to celebrate his marriage with Henry's sister. The duke of Alva was sent to the same capital, at the head of a splendid embassy, to espouse Elizabeth in the name of his master. They were received with extraordinary magnificence by the French court. Amidst the rejoicings and festivities on that occasion, Henry's days were cut short by a singular and tragical accident [July 10]. His son, Francis II. a prince under age, of a weak constitution, and of a mind still more feeble, succeeded him. Soon after, Paul ended his violent and imperious pontificate, at enmity with all the world, and disgusted even with his own nephews. They, persecuted by Philip, and deserted by the succeeding pope, whom they had raised by their influence to the papal throne, were condemned to the punishment which their crimes and ambition had merited, and their death was as infamous as their lives had been criminal. Thus most of the personages, who had long sustained the principal characters on the great theatre of Europe disappeared about the same time. A more known period of history opens at this era; other actors enter upon the stage, with different views, as well as different passions; new contests arose, and new schemes of ambition occupied and disquieted mankind.

Up

pon reviewing the transactions of any active period, in the history of civilized nations, the changes which are accomplished appear wonderfully disproportioned to the efforts which have been exerted. Conquests are never very extensive or rapid, but among nations whose progress in improvement is extremely unequal. When Alexander the Great, at the head of a gallant people, of simple manners, and formed to war by admirable military institutions, invaded a state sunk in luxury, and enervated by excessive refinement; when Ghenchizcan and Tamerlane, with their armies of hardy barbarians, poured in upon nations, enfeebled by the climate in which they lived, or by the arts and commerce which they cultivated, these conquerors, like a torrent, swept every thing before them, subduing kingdoms and provinces in as short a space of time as was requisite to march through them. But when nations are in a state similar to each other, and keep equal pace in their advances towards refinement, they are not exposed to the calamity of sudden conquests. Their acquisitions of knowledge, their progress in the art of war, their political sagacity and address, are nearly equal. The fate of states in this situation, depends not on a single battle. Their internal resources are many and various. Nor are they themselves alone interested in their own safety, or active in their own defence. Other states interpose, and balance any temporary advantage which either party may have acquired. After the fiercest and most lengthened contest, all the rival nations are exhausted, none are conquered. At length they find it necessary to conclude a peace, which restores to each almost the same power and the same territories of which they were formerly in possession.

Such was the state of Europe during the reign of Charles V. No prince was so much superior to the rest in power, as to render his efforts irresistible, and his conquests easy. No nation had made progress in improve

ment so far beyond its neighbours, as to have acquired a very manifest pre-eminence. Each state derived some advantage, or was subject to some inconvenience from its situation or its climate; each was distinguished by something peculiar in the genius of its people, or the constitution of its government. But the advantages possessed by one state, were counterbalanced by circumstances favourable to others; and this prevented any from attaining such superiority as might have been fatal to all. The nations of Europe in that age, as in the present, were like one great family; there were some features common to all, which fixed a resemblance; there were certain peculiarities conspicuous in each, which marked a distinction. But there was not among them that wide diversity of character and of genius which, in almost every period of history, hath exalted the Europeans above the inhabitants of the other quarters of the globe, and seems to have destined the one to rule, and the other to obey.

But though the near resemblance and equality in improvement among the different nations of Europe prevented the reign of Charles V. from being distinguished by such sudden and extensive conquests as occur in some other periods of history, yet, during the course of his administration, all the considerable states in Europe suffered a remarkable change in their political situation, and felt the influence of events, which have not hitherto spent their force, but still continue to operate in a greater or in a less degree. It was during his reign, and in consequence of the perpetual efforts to which his enterprising ambition roused him, that the different kingdoms of Europe acquired internal vigour; that they discerned the resources of which they were possessed; that they came both to feel their own strength, and to know how to make it formidable to others. It was during his reign, too, that the different kingdoms of Europe, which in former times seemed frequently to act as if they had been single and disjoined, became so thoroughly acquainted, and so intimately connected with each other, as to form one great political system, in which each took a station, wherein it has remained since that time with less variation than could have been expected after the events of two active centuries.

The progress, however, and acquisitions of the house of Austria, were not only greater than those of any other power, but more discernible and conspicuous. I have already enumerated the extensive territories which descended to Charles from his Austrian, Burgundian, and Spanish ancestors.* To these he himself added the Imperial dignity; and, as if all this had been too little, the bounds of the habitable globe seemed to be extended, and a new world was subjected to his command. Upon his resignation, the Burgundian provinces, and the Spanish kingdoms with their dependencies, both in the old and new worlds, devolved to Philip. But Charles transmitted his dominions to his son, in a condition very different from that in which he himself had received them. They were augmented by the accession of new provinces; they were habituated to obey an administration no less vigorous than steady; they were accustomed to expensive and persevering efforts, which, though necessary in the contests between civilized nations, had been little known in Europe before the sixteenth century. The provinces of Friesland, Utrecht, and Overyssel which he acquired by purchase from their former proprietors, and the dutchy of Gueldres, of which he made himself master, partly by force of arms, partly by the arts of negotiation, were additions of great value to his Burgundian dominions. Ferdinand and Isabella transmitted to him all the provinces of Spain, from the bottom of the Pyrenees to the frontiers of Portugal; but as he maintained a perpetual peace with that kingdom, amidst the various efforts of his enterprising ambition, he made no acquisition of territory in that quarter.

VOL. II.-62

* Sce p.89.

Charles had gained, however, a vast accession of power in this part of his dominions. By his success in the war with the commons of Castile, he exalted the regal prerogative upon the ruins of the privileges which formerly belonged to the people. Though he allowed the name of the Cortes to remain, and the formality of holding it to be continued; he reduced its authority and jurisdiction almost to nothing, and modelled it in such a manner, that it became rather a junto of the servants of the crown, than an assembly of the representatives of the people. One member of the constitution being thus lopped off, it was impossible but that the other must feel the stroke, and suffer by it. The suppression of the popular power rendered the aristocratical less formidable. The grandees, prompted by the warlike spirit of the age, or allured by the honours which they enjoyed in a court, exhausted their fortunes in military service, or in attending on the person of their prince. They did not dread, perhaps did not observe, the dangerous progress of the royal authority, which, leaving them the vain distinction of being covered in presence of their sovereign, stripped them, by degrees, of that real power which they possessed while they formed one body, and acted in concert with the people. Charles's success in abolishing the privileges of the commons, and in breaking the power of the nobles of Castile, encouraged Philip to invade the liberties of Arragon, which were still more extensive. The Castilians, accustomed to subjection themselves, assisted in imposing the yoke on their more happy and independent neighbours. The will of the sovereign became the supreme law in all the kingdoms of Spain; and princes who were not checked in forming their plans by the jealousy of the people, nor controlled in executing them by the power of the nobles, could both aim at great objects, and call forth the whole strength of the monarchy in order to

attain them.

As Charles, by extending the royal prerogative, rendered the monarchs of Spain masters at home, he added new dignity and power to their crown by his foreign acquisitions. He secured to Spain the quiet possession of the kingdom of Naples, which Ferdinand had usurped by fraud, and held with difficulty. He united the dutchy of Milan, one of the most fertile and populous Italian provinces, to the Spanish crown; and left his successors, even without taking their other territories into the account, the most considerable provinces in Italy, which had been long the theatre of contention to the great powers of Europe, and in which they had struggled with emulation to obtain the superiority. When the French, in conformity to the treaty of Chateau-Cambresis, withdrew their forces out of Italy, and finally relinquished all their schemes of conquest on that side of the Alps, the Spanish dominions then rose in importance, and enabled their kings, as long as the monarchy retained any degree of vigour, to preserve the chief sway in all the transactions of that country. But whatever accession, either of interior authority or of foreign dominion, Charles gained for the monarchs of Spain in Europe, was inconsiderable when compared with his acquisitions in the new world. He added there, not provinces, but empires to his crown. He conquered territories of such immense extent; he discovered such inexhaustible veins of wealth, and opened such boundless prospects of every kind, as must have roused his successor, and have called him forth to action, though his ambition had been much less ardent than that of Philip, and must have rendered him not only enterprising but formidable.

While the elder branch of the Austrian family rose to such pre-eminence in Spain, the younger, of which Ferdinand was the head, grew to be considerable in Germany; the ancient hereditary dominions of the house of Austria in Germany, united to the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, which Ferdinand had acquired by marriage, formed a respectable power; and when the Imperial dignity was added to these, Ferdinand possessed

territories more extensive than had belonged to any prince, Charles V. excepted, who had been at the head of the empire for several ages. Fortunately for Europe, the disgust which Philip conceived on account of Ferdinand's refusing to relinquish the Imperial crown in his favour, not only prevented for some time the separate members of the house of Austria from acting in concert, but occasioned between them a visible alienation and rivalship. By degrees, however, regard to the interest of their family extinguished this impolitical animosity. The confidence, which was natural, returned; the aggrandizing of the house of Austria became the common object of all their schemes; they gave and received assistance alternately towards the execution of them; and each derived consideration and importance from the other's success. A family so great and so aspiring, became the general object of jealousy and terror. All the power, as well as policy, of Europe were exerted during a century, in order to check and humble it. Nothing can give a more striking idea of the ascendant which it had acquired, and of the terror which it had inspired, than that after its vigour was spent with extraordinary exertions of its strength, after Spain was become only the shadow of a great name, and its monarchs were sunk into debility and dotage, the house of Austria still continued to be formidable. The nations of Europe had so often felt its superior power, and had been so constantly employed in guarding against it, that the dread of it became a kind of political habit, the influence of which remained when the causes which had formed it ceased to exist.

While the house of Austria went on with such success in enlarging its dominions, France made no considerable acquisition of new territory. All its schemes of conquest in Italy had proved abortive; it had hitherto obtained no establishment of consequence in the new world; and after the continued and vigorous efforts of four successive reigns, the confines of the kingdom were much the same as Louis XI. had left them. But though France made not such large strides towards dominion as the house of Austria, it continued to advance by steps which were more secure, because they were gradual and less observed. The conquest of Calais put it out of the power of the English to invade France but at their utmost peril, and delivered the French from the dread of their ancient enemies, who, previous to that event, could at any time penetrate into the kingdom by that avenue, and thereby retard or defeat the execution of their best concerted enterprises against any foreign power. The important acquisition of Metz covered that part of their frontier which formerly was most feeble, and lay most exposed to insult. France, from the time of its obtaining these additional securities against external invasion, must be deemed the most powerful kingdom in Europe, and is more fortunately situated than any on the continent either for conquest or defence. From the confines of Artois to the bottom of the Pyrenees, and from the British channel to the frontiers of Savoy and the coast of the Mediterranean, its territories lay compact and unmingled with those of any other power. Several of the considerable provinces, which had contracted a spirit of independence by their having been long subject to the great vassals of the crown, who were often at variance or at war with their master, were now accustomed to recognise and to obey one sovereign. As they became members of the same monarchy, they assumed the sentiments of that body into which they were incorporated, and co-operated with zeal towards promoting its interest and honour. The power and influence wrested from the nobles were seized by the crown. The people were not admitted to share in these spoils; they gained no new privilege; they acquired no additional weight in the legislature. It was not for the sake of the people, but in order to extend their own prerogative, that the monarchs of France had laboured to humble their great vassals. Satisfied with having brought them under entire subjection to the crown, they discovered go solicitude

to free the people from their ancient dependence on the nobles of whom they held, and by whom they were often oppressed.

A monarch at the head of a kingdom thus united at home and secure from abroad, was entitled to form great designs, because he felt himself in a condition to execute them. The foreign wars which had continued with little interruption from the accession of Charles VIII. had not only cherished and augmented the martial genius of the nation, but by inuring the troops during the course of long service to the fatigues of war, and accustoming them to obedience, had added the force of discipline to their natural ardour. A gallant and active body of nobles, who considered themselves as idle and useless, unless when they were in the field; who were hardly acquainted with any pastime or exercise but what was military; and who knew no road to power, or fame, or wealth, but war, would not have suffered their sovereign to remain long in inaction. The people, little acquainted with the arts of peace, and always ready to take arms at the command of their superiors, were accustomed, by the expense of long wars carried on in distant countries, to bear impositions, which, however inconsiderable they may seem if estimated by the exorbitant rate of modern exactions, appear immense when compared with the sums levied in France, or in any other country of Europe, previous to the reign of Louis XI. As all the members of which the state was composed were thus impatient for action, and capable of great efforts, the schemes and operations of France must have been no less formidable to Europe than those of Spain. The superior advantages of its situation, the contiguity and compactness of its territories, together with the peculiar state of its political constitution at that juncture, must have rendered its enterprises still more alarming and more decisive. The king possessed such a degree of power as gave him the entire command of his subjects; the people were strangers to those occupations and habits of life which render men averse to war, or unfit for it; and the nobles, though reduced to the subordination necessary in a regular government, still retained the high, undaunted spirit which was the effect of their ancient independence. The vigour of the feudal times remained, their anarchy was at an end; and the kings of France could avail themselves of the martial ardour which that singular institution had kindled or kept alive, without being exposed to any of the dangers or inconveniences which are inseparable from it when in entire force. A kingdom in such a state is, perhaps, capable of greater military efforts than at any other period in its progress. But how formidable or how fatal soever to the other nations of Europe the power of such a monarchy might have been, the civil wars which broke out in France saved them at that juncture from feeling its effects. These wars, of which religion was the pretext and ambition the cause, wherein great abilities were displayed by the leaders of the different factions, and little conduct or firmness were manifested by the crown under a succession of weak princes, kept France occupied and embroiled for half a century. During these commotions the internal strength of the kingdom was much wasted, and such a spirit of anarchy was spread among the nobles, to whom rebellion was familiar, and the restraint of laws unknown, that a considerable interval became requisite not only for recruiting the internal vigour of the nation, but for re-establish ing the authority of the prince; so that it was long before France could turn her whole attention towards foreign transactions, or act with her proper force in foreign wars. It was long before she rose to that ascendant in Europe which she has maintained since the administration of Cardinal Richlieu, and which the situation as well as extent of the kingdom, the nature of her government, together with the character of her people, entitle her to maintain.

While the kingdoms on the continent grew into power and consequence, England likewise made considerable progress towards regular government