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he reports directly to the President with one hand, and then reports to the President through somebody else in another situation. I think it present a very difficult position for a man, although I think General O'Connell has handled it very well.
Mr. ROBACK. You are familiar with the recommendation we made in two previous reports which would separate that office from the Office of Emergency Planning?
Mr. HORWITZ. I am aware of that.
Mr. ROBACK. Are you in a position to make any observations about that?
Mr. Horwitz. Really, this is a matter, I suppose, that only the President can decide as to how he wants this to function. As I
say, ' it does put Mr. O'Connell in a very difficult position, and there have been discussions from time to time as to whether it would be better to do this; but, as I say, this is really a matter that only the President can determine.
Mr. ROBACK. Your personal impression, from your vantage point, is that it would be a good thing to do?
Mr. HORWITZ. This would be my personal view.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH ODTM
Mr. ROBACK. Right.
Now, what are your relationships, talking about your office as distinct from General Starbird's office, what is the relationship. of your office with that of the DTM, the directorate of telecommunications management?
Mr. Horwitz. The relationship is one of a coordinating factor. I discuss problems that involve the national communications with Mr. O'Connell. He discusses problems with me. We attempt to find out what are the problems that are bothering him in his role as adviser to the President, to help him to be able to get the fullest explanation that he can give the President to handle this, and there has been a very cordial relationship and a close one.
Mr. ROBACK. On a personal basis, there has been a good working relationship?
Mr. Horwitz. Excellent working relationships.
Mr. ROBACK. Even though, from the standpoint of organization, you could see possible improvements on their part!
Mr. HORWITZ. Oh, yes.
I may say that I have had no problem even with the divided authority because I have found even in working on his DTM role that both under Governor Ellington and Governor Bryant the relationship has been a smooth one.
REVIEW OF NASA PROPOSAL Mr. ROBACK. Your office, in behalf of Secretary McNamara, was called upon to review the NASA proposal to deal with Comsat. What role, as you understand it, did the DTM--and by DTM, we are talking about the Director of Telecommunications Management-what role did the DTM play in the proposal to deal with Comsat?
Mr. Horwitz. His role was one in seeking advice, in getting his opinion, but this was not a matter that went up for review because this is within the purview of the Secretary to determine these questions.
His advice was sought, his opinion was gotten.
Mr. ROBACK. Well, is it not a fact NASA was brought into th. picture because your office was somewhat slow about responding to the NASA interest in this matter?
Mr. HORWITZ, I had better have General Starbird answer that.
General STARBIRD. Actually, NASA wrote to me on the 16th of June
Mr. ROBACK. Let me interrupt on that point. Why would they write to you when you are the day-to-day operator and Secretary McNamara is the Executive Agent?
Mr. Horwitz. The answer there is, as the Manager, he is the subordinate of the Executive Agent. He has a working group that work together all the time with representatives from NASA, and they introduced the problem in the first instance to the Manager, and the manager then brings it forward.
Mr. Roback. You mean it goes from the Manager up?
Mr. RoBACK. Well, they asked the Manager to initiate some discussions with Comsat. Now, presumably, first you state the request, and then you get the policy approval. Is that the sequence, or is that just the way it happened?
Mr. Horwitz. This is the way that it happened in the particular case. There is no set procedure that I know of, of how you initiate.
Mr. ROBACK. But the Secretary, as Executive Agent, has to entertain requests, statements of requirements. As a matter of protocol, has this been a request to your office or a request to General Starbird?
General STARBIRD. Actually, I do not think it makes any difference. Mr. HORWITZ. I do not think it makes any difference.
General STARBIRD. We carry on our business all the time by our designated representative from the other operating agent who is right in my office full time.
Mr. Horwitz. And, I may say, General Starbird brought this to my attention immediately and notified me that this request had been made.
Mr. ROBACK. I had interrupted General Starbird.
General STARBIRD. What I was saying, Mr. Roback, was that on June 16, 1965, Mr. Buckley wrote to me and asked me to investigate the possibility of procuring this service through Comsat.
We immediately initiated negotiations with Comsat, and we carried them on for quite a while on an oral basis instead of on a written basis, and then Comsat came to me and indicated they would prefer to have something in writing before they gave an official quote. In fact, they indicated that they were spending a little money in connection with their investigations, and they wanted, therefore, a written request.
Therefore, on the 26th of July, Secretary Horwitz signed an official document over to Comsat to request the information formally. But all during that period Comsat was at work developing its figures.
Mr. RoBACK. But before that June 1965 letter, as we noted in House Report 1340 of the Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, Dr. Seamans had written about a year or more before that and, as a matter of fact, we said at page 69 of House Report 1340:
Five months elapsed before Solis Horwitz, Assistant to the Secretary of De fense for the NCS, acknowledged the letter and advised Dr. Seamans that a study would be made.
Dr. Seamans had written on April 2, 1964, asking for a study. This letter was acknowledged in August 1964, 5 months later.
Now, it is true that during this time the Department of Defense was very busy trying to figure out with Comsat how they could ride together on the same satellite, and they could not figure it out. But was that the reason why there was this long delay of 5 months in acknowledging this letter?
General STARBIRD. I think that was an earlier overall study we attempted to make in connection with what were the total requirements that the NCS might have on Comsat. The earlier study we worked on the basis of no specific requirement.
Mr. ROBACK. Generalized.
Mr. ROBACK. In other words, NASA did not lay down a specific enough requirement for you.
General STARBIRD. That is correct.
Now, as soon as they came with a specific requirement, then we went over to Comsat to get that crystallized. But Comsat, as well as the NCS agencies during this early generalized period, really were not in a position where they could give more specific information on what they intended to do.
Mr. ROBACK. But that letter you referred to, that Mr. Buckley wrote to you on June 16, 1965, complained that you were not giving him any conclusive information on Apollo, so apparently he understood that he had a specific request.
General STARBIRD. I do not remember it that well, Mr. Roback. I did not take it as a complaint because we had had discussions with them, and they then pinned down their requirement as a specific requirement to serve from three remote tracking stations and from three ships.
Nr. ROBACK. I will just read the first paragraph of that letter, which is at page 120 of our 1966 hearings on missile and space ground support operations:
NASA has participated in and has closely monitored the communications satellite study being carried out as an NCS task. The Agency, however, has not received any conclusive information on how the essential communications requirements to the Apollo ships and other remote Apollo facilities could be satisfied in time to meet the program schedule.
Apparently he had something in mind that you did not.
Mr. Horwitz. This, I think, is the first time he is saying, "We have an issue coming up, the Apollo," and the study so far has not revealed anything, and this was really directing it for the first time into the Apollo channel.
Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Buckley refers, in his letter of June 16, to an Executive Office memorandum of March 26, 1964, as the basis for authority for initiating discussions with Comsat. I believe you also refer in your testimony to a memorandum. Can you tell us what that memorandum is?
Mr. HORWITZ. That memorandum is a short memorandum which states that the dealings with the Comsat Corp. with respect to furnishing service to any element of the National Communications System should be under the supervision of the Executive Agent. In other words, he should be in the position of determining whether we will go to the Comsat Corp., and then determine which element will go.
Mr. ROBACK. In other words, Mr. Webb, as Administrator of NASA, who has the top procurement responsibility for his AgencyMr. HORWITZ. Yes.
Mr. RoBACK (continuing). Could not go to Comsat unless he went through the Executive Agent.
Mr. HORWITZ. That is right.
Mr. ROBACK. And this would be true of everybody who would be a participant in the NCS.
Mr. Horwitz. With respect to that portion of their communication facilities that were part of the NCS.
Mr. RoBACK. With respect to that. Outside of that they would not necessarily be bound.
Mr. HORWITZ. Because it was not part of the NCS system.
General STARBIRD. It is classified, Mr. Roback. But the substance of it, in fact a quote from it, was contained in--was given to you a yearplus ago, and was contained in your hearing records. Does someone have reference to that? Give the reference page and read it. May we read it to you?
Mr. RANDALL. This has previously been released, what is being read, in the press?
General STARBIRD. The material applicable to this out of the memorandum was given.
Mr. RANDALL. In other words, this, as we say on the Armed Services Committee, this has been sanitized. Go ahead.
Admiral Boyle. This is from the document, the hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, from the 88th Congress, Satellite Communications, part 1, page 493:
The delegation was contained in a classified document. However, the portion dealing with the delegation is not classified and the gist of it is set forth below:
"The President has designated the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the National Communications System to arrange with the Communications Satellite Corporation for the procurement of satellite communications services for the National Communications System and to take appropriate steps to assure that the services provided are satisfactory to meet the needs of the National Communications System."
There were no previous delegations of authority to the Secretary of Defense dealing with the procurement of satellite communications services for the National Communications System.
Mr. ROBACK. May I ask, Mr. Horwitz-
Mr. ROBACK (continuing). Do you understand, and is it a fact, that this delegation is made pursuant to the President's authority under the Satellite Act? Under the Satellite Act, the President has certain responsibilities to arrange for the use of the services for Government purposes.
Mr. Horwitz. I would say that that is at least one of the bases for it. There may be others.
Mr. ROBACK. Is it cited in a memorandum?
Mr. HORWITZ. As I recall, it is not specifically cited.
Mr. ROBACK. Absent that authority, would you say that the President could designate any agency he wanted to make a decision as to which agency of the Government would procure which services ?
Mr. HORWITZ. I think he could make that decision.
Mr. ROBACK. In other words, if he wanted the General Services Administration, let us say, to approve all of the procurement of the Defense Department, do you think he could do that, just for example?
Mr. HORWITZ. This is really a question that would have to go to the Attorney General on it. I am not prepared to answer that one.
Mr. RANDALL. In other words, the witness is saying this is a legal question.
Mr. HORWITZ. This is a legal question.
Mr. RANDALL. May I ask a question, Mr. Roback, so we can have fixed in our minds, and for some of us who maybe have not had a chance to be here the other day, what was the source of this memorandum, where did it emanate from?
Mr. HORWITZ. It emanated from the White House. Mr. RANDALL. From the White House itself? Mr. HORWITZ. That is right. Mr. RANDALL. And it was directed to whom? Mr. Horwitz. Directed to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent of the National Communications System. Mr. RANDALL. Thank you.
Mr. ROBACK. Now, this memorandum, in effect, makes the Secretary of Defense, and you, as his agent, responsible for negotiating all communications services with Comsat.
Mr. HORWITZ. It does not make us necessarily responsible for the negotiations themselves. I think it makes us responsible for determining whether negotiations should be had, and determining who is going to be the negotiating party.
I think you have got to remember something about the National Communications System, what it is designed to do. It is designed to make maximum use of each other's capacities.
Now, let us take for an example here, the NASA desire to have communications satellites. One of the things that had to be determined there before you would go to negotiate with the corporation at all is to determine whether (1) you needed satellite communications at all for this purpose or could some other form of the National System, which is in use, perform this job.
And (2), you had to look at, to see whether this same service could not have been performed by the initial satellite that the Defense Department was putting up. Would there be capacity to do this or would it be up in time.
So these are the questions which normally have, under the grrrral order setting up the National Communications System—are the responsibilities of the Executive Agent to look into, and so this piece of paper was a supplementary piece of paper dealing with the specific questions of satellites.