ATS, over and above that required for the Apollo program, it was not desirable to rely on the success of that spacecraft.

Mr. ROBACK. We are not talking about a single use of the spacecraft for pilot communications. With all the capacity that is involved, why couldn't you have dedicated a portion of it, so to speak?

Mr. JAFFE. Again, the only

Mr. ROBACK. I mean, it makes sense, doesn't it?

Mr. JAFFE. The only requirement at the time was the requirement of the Apollo mission, and the Apollo mission is a requirement that is a very hard requirement. It must be met, and it must be met with a great deal of reliability.

Again I would like to state that ATS does represent a significant advance in the technology. It has never been flown. It is not merely a factor of two or three extensions of Syncom, and to rely on that for an operational utilization by NASA, I think, would have been a mistake. Mr. ROBACK. Let us say, and nobody is wishing any bad luck-but let us suppose that Mr. Sohier has to exercise the default clause. Can you hook onto ATS?

Mr. JAFFE. We will not have ATS spacecraft in orbit, more than one in orbit at the time, and it will be placed over the Pacific. There wil be no Atlantic ATS spacecraft at that particular time.

Mr. ROBACK. But conceivably, you could get part of your traffic re quirement. Maybe you could make a deal with the Defense Depart ment also.

Mr. JAFFE. Conceivably, if this has to be pressed into service, and if it exists over the Pacific, it could be pressed into service for a portion of their requirements. I am not sure whether it takes care of the entire requirement.

USE OF NUCLEAR POWER SOURCES

Mr. ROBACK. Why didn't you, in view of the power constraints that you tell us about, why didn't you put an advanced concept of power in

the ATS?

Mr. JAFFE. This spacecraft is designed to take maximum advantage of the launch vehicle, which is the Atlas-Agena, and designed to get about as much power with as much volume as one can get with that launch vehicle into the 24-hour orbit.

Mr. ROBACK. You are talking about a conventional power source, that is to say, an established power source?

Mr. JAFFE. It is true we are still talking about solar cells, yes. Mr. ROBACK. If this is advanced in so many ways, why didn't you strike out in the power field? Isn't it a fact that power is going to be your limitation on all these space experiments in the 1970's? Mr. JAFFE. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. You said so, in effect.

Mr. JAFFE. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. You are talking about broadcast satellites, for example: you are going to need a new power source, aren't you? Mr. JAFFE. Probably.

Mr. ROBACK. Is your power development keeping pace?

Mr. JAFFE. I think it is. There is so much in any particular time that one wants to design into an experimental vehicle or into an ad

vance; in this particular time scale it is not desirable, in my opinion, to clevelop new power sources on the ATS vehicle.

Mr. ROBACK. What about the ATS-II? I don't mean the second vehicle, I mean the second generation.

Mr. JAFFE. The second generation is still in the design stage, still open for question.

Mr. ROBACK. You are making feasibility studies?

Mr. JAFFE. We are making feasibility studies.

Mr. ROBACK. What is your expectation for power in the feasibility study?

Mr. JAFFE. We really haven't given that a tremendous amount of thought at this particular time.

Mr. ROBACK. Don't you think you should? If NASA is the far out agency in communications-and it doesn't have very much justification for being near in on communications apparently-why aren't you studying the power source?

Mr. JAFFE. We are studying the power source, but our basic reason for the follow-on series of ATS spacecraft is to develop antenna technology, and as our first step we would like to determine what an optimal approach would be to erecting a large area antenna with suitable characteristics in space, and to see what constraints might be placed on additional things that might be done, power being one of the additional experiments that one might fly.

Mr. ROBACK. The second generation is bringing you into the 1970's. Mr. JAFFE. We hope so.

Mr. ROBACK. And, therefore, you have to know pretty much what vour power supply is going to be. You also want to know whether that big antenna that you want to put up will be interfered with by nuclear power, let us say.

Mr. JAFFE. That is correct. I might just say this about power. It has been our considered judgment that solar cells will be the device used to create power in space through probably mid 1970's. We can go to the several kilowatt level using power supplies made of solar cells involving rather large area structures.

The next generation will probably be the nuclear supply of the SNAP-8 variety, reactor type of power supply and this will not be available until the late 1970's, so that we have given a considerable amount of attention to this, and there seems to be nothing better at this particular time for the kind of power generation capabilities we are talking about, other than solar cells.

Mr. ROBACK. Is it because it is hard to get the budgetary allocation, or is it because you don't think it is timely?

Mr. JAFFE. I think it is the technology limitation. We do not have at this particular time anything which looks substantially better on the forefront than solar cells for this particular power class. Furthermore, there does not seem to be anything on the technical horizon which will preclude the continued use of solar cells in the area of power that we are talking about now, from zero to perhaps several kilowatts.

Mr. ROBACK. Are you experimenting with great masses, great arrays of solar cells?

Mr. JAFFE. We have done a number of studies looking at how one might carry solar cells on large area structures, yes.

Mr. ROBACK. You are really afraid to to deal with this nuclear stuff, afraid you might get burned?

Mr. JAFFE. No, sir; I wouldn't put it that way.

Mr. ROBACK. Afraid it is poisonous?

Mr. JAFFE. Our current rate of progress in the development of the reactor supply indicates that we will not have a reactor supply available to us of the SNAP-8 variety, which we think is a next generation type of power unit, until the end of the 1970's, and our plans, our internal plans are based on that assumption.

Mr. ROBACK. You want to leapfrog the isotope to the power reactor? Mr. JAFFE. We have not found an economically attractive isotope. supply at this stage of the game that would be acceptable to all concerned.

Mr. ROBACK. You said you had a feasibility study on the second generation ATS.

Mr. JAFFE. That is right.

Mr. ROBACK. Is that under contract?

Mr. JAFFE. Yes, it is under contract.

Mr. ROBACK. Can you supply us, without too much difficulty, a list of all the contracts now outstanding and about to be let? Let us say the RFP's that have been put out for satellites, communication satellites, a list of the contracts, a brief description of what they propose to do, and the cost estimates, if available, of what the effort is going to cost?

Mr. JAFFE. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. Just so we get a little idea of your imagination and variety.

Mr. JAFFE. Yes, sir.

(The list referred to follows:)

Summary of current and pending contracts concerning advanced communications technology

1. ITT Contract, "Modulation Techniques for Active Communication Satellites." NAS5-10123, $360K. Study and development of a time division multiplex approach to a multiple access communications satellite system.

2. RAND Contract, "Technological Studies and Operational Factors," NAST 21 (02), $350K. Technical studies of communications satellite systems. Includes theoretical studies of modulation and multiplexing techniques for multiple access; stabilization and control systems for active and passive communications satellites; factors affecting orbital control.

3. SSC Contract NASw-1216, "Studies of Communications Satellite Systems." $98K. Studies of time division multiple access systems applicable to small terminal communications; studies of interference prediction techniques, broadcast satellite subsystem studies.

4. G. E. Co. NASw-1475, $125K; RCA NASw-1476, $125K. "Voice Broadcast Satellite Mission Studies." Two independent studies of short wave and frequency modulation broadcasting of aural program material.

5. Radiation Applications Inc. NAS5-3923, $130K, "Development of a Prototype Plastic Space Erectable Satellite." Develops irradiated polyethylene as a lightweight photolyzable structural material for passive communication satellites.

6. G. T. Schjeldahl Co. NAS5-3943, $135K, "Development of a 425 Foot Diameter Passive Communication Satellite with Self-erecting Properties."

7. AoTech Corp. Contract Pending, $85K, "Millimeter Wave Steerable Antenna Studies and Development." Studies spacecraft beam forming and steering techniques for the range 30 to 100 ges.

8. B. T. L. "Deep Space Communications and Navigation System Comparison and Tradeoff Study," Contract Pending. Study of advantages of alternative approaches to deep space communications.

9. Raytheon Co. NAS5-9523 $144K, “Millimeter Wave Propagation Studies." 10. "REP for Millimeter Wave Experiment" estimate $800K. Design and fabricate engineering and prototype models of spacecraft equipment for a propagation experiments at 16 and 35 GHZ.

11. NASW-1412, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, CPFF $137,477. 12. NASW-1410, General Electric Company, CPFF $148,000.

13. NASW-1411, Fairchild Hiller Corp., FP $150,000.

All 3 of the above contracts:

Six month feasibility studies to set forth details necessary for planning and development of ATS-F and G Mission, the primary objective of which is development of capability to place in geostationary orbit and experiment with a large spacecraft containing a 30' diameter parabolic antenna good to 10 GHz, a multibeam high gain phased array antenna, a precision interferometer, and an attitude control system good to ±.1° in three axes.

Mr. DAHLIN. Are the minutes of the TCCS meeting of August 22 and 23 available yet?

Mr. JAFFE. No.

Mr. DAHLIN. Will you supply them to the committee when they are available, please?

Mr. JAFFE. Yes.

(The minutes referred to were scheduled to be available early in October.)

Mr. DAHLIN. Mr. Sohier, from the standpoint of NASA, was there a delay in the NCS filling your requirements and approving your proposals with respect to this whole Apollo communications business? Mr. SOHIER. If you are talking from the time that we were authorized to go ahead and start negotiations, I would not say so.

Mr. DAHLIN. No; before that, before you got approval to go ahead. Mr. SOHIER. Well, there was considerable study conducted, and that took time, so that there was delay. I don't think we are critical of the delay. We participated very much in the studies to see what alternatives there were.

Mr. DAHLIN. I wasn't asking you if you were critical. Was there a delay which interfered with any of your planning and preparation for Apollo communications and Apollo missions?

Mr. SOHIER. I don't think so. I think that with the exception of the slight delay that Comsat itself has undergone technically in the spacecraft, getting it ready, I think we are in shape to meet the requirement. Mr. DAHLIN. And you believe that all of the alternatives have now been fully studied; that is, for contingencies or for all alternative needs of supplying the same services if anything goes wrong?

Mr. SOHIER. We studied it with great care. Mr. Buckley chaired a joint NASA-DOD group that looked at all the alternatives, and we looked at them in-house as well, and I think the answer to that is "Yes, that we have looked thoroughly at the other ways of getting the communications requirement met."

NAVIGATION AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SATELLITES

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Jaffe mentioned the emphasis given to the navigation satellite and the interest of FAA. Is this research and development that the FAA should be doing or is this R. & D. that you are doing in cooperation with them, or what? You know they had some kind of discussions with Comsat.

Mr. JAFFE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Which came to no final resolution at this time.

Mr. JAFFE. It is research and development, specifically, we are doing in cooperation with them. The FAA is involved in the program cooperatively with us.

Mr. ROBACK. Is this a research and development problem now, or is this now one that you can build, a system for traffic control, navigation or multipurpose, or whatever?

Mr. JAFFE. In my opinion, it is definitely a research and development problem. We have not developed the techniques for communicating from a spacecraft to a very complicated aircraft, and certainly not in large quantities.

Mr. ROBACK. What was Comsat offering to do? Is that a research and development program?

Mr. JAFFE. Comsat was offering to deliver, I believe, one or two channels of capability from a spacecraft to an aircraft.

Mr. ROBACK. You were the technical adviser to Comsat on that. Did you tell them that it was too far out?

Mr. JAFFE. We were not asked to advise on this particular issue.

Mr. ROBACK. Do you mean to say that you weren't consulted on this even though you are the repository of research and development information on the subject?

Mr. JAFFE. Comsat was aware of our early experiments involving Syncom and our plans on the ATS program.

Mr. ROBACK. Did FAA come to you?

Mr. JAFFE. Yes, they did.

Mr. ROBACK. After Comsat, or before?

Mr. JAFFE. They talked to us about their discussions with Comsat. Mr. ROBACK. What did you tell them?

Mr. JAFFE. We told them that it was feasible to do an experiment involving one or two channels. That this was in essense what we were talking about doing with the ATS series of spacecraft and the VHF transponder, and they agreed to cooperate with us in the use of that transponder in the experimental program.

Mr. ROBACK. In other words, you could do it for them for free rather than having to hire Comsat, that is free from the standpoint of the FAA?

Mr. JAFFE. It was being done and had been in the plan long before the submission.

Mr. ROBACK. They weren't going to learn any more from Comsat on the contract that they considered entering into than you were proposing to do for them.

Mr. JAFFE. From an experimental standpoint, the answer is right. They were not going to learn any more.

Mr. ROBACK. That is what we are talking about, an experiment, because they must have known what you just said-you are not ready for a system.

Mr. JAFFE. I think we are not ready for a system. I think the FAA discussions were in the terms of the context of making available on an operational basis one or two channels. When I say that I don't think we are ready for a system, I feel that the problem is broader than just one or two channels of voice communications with an aircraft. Mr. ROBACK. What is the problem, briefly?

Mr. JAFFE. The problem is one of not only providing communications to an aircraft, but providing for position determination of these