Thank you very much for your testimony. (The following additional statements were furnished for the record at the request of the subcommittee:) DODGE EXPERIMENT The Department of Defense has long recognized the need for an experiment which would evaluate a three-axis gravity gradient stabilization system for com'munications (and other) satellites at near-synchronous altitudes. Certain other two-axis gravity gradient systems are currently undergoing tests and evaluation with encouraging results. In June 1965, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to implement its proposal for a three-axis gravity gradient experiment which had been submitted to the D.D.R. & E. in March of 1965. The Navy's interest in gravity gradient systems stems back to November 1961, when a single-axis system was experimentally orbited on the Traac satellite. This experimental satellite, DODGE, meaning Department of Defense gravity experiment, will integrate two different configurations of extendible booms, and a variety of damping techniques. The primary booms, extendible to 150 feet and the "damper" booms capable of extending to 50 feet, are controlled by alternating-current drive motors for variation of length. One of the damping techniques, based on a gimbaled boom set at an angle with respect to the X-Y plane is an adaptation of an engineering concept developed by NASA for use in the NASA advanced technology satellite (ATS). Provisions are included in Dodge for varying the amount and kind of damping provided with the gimbal. In addition, an enhanced magnetic damping technique is incorporated, which acts in a fashion similar to the magnetic hysteresis rods used for the lowaltitude navigation satellites, but enhanced by electrical amplification. The enhanced magnetic system stores magnetic field samples in a memory, and creates field vectors at a later time, providing step function hysteresis and excellent damping characteristics. Altitude sensing will be accomplished by a combination of sun sensors, magnetometers and downward looking TV cameras, providing an overall altitude sensing accuracy of better than 2 degree. The experiment will adapt an existing Navy spacecraft design, and will be fabricated, checked out, and operated for the Navy by the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University. APL/JHU is the prime contractor for the Navy's navigation satellite system and was the technical director of the ANNA program, DODGE will be launched in early 1967 on a development round of the Titan III-C in conjunction with other satellites, resulting in a minimal cost program. Funds in the amount of $3 million were provided to the Navy for this experiment, and the Astronautics Division of the Naval Air Systems Command is directing the program. APOLLO SHIPS CURRENT STATUS Five ships are being converted by the Navy for use in the APOLLO program. Three of these five are being activated from the reserve fleet; two are active range ships which are being converted to outfit them for work with APOLLO. Status of the three ships being activated and converted to APOLLO use is as follows: USNS Vanguard (TAGM-19) was delivered on February 28, 1966, and is now undergoing instrumentation tests. The Satcom terminal will be installed between February and May 1967. USNS Redstone (TAGM-20) was delivered on June 30, 1966, and is now undergoing instrumentation tests and trials. The Satcom terminal will be installed by December 1966. USNS Mercury (TAGM-21) will be undergoing Board of Inspection and Survey trials prior to delivery in early September, with delivery anticipated in late September 1966. The Satcom terminal will be installed by January 1967. Of the total cost of activation and conversion of these three ships approximately $20.5 million is the cost of the three Satcom terminals. Status of the two range ships being converted to APOLLO use is as follows: USNS Watertown (TAGM-6) will be inspected by the Board of Inspection and Survey in September; delivery is expected in October 1966. Completion of testing and trials is planned for December 1966. Will not receive Satcom terminal. USNS Huntsville (TAGM-7) will complete inspection and trials in October 1966. Completion of testing is planned for February 1967. Will not receive Satcom terminal. No Satcom costs are associated with these two ships. (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to recon GOVERNMENT USE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 1966 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Chet Holifield, William J. Randall, Jim Wright, and William L. Dickinson. Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Douglas G. Dahlin, counsel; Paul Ridgely, investigator; and J. P. Carlson, minority staff. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The committee will be in order. Today we have before us the Honorable James D. O'Connell, Director of Telecommunications Management, Executive Office of the President. Mr. O'Connell, it is good to have you before the subcommittee again. I want to express our apologies for postponing your appearance which originally was scheduled for last Wednesday. As you know, I am the sponsor of the Department of Transportation bill which came to the floor last week, and I was the floor manager of the bill. In view of all the preparatory work in transportation matters, which are almost as complicated as communications matters, I had to cancel our scheduled hearings last week. I thought I would finish the Department of Transportation legislation last week, but the leadership saw fit to carry it over until today. It is the first order of business at noon today, so I am still under pressure on that subject. Your statement, I note, is rather lengthy, and you may proceed to read such parts of it as you wish, and the remainder will be placed in the record as if read. But before you proceed, the Chair would like to make some observations and, perhaps, you will want to comment on some of them in the course of your presentation. First of all, there has been an unfortunate blowup of the Titan III-C booster carrying the second installment of the IDCSP-the initial defense communications satellite program-and we lost eight satellites in that blowup. We can only regret the occurrence, but it serves to recall the warning sounded by the committee 2 years ago in a basic report on this subject. We believed then, and subsequent events apparently have affirmed, that a military communications systems is important, indeed urgent. We said at that time that it was too risky to put all our satellite eggs, so to speak, in the basket of a development booster if we wanted to get a satellite communications system going as soon as possible. Your statement was prepared before this unfortunate incident, Mr. O'Connell, and perhaps, it has a more optimistic tone than the events now warrant. What this blowup does to the IDCSP launch schedule is a matter of interest to this subcommittee. I trust that everything possible will be done to compensate for the accident and to move quickly toward placing the next installment of the satellites in orbit. We will ask the Air Force to give us a report on the whole matter. Optimism about communication satellite technology should not gloss over another fact: that our ground station program is lagging. We reviewed this matter with General Starbird of DCA and Army witnesses. It is of great concern to the subcommittee, and we expect the Army to take all necessary steps toward correcting deficiencies and getting it back on the track." Regarding the Government's decision to purchase Comsat services. we have discussed these in some detail with Defense witnesses, and expect to explore other aspects with you and following witnesses. At this point, it seems to me, as I have reviewed our materials on the subject, that Government policy on satellite communications badly needs clarification. At issue, among other things, are: (1) the extent to which the Government will establish and utilize its own system o systems; and (2) whether the Government will deal directly or indi rectly with Comsat in procuring satellite communication services. The first issue has been the subject of continuing inquiry by this subcommittee over the past few years. The second issue is brought into prominence by Government commitments, approved by the Secre tary of Defense as Executive Agent of the NCS, to buy Comsat serv ices for NASA and DOD at an estimated cost of $58 million over 3-year period; and (b) an FCC decision to the effect that Comsa should not provide satellite communications services to the Govern ment directly, except in unique and exceptional circumstances. At this reading, the DOD and the FCC apparently are on a collision course. As Director of Telecommunications Management, you ar in a key position to inform the subcommittee how and why this conflic arose and what you believe ought to be done about it. You may proceed now with your prepared statement, sir. (The biographical sketch of Mr. O'Connell follows:) BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JAMES D. O'CONNELL Born: Chicago, Ill., September 25, 1899. Education: University of Chicago; U.S. Military Academy, B.S., 1922; Ya University, M.S. (communications engineering), 1930; Northwestern Unive sity, graduate studies. Present position: Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunication Director of Telecommunications Management, Executive Office of the Presiden Appointed May 15, 1964. Experience: Tactical and strategic military communications operations. R search and development of U.S. military communications equipment. Servi in North African and European theaters of operation, World War II; Japa postwar; deputy chief signal officer and chief signal officer, U.S. Army, 1951-39 retired lieutenant general, U.S. Ariny, 1959; vice president, General Telephone Electronics Laboratories, 1959-62; Consultant in communications-electronics t |