General Starbird has advised me he does have those numbers and can provide them.

General STARBIRD. The ground system, as presently under procurement, will amount to about $70 million. That counts the developmental work that went into these specific ground terminals and those that are under orders for purchase.

Mr. HORTON. So that would be $70 million over the $50 million.
Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

Mr. HORTON. Excuse me just a second. You spoke about a despun antenna, and I wasn't clear as to the comparison between that and the gravity gradient.

Mr. ROGERS. I see.

Mr. HORTON. Are they the same or basically the same? Will one supplant the other?

Mr. ROGERS. The goal in each case is essentially identical. We want to be able to direct the satellite's radiation toward the earth's surface and receive signals from the earth's surface. At the present time, the satellites in orbit radiate a great deal of their energy out into space. Mr. HORTON. I understand what the purpose is, but I am not clear as to whether the despun antenna technique is the same as gravity gradient.

Mr. ROGERS. No, it is quite different in practice, what we do is quite different. In the case of the despun antenna, we permit the satellite to spin and then we electrically direct the antenna so that regardless of the position at any moment in time of the satellite, the antenna looks at the earth.

In the case of gravity gradient, we stabilize the whole spacecraft; we fix it in orbit with respect to a point on the earth's surface and point the whole spacecraft downward toward the earth's center.

Now, since the forces, the gravity gradient forces, are weak at synchronous altitude, we are not altogether sure this technique will work out. We thought it best to explore in orbit both of these techniques and that is what we are doing because we do want to look forward to the day, particularly with respect to the advanced system, when we can have more effective radiated power and greater sensitivity and, in order to do this, we will have to have either one technique or the other of this type available to us.

Mr. HORTON. I have not had an opportunity to digest the statement that you made regarding the R. & D. programs. Perhaps you could summarize what is now under study other than the operational system. Perhaps you could tick them off, one, two, three, four, whatever they are.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. HORTON. The areas in which there is R. & D. now.

Mr. ROGERS. All right.

Mr. HORTON. With regard to either the operational system or some other system you may be considering.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, first, of course, as to the IDCSP system and the satellites and terminals now employed therein. We made the very

best estimate that we could some 2 or 3 years ago of how these devices would work; we are now measuring them, evaluating their behavior to see to what extent our estimations, in fact, are borne out.

At the same time learning from the Syncom, learning from the IDCSP, learning from the general advance of technology, the DCA has, in response to the Joint Staff also been making very, very careful studies of what a truly generally useful operational system should look like.

Our R. & D. now, I think it fair to say, is entering a stage when gradually our concerns about overall system network operation will be predominant, and where we will begin to pay more attention now, a growing attention, I should say, to the tactical satellite communications area.

We are beginning to have a much more growing confidence that the technology-the boosters, the spacecraft, the ground terminals that we will need for a fixed and transportable global system-we are beginning to have confidence in that technology, Mr. Horton.

Now, we are concerned with the extent to which we can use satellite repeaters for communications to mobile terminals, within the fleet, amphibious landing operations, and so forth.

Mr. HORTON. Is this another system or is this in addition to the operational system already designed?

Mr. ROGERS. No, the word "system" does not describe our efforts here yet. We don't know enough yet about the technology that would be required or how we would use this technology to be able to think in terms of tactical systems yet. We are, I would judge, perhaps 2 years or more behind in the tactical area where we now are in the strategic area. We are just beginning to think very usefully about the kinds of terminals, the kinds of satellites, the kinds of operations. but we don't know enough about this yet to be thinking in terms of tactical systems.

Mr. HORTON. Do you envision a different system to accomplish this tactical mission?

Mr. ROGERS. To a very great extent yes, very definitely. For instance, we will have to place a great deal more of the total system burden on the spacecraft because now, instead of having relatively large terminals on the ground, we must have smaller ones, perhaps airborne terminals having hardly any antenna gain at all, with mucl smaller power. So we will have to have satellites with much more sensitivity and effective radiated power.

Also, the Defense Communications System under the control of the DCA is a very disciplined network. The capacity is assigned depend ing upon the exigencies at the moment. But, in a tactical situation we would like a large number of users to be able to take advantage o the satellite repeater without having tight network control.

We would like any user having the proper equipment in a field army, or in an amphibious operation, to be able to communicate with out having a very tight network control. We would like ships and aircraft to be able to use the repeaters simultaneously. But I would be misleading you if I were to leave you with the impression that w knew how to do all of these things yet. We don't, and that is why thi major effort is underway in R. & D. leading, we hope, to eventua system application.

Mr. HORTON. What is your estimate of the yearly expenditures for R. & D. at the present time?

Mr. ROGERS. If I may, Mr. Horton, I would rather supply estimates of future budgets to the committee in private.

Mr. HORTON. All right. I asked because I wondered whether or not you expected that the R. & D. estimate would go up or down or remain about the same? Perhaps you can answer it that way.

Mr. ROGERS. I think our general estimate is that, in a very gross fashion, it probably will be approximately the same for the predictable future, the next few years, because what we will be doing will be gradually turning the attention of our technical people onto the design of these smaller mobile terminals where heretofore they have concentrated on the larger, more fixed and transportable terminals. We will have to learn how to design more sophisticated spacecraft and I think, to a rough order of approximation, the costs should remain roughly the same per year for the next few years.

FOURTH IDCSP LAUNCH

Mr. HORTON. Regarding this fourth Titan III-C launch that is planned for early 1967, you have indicated that there will be three IDCSP satellites and three experimental satellites.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. HORTON. Is that a continuation of the same program or is that directed toward a new program?

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the three IDCSP satellites are put in there, in a sense, as insurance. If we have difficulties with any of the ones launched on the first two launches, the first seven or the second eight, this is insurance.

Mr. HORTON. Is this launch needed?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, this will give us enough more satellites, then, to give us a greater operational capability. That would raise us to 18 IDCSP satellites total, and this will raise our statistical availability quite a bit. But, in addition to that, those three other experiments are very important: in the case of the despun antenna and the gravity gradient experiment, these are very important for the advanced operational system, and the third spacecraft for the tactical R. & D. program.

That will be our first launch, incidentally, for the tactical R. & D. program.

Mr. HORTON. If that is not scheduled until early 1967, it would seem to me that the total operational system won't be complete until early 1967 rather than 1966.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, unlike the civil people or the commercial people who say they want to communicate, say, between New York and London, and will place the one satellite over the Atlantic that they want, in the military system, being concerned about global coverage, we have taken the view that we must put up a large number of satellites into near-synchronous orbit. Now, how effective that system is depends upon, among other things, how many satellites you have up there. The beginnings of utility for testing is about seven. The minimum number you need for some useful operation is about 15, and, as you put more

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of them up, what you have is more capacity and more availability, and 18 is just that much better than 15.

Mr. HORTON. Can you decide that question now? Shouldn't you wait until you have taken a look at what you have already put up?

Mr. ROGERS. No, we can't. If we do that, Mr. Horton, then we are always a year or so behind the decision to launch, and we made the decision to put these three satellites on that launch for early next year a year or so ago so that we wouldn't be too far behind in the schedule. They certainly will not-they will certainly be useful up there. Mr. HORTON. Well, the concern I have is when do you stop all this? This is a very expensive proposition.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I agree with you.

Mr. HORTON. Of course, somebody can draw a line, saying you can't spend more than $120 million and that ends it. But I think we are concerned about operational efficiency and to that extent we have permitted the executive to continue his planning to a point where he feels that it can be operationally effective.

I certainly don't say that we would want to substitute our judgment. for the Department of Defense with regard to the system's operational efficiency. But there has to come a time when you must stop.

Mr. ROGERS. I agree.

Mr. HORTON. You have indicated 7 are up now, 15 are the maximum, but 3 more would be better than 15. Someone may argue that 3 more would be better than 18. Where do you stop?

Mr. ROGERS. You are quite correct. There will always be somebody who will argue that more is better than the number you have. This is a matter of judgment, and it is a matter of judgment that eventually will not reside within the R. & D. community. We have set ourselves two goals: One, to obtain an initial limited operational capability in this R. &. D. system based upon the technology of some 2 years ago, during this calendar year, and we are well on our way to doing that. Two at the same time, we set ourselves the goal of having available by about 1970 a truly advanced operational system that would be sensibly responsive to the unique and vital trunk needs specified by the JCS.

Now, between the time that we have the initial operational capability-hopefully in 1966-and the availability of this truly advanced operational system in 1970, we will have to make decisions about the utility of the space segment that is in orbit. That is why we have a third launch set aside, with eight satellite repeaters on it, a payload that we may or may not launch depending not on R. & D. considerations if the second one goes all right, but upon operational considerations.

But I would say this, if the next launch is successful that will give us 15-we will then probably not launch the third one with 8 IDCSP repeaters until or unless there is an operational reason advanced therefor. We will go ahead with the fourth launch that has three IDCSP repeaters and the three experimental spacecraft.

Mr. HORTON. Are you saying you may cut out the third and then the fourth would become the third?

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. HORTON. Is there a good possibility?

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct.

But we have no IDCSP space segment R. & D. plans beyond the two full launches plus the three extra satellites.

What operational factors may come into being in the period of the late 1960's I could not speculate on; that will be a consideration to concern the DCA.

Mr. HORTON. Are you studying these possible developments in your programs with the intent of keeping a lid on expenditures? Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely.

Mr. HORTON. I see that you plan two trials with this despun antenna and also this so-called "DODGE" experiment.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Mr. HORTON. Do you have any figures as to what these will cost separately?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Each of these spacecraft cost approximately a very few million dollars in the total experiment and I can supply you with the exact costs, if you wish.

Mr. HORTON. These are not included in the initial $50 million? Mr. ROGERS. They are not.

Mr. HORTON. These are in addition to that?

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct. They are the demonstrations in space hopefully of the technology that will underlie the design of a truly advanced system in the late 1960's or 1970's.

TACTICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM

Mr. HORTON. Just one other question.

In the Tacsatcom program, is the tactical operational system different from the operational system we have been talking about? Mr. ROGERS. That is the tactical R. & D. program effort that has been underway now for about 6 or 9 months. But I would like, again, for the purpose of clarification to describe this as an R. & D. effort, Mr. Horton. It is entirely in addition to and, in many respect different from, the systems are are underway that we have spent much of the time discussing here earlier today. These are R. & D. activities. Mr. HORTON. Is this pointed toward a possible tactical system? Mr. ROGERS. Yes, or systems, in fact.

Mr. HORTON. And this is what you were talking about earlier?
Mr. ROGERS. Yes; much earlier in my opening statement.
Mr. HORTON. And this is what this program is?

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. HORTON. Have we any figures on that program?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes; but-since this program is just underway in this fiscal year, again, I would prefer to supply these figures to the committee privately.

Mr. HORTON. Is this going to supplant or be an addition to the so-called operational system that we have been talking about? If it is going to be an addition or substitute, will you still go as far as you have been contemplating on the operational system, or wouldn't it be better to slow down a little bit on the operational system, put it up, try it out, see how it goes, and then move along on this tactical system or project.