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REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH RELIABILITY Mr. ROBACK. You have a certain reliability factor which you put in your CSA, that is what, 99.5?

General STARBIRD. 99.5.

Mr. ROBACK. If you had to get that same reliability in the IDCSP, how many satellites would you need?

General STARBIRD. I would like to furnish that for the record. Of course, it varies

depending upon the link. It depends on whether it is one along the Equator, a long link, or a short link, and what I would like to do is to take three or four typical links, calculate them out and give you the answer. (The information referred to was prepared for subcommittee use.)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Rogers, in his testimony, adverted to the relationship between the tactical and the trunk or long haul kind of responsibility which your agency has, indicating that maybe in the future there might be some alteration of relationships or responsibilities, at least that was implied in one of his comments.

Today, as I believe he testified or perhaps you did, there is a threeagency, a triservice, committee that is looking over the tactical program.

In view of the asserted urgency, and certainly this committee has gone on record in recommending, and the Department has been responsive in following through on developments in the tactical field because of the importance of that, do you believe a triservice committee is an effective agency for administering that kind of program?

General STARBIRD. Well, I think that the objective here, when the triservice approach was adopted, and realize that the program right now was still in the study and investigative and early experimental stage, the objective here was to make people get out and think, not to try to control them from thinking, but let them

Mr. ROBACK. That is the formative, creative stage.

General STARBIRD. That is right. And what Mr. Rogers stated, I believe, was that the DCA was being kept informed because these tactical systems would play through the long haul in certain cases to get the signals on back, and at some later time it might be desirable to cut DCA into the type of strong focal point function for the tactical that it now has for the long haul.

Mr. ROBACK. The genius of administration is not to let that creative triservice approach go to the point where nobody is going to make a decision, you understand. In other words, there comes a time when you change from this transitional type of organization to one of administrative efficacy where somebody can say "This is the way we will do it," after the different contributions have been made. I am not making any judgment here about whether it ought to be changed or whether it ought to be in the DCA. But why, offhand, couldn't it be a single service assignment?

General STARBIRD. Oh-
Mr. ROBACK. Do you want to reflect on that?

General STARBIRD. I think there would be a tendency realistically if it were a single service, there would be a tendency, for the other two services to have to fight uphill to get characteristics that they most desired in there.


So with the three-service approach, and particularly with the threeservice approach sitting under the direction of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, it was felt that all could play their part and get their ideas fed in better.

Now, the Navy is certainly the expert on terminals at sea. The Air Force is certainly the expert on what flies in space; and the Army is probably the expert in the usage and need on the ground. So it appeared logical for the formative period to have the three of them.

Mr. ROBACK. All represented.

So is it your feeling or belief that the logic of the situation is if that transitional stage should go into a more specific administrative organization, it would head in your direction?

General STARBIRD. I think that is logical.

Mr. ROBACK. And if it heads in your direction you would be prepared to be aggressive in developing that program?

General STARBIRD. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. There is not any question about that. You are saying that you would do so?

General STARBIRD. We are prepared to take on anything that anybody wants to give us, and I think we are aggressive.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. General Starbird, thank you very much for your responsiveness and your testimony.' You have been a very valuable witness to us. We are going to excuse you at this time. I do not think we will need to have you back, but if we do, we will let you know, and if we wish to send you some letters with additional questions which we may have failed to ask, we would like to do that and have you respond to them.

Now, tomorrow we will have Mr. Rogers and the Air Force isn't that right, at 10 o'clock in this room. General STARBIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The committee is adjourned. (Whereupon, at

12:10 p.m., the subcommittee took a recess, to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Thursday, August 18, 1966.)




Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Chet Holifield and Frank Horton.

Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Douglas G. Dahlin, counsel, and J.P. Carlson, minority staff.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order.

Mr. ROBACK. Is Colonel Paschall of Defense Communications Agency here, or his representative?

Colonel FORBES. I am from Defense Communications Agency. I am Colonel L. G. Forbes.

Mr. ROBACK. Would you convey to General Starbird a request for a copy of a letter which I think is dated January 21, 1966, which directed him to negotiate with Comsat?

Colonel FORBES. I will be happy to do that, sir. (The following was furnished for the record :)


Washington, D.C., January 21, 1966. Memorandum for Secretaries of the military departments, Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Director, Defense Communications Agency. Subject: Employment of satellite communications circuitry in the far Pacific. Reference: JCSM-903–65 dated December 22, 1965, subject as above.

I approve the recommendations in the referenced memorandum for proceeding as expeditiously as possible to lease commercial satellite circuits to improve our communications in the Pacific area. It is essential that these circuits be made available at the earliest practicable date. Therefore the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) acting as a representative of the Executive Agent, National Communications System (NCS) should proceed immediately to conduct negotiations with the Communications Satellite (Comsat) Corp.

Negotiations should be conducted with due regard to those now being carried on by the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) with the Comsat Corp. for the Apollo program communications requirements; therefore, no negotiations by the Director, DCA, should be concluded prior to approval by the Executive Agent, NCS, of the NASA contract. Department of Defense requirements for circuitry will be satisfied with tariff offerings in accordance with applicable Federal Communications Commission procedures.

The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will provide the funds required to support the lease of circuits from the Comsat Corp. in fiscal year 1967 within resources approved for inclusion in the fiscal year 1967 budget estimates. Initial estimates are included in annex 5 to the Defense Communications Agency plan forwarded by the reference.

This action constitutes approval of the subject program under the provisions of DOD directive 4630.1.


Mr. ROBACK. I discussed with General Starbird the question as to whether the members of the carriers, the representatives of the carriers, who sat on the board of Comsat, when they were privy to bidder information which was submited to Comsat, and General Starbird and Colonel Paschall were not necessarily—or were not-acquainted with that aspect of the matter; and we thought that we would inquire on it further.

However, I would appreciate it if you would call to General Starbird's attention a petition for preliminary injunction by ITT World Communications, Inc., which was entered in the U.S. court of appeals on June 22, 1966, No. 20263 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit.

This is, in effect, ITT is suing Comsat for, and asking the court for, a preliminary injunction to, I gather, to restrain them from perhaps accepting this contract.

Now, in the course of this petition which I understand later was withdrawn for want of valid grounds, the ITT, as petitioner, makes a statement about what they quoted to the Government, and they make a statement about what they understand Comsat quoted to the Government.

Now, regardless as to whether these quotations are correct, and I don't believe that ITT was fully informed or at least accurately informed on it, the memorandum has a statement in it:

“Petitioner's information and belief with respect to this figure”as to Comsat's quote to the Government—"is derived from the memorandum of the chairman of the board of directors of Comsat for the directors relating to the board meeting of June 17, 1966."

Now, I don't know whether the chairman of the board informs the members or they get this information in due course, but obviously from the standpoint of the procuring officer, if it is a fact the bidder's information that goes to one bidder is by virtue of board representation available to the other bidders, that creates a problem, doesn't it?

Colonel FORBES. It would appear to, sir.

(The following comment was furnished for the record by General Starbird :)

We have no way of knowing what transpired in the board of directors meetings of Comsat. We do note, however, that the ITT-WC petition for injunction of June 20 was in error where it indicated in paragraph 6, that based upon a chairman of the board memorandum, ITT concluded that Comsat had quoted a lower price to the Government than it had to the carriers. Comsat quoted an annual price of $48,000 per channel to the carriers for the Hawaii earth station to satellite link. The May 31 Comsat proposal to DCA quoted a price of $50,400 for the Hawaii to satellite link.

Mr. ROBACK. I just wanted you to call that to General Starbird's attention.

I believe Mr. Rogers made a statement in his testimony. It was kind of a-not a specific response but a rather speculative response to a question that Mr. Horton raised or was discussing about Early Bird, that is to say, whether the Department of Defense or the DCA was a buyer of circuits from Early Bird; and you said, Mr. Rogers, I believe, that possibly they did, and you referred this matter to General Starbird.

Now, my understanding is that Comsat is not licensed to sell Early Bird circuits to the Government, and that if they were to sell such circuits, they would have to sell them through the carriers. Colonel Forbes, do you have any information on that?

Colonel FORBES. I have no direct information on that, Mr. Roback.

Mr. ROBACK. Well, perhaps you could verify our understanding. Do you have any more information on that, Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. I do not.

Mr. ROBACK. You don't know now whether the Government can buy directly from Comsat or not with respect to Early Bird? Our understanding is Comsat is not licensed to sell Early Bird services to the Government.

Mr. ROGERS. I simply don't know.
Mr. ROBACK. Well, you can ask General Starbird to inform us.

Colonel FORBES. May I ask how the subcommittee would like that submitted ?

Mr. ROBACK. When? Colonel FORBES. How. Mr. ROBACK. In the form of a brief statement for the record. Colonel FORBES. Yes, sir. (The following statement was furnished for the record:) Department of Defense (DOD) has not considered leasing circuits from the Early Bird satellite, either directly from Comsat or from other carriers, since the Early Bird is providing only 18 hours per day service and our requirement is for 24 hours per day service.

Mr. ROBACK. Thanks, Colonel Forbes. We appreciate it.

Mr. Rogers, in the intervening period between your last appearance and this one, you went to, among other places, to MIT, did you not?



Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I did.
Mr. ROBACK. You were there on a secret mission, were you?

Mr. ROGERS. No. I had a very brief meeting in the morning with the new president of MIT, President Johnson.

Mr. ROBACK. I see.

Mr. ROGERS. And then in the afternoon, in the company of one of my assistant directors, and Mr. Davis of the Air Force, I visited the MITRE Corporation.

Mr. ROBACK. Did you learn anything up there about MIT, which you should report to us now!

Mr. ROGERS. Well, they are certainly still in business.
Mr. ROBACK. Let me ask you this, then.

Mr. ROGERS. We did not discuss, I did not discuss, with President Johnson or, to the best of my knowledge, even at the MITRE Corporation, the subject of satellite communications.

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