As an example, the metroliners were designed by a committee. We now are having to overhaul them, upgrade them, and put the electric gear on the roof so it won't suck in snow and dust-snow in winter and dust and heat in the summer.

The experimental United Aircraft TurboTrains are out of service due to the unreliability and poor rideability; they have single axles instead of double axles, on their bogies, or trucks, as we call them in this country.

Although we haven't done everything perfectly, we have a good record in the last 3 years in the equipment design field. We feel we ought to have a major role and, in fact, be the determinator of the operating engineering features.

The funding, of course, comes through the Department. They have a veto power, and we will cooperate with them. We have to adhere to safety regulations. It is a matter of who is carrying the ball rather than what we end up with.

The second major point of disagreement is on the overhead bridges. The Department wants to make a study. While they are making a study, we could have one of those overhead highway bridges fall in on the railroad.

There isn't time to make another bureaucratic study. The conveyance of Penn Central properties to Con Rail, and on to us, did not technically convey these bridges. However, State statutes-and your State of Pennsylvania, Mr. Chairman, has a statute-hold that the operating railroad is responsible for these bridges, so we get orders from the State to repair a highway bridge. That is the last thing that Amtrak ought to be doing, with all the other needs for funds. That is really a highway situation, in my opinion, rather than a railroad situation, particularly concerning Amtrak.

We, in the meantime, since we do not have money for the highway bridge repair, are insuring that the bridge will not fall down on us and if we see one we feel should not have trucks operating over it, or it should have a load limit put on it, we tell the State, so we are going to insure everything is done safely. But we are not repairing them. I feel this ought to be addressed head on, as your committee deliberates, rather than being finessed by a study.

We do have-I am referring to the bottom of page 11 of my prepared statement-minor sechedule changes around the country, which I would like to summarize briefly, because some of you are interested in them.

Out west, the significant one for April 30 will be the total flipflop of the Chicago-Twin Cities-Seattle services, by 12 hours. That service, as is scheduled today, has brought about a lot of complaints from the public in that area. We feel that we should give people the schedules they want, to the extent we can.

In this case, we will be serving the western parks, such as Glacier, during the daylight hours rather than at nighttime.

In the East, there are two major changes. First, we would add time to the metroliners. Based on this year's track work program, which began this Monday, we are now able to simulate operations, with the assistance of the computer, based for example on work on track one and track four, between X and Y, so we know how much

time is needed, and each metroliner schedule is being adjusted. The average would be something on the order of 15 minutes. We think this will be very helpful in cutting complaints and also having people know when in the world the train is going to arrive.

We should have done it last year. However, we were dealing with moving targets. We didn't know which track we were going to work on and when. We were working when we were also planning. This year, we have an FRA-Amtrak plan for track work and we will program this.

If we need refinements, in June, we will have a time for rescheduling again.

The second big change is we are removing several Friday-Sunday trains, which are like extras-they are very costly-and spreading the other schedules in that time-frame so we can better accommodate the loads on a daily basis.

Adding a train in a very significant gap we had open in the present schedules is one that I personally should have caught before this. We go from 2:45 in the afternoon until 5 p.m. out of New York City today with nonmetroliner trains-let's call it the Amfleet-the conventional service to Washington. That is why we have standingroom-only on the metroliners.

There is more demand than we can handle. There is crowding on that 4:45 train, and also on the 5 p.m. trains. We are adding a 4 p.m. train. It comes out to be roughly equal to what we are doing today. We are only adding about 1,000 train-miles a week, and for about the same cost.

I would like to comment

Mr. SKUBITZ. Are you losing money on the routes when you crowd them in that way, or not?

Mr. REISTRUP. We lose money, as you know, over the entire system, and if every seat were filled-but in the Northeast corridor, the metroliners bring in more money than they cost on a direct basisand the Washington and Boston trains which we are referring toso actually, we are ahead of the game. But fares do not cover the fully allocated costs, however.

Mr. SKUBITZ. They don't?

Mr. BRAZIER. That is correct.

Mr. REISTRUP. I think we should, as I said in my opening remarks, get it all out on the table, referring to H.R. 11098, which would be quite a radical change in Amtrak as it compares with Mr. Staggers' bill, which is evolutionary.

The purpose of H.R. 11098, as I see it, is admirable. It is simply to save money. However, the purpose of Mr. Staggers' bill, which we feel is admirable but a lot more complex, is to save the passenger train service as a national system serving all regions of the Nation.

The question of costs is not be be neglected, and it is not neglected in the Staggers bill. It is proportionate to need and to moderate service growth, such as the taxpayers and the voters of this Nation.

want.

We, at Amtrak-and I would like to say it again-support a route restructuring process. We are trying to help the Department of Transportation in every way we can. We found that working with the route and service criteria, and procedures, was very cumbersome, one route at a time, and when we got into a region such as the

Southeast-the Floridian was the first train we worked on-it was having a ripple effect on other services.

Connecting ridership is very important to Amtrak. About onefifth of our passengers connect from one train to another, so we were really unable to handle that sort of a change in the whole Southeast of the United States, using those procedures.

I think that it is time for a zero-based study. We are waiting for it. I wish we could have had it by March 1. What is recommended and approved by you should be properly funded, first, with capital and then with the operating grants. Let's do it right rather than starting out on the wrong basis.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, I have already covered the winter well enough.

I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, that the Amtrak people have matured, particularly those that are representing the railroads in the Northeast corridor. It is a sergeant that runs the Army. It is conductors and yardmasters and maintenance-of-way people that run

a railroad.

I don't know how they did it with snow up to their waist this year. But it shows you what a railroad can do. We had the airline passengers, including the mayor of Boston. I was on some of those trains. Many of the passengers are not with us every day, when they need us, they know we are there, and they can count on us. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Reistrup's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF PAUL H. REISTRUP, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP. (AMTRAK)

Mr. Chairman; Members of the Committee: We would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify on Amtrak's capital and operating authorizations for Fiscal Year 1979; on the legislation that has been introduced (H.R. 11493) by the Chairman of the full Committee and with a number of cosponsors; on Amtrak today—its problems and our progress, and on proposed changes to our basic statute, The Rail Passenger Service Act, some of which are incorporated in H.R. 11493, and some others that are pending in other proposed legislation. Mr. Chairman, in this settlement, and I hope it is with this Committee's understanding, I am going to depart somewhat from the usual form for Amtrak testimony. I have in the past taken the position that it is Amtrak's job to run the best possible passenger railroad and to defer to the nation's policymakers for decisions on national transportation policy. That still stands. But as a citizen, and as Amtrak's chief executive officer for the past 37 months, and as a member of the Amtrak Board of Directors, I believe the time has come for me to speak out on some of the basic policy issues as well.

As you all know, especially you, Mr. Chairman-and Mr. Staggers, Chairman of the full committee also knows the full history-Amtrak has been under attack from some quarters-not just since its beginning but before its very conception. Congress, which was as usual far more closely in touch with the American public than the policymakers of the administrative branch, knew well before 1970 that something was going to have to be done by the Federal government to save passenger train service in this country, for the simple reason that the American people wanted it saved. Congressional initiatives in the 1960s forced a reluctant administration to go along with a compromise approach that finally resulted in the establishment of Amtrak. The compromise took many forms, among them the discontinuance at the stroke of midnight. April 30, 1971, of fully half of the passenger trains and routes still serving American communities. Another was the very limited funding the Administration was willing to approve.

Some people were convinced, in 1971, that Amtrak was just a shell game. contrived by a hostile administration, designed to prove within a few years that passenger train service had no future in this country. Congress knew other

wise. Although the future of the passenger train was an open question, the Congress took steps to see that the test would be the fairest test possible.

The Act was innovative in the best legislative sense of the word. Rail passenger service was freed of a great deal of burdensome regulation and bureaucratic red tape. And, perhaps most importantly, the passenger train service was made national in scope and put under a management that had no other interest but running passenger service, which includes those ancillary and often very profitable services that historically were combined with passenger train operations-mail and express.

We were specifically defined as neither an agency nor an establishment of the United States government. Although we were and remain heavily dependent on federal funding we were ordered to be incorporated as a for-profit corporation. The law could, perhaps, have specified us to be a non-profit corporation, but there are certain advantages to a "for-profit" charter, not the least of which is support for a corporate emphasis that constantly directs managerial attention to the never-ending struggle to control costs and improve revenues. Our philosophy must be to obtain as many dollars as possible from the farebox while incurring the minimum in expenses, and that is what the words "for profit" tell us to do.

Subsequent amendments to the Act, amendments that were almost exclusively Congressional initiatives, expanded the necessary funding—especially for capital improvements-made it easier for Amtrak to bring its needs directly to the Congress without first passing them through the many layers of the Federal bureaucracy, required added routes (recognizing that the early 1971 Amtrak route structure was too thin), and assisted in numerous technical ways with other problems such as customs handling for passengers, continuation of Metroliner telephone service, facilitation of state-assisted services, and help in defining the basis of Amtrak's payment for railroad-provided services. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 11493 would help us take another long step further into the future. We support this legislation. It continues the present system and preserves the present institutional concepts while permitting a timely review of the route structure and an examination of the question of how we might do better-how a better system could be evolved from the present one, with improved revenue possibilities, reduced costs, service maximization where the markets will support more trains, and sufficient capital for the improvements to do the job right.

Not long ago before this committee I suggested that if we are to have a passenger train system in this nation, then we should fund it properly and operate it properly. That remains my position today. I find that spirit in the Staggers bill now before you.

I would like to make a strong statement for the record here today, that despite our problems-and at times they have been monumental-Amtrak today is a success: Based on what we already have done with the help of Congress, we today have a system with promise for a decade of uncertainties ahead. We are now for the first time beginning to show what we can do. The public welcomes our new trains and stations and protests proposed discontinuances. Our new equipment is making a difference. Our record of service this winter compared to last winter shows the value of an all-electric car system. In New England during the blizzard in late February we were the only form of transportation moving, local or intercity.

Mr. Chairman, earlier I alluded to the fact that the reason we have an Amtrak today is that the American people want this intercity train service. This was true in the 1960s and it was true in 1972, when Amtrak was just getting underway and commissioned a national survey by Louis Harris and Associates. The Harris polling organization has now repeated and updated its 1972 survey. A similar survey just announced by the Department of Transportation confirms the Harris results.

These surveys support what you already know from your constituent mail and personal contacts. The new Harris survey continues to find a decisive mandate from the public to upgrade intercity rail passenger service (and mass transportation generally). There is today less support than in 1972 for highway or airport construction.

A substantial majority-60 percent-want improvements in the quality and availability of rail passenger travel. This percentage is up from 54 percent in 1972. A majority of those polled want the federal government to spend more to get these improvements.

The Harris poll found that a major reason for the increasing support for mass transportation-including intercity and commuter rail transit-is the perceived future shortage of energy, a problem that must concern us all. The automobile is convenient and the airplane saves travel time, but on a per-seatmile basis both consume inordinate amounts of fuel. The bus and the train are our most energy-efficient modes. Assisted in large part by our massive national investment in the interstate highway system, the bus can be more efficient than the train in moving smaller groups of passengers. But with our new highcapacity equipment, moving large numbers of people, Amfleet trains can provide the maximum fuel efficiency of any intercity mode of travel. (Chart attached.)

Earlier, I said that in terms of the original Congressional intent, Amtrak should, despite its critics, be considered a success. Amtrak has succeeded in bringing back passengers lost to other forms of transportation and bringing on board a whole new generation who are discovering the advantages of train travel. If we had more train-miles we would have more seats to sell, and with equipment and schedules reliable enough to advertise, we can sell them. To date, Amtrak has been equipment-limited, both in terms of quality and quantity. Progress is now being made. If we had more services over which to spread our fixed costs-the overhead-the revenue-to-cost ratios would be better.

Our critics can point to only one "failure". That is our need for subsidy. If it had not been for inflation-an unpredicted double-digit inflation-our financial position would today be much better. This inflation, which was not foreseen in 1971, was beyond our control.

Our critics neglect the effect of inflation and they also neglect the fact that in our nation's history there is no mode of transportation that has even become established on a continental scale without substantial government support, whether it be by direct appropriations, funding for public works, the power of government to shape by regulation and law the very growth patterns of our land, or by the use of the coercive power of eminent domain. These subsidies or supports, call them what you will-also tend to continue for the other modes, although they may be modified over time as one mode or another gains strength.

In Amtrak's case, the need for subsidy was not to assist in the development of a new form of transportation. Rather, it was to resurrect one, operating over right-of-way long neglected_by_national policies assisting other modes. And resurrection is the right word. Passenger train service was so near death that the distinction is academic.

As I told the legislative committee in the Senate, we have not developed detailed technical comments on every provision in the legislation being here considered. The Amtrak Board at its March meeting considered the provisions in H.R. 11493, that they appear to be most constructive in intent. I have been authorized by the Board to continue to work cooperatively with the Congress and this Committee in the further development of this legislation.

The Board supports either of the approaches offered in the legislation introduced by Senator Long or Chairman Staggers (Section 3 of H.R. 11493) to better define the tasks and readjust the time periods for development and review of the Department of Transportation's "zero-based" systemwide route study. We think it will be helpful for the question of resubmission of revised recommendations to be clarified.

Although there were several dissenting votes, the Board also specifically approved the principle in H.R. 11493 that the recommendations that are adopted by Congress be done so on an affirmative vote of the full House and Senate.

AUTHORIZATION LEVELS

We appreciate that the amounts authorized for operating and capital funding are in accordance with Amtrak's most recent Five Year Corporate Plan as presented to the Congress and the Administration in October. I have been specifically authorized by the Amtrak Board to seek the funding specified in the plan, which was carefully developed. I should add that we can justify every dollar requested for capital improvements either in terms of improved service, continued reliability of service, compliance with health or pollution requirements, and more efficient operation of the sort that can reduce operating losses by improving productivity. Further, these plans were conservatively developed under an assumption that there would be no energy crisis forcing wholesale public shifts to public transportation modes.