CARDOZO, J., dissenting. 298 U.S. Recklessness and deceit do not automatically excuse themselves by notice of repentance. Under § 24 of the Act, there is the possibility, at times the likelihood, of penal liability. A statement wilfully false or wilfully defective is a penal offense to be visited, upon conviction, with fine or imprisonment. Under § 12, there is the possibility, if not the likelihood, of liability for damages. The statement now in question had been effective for over twenty days, and the witness did not couple his notice of withdrawal with an affidavit or even a declaration that securities had not been sold. Nor is the statute lacking in machinery with which to set these liabilities. in motion upon appropriate occasion. Under § 19 (b), plenary authority is conferred on the Commission to conduct all investigations believed to be necessary and proper for the enforcement of the Act and of any of its provisions. There will be only partial attainment of the ends of public justice unless retribution for the past is added to prevention for the future. But the opinion. of the court teaches us that however flagrant the offense and however laudable the purpose to uncover and repress it, investigations under § 19 (b) will be thwarted on the instant when once the statement of the registrant has been effectively withdrawn. If that is so, or even indeed if the effect of the retraction is to embarrass the inquiry to cloud the power to continue-the fairness of the Rule is proved out of the mouths of its accusers. If such consequences are inherent in a privilege of withdrawal indiscriminately bestowed, there is need of some restraint upon the power of the wrongdoer to mitigate the penalties attaching to his wrong. Shall the truth be shown forth or buried in the archives? The Commission is to determine in the light of all the circumstances, including its information as to the conduct of the applicant, whether the public interest will be prompted by forgetting and forgiving. Bronx Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U. S. 230. 1 CARDOZO, J., dissenting. The objection is inadequate that an investigation directed to the discovery of a crime is one not for the Commission, but for the prosecuting officer. There are times when the functions of the two will coincide or overlap. Congress has made it plain that any inquiry helpful in the enforcement of the statute may be pursued by the Commission, though conduct punishable as a crime may thereby be uncovered. Indeed, the Act is explicit-§ 22 (c) that a witness is not excused from testifying on the ground that the testimony required of him may tend to incriminate him or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. He may, however, claim his privilege, and if then compelled to testify, may not be prosecuted thereafter for any matter thus revealed. All this is far from proving that there can be no practical advantage in keeping the proceeding open. Aside from the possibility of civil liability, the offender may not choose to claim the privilege, and even if he does, and is then excused from testifying, other witnesses may be available, for example, employes, who are not implicated in the offense and who can bring the facts to view. Moreover, amnesty for one offender may mean conviction for another, an associate in the crime. Inquiry by the Commission is thus more penetrating and efficient than one by a grand jury where there is no statutory grant of amnesty to compel confederates to speak. More important still, the enforcement of the Act is aided when guilt is exposed to the censure of the world, though the witness in the act of speaking may make punishment impossible. It is no answer to all this that upon the record now presented a crime has not been. proved or even definitely charged. An investigator is not expected to prove or charge at the beginning the offenses which he has reason to suspect will be uncovered at the end. The petition in behalf of the Commission enumerates one by one the false statements and the omissions imputed to the registrant. Some at least are of www 298 U.S. Opinion of the Court. HART v. VIRGINIA. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. No. 857. Jurisdictional statement distributed March 28, 1936.Decided April 13, 1936. A convict in a Virginia penitentiary who kills an officer or guard having him in custody is not chargeable under §§ 5049 and 5051 of the Virginia Code of 1930, as construed by the Virginia courts, if the killing was done in self-defense. Appeal dismissed. APPEAL from a judgment sustaining a verdict and sentence for felonious homicide. Mr. S. H. Bond for appellant. Mr. Abram P. Staples, Attorney General of Virginia, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, a convict, was convicted of the felonious killing of one Alton Leonard, a prison guard, in whose custody appellant was working. The jury fixed his punishment at death. The conviction and sentence were pursuant to §§ 5049 and 5051 of the Virginia Code, 1930, providing, so far as pertinent, as follows: "§ 5049. A convict confined in the penitentiary, or in custody of an officer, shall be deemed guilty of felony if he kill, wound, or inflict other bodily injury upon an officer or guard of the penitentiary; "S 5051. A convict guilty of such killing as is mentioned in section five thousand and forty-nine, or of any act therein mentioned, from which death ensues to such officer or guard, shall be punished with death." Appellant challenged these provisions as being repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses 34 Opinion of the Court. of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. His main contentions were that the statute was so broad as to embrace excusable homicide and that, as a convict he was deprived of the equal protection of the laws relating to murder and manslaughter. We take the statute as construed by the state court and applied in the instant case. Appellant defended the killing of Leonard upon the ground of self-defense. The evidence in support of that defense, with all the circumstances of the case, was submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions which recognized the admissibility of the defense under the statute. The trial court, defining with care the right of self-defense, charged the jury that if appellant had acted in the exercise of that right, the jury should find him not guilty. The Supreme Court of Appeals refused to review the judgment upon the ground that it was "plainly right." As we find no substantial federal question presented, the appeal is dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. (1) Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67, 70; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160; Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277; (2) Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616, 630; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 79; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 453. Dismissed. 298 U.S. Opinion of the Court. SCHENEBECK v. McCRARY ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS. No. 810. Jurisdictional statement distributed March 28, 1936.Decided April 13, 1936. A taxpayer in Arkansas has no vested interest in public funds deposited by a county treasurer in a designated depositary; consequently, state legislation releasing the treasurer and his bondsmen and the bondsmen of the depositary from liability for deposits lost through the insolvency of the depositary, was not in this case an impairment of the obligation of contracts. 191 Ark. 698; 87 S. W. (2d) 572, affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment affirming in part and in part reversing a judgment of the trial court in an action to recover county funds. Mr. John Ross Thompson for appellant. Mr. Charles A. Walls for appellees. PER CURIAM. Prior to its insolvency, the Lonoke County Bank was the duly designated depository for the public funds of Lonoke County, Arkansas. In November, 1934, the County Court entered an order compromising the liability of the sureties on the depository bond. In December, 1934, appellant, a taxpayer of the county, brought this action, in the first count, against the county treasurer and her bondsmen, and in the second count, against the bondsmen for the depository, seeking to recover the amount of public funds on deposit in the bank when it closed. The defense relied upon Acts No. 16 and No. 325 of the Acts of Arkansas of 1935. Act No. 16 released county treasurers and their bondsmen from liability where deposited funds had been lost by reason of the insolvency |