Argument for Appellant. 298 U.S. the State of Ohio on "accounts and notes receivable." The record, however, presents the question of the constitutionality of the tax in West Virginia, and no question of the amount or validity of any tax assessed elsewhere. 4. The West Virginia statutes, as construed by the state court, tax only such part of the intangible property of a foreign corporation as upon the facts and the applicable principles of law the State may rightfully tax. P. 215. 5. No delegation of authority, violative of the Federal Constitution, exists in permitting the state tax officials to fix the assessment of intangible property of a foreign corporation by applying the law to the facts, subject to review by the state courts and ultimately to review, as to any federal questions arising, by this Court. P. 215. 6. The assertion that the West Virginia tax on intangible property of foreign business corporations, in comparison with taxes on property of natural persons, railroads and other public utilities, denies to business corporations the equal protection of the laws, is not sustained by the record in this case. P. 215. Affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment of a Circuit Court of West Virginia in a statutory proceeding for the review of a tax assessment. The Supreme Court of Appeals of the State denied a writ of error, the judgment having been entered pursuant to its decision on a previous review. In re Wheeling Steel Corporation Assessment, 115 W. Va. 553; 177 S. E. 535. Messrs. J. E. Bruce and Wright Hugus for appellant. The statutory provisions, as construed, operate to tax property over which the State has no jurisdiction. The State creating a corporation has the sole right to tax the intangible property of that corporation unless such intangible property has acquired a "business situs" elsewhere, that is, it has been derived from, and is being held for use in, a purely local business. And conversely, a State which is not the domicile of the taxpaying corporation, and in which the intangible property of 193 Argument for Appellant. such corporation has not acquired a "business situs," cannot, consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, impose a tax upon such property. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board, 221 U. S. 346; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586. West Virginia is not the domicile of the appellant. Appellant was organized and now exists under and by virtue of the laws of Delaware. It operates in West Virginia, Ohio and Minnesota as a foreign corporation, having complied with the laws of each of those States taxing and regulating foreign corporations doing business therein. The laws of West Virginia do not provide for the domestication of foreign business corporations. On the contrary, c. 31, Art. 1, § 79 (Michie Code, 1932, § 3091) provides that foreign corporations may do business, as foreign corporations, within West Virginia under certain conditions. Foreign corporations doing business within the State preserve their status as foreign corporations. Chapter 11, Art. 12, § 71 (Michie Code, 1932, § 939) illustrates that different methods are used in calculating license taxes imposed on foreign, as distinguished from domestic, corporations, and that the policy of West Virginia is to maintain that distinction. The Supreme Court of Appeals in its opinion took the position that, notwithstanding the facts that appellant is a foreign corporation, that 72.90% of its real estate and tangible personal property is located outside of West Virginia, and that 75.80% of its shipments in 1932 originated from its manufacturing plants located outside of West Virginia, its entire business had been localized in West Virginia. This overthrows the distinction between domestic and foreign corporations as now existing in the law, and Argument for Appellant. 298 U.S. attempts to substitute therefor a distinction depending, apparently, upon the place where the executive and management functions are exercised. It transfers to the place of control at least one of the attributes of domicile the power to tax the total intangible property of a corporate taxpayer irrespective of the fact that its real estate and tangible personal property may be located elsewhere. From the finding that all the property of the appellant is controlled by the executive offices in West Virginia, the state court deduces that all the intangible personal property owned by appellant, wherever it may be said to be located and however arising, except that portion actually taxed in other States, is taxable by West Virginia. It may just as well be argued that all the real property and all the tangible personal property owned by appellant is likewise controlled by the West Virginia office; and, if the court's reasoning is correct, should also be amenable to assessment and taxation in West Virginia. But the court does not attempt to extend the argument to its logical conclusion. If taxation of real and tangible personal property located outside of the jurisdiction of the taxing authority is deprivation of property without due process (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194), the assessment and taxation of intangible personal property located or arising from business done outside of the jurisdiction of the taxing authority is just as much an attempted deprivation of property without due process. Appellant owns and operates manufacturing facilities both within and without the State of West Virginia. Only 27.10% of the assessed value of its real estate and tangible personal property is located in West Virginia. Only 24.20% of its shipments originated in West Virginia in 1932. Its West Virginia production was 15.6% of the total production in 1932. Only 19.45% of its employees 193 Argument for Appellant. were employed in West Virginia in 1932. Its West Virginia payrolls were only 16.22% of the total payrolls in 1932. Its West Virginia ingot capacity is only 16.6% of its total ingot capacity, and ingot capacity is a recognized basis of determining the producing ability of a steel company. It is clear that the larger portion of appellant's intangibles sought to be assessed and taxed by West Virginia was derived from operations carried on outside of West Virginia. If intangibles can have any situs for taxation other than at appellant's domicile in Delaware, such situs cannot be determined solely by control, for such a rule would result in taxation of property outside of the jurisdiction of the State. The use of tangible property, both real and personal, in business, creates intangible property; and it is submitted that the only fair rule for the taxation of property in States other than the State of the domicile is a rule which allocates intangibles on the basis of tangible property owned and used in production of material for sale. Such a rule will permit each State in which tangible property is located and operated for profit to tax a fair proportion of the intangible property created within its borders. It is well settled in the law that a corporation is domiciled in the State of its creation, and that it cannot migrate. It may own property and do business in other States, but its domicile is not thereby changed. To hold that a corporation may have a roving domicile, dependent upon the place its executive functions are exercised from time to time, would be an anomaly. Adams Express Co. v. State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185. The money and accounts receivable here sought to be taxed are property derived from business done for the most part in the State of Ohio. The management activities in West Virginia, particularly the "control" emphasized by the state court, did not create these intangibles. Argument for Appellant. 298 U.S. Appellant's business is not localized in West Virginia. Its general offices in Wheeling did not and could not bring into existence such intangibles without the acts of manufacture and shipment in and from the State of Ohio. The most important act-the manufacture of the steel-was performed in Ohio. No money would have been received, and no credits would have been created but for such manufacture. If intangibles arising from appellant's Ohio manufacturing operations are taxable in any State, other than Delaware, they are taxable in Ohio. They are not taxable in West Virginia. Hans Rees Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123; American Barge Line Co. v. Board, 246 Ky. 573; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U. S. 1; First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312. The state law, as construed, results in multiple taxation. Cases hereinafter discussed involve not only property taxes, but also transfer, inheritance, license and income taxes, but the same general jurisdictional principles govern all types of taxation. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473. The modern view of this Court, to the effect that multiple taxation of intangible personal property is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, apparently had its inception in the case of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83. That intangibles consisting of negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness are subject to the imposition. of an inheritance tax only by the State of the decedent's domicile was held in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204. This case expressly overruled Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, involved other types of intangible property. In that case the Court |