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constant, like the statute, in the absence of deflecting forces. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 507; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596, 615; Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362, 366; Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610, 622; Clark Bros. & Co. v. Pou, 20 F. (20) 74, 77, 78; Greene v. Darling (Story, J.), 5 Mason 201, 210; Gray v. Rollo, 18 Wall. 629, 632; Dade v. Irwin's Executor, 2 How. 383, 390, 391; Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 229 U. S. 523, 528, 529; Pond v. Harwood, 139 N. Y. 111, 119; 34 N. E. 768; Frank v. Mercantile National Bank, 182 N. Y. 264, 268; 74 N. E. 841; Lockwood v. Beckwith, 6 Mich. 168, 175; Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 14th ed., $$ 1871, 1872.

The defects of the certificate, its incomplete disclosure of the facts conditioning an answer, are thus exhibited in clear relief. “Insolvency" in proceedings to reorganize (S 77) is often very different from “insolvency” in ordinary bankruptcy. $ 1 (15). There is at least a possibility that at times the difference may be great enough to vary the resulting equities. When things are called by the same name it is easy for the mind to slide into an assumption that the verbal identity is accompanied in all its sequences by identity of meaning. A court of equity in allowing or rejecting set-off will not be guilty of that fallacy. To know "the justice of the particular case" (Scott v. Armstrong, supra; Story, Equity Jurisprudence, supra), one must know the case in its particulars. More concretely, one must know the value of the assets, the temporary or permanent character of the debtor's inability to pay its debts as they mature, the liens, if there are any, superior to the bonds in controversy, the probability of an understanding that the bonds, though unmatured, would be used to cancel the deposits, all the circumstances, in brief, that might affect the judgment of the chancellor in weighing the competing equities of the

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interested factions and shaping his decree accordingly. We have no thought at this time to foreshadow the result of an exploring expedition directed to those ends. When all the facts are known, they may be found to offer no excuse for a departure from the rule in bankruptcy which, as indicated already, is generally, even if not always, the rule in equity as well. They may point, on the other hand, to the need for an exception, or may even lead to a decree in the nature of a compromise, the moneys being paid into the registry of the court to abide its future action. A decision balancing the equities must await the exposure of a concrete situation with all its qualifying incidents. What we disclaim at the moment is a willingness to put the law into a strait-jacket by subjecting it to a pronouncement of needless generality.

Question No. 3 is so framed as not to call for an answer unless an affirmative answer is given to questions Nos. 1 and 2.

Our conclusion as to the defective form of the certificate is borne out in a striking way by the concession of the parties. Before the argument on the questions, plaintiffs and defendant joined in moving us for an order to bring up the whole case. That motion was denied. Nothing in the nature of the controversy called for a writ of certiorari in advance of a decision by the court of intermediate appeal. The significant thing, however, is that in briefs submitted on that motion both parties admitted that the second question was defective. The plaintiffs said: the statement "is not sufficiently complete to enable this court to answer the second question as applied to this case.” The defendant made a like objection. Plaintiffs and defendant fortified their general criticism by the enumeration of particular defects. The certificate is

Dismissed. Opinion of the Court.

ZIMMERN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 766. Argued April 3, 1936.—Decided April 27, 1936.

An order made by a district judge on his own motion during the

term at which a decree has been entered, reciting the need for an amendment of the decree and extending the term to a future day for the declared purpose of allowing such amendment, without specifying the change in contemplation, has the effect of suspending the operation of the decree so that no appeal can be taken

from it until it has been amended or confirmed. P. 169. 79 F. (20) 703, reversed.

CERTIORARI, 297 U. S. 701, to review a judgment dismissing an appeal.

Mr. Lawrence Koenigsberger for petitioners.

Mr. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Attorney General Jackson, and Messrs. Sewall Key and S. E. Blackham were on the brief, for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by law.

The United States brought suit to set aside a deed by Samuel Zimmern to his wife, and another deed, in which the wife joined, to his children, a separate parcel of real estate being the subject of each. At the time of the conveyance Samuel Zimmern was indebted to the complainant for a deficiency of income taxes duly assessed against him. The deeds were attacked upon the ground that they

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interested factions and shaping his decree accordingly. We have no thought at this time to foreshadow the result of an exploring expedition directed to those ends. When all the facts are known, they may be found to offer no excuse for a departure from the rule in bankruptcy which, as indicated already, is generally, even if not always, the rule in equity as well. They may point, on the other hand, to the need for an exception, or may even lead to a decree in the nature of a compromise, the moneys being paid into the registry of the court to abide its future action. A decision balancing the equities must await the exposure of a concrete situation with all its qualifying incidents. What we disclaim at the moment is a willingness to put the law into a strait-jacket by subjecting it to a pronouncement of needless generality.

Question No. 3 is so framed as not to call for an answer unless an affirmative answer is given to questions Nos. 1

and 2.

Our conclusion as to the defective form of the certificate is borne out in a striking way by the concession of the parties. Before the argument on the questions, plaintiffs and defendant joined in moving us for an order to bring up the whole case. That motion was denied. Nothing in the nature of the controversy called for a writ of certiorari in advance of a decision by the court of intermediate appeal. The significant thing, however, is that in briefs submitted on that motion both parties admitted that the second question was defective. The plaintiffs said: the statement "is not sufficiently complete to enable this court to answer the second question as applied to this case.” The defendant made a like objection. Plaintiffs and defendant fortified their general criticism by the enumeration of particular defects. The certificate is

Dismissed. Opinion of the Court.

ZIMMERN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 766. Argued April 3, 1936.-Decided April 27, 1936.

An order made by a district judge on his own motion during the

term at which a decree has been entered, reciting the need for an amendment of the decree and extending the term to a future day for the declared purpose of allowing such amendment, without specifying the change in contemplation, has the effect of suspending the operation of the decree so that no appeal can be taken

from it until it has been amended or confirmed. P. 169. 79 F. (20) 703, reversed.

.

CERTIORARI, 297 U. S. 701, to review a judgment dismissing an appeal.

Mr. Lawrence Koenigsberger for petitioners.

Mr. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., with whom Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Attorney General Jackson, and Messrs. Sewall Key and S. E. Blackham were on the brief, for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by law.

The United States brought suit to set aside a deed by Samuel Zimmern to his wife, and another deed, in which the wife joined, to his children, a separate parcel of real estate being the subject of each. At the time of the conveyance Samuel Zimmern was indebted to the complainant for a deficiency of income taxes duly assessed against him. The deeds were attacked upon the ground that they

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