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in a Circle ten thousand times lefs than the Equator, that there is in the Equator it felf. And because there may be a Circle drawn from any point of the Diameter, the leffer Circles may be multiply'd to as many as there are points in the Diameter, which are innumerable; and therefore the leaft Circle imaginable may by this Demonftration have as many points as the greatest, that is, it may be as big as the greateft, or as big as one never fo many thousand times bigger than it felf. For all the Lines drawn from the utmost Circumference, terminate in the Center, which proves that the Center, or the leaft Circle imaginable Immediately next to it, must be equal to the Circumference never fo much bigger than it. For to answer, that the lefler Circles have as many points, but not fo big as the greatest, is against the Suppofition, becaufe I fuppofe a Line drawn from every one of the leaft points of the greatest Circle, through the leaft Circle to the Center, and the least points in the greateft Circle must be as fmall as any in the least Circle, there being nothing in the nature of Circles or Points to hinder it, and every Line paffing from the Circumference to the Center, is fuppofed to be of the fame bigness in all its parts, and therefore all the Points of Interfection must be equal with those in the Circumference.

This proves, that we may lose our selves in the Speculation of Material things: for when we once abftract them from Senfe, and confider them in the Theory, they become inexplicable: Because our Faculties were never defign'd for fuch Speculations, and are not made for them, nor are capable of them, at least in this mortal ftate. But this is no Argument, that our Senfes rightly difpos'd, and in due Circumftances, may deceive us in things, which are the Objects of Senfe, or that we may be deceiv'd in trufting to them. Because what is the Object of Senfe, is the proper Object for us to judge of by Notions deriv'd

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from our Senfes, or by the Informations which we receive from them. Our Faculties were defign'd not for mere Speculation and Curiosity about matters, which perhaps it is impoffible for us Creatures fully to comprehend, but for our Ufe and Welfare: they were defign'd to prevent our being deceiv'd in things which are the Objects of Senfe; and therefore all the Abfurdities, which are charged upon the Doctrine of Tranfubftantiation, are truly urged, because they are concerning an Object of Sense; and all fuch Maxims, as the Part is less than the Whole, &c. must hold true, when they are apply'd to Objects of Senfe, tho' it be past our Understindings to conceive, how they fhould be applicable to things, which do not fall under the Perception of our Senfes; for thefe Notions were implanted in us, to guide and direct us in the Courfe of this Life; and we must rely upon them, when they are apply'd only to their proper Objects, rather than upon any Speculations, which are too nice and high for our Conceptions. And it is as abfurd to believe what contradicts our Scafes in an Object of Senfe, as to extend thefe Maxims to Objects which are infenfible, and only in Idéa.

The feeming Demonstration of these, and fuch like Contradictions, arifes from the applying of the Maxims taken from Physical and Material things, to Mathematical Ideas, which are in the Mind only, and have no Existence in the Nature of things. And the fame Abfurdities, may be ftarted upon any other Subje, by confounding the feveral Notions and Properties of things of different Natures. That the Whole is greater than Part of it, is a Phyfical Axiom, and obvious to Senfe; but that Lines are form'd by indivifible Points, is purely Mathematical Speculation, and the Work of Reafon. So again, that Matter is divisible, is an Object of Senfe; but, that Divifibility is infeparable from Matter, is mere Speculation, and a Deduction which is made from Senfe; of which our Senfes

Senfes can give us no Affurance, but that our Reason may be mistaken in it. And whenever we pafs the proper Bounds of each Faculty, and judge of the Dif ficulties concerning the Objects belonging to one Faculty, by abstracted Notions belonging to another we must neceffarily fall into Error and Confufion. And therefore this must needs happen, when we reafon about Objects, which we know only by Revelation, and which are the Natural and Proper Objects of none of our Faculties.

There are proper Notions and Maxims, which belong to the feveral Natures and Kinds of things, and these must of neceffity fail us, when they are used about things of another Nature. Thus if a Man fhould judge of Sounds by his Idea's of Colours, or of Colours by his Notions of Sounds, he might multiply, Contradictions without end: and yet thefe are not more different, than fenfible Objects are from infenfible, and material from immaterial. God may fee it fitting to reveal fuch things to us, as are above our Underftandings, but then we must be contented to take his Word for the Truth of them, and not apply our Principles and Maxims taken from things of an inferiour Nature, to things of which we can have no Conception but from Revelation: which would be as abfurd, as for a deaf Man to apply the Notion which he has of Colours to Sounds; or for a blind Man to fancy, that there is no fuch thing as Colours, becaufe he is told they cannot be heard.

And there must be a due proportion between the Faculty and its Object. For the Faculties both of our Bodies and Minds are confined and limited in their' Exercise about their feveral Objects. The Parts of Matter may be too fmall and fine to be any longer difcern'd or perceiv'd by Senfe. For only Bodies which are fo big as to reflect a due Quantity of Rays to the Eye, can be perceiv'd by the Sight it felf, the quickest and fubtileft of all our Senfes. And as Objects in

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their Bulk are fenfible, but are infenfible in their minute Parts; fo it is in the inward Senfations or Perceptions of the Mind in refpect of its Objects. We may puzzle and perplex our felves in the Deductions, which may be made from the most common Notions. Nothing is more certain and familiar to our Minds, than our own Thoughts. That we Think, and Underftand, and Will, we all know, but what is the Principle and Subject of Thought in us, and how our Understanding and Will act upon, and determine each other, is matter of perpetual Dispute.

The Sum of this Argument is, that our Faculties are finite, and of no very large Extent in their Operations, but are confined to certain Objects, and limited to certain Bounds and Periods. Both our Natural and Acquired Knowledge is converfant about certain kinds of Objects, and our Faculties are fitted and fuited to them; and from the Properties and Affections which we obferve in them, we form Notions, and make Conclufions, and raise Maxims and Axioms. Now if we apply our Natural Notions to things which we know only by Revelation, we must be very liable to great Mistakes about them. For thus it is in things not fo much out of the Reach of our Capacities, and which are not of a:fpiritual Nature; if we frame fpeculative and abftra& Idea's from the Principles and Maxims which are for m'd in our Minds from fenfible Objects, we may foon puzzle our felves, and feem to demonftrate Contradi&tions; which demonftrates only, that all Arguments of this nature are vain and unconcluding. And therefore it must be abfurd to reject the Mysteries of Religion, because they will not come under the Rules of Logick and Philofophy, when they are acknowledg'd to be incomprehenfible, and therefore not to be judg'd of as to the Manner and Nature of them by the Rules and Principles of Humane Sciences.

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What has been here alledg'd concerning the Contradictions about the Divifibility of Matter is no more than has been generally confefs'd by the best Philofophers and Mathematicians. And the excellent Mr Boyle, having produced the Testimony of Galileo and Des Cartes upon this Subject, concludes with this Obfervation. If then fuch bold and piercing Wits, and fuch excellent Mathematicians, are forced to confefs, that not only their own Reafon, but that of Mankind, may be pass'd and non-plus'd about Quantity, which is an Object of Contemplation, Natural, nay Mathematical, and which is the Subject of the rigid Demonftrations of pure Mathematicks, why should we think it unfit to be believ'd, and to be acknowledg'd, that in the Attributes of God who is effentially an infinite Being, and an Ens fingulariffimum, and in divers other Divine things, of which we can have no knowledge without Revelation, there should be fome things, that our finite Understandings cannot, ef pecially in this Life, clearly comprehend?

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II. Every Man believes and has the Experience of feveral things, which in the Theory and Speculative Notion of them, would feem as incredible, as any thing in the Scriptures can be fuppos'd to be. It was well obferv'd by Quintilian, and may be obferv'd by any one that will confider it, that very many things are true, which fcarce feem credible, and as many are falfe, which have all the Appearance of Truth; and yet the Caufe of Unbelief in matters of Religion is chiefly this, that we are hardly brought to believe any thing poffible to be done, which we never faw done, and judge of things not from any Principle of Reafon, but from our own Experience, and make this the Measure of what is poffible to be, not confidering that many things may be altogether as poffible, which

• Confiderat. about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion, § 2. b Sunt enim plurima vera quidem, fed parum credibilia; ficut falfa quoque frequenter verifimilia, Quintil. Inftitut. l.iv. c. 2. we

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