internal administration of the three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and esprit de corps of each service can be retained. It was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted support to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be on those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can count upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the Congress of a bill containing the 12 basic elements set forth above. Very sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN. JUNE 15, 1946. MY DEAR SENATOR WALSH: One of the most important problems confronting our country today is the establishment of a definite military policy. In the solution of this problem, I consider it vital that we have a unified armed force for our national defense. At my request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have made a sincere effort to settle the differences existing between the services on this question. They have made splendid progress. They have reached an agreement on eight important elements of unification, and with reference to the four upon which there was not full agreement, their differences are not irreconcilable. On May 31, 1946, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy delivered a report to me of the results of their efforts. I have replied to them stating my position of those points submitted to me for decision. I enclose herewith a copy of the report of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, together with a copy of my reply to them. You will note that there are now presented 12 basic principles upon which the unification of the services can be based. They are as follows: 1. SINGLE MILITARY DEPARTMENT There should be one Department of National Defense. It would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the Cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the title of "Secretary." These secretaries would be charged with the internal administration within their own services. They would not be members of the Cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy, subject of course to the authority and over-all control by the Secretary of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different functions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity of each service would be retained. The civilian secretaries of the services would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this capacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their respective services to the fullest extent. 2. THREE COORDINATED SERVICES There should be three coordinate services-the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and should operate in a common purpose toward over-all efficiency of the national defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary for the Air Force. 3. AVIATION The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the development, procurement, maintenance, and operation of the military air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy: (1). Ship, carrier, and water-based aircraft essential to naval operations, and aircraft of the United States Marine Corps. (2). Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces and where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities. (3). Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of personnel for the aforementioned purposes. Land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare and protection of shipping can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange of personnel and special training for specific duties. Within its proper sphere of operation, naval aviation must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity to develop its maximum usefulness. 4. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting air component to perform the following functions: (1) Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by the landing forces. (3) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy. (4) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. 5. COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE To integrate our foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security. The membership of this council should consist of the Secretary of State, the civilian head of the Military Establishment, the civilian heads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, referred to below. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD To establish, and keep up to date, policies and programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of our national security. It should operate under the Council and be composed of representatives of the military services and of other appropriate agencies. 7. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs, to make recommendations for integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the United States military forces. 8. NO SINGLE MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF In the opinion of the War Department, the Military Establishment should contain a single military chief of staff, who would serve as principal military adviser, available to offer advice when differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the several services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the highest source of military advice. The War Department is willing to omit the feature of a single chief of staff. 9. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered by such various Government agencies, including the military, and to furnish such information to the National Defense Council and to other Government agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the Council. An organization along these lines, established by Executive order, already exists. 10. PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY There should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition in the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning and coordination of procurement, production, and distribution. 11. RESEARCH AGENCIES There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific research and development of the military services. 12. MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING There should be an agency to review periodically the several systems of education and training of personnel of the military services and to adjust them into an integrated program. A plan of unification containing these 12 elements has my unqualified endorsement. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations have assured me that they will support such a plan. It is my hope that the Congress will pass legislation as soon as possible effecting a unification based upon these 12 principles. Very sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN. JUNE 24, 1946. MY DEAR MR. PREISDENT: The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge your letter of June 15, 1946, addressed to the Secretary of War and to me, and to refer to my conversation with you of June 19 on the general subject of the reorganization of the War and the Navy Departments. It is my understanding from your letter and our subsequent conversation that your principal objectives are: (1) The creation of a single department of national defense under a civilian head, with broad powers of over-all supervision and control, while leaving full administration of their respective services to the Secretaries for War, Navy, and Air. (2) With particular regard to the Navy-the preservation of its integrity and autonomy so as to insure the retention of those imponderables of spirit and morale so essential to a military service, and to insure also that the ability of the future Navy to discharge its responsibility for the security of the Nation is not impaired. I consider the foregoing objectives attainable, and the recognized difficulties in drafting legislation which will insure their success, surmountable. One of the other points in your letter of June 15 relates to the subject of land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. I am glad to note that the Navy is to have a continuing part in the future development of these operations, so that full advantage may be taken of its experience in this field and of the lessons learned in the late war. Admiral Nimitz joins me in this expression. I wish to thank you for the patience with which you have listened to the Navy's views on the reorganization of our national defense and for the time which you have devoted to the subject. You may be assured of my desire and that of Admiral Nimitz to cooperate with you fully in the effort to achieve the objectives of your program. Respectfully, JAMES FORRESTAL. The CHAIRMAN. You will proceed, Mr. Kenney, with your statement? STATEMENT OF HON. W. JOHN KENNEY, THE ASSISTANT Mr. KENNEY. May I make this preliminary statement? Admiral Halsey is leaving the first thing in the morning. He has to get away, so if I find that my time is running a little short, I may ask leave to stop and let Admiral Halsey make his statement because I think it is most important that the committee have his statement before them. I can come before your committee at any time. The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Halsey, have you read his amended bill? Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir; in a very cursory manner. The CHAIRMAN. So that you can give us your views on that bill? Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir; I can. Senator ROBERTSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we couldn't have Admiral Halsey give us his views first. Is there any objection on that? The CHAIRMAN. There is no objection, is there, Mr. Kenney? Senator BYRD. The Senate meets at 11, and I have to get out of here. (There was a discussion off the record.) Senator ROBERTSON. I don't want to embarrass Admiral Halsey or Mr. Kenny in the order in which they will make their presentation. Of course, Senator Byrd will have the record, so I will withdraw the request. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kenney, will you proceed, please. Mr. KENNEY. The President has stated that one of the most important problems confronting our country today is the establishment of a definite military policy. To assist in the establishment of such a policy, he requested that the Secretaries of War and the Navy review the major elements involved in establishing a greater measure of unification among our national security organizations, with a view to defining those upon which they agree and those upon which they differ. Fortunately, the field of difference between the two departments was not as great as many people have been led to believe. The Departments were in agreement upon the following matters: 1. The establishment of a Council of National Defense: To integrate the foreign and military policies and to enable the military services and other agencies of government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. Members of this council should consist of the Secretary of State, the civilian head of the Military Establishments, the civilian heads of the military services, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. 2. The establishment of a National Security Resources Board: To establish and keep up to date policies and programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of our national security. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff: To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs and to make recommendations for the integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces. 4. Central Intelligence Agency: To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered by various Government agencies, including the military, and to furnish such information to the National Defense Council and other Government agencies entitled thereto. 5. Procurement and Supply Agency: To prevent wasteful competition in the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning and coordination of procurement, production, and distribution. This, in effect, would be the continuation of the Army-Navy Munitions Board which we now have. 6. Research Agency: To coordinate the scientific research and development of the military services. 7. Agency for Military Education and Training: To review periodically the several systems of education and training of personnel in the military services and to adjust them into an integrated program. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kenney, will you stop for a moment. Mr. KENNEY. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Are you later going to speak of a single head, Secretary of Common Defense? Have you agreed to that? Mr. KENNEY. I am going to discuss that; yes. The CHAIRMAN. Hove you agreed to that? I understood that that was the primary thing, the one thing that the President is insisting upon, and that is agreed to. Mr. KENNEY. The President, as I read the proposal of the President, Mr. Chairman, has said that there shall be a single department composed of three autonomous divisions. He was very careful in his letter to state that the autonomy and integrity of the three divisions should be preserved. As I construe the Secretary of Common Defense, he is more, in a sense, a coordinator of the activities of the three departments, to bring their activities together, to prevent duplication, overlapping, and with powers of supervision. The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to anticipate your story, but I understand that the President has said in substance that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were going out of the Cabinet, and there is going to be one Secretary of Common Defense. Now, is that agreed to? Mr. KENNEY. The Secretary has stated that that is agreeable; provided, as he sets forth in his letter, the objective is the creation of a single department, and provided there is the preservation of its integrity and autonomy of the Navy so as to insure the retention of those imponderables of spirit and morale so essential to a military service, and to insure also and this is most important-that the ability of the future Navy to discharge its responsibility for the security of the Nation is not impaired. In other words, that organizational form is satisfactory if those things can be protected, which he feels is necessary in order to continue the Navy as an effective instrument of national defense. The CHAIRMAN. Now, that is the first thing. So, the position of the Navy is that they do not object to a Secretary of Common Defense and the elimination of the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War if it is so defined-if the duties and obligations are so defined so as not to affect the efficiency of the Navy. That is pretty indefinite language. You either agree to it or you don't. Senator ROBERTSON. I think the amendment on page 3, section 101 (a): There shall be at the seat of Government an executive department to be known as the Department of Common Defense, which shall be under the control and supervision of a Secretary of Common Defense is important. I don't see anything in this whole section 101 particularly relative to the Navy's position in this, and the duties under the heading of "Establishment of Department." Mr. KENNEY. I go into that. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps you go into it later in your statement, do you? Mr. KENNEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Then you may go ahead then. There is where we have got to begin; that is the very first thing. What is our position on that one thing. Because it involves the elimination of the two secretaries, and making another, creating another Cabinet officer, doesn't it? Senator ROBERTSON. Definitely. And further than that, do we agree to that, to the establishment of a Secretary of Common Defense. |