CHAPTER XV

EFFECT OF DECREES

PLATT v. WOODRUFF.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS, NEW YORK. 1875.

61 New York 378.

APPEAL from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee, and granting a new trial.

This was an equity action, brought for the purposes hereinafter stated.

Defendants, the Bank of Dansville, in January, 1867, commenced two actions in the Supreme Court, one against Warren Leland, plaintiff's assignor, to recover the amount due upon his acceptance of a draft made upon him by the defendant William W. Leland, on the 6th of June, 1866, for $814.73, payable to the order of the defendant Woodruff at three month's [sic] sight; the other against the said Warren Leland and the defendants William W. Leland and Edward S. Hardy, to recover the amount due on a draft made on the 18th of April, 1866, by the defendant William W. Leland upon the defendant Hardy for $11,800, payable to the order of Warren Leland six months after date accepted by Hardy and indorsed by Warren Leland. The place of trial in each of these actions was Livingston county. Warren Leland, after appearing and answering the complaint in each of these actions, and in March of the same year commenced this action, designating Westchester county as the place of trial, setting out in his complaint substantially the same facts, the existence of which he alleged in his answers as a defence to the actions brought by the Bank of Dansville, praying, amongst other things, that the two drafts sued upon by the bank be delivered up and canceled; and that, during the pendency, and until the final determination of this action, the bank might be restrained from the further prosecution of the two actions thus commenced. In furtherance of the object of this action, said Warren Leland, on the 16th of April, 1867, obtained, from one of the justices of the Supreme Court in New York, an injunction order restraining the bank from the further prosecution of its actions during the pendency of this action, or until the further order of the Supreme Court. This order was afterwards, at a Special Term of the Supreme Court, held in the county of Westchester in June of the same year, vacated as having been "irregularly and im

properly granted." The issues in the two actions brought by the bank were then each regularly noticed for trial at the then next Livingston Circuit, to be held on the twenty-first of the following October. On that day (October twenty-first), a second order was obtained from another judge of the Supreme Court, again restraining the bank from further prosecuting the two suits during the pendency of this action, or until the further order of the court. This order was served on the defendants' attorney, in Buffalo, on the twenty-sixth, and on the cashier of the bank, at Dansville, on the thirtieth of October. On the second day of the following November, and during the Liv-. ingston October Circuit, the two actions brought by the bank were each regularly reached on the calendar; and the trial of each of them proceeded into a decision by the court in favor of the bank for the sum demanded in each action. At a Special Term of the Supreme Court held in the county of Westchester on the 26th of November, 1867, the injunction order of the twenty-first of October was, after hearing both parties, also vacated as having been "irregularly and improperly" granted. And, after the order was thus vacated, and on the nineteenth of the following December, upon filing the decision of the court at Circuit, judgment was entered in accordance therewith. These judgments were each held by the referee in this action to be void, and judgment was rendered herein as if they had not been recovered.

GRAY, C. It does not appear from the record why these injunction orders were held to have been "irregularly and improperly granted." It may be that the judge holding the terms at which they were vacated was of the opinion subsequently expressed at a General Term (Schell v. The E. R. Co., 51 Barb. 368), that such an order could not be granted by a judge in an action pending in one judicial district to restrain the proceedings involving the same subject-matter between the same parties pending in another judicial district. That it can is now settled. (The E. R. R. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637.) While the common-law and equity courts were separate tribunals in this State, a court of law did not hold a party to a suit pending in it who should proceed in his suit in violation of an injunction of a court of chancery as even irregular in his practice, but left him to the sufficient power of that court to vindicate its own authority. (Grazebrook v. McCreedie, 9 Wend. 437, 442.) And now that law and equity are separately administered by the same tribunal, each judge having equal power, as well to grant as to vacate an injunction order, it does not follow that a judge holding a purely law court is divested of his jurisdiction to proceed in an action pending in it, because of an order made by another judge of the same court, in the exercise of his equity powers, forbidding a party in a law suit from further prosecuting his action. A judge at Circuit would, doubtless, if the existence of such an order should be prop

erly brought to his knowledge, heed it; and would not, unless under very extraordinary circumstances, permit a party to disregard it. It does not appear in this case that the judge holding the Circuit was informed of the existence of this order; or, being informed, he did not make it a condition of his hearing the cause that the bank should not proceed to judgment in it until the order should be vacated; but, whether he knew or did not know that such an order existed, he had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, of which he was not ousted by an order directing the bank to refrain from the further prosecution of its actions. That order was not operative upon the court, but upon the bank, who, unless purged of its contempt, might have been compelled to relinquish all advantage of its proceedings subsequent to the service of the order. The judgments were not void.

This renders the examination of other questions involved unnecessary, as the order of reversal must, upon this ground, be affirmed.

All concur.

Order affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered against plaintiff.1

THRALL v. WALLER.

SUPREME COURT, VERMONT. 1841.

13 Vermont 231.

DEBT, upon a decree of the court of chancery, duly enrolled, in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, for the payment of a balance of an account between the parties, as partners.

Demurrer to the declaration and joinder.

There were no objections to the form of the declaration.

The question presented for the decision of the court was, whether an action of debt could be maintained upon this decree of the court of chancery.

The county court decided that the declaration was sufficient, and the defendant excepted to this decision.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

1 See J. R. v. M. P., Y. B. 37 Hen. VI, 13, pl. 3 (C. P. 1459), p. 601, supra; Winston v. Westfeldt, 22 Ala. 760, 771 (1853) (effect of injunction against negotiation of promissory note); Monell v. Lawrence, 12 Johns. 521 (N. Y. 1815) (injunction against foreclosure sale); Home Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 265 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), noted in 25 Col. L. Rev. 371 (1925). Compare Wilson v. Bryan, 195 N. C. 360 (1928), criticized in 23 Ill. L. Rev. 500 (1929).

As to the effect at law of equity decrees, see Cook, "The Powers of Courts of Equity," 15 Col. L. Rev. 228 (1915).

REDFIELD, J. This is an action of debt, upon the decree of the court of chancery, for the balance of an account between partners. The only question is, whether the action can be maintained on such a decree. This court entertain no doubt that such actions will well lie. Courts of common law and of equity have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of account. In the case of Carpenter v. Thornton, 3 B. & A. 52, which is much urged upon the court by the counsel for the defendant, Ch. J. Abbott puts the very case in judgment as the proper basis of an action of debt. In the case of Sadler v. Robbins, 1 Camp. 253, Lord Ellenborough intimates that an action of debt will well lie upon the decree of a court of chancery.

We are fully aware, that, from the long controversy between the courts of equity and common law, in England, the common law courts have inclined wholly to disregard mere equitable rights. Hence, in Preston v. Christmas, 2 Wilson, 86, a book of respectable authority, and comparatively recent date, it is said, "The whole court were clearly of opinion, that a release of an equity of redemption was nothing at all in the eye of the law." Any judge, who should now utter such a sentiment, on his own responsibility, would be esteemed a very bold man, if quite sane. Most of the cases relied upon by the defendant may be explained in the same manner. They are decisions and dicta resulting from this long controversy.

It is true, too, that, in England, courts of equity are not considered courts of record. But Mr. Justice Story lays it down as clear law, that they are courts of record in America. Eq. Pl. 600-1. It is certain that a decree of a court of equity, enrolled, is of the same force as a record. It is very obvious, that, until the decree is enrolled, it is of no force. Hence, no action at law will lie upon a mere decretal order. Hugh v. Higgs & wife, 5 Peters. Cond. R. 560. A decree of a court of equity in the alternative, by way of penalty for nonperformance of some specific act required, doubtless would not sustain an action of debt at common law. But when the decree is for a fixed, liquidated, and absolute debt, it would be monstrous to suppose that no action at common law will lie upon it. We allow actions of debt to be sustained, even upon foreign judgments, and could we esteem the judgments or decrees of our own courts of less validity? In the case of McKim v. Odom, 3 Fairfield, 94, it was held, and we think, upon good grounds, that debt will lie on a decree of a court of chancery, of a sister state. The reasoning of Mr. Justice Parris, and the authorities relied upon in that case, fully sustain the judgment. When we consider the high characer of the judgments of courts of equity, the conclusiveness and absolute deference with which they have been regarded by the courts of common law, for the last fifty years, our surprise is, that any doubt could be entertained upon the subject. And the only grounds upon which these doubts have proceeded, in any recent case, is, first, that the domestic courts of equity can better carry their own decrees into effect than the courts of com

mon law. But, of this, the parties should judge for themselves. Courts of equity have frequently been known to lend their aid for the mere purpose of enforcing the judgment of a court of common law. There is no good reason why the courtesy should not be reciprocal. Second, it has been said, that the proceedings are not according to the course of the common law, and the original cause of action could not avail the party in a common law court. The same argument will render of no force the judgments and decrees of all foreign courts, almost, except those of Great Britain. The original cause of action is merged and lost. The only inquiry now is, does the decree impose an absolute and conclusive obligation upon the defendant? Of this no one can doubt. This point was expressly so ruled in Henley v. Soper, 8 B. & C. 16. So, also, in the case of Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22, and in Evans v. Tatem, 9 Serg. & Rawle, 252. I make no distinction between decrees of courts of equity in our own state and the other states. If there be any difference, it should be in favor of those of our own state, but there is none.

Judgment affirmed.1

WILLIAMSBURGH SAVINGS BANK v. TOWN OF SOLON. COURT OF APPEALS, NEW YORK. 1893.

136 New York 465.

FINCH, J. The plaintiff brought this action to recover upon unpaid interest coupons attached to the bonds of the town of Solon, issued about twenty years earlier, in aid of the Utica, Chenango and Cortland Railroad Company. The complaint sets out in full the judgment of the county judge authorizing such issue upon the consent of the taxpayers, and the further proceedings which followed, and avers the plaintiff's ownership of the specified bonds and the refusal of the town to pay the matured interest thereon. It further avers that in

1 See, accord, Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22 (N. Y. 1805) (action of debt on a New Jersey money decree - Kent, C. J., dissenting); Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65 (U. S. 1853) (action in federal court for Maryland on New York money decree). In Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910), it was held that full faith and credit must be given to the money decree of a sister state.

In Boyle v. Schindel, 52 Md. 1 (1879), it was held that an action of debt would not lie on a domestic money decree. The court recognized that such an action would lie on a money decree of a sister state, but said (p. 7): "It is not because decrees of Courts of equity are not of equal dignity and finality with judgments at law, that they are not subjects of suits at law in this State, but because they are so equal and final they require no extrinsic aid from Courts of law to give them full force and effect. Courts of equity within their own jurisdiction have full power to issue judicial writs to enforce their decrees with equal economy and despatch as at law."

The difficult question of how far the equity courts of one state will enforce or otherwise give effect to act decrees of another state is considered in the courses on Equity and on Conflicts of Laws.