union does not thereby subject the property of individual members of the union to any judgments that may be had against the union. That is one thing the Norris-LaGuardia Act did, it adopted the rule of law that when you try to reach an individual for acts done in connection with a labor dispute, that not only must there be personal service upon him, but he must be shown to have participated in the act, previously authorized it, or subsequently ratified it. I thank you for the opportunity to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to find out these things. We want to get Mr. Tolman on pretty soon to explain this matter, but we thought it better to bring you gentlemen in now before the proponents or supporters of the legislation had concluded so that we might find out just what objections you had. Mr. Vincent is here representing the C. I. O., and I believe it would be a good idea to have him next so that we could have these issues before us.

(Thereupon, after informal discussion, the committee recessed at 12:30 p. m. until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. We will be very glad to hear you now, Mr. Vincent. Will you state for the record your name and whom you represent?

STATEMENT OF MERLE D. VINCENT, ESQ., COUNSEL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, my name is Merle D. Vincent. I am counsel for the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

The Attorney General yesterday morning called attention to the provision in the act of June 9, 1934, which provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under the act shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant; nevertheless, as was also mentioned, when these rules do take effect, all laws in conflict with them are of no further force or effect.

I think, of course, that in the formation of the rules it was the intention not in any manner to abridge existing rights; nevertheless, I feel that the qualifying language contained under subsection E, rule 65, page 83, to which reference was also made this morning by Mr. Padway, may affect existing rights.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the particular language you refer to?

Mr. VINCENT. The language that I refer to begins in line 6 and reads: "relating to temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and employee." If that language is eliminated the rule leaves the Norris-LaGuardia Act and related acts in full force and effect. It is quite essential, in order that those acts remain in force, that the possibly qualifying language to which I have referred should be eliminated.

Mr. MASSINGALE. I do not know whether I got just exactly what you said. Do you say that the words "relating to temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions" should be eliminated or left in? Mr. VINCENT. Eliminated.

Mr. MASSINGALE. They should be eliminated?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that leaves the acts standing as they are without any qualifying terms in the rules.

Calling the committee's attention now, Mr. Chairman, to rule 17, section B, on the capacity to sue or be sued, that rule has been so thoroughly discussed that I will make only a brief comment.

The language which provides that a partnership or other unincorporated association which has such capacity by the law of such State may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution and laws of the United States, must, of course, be considered in connection with rule 4, section D, subsection 3, where it is provided that an association which is subject to suit under a common name

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Where is that language?
Mr. VINCENT. Page 3, under subsection 3.

Mr. RAMSAY. 4 (d) 3, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. That language provides that an association which is subject to suit under a common name may be served by delivering summons to "an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process," and if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service, if the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant.

I think I can illustrate the necessity and the practicality for naming the officer, as one of your committee members suggested this morning, by indicating to you the nature, for instance, of the organization which I represent. Its head office is in New York City. It has local unions in perhaps 38 or 40 States. The government of those local unions, however, is independent and autonomous, in the sense that they elect and appoint their own local officials, nor does the general organization have general agents in those States; it has regional officers, some of whom are supervisors of organizations, others are members of joint boards which are a part of the general machinery charged with the responsibility of negotiating contracts and supervising the enforcement of contracts.

It is very important to us that if an action is brought, service shall be made upon an officer whose position is such that there will be no question of ample notice. There is no desire on the part of the organization to escape its responsibility, but it nevertheless has a responsibility to its members which makes it quite necessary to have its rights guarded with rules of procedure in actions which may be brought against it.

Mr. RAMSAY. Let me just suggest this: In the La Follette hearings there were quite a number of cases brought out where the employers had suborned the organization and controlled all of the officers who were spies against the union, and had these officers, who were acting for the corporation, officers of the union. What would be the effect of serving summons on a man like that, even if he was an officer of the union?

Mr. VINCENT. It might be this, Mr. Ramsay: If he were an officer under such dominion and control as you have mentioned, that he would not report the service to the general office, and very possibly the general office would be in default without knowing it had been sued, and assuming that such instances will be rare or exceptional, nevertheless very important. May I point out to you that this

organization has an annual budget of between 5 and 6 million dollars. It has, for instance, aside from its direct union activities and its machinery for negotiating contracts and for organizing, a medical and hospital set-up which serves nearly 100,000 people at a very large expense; it has an educational department to which annually is appropriated very large sums of money. These are related to but nevertheless collateral to the main activities of the organization, but the result is that the union owns property and has funds of such value, for which it is trustee for its members, that it feels it must be on guard respecting any rules of court procedure which will affect its substantive rights. They should be of such a practical nature as to give it instant notice or prompt notice of any action which may be brought against it.

I may say, Mr. Ramsay, that the organization operates under contract with some 8,000 factories. There is little probability of action in that field. There is a marginal group, however, who are not under contract, where just such subornation of officials not infrequently occurs in new local organizations. They rarely, if ever, occur in older, disciplined, experienced organizations. So is this respect we suggest a more detailed specification of the officer or officers to be served.

For instance, the New York General Association law, rule 13, I think it is

Mr. CELLER (interposing). It is either 13 or 17.

Mr. VINCENT (continuing). Provides, as you suggested this morning, for service upon the president or treasurer. A provision here for service upon the president or secretary or treasurer would meet the objection that I have raised and assure not only this organization but other union organizations who are similarly constituted and situated of notice of commencement of action in ample time to enable them to prepare to defend. I think that in so providing you are putting them in a position that is consistent with the remainder of rule 17 respecting capacity of parties to sue and be sued.

Mr. Chairman, I think that covers all the suggestions that I have to make, except one which is not to the rules themselves, but respecting the supervisory power of Congress over the authority which it has delegated to the courts. This ought to be carefully exercised under such circumstances as the committee is now considering these rules. I am not disposed to say that it is either impracticable or unwise to delegate authority, subject to limitations, to courts, familiar as they are with their own work and needs, to formulate rules of procedure. I think it was very wise, however, to exercise the supervisory authority that Congress has to examine these rules before they are permitted to go into effect, and I think this committee by just such hearing as it is now conducting can get information which perhaps the justices themselves could not always have opportunity to obtain, because many cases do not reach the Supreme Court. When in the judgment of the committee an amendment to these rules appears advisable before they go into effect, the committee and Congress should be prompt to act, to suggest that the court make an amendment, or the committee itself propose an amendment for the action of court; otherwise there would be a delegation of power which it is true is intended to extend only to rules of procedure and not to substantive law; but which may nevertheless extend to substantive rights. It is possible for rules of

procedure to very seriously affect, in some instances diminish, substantive rights without perhaps intending to do so, as I think may be the case respecting rule 65.

Unless there are some questions, Mr. Chairman, which members of the committee desire to ask, that covers all that I desire to say.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you for your very clear and comprehensive statement.

Mr. MICHENER. One question, Mr. Vincent. We could not hear over here part of the time. Whom do you represent?

Mr. VINCENT. I am counsel for the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

Mr. MICHENER. Is that affiliated with the A. F. of L. or the C. I. O.? Mr. VINCENT. The C. I. O.

Mr. MICHENER. It was suggested this morning that the C. I. O. should be represented, and I think it should be. Do you represent the C. I. O.?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I may say this: Yesterday morning Mr. Lee Pressman, who is general counsel for the C. I. O., and Mr. Gardner Jackson and Congressman Celler and I were discussing this subject. Mr. Pressman's engagements were such that it was impossible for him to be here-they were previously made-but he promised to send over sometime today a letter outlining his views respecting the rules. Mr. MICHENER. You were here this morning when Mr. Padway, representing the A. F. of L., spoke?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICHENER. Do you take issue with the things that Mr. Padway said, so far as labor's position is concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I think Mr. Padway made a very lucid analysis of the rules and very clear suggestions. As I remember, in his statement of the attitude of the A. F. of L. he was guarded and did not assume to speak entirely without qualification, saying that some things that he said expressed his own personal view. I may say for the organization which I represent, Mr. Chairman, that it would not under any circumstances want to be understood as making any suggestion to this committee which in any manner would avoid, legally or otherwise, any of its responsibilitity to those with whom it is under contract, or to the public. May I take a moment to illustrate? Mr. MICHENER. I would like to ask one question right there. I am glad to hear that statement and I take it then that your organization would not be averse to Congress enacting legislation that would make that responsibility fixed and definite, so that there would be no trouble, no difficulty and no misunderstanding on the part of anyone with reference to just what was to be done?

Mr. VINCENT. We are emphatically opposed to that, for the reason that the law as it exists affords ample remedy to any party having a cause of action against these organizations. So far as responsibility is concerned, that has been determined by the courts. And may I suggest this, that that is not alone our attitude. In one branch of the garment industry 1,800 manufacturers who are in contractual relations with this organization which I represent, have created a joint recovery board with the union upon which there are 25 representatives of industry and labor who deal constantly with every question from wages and hours to production and markets. It is a very significant industrial development. No question of

responsibility arises between them, for the reason that those employers have accepted the laws enacted by Congress, as labor has accepted such laws.

May I add this: Those who are pressing for legislation of the kind you suggest are not those who are under contractual relations with labor and enjoying a satisfactory and cooperative contractual relationship. This demand comes chiefly from those sections of industry that has not been ready or willing to accept acts of Congress as law, nor decisions of the Supreme Court as law.

Mr. MICHENER. My question was prompted by this: I have been on this committee a long time, as suggested by Mr. Padway. I have heard Mr. Robert Jackson, I have heard Mr. Gompers and I have heard the attitude of organized labor down through the years, and it was a revelation this morning to hear the statements made by Mr. Padway as to the attitude of the American Federation of Labor since 1930. I was just wondering if that was the attitude of the C. I. O., and if it was the attitude that you want-the opportunity to sue and to hold people responsible on your own contracts; I just wondered why it would not be advisable to come out in the open and pass a law and state that labor, since it has the protection of the law, has the right to organize. I wonder why it would not be a good idea to just clarify all this maze of legal interpretation and decision and write. into the statutes something that labor will agree to and the country will accept, and then we will not have these constant quarrelings about what the law might be.

Mr. VINCENT. I can only answer that by saying this: Labor now has its right to sue. Any individual or corporation with a cause of action against labor organizations now enjoys the right to sue them. In other words, I think both have their remedies at this time. Furthermore, peace and public order prevail in those sections of industry that have accepted the laws of Congress and the decisions of the courts on those laws, and I do not know of any labor organizations that have sought to evade their legal responsibilities. They go into court, and to defend, as any defendant would of course, against an alleged cause of action the existence of which he denies; and reviewing the cases in which remedies have been found adequate against and for labor organizations, I do not know of any reason for the enactment of what call "laws to make labor responsible.'

you

Mr. HEALEY. That responsibility is already fixed by existing law, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. MICHENER. Where is it fixed by existing law?

Mr. VINCENT. You can bring an action against a union, if you have a cause of action. There is nothing to bar it. Just as you can against an individual.

Mr. MICHENER. Of course, that gets into the realm of control of jurisdiction. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that there is a difference between the control in the A. F. of L. and the C. I. O. If that is true, that in one case it comes from Washington and in the other case it comes from a local union, the law might be somewhat different.

Mr. VINCENT. These organizations are both voluntary unincorported organizations, it is true, but nevertheless they are subject to suit for acts which interfere with the rights of others or do damage to