PART II I come now to the second part of my statement, which is concerned with problems of training involved in the proposal to transfer the functions of antisubmarine warfare, fleet reconnaissance, and protection of shipping by landbased naval aircraft to the now Army Air Force. I emphasize the training aspect because I am presently serving as Director of Aviation Training in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and in the event that such transfer were effected, this problem would be my immediate concern. Because of this, I am naturally giving the matter considerable thought and study. It is a little difficult to be entirely specific because the proposal itself is so broad and nebulous as to leave many questions unanswered. As a basis for consideration and discussion I have been forced to make certain assumptions, which I set forth below: (a) Aircraft units assigned the functions of overwater reconnaissance, submarine warfare, escort of shipping, and fleet support will be under the operational control of the Navy.-This is so basic that it appears to me to require no discussion. May I remind the committee that one of the first steps taken by the British after the outbreak of the war was to place the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force under the operational control of the Admiralty. (b) Aircraft units assigned the above functions will be specifically and permanently assigned.—This is a matter of vital importance. Any concept that these missions can be performed by aircraft and personnel drawn at random from the mass of land-based aircraft, such as the various bomber commands, is fallacious and potentially disastrous. The functions described above are highly specialized and can only be performed by personnel especially trained and aircraft especially designed and equipped for the purpose. (c) Personnel assigned to such aircraft units will have sufficient permanency in this assignment to insure adequate training and experience in all grades.— We have seen the difficulty experienced by the British Navy because of the failure of the Royal Air Force to observe this principle in personnel assignment. Unless this principle is carefully followed, I am convinced that no satisfactory state of training among these personnel can be achieved. I have in mind not only the initial training of junior personnel during one tour of duty with these units but also the requirement that more senior echelons be manned by officers with previous experience in this type of work. This, in effect, requires that a certain proportion of the officers initially assigned to this part of the present Army Air Force continue in such duties throughout their active careers. (d) Personnel assigned must be satisfactory to the Navy.-This is a corollary of the requirement stated above. I have described the practice which grew up in the Royal Air Force of assigning to the Fleet Air Arm and the Army Cooperation Command only the less desirable officers, and I am convinced that this pernicious tendency is so natural and inevitable under similar conditions of organization that it must be specifically provided against by legislation. It will be immediately recognized that the above provisions will be distasteful to the Army Air Force and difficult of administration. Nevertheless, I am convinced that they are minimum requirements for the protection of the Nation's vital interests, if the Navy is to be deprived of its own land-based aircraft. Certainly if we can draw any conclusions from the British (and German) experience, this is true. On the basis of the above assumptions, I have made a study of the training requirements to inaugurate and continue the transfer of the functions now performed by land-based naval aircraft to what is now the Army Air Force. Starting with standard Army-trained personnel, I have outlined in detail a training program for pilots and flight crews for our-engine and twin-engine aircraft in numbers now operated by the Navy as currently provided by congressional appropriations. It provides specialized training for these personnel over and above the training which they have received to fit them for duty in the bomber commands, in order to give them the minimum proficiency required for the naval tasks. This training must include advanced overwater navigation, specialized gunnery training against surface craft and submarines, including use of depth charges, rockets, torpedoes and special weapons, recognition of ships and submarines, naval tactics, submarine-detection devices, and familiarization with shipboard procedures necessary for a proper understanding on which air-surface cooperation is based, and similar matters not required for normal air force functions. I estimate that to train only the initial group of air crew personnel would require about 101⁄2 months, at a cost of $17,122,000, exclusive of station maintenance costs, and pay subsistence and transportation of personnel. Thereafter, a training program necessary to supply replacement personnel for normal attrition and rotation would have to be continued at an estimated cost of about $12,000,000 per year. This does not include ground maintenance and administrative personnel, who, it is assumed, would be provided by the present Army Air Force to meet the requirements for this service. I wish to make it clear that the costs mentioned above do not represent merely a transfer of funds from naval to Air Force appropriations, with no net increase of cost to the Government. The $17,122,000 cited as initial cost would be over and above any expense of both services as now constituted. Of the $12,000,000 per year required for replacement training, I estimate that at least half and possibly two-thirds would represent a nét increase over present costs of both services, since it would be necessary for the Navy to continue its training program for the seaplane squadrons remaining under its control. Thus, we would have two parallel training programs for the same function, and the unnecessary duplication would result in unnecessary expense. In addition to Air Force personnel, I consider it a matter of vital importance that a certain number of naval officers likewise be trained in these duties and serve as active aviators with the Air Force units involved. If this is not done it is only a question of time before there are no naval officers with sufficient intimate background and experience in this particular type of operations to guide naval policies and requirements. Once this occurs we will find ourselves in precisely the position reached by the British Navy, that is, without officers in the command and flag ranks with personal knowledge and background for this important function of aviation. When this occurs, absolute divorce of the Navy and the shore-based aircraft on which it depends is a fact, and can only be changed by long years of rebuilding. I do not by any means wish to give the impression that the costs I have mentioned above represent more than a part, perhaps a minor part, of the total cost involved. The aircraft used to perform the functions we are discussing must be designed and developed specifically for the purpose, as are the naval landbased aircraft at present. If we are to avoid the disastrous course followed by the British, the Navy must continue this design and development, even though the aircraft and equipment are eventually procured by the Air Force. The cost of such a program as this is outside of my immediate knowledge and my present duties, but I am sure that it will not be negligible. As examples, I cite the results of preliminary studies made by the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Aeronautics as to costs to the Navy in case of the proposed transfer: (a) Additional cost of furnishing special ordnance shop equipment, required for maintenance of antisubmarine and other specialized naval weapons required for Army Air Force units assigned naval duties, $4,000,848. (b) Design of new aircraft, technical liaison, operational development and research (additional cost), $1,158,660 per year. Again I emphasize that these are but examples, and by no means a complete compilation of the additional costs involved. I have been speaking here in terms of money costs involved in the proposed transfer of functions now performed by naval land-based aviation to the Army Air Force. Important and tangible though these costs may be, the sums mentioned, even multiplied a hundredfold, will be insignificant if it develops that by following in the footsteps of the British we incur the same penalties for faulty organization. The financial costs of such defeats as the British suffered in Norway, Crete, and Singapore are indeed tremendous; but the true costs cannot be estimated in terms of money alone, and may well lead to ultimate national disaster. The CHAIRMAN. The following memoranda relating to Japanese vessels sunk by United States agents, and enemy submarines sunk at sea, may be made a part of the record: Statistics on Japanese vessels sunk by United States agents 1. Merchant vessels (1,000 gross tons or over): (a) In cases of sinkings credited to aircraft, it has occasionally happened that, although reports nominate the type of aircraft responsible, i. e., Army, Navy carrier-based, etc., the nationality has not been specified as other than "Allied." The practice has been to treat such as United States aircraft, since in the very great preponderance of cases, this would be correct. This practice has been followed here. (b) "Unspecified" United States aircraft are, of course, those aircraft credited with sinking a ship which have not been identified in the reports as Army or Navy. (c) Merchant vessels included are limited to those of 1,000 tons or more. (d) As an estimate, merchant vessels under 1,000 tons would increase the tonnage sunk by about 10 percent, or 748,489 tons (approximately). NOTE (1) All references to submarines sunk are in terms of "number sunk" without mentioning tonnage. (1) Submarines are not included. See table 2. (1) Minor warships include escort vessels, patrol craft, minecraft, seaplane-tenders, fleet train transports 5. Summary of all Japanese ships sunk by United States agents: NOTE.-The above table includes Japanese submarines which have been computed at 1,500 tons each. ENEMY SUBMARINES SUNK AT SEA A survey made by the Navy's Submarine Assessment Committee and the British Admiralty shows that 933 enemy submarines were destroyed at sea during the war. United States forces sank 246.5 and the British, 580.5, the remaining 106 being lost to other and unknown causes. Half credits result from joint operations by components of one nation or combined efforts of United States and British units. Two of the Navy's best records for the greatest number of sinkings in the shortest time by single ships were made in the Pacific. The U. S. S. England, a DE, knocked out five and participated in the kill of a sixth in 11 days. A submarine, the U. S. S. Batfish, sank three Jap subs in 4 days in the South China Sea. Break-down figures follow: |