sustained, and hence any premiums paid upon insurance thus applied for should be returned to the applicant. (1919) 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 534.

Vol. IX, p. 1326, sec. 402. [First

ed., 1918 Supp., p. 917.]

Validity of provision in converted policy making commuted value payable to estate of insured.- Inclusion in the converted insurance policies proposed to be issued under the War Risk Insurance Act of a provision that the commuted value of the policy shall be payable to the estate of the insured, in the event of the failure of any person within the permitted classes to survive the insured, or in the event of the exhaustion by death of all persons within those classes before the payment of the full number of installments provided for, is authorized by the law and will be valid. (1919) 31 Op. Atty.-Gen. 387, wherein it was said: "The form of policy submitted is one of the forms of insurance into which it is proposed to convert the term insurance heretofore issued. The precise question is whether the fact that section 402 does not expressly provide that, in any event, anything more than the reserve value of the policy shall be paid to the estate of the insured precludes authority to insert in the converted policy a provision making the commuted value of the insurance payable to the estate of the insured. This, as has been seen, it is proposed to do in two contingencies. In the case of a beneficiary or beneficiaries within the permitted classes surviving the insured, as stated above, the obligation of the United States to pay the full amount of the insurance accrues even in the case of the temporary insurance, and section 402 does not undertake to direct to whom any unpaid part of it shall go in the event of the death of the beneficiary. The result is that the Secretary of the Treasury was left free, in determining upon the full and exact terms and conditions of such contract,' to provide for the disposition of the unpaid part of the insurance in this contingency. I am of opinion, therefore, that he could lawfully have put into the policy of temporary insurance the last sentence of the paragraph quoted above from the proposed policy, and here can be no doubt about his right to insert this in the converted policy.

"The only remaining question is whether he is now authorized to insert in the converted policy a provision making payable to the estate of the insured the commuted value of the insurance in the event no beneficiary within the permitted classes survives the insured when, under section 402, the policy of temporary insurance was required to provide that, in that event, only the reserve value of the policy should be paid,

I am therefore of opinion that, in the event of the failure of any person within the permitted classes to survive the insured, or in the event of the exhaustion by death

of all persons within those classes before the payment of the full number of installments provided for, there is ample authority to make the amount then and thereafter payable under the policy payable to the estate of the insured. This being true, there can be future no legal objection to commuting payments and discharging the obligation of the United States by paying the commuted value."

Vol. IX, p. 1328, sec. 404. [First

ed., 1918 Supp., p. 919.]

Conversion of war time term insurance into other forms of insurance.- The Bureau of War Risk Insurance may, without awaiting the formal termination of the war as declared by proclamation of the President of the United States, convert war-time term insurance heretofore granted under the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act into other forms of insurance authorized by said Act. 31 Op. Atty.-Gen. 382.

1918 Supp., p. 887. [Medals of honor, etc.] [First ed., 1918 Supp., p. 1045.]

Acceptance by naval officers of medals and decorations conferred by allied nations in great war.- - By virtue of this provision of the Army Appropriation Act, the Department of State is justified in delivering to naval officers of the United States medals and decorations heretofore tendered to such officers through said Department by the governments of nations concurrently engaged with the United States in the great war. The words "medal or decoration," appearing in the provision, are used in their usual meaning and do not include such articles as bowls, cups, and photographs. (1919) 31 Op. Atty.-Gen. 445, wherein it was said: "The paragraph under consideration is one of twelve contained in the Army appropriation act of July 9, 1918, which deal with the subject of medals and decorations. The first nine paragraphs authorize the award of such medals and decorations by the United States to persons serving in any capacity with the Army. The tenth paragraph provides that American citizens who since August 1, 1914, have received 'decorations or medals for distinguished service in the armies or in connection with the field service of those nations engaged in war against the Imperial German Government, shall, on entering the military service of the United States, be permitted to wear such medals or decorations.' The eleventh paragraph is the one under consideration. The twelfth provides that the President ‘is authorized, under regulations to be prescribed by him, to confer such medals and decorations as may be authorized in the military service of the United States upon officers and enlisted men of the military forces of the countries concurrently engaged

is an investigation for the purpose of determining the feasibility of a proposed project. Such investigation necessarily involves some consideration of the probable cost, but apparently Congress was not content to have the Secretary base his estimate upon the opinion of engineers alone; he is first to let contracts for construction, and then he is to estimate the probable cost, and equitably apportion it to the lands to be reclaimed. Of this estimate and apportionment he is to give public notice, and thereupon prospective settlers may determine for themselves whether they will or will not

settle upon the lands, and thus bind themselves to pay the published price for water. In case of settlement under such conditions. it is incompetent for the Secretary to increase the price at a later date, even if it turns out that the published estimate is insufficient to cover the actual cost." PayetteBoise Water Users' Assoc. r. Cole, (D. C. Idaho 1919) 263 Fed. 734, holding, however, that the requirements of the section as to estimate may be waived by the settlers, in which event the actual cost only can be charged and this is a subject of judicial inquiry.

III. ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE

1. Debauchery (p. 1410) Immoral act committed on interstate journey. The mere fact that an immoral act is committed on an interstate journey does not of itself constitute a violation of this section. Biggerstaff v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 260 Fed. 926. Regarding the effect of the proof of such an act, the court said: "Its relevance in that respect is evidential, not substantive, and when relied on as evidence of a preconceived purpose care must be taken to regard it in a true perspective. The act may have been a casual incident in the journey, without forethought or anticipation at the time it was begun. Many things, good and bad, occur in that way."

IV. INDICTMENT

1. In General (p. 1411)

A count in an indictment which follows the language of the statute is sufficient. Huffman v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 35, 170 C. C. A. 35. The court said:

"This offense is statutory, and we must look to the language of the statute for the ingredients of the offense. The said first count of the indictment in the case at bar charges the offense in the language of the statute, and is therefore sufficient. U. S. r. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 6 L. Ed. 693; Potter v. Ü. S., 155 U. S. 438, 15 Sup. Ct. 144,

39 L. Ed. 214; Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Ann. Cas. 392.

"We think the count in question contained every element of the offense intended to be charged; that it was sufficient to notify the defendant of what he was charged with, and therefore what he must be prepared to meet; and upon its face accurately revealed to what extent an acquittal or conviction upon that count of the indictment might be pleaded, in the event of other proceedings for the same or a similar offense."

2. Purpose of Transportation (p. 1411) An indictment under this section which charges that the transportation was unlawfully and feloniously made for the purpose of debauchery," sufficiently alleges the necessary criminal intent. Ammerman r. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 262 Fed. 124.

V. EVIDENCE

1. Admissibility (p. 1412). Similar offenses. In a prosecution under this section evidence of prior illicit relations between the accused and the woman charged to have been transported are admissible, as bearing upon the element of the intent with which she was transported at the time specified in the indictment. Ammerman v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 262 Fed. 124.

For evidence held admissible to show a violation of this Act, see Nokis v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 413, 168 C. C. A. 453.

2. Sufficiency (p. 1412)

For evidence held to be sufficient to show violation of this Act, see Nokis v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 413, 168 C. C. A. 453; Huffman v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 35, 170 C. C. A. 35; Blackstock . U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed. 150.

Vol. IX, p. 1415, sec. 3. [First ed.,

1912 Supp., p. 420.]

"Any other immoral purpose."-" Without deciding the proposition, it may be said to be at least doubtful whether the statute was intended to cover transportation for immoralities other than those of a sexual nature" for instance, a purpose of rob

bery or blackmail. Per Alschuler, J., in Griffith v. U. S., (C. C. A. 7th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed. 159, affirming a conviction, however, on a record abundantly showing that the purpose of the transportation was that of illicit sexual intercourse, even if this did not, under the record, amount to debauchery or prostitution within contemplation of the statute.

Vol. IX, p. 1421, sec. 858. [First ed., 1909 Supp., p. 708.]

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS (p. 1422) Effect of amendment.—The amendment of this section by the Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3608, applies to civil cases only. Adams v. U. S., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 214, 170 C. C. A. 282.

Vol. IX, p. 1434. [Defendants in criminal cases may be witnesses.] [First ed., vol. VII, p. 1120.]

An instruction in the language of this section that defendant's failure to testify creates no presumption against him, is not error. Robilio r. U. S., (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 101, 170 C. C. A. 169.

Comment on failure to testify.-In Robilio t. U. S., (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 101, 170 C. C. A. 169, regarding comments on the defendant's failure to testify, the court said:

"The additional remarks of the court to the jury, to the effect that the situation created by the government's proofs remained 'unexplained,' as such remarks would naturally be applied to the facts of this case, and as they were interpreted by the response of the court when his attention was called thereto, did not constitute that comment' condemned in Wilson r. United States, 149 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 765, 37 L. Ed. 650. See Stout r. United States, supra, 227 Fed. at page 804, 142 C. C. A. 323, and Shea v. United States (C. C. A. 6) 251 Fed. 440, 445, 163 C. C. A. 458."