AEC program can be approved. It is a program that has been reviewed carefully and closely. It reflects the prudent minimum that we must commit toward maintaining our strategic posture in the fact of the growing Soviet strategic potential. I appreciate the opportunity to appear in Mr. Cotter's absence and thank you for that opportunity, Mr. Chairman. Senator STENNIS. We are glad to have you here. Each of you have significant statements here to make a strong record. Dr. Ray, you may proceed, or did you, General Graves, want to give your part. General GRAVES. I will go ahead with my part. PLANS AND COST ESTIMATES FOR ACCELERATED PROGRAM General GRAVES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you again. Dr. Ray has summarized the AEC's need for supplemental funds in fiscal year 1975 to support accelerated weapons testing and improved safeguards for nuclear materials while they are being transported from one facility to another. General Maxson has presented the defense requirements which are the basis for our weapons testing program. My statement covers the specific plans and cost estimates for the testing and improved transportation safeguards. [Chart deleted.] You will recall that the President's budget for fiscal year 1975 included funds for approximately [deleted] nuclear weapons tests: [deleted] in the weaponization category, [deleted] in the weapons feasibility category, and [deleted] in the advanced technology category. In the revised program, we propose to concentrate essentially all resources on test in the weaponization and weapons feasibility categories. This will enable us to continue development of the nuclear weapons which DOD has assigned the highest priority and to complete essential high-yield testing by March 31, 1976. That is the effective date of the 150 KT threshold test ban under the treaty signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974. In the weaponization category, the accelerated program includes [deleted]. We have also added a [deleted]. The AEC has an extensive surveillance program to check continually on the reliability and safety of weapons in the stockpile. If any serious question arises about the reliability of a weapon, we can check its performance by an underground test in Nevada. However, when the threshold test ban becomes effective on March 31, 1976, we will no longer be able to test weapons with yields greater than 150 KT. Therefore, we plan to test the [deleted] to obtain baseline data to aid in the continuing surveillance of this weapon after we can no longer test it in Nevada. This is important to assure reliability for as long as this [deleted] remains a major part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. In the weapon feasibility category, we plan a test of a [deleted]. The major addition in the weapon feasibility category is [deleted] suitable for use in a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for delivery by a strategic intercontinental ballistic missile; for example, the Minuteman III or a growth version of the Minuteman. The objective is to apply our most advanced technology to develop [deleted]. Completion of the essential high-yield nuclear testing now before the March 31, 1976, effective date of the threshold test ban will give us the capability to produce such a warhead in the future if it becomes necessary. PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS The President's budget and the congressional authorization and appropriations have provided $152.2 million in operating expenses for testing of atomic weapons in fiscal year 1975. The estimate for the revised program of approximately [deleted] tests is $190.2 million. The additional $38 million in operating expenses is due mainly to two factors. First, we have added [deleted]. [Chart deleted.] The accelerated test program requires simultaneous preparations and test operations on Yucca Flat and Pahute Mesa. These are 50 miles apart over rough roads. Preparations for the typical underground test require 6 months from the beginning of equipment installation until actual detonation. In order to be able to prepare simultaneously for a number of tests on Yucca Flat and Pahute Mesa, we need additional diagnostic measurement and recording equipment and timing and control equipment. Our request is limited to equipment which can be procured within the next few months and received in time for use in the accelerated test program before March 31, 1976. The estimate for this capital equipment not related to construction is $4.5 million in additional budget authority and $4 million in additional budget outlays in fiscal year 1975. That completes the part of my statement concerning accelerated testing. SAFEGUARDING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS Senator STENNIS. Dr. Ray, that brings us back to you. Dr. RAY. That brings us to the second portion of the supplemental request which has to do with safeguards. A major concern of your committee and of the Atomic Energy Commission has been the safeguarding of nuclear materials from theft or diversion. In the last year the Commission has given increased attention to assuring that no such material falls into the hands of terrorists who could use it to threaten the public safety. In addition to our own reviews, studies, and reports, the need for strengthened safeguards has been highlighted by a series of reports by the General Accounting Office, a series of articles in the New Yorker magazine, the Taylor-Willrich report funded by the Ford Foundation, and a study completed earlier this year by a group of consultants to our regulatory program. One of the most vulnerable areas identified in all these stud ies is in the transportation of nuclear materials from one facility to another. As you know, the Commission affords a high degree of security to movements of nuclear weapons. The funds included in this fiscal year 1975 supplemental request would be used to procure equipment and hire additional armed couriers in order to afford shipments of strategic quantities of nuclear materials essentially the same security that we now provide for nuclear weapons shipments. This security is based upon specially designed and constructed safe-secure vehicles which will significantly delay penetration to the cargo compartment. Constant radio communications are maintained so that response forces may be summoned in the event of an attack. Our Albuquerque operations office maintains liaison with State law enforcement agencies along every route where weapons are shipped. Thus, we have arranged for response forces to come to the assistance of any convoy under attack within the delay time afforded by the safe-secure vehicle. During fiscal year 1975, significant quantities of AEC-owned enriched uranium and plutonium will be moved to and from AEC-owned and AEC-licensed facilities in shipment quantities which could be possible terrorist targets. Currently, the AEC is able to provide armed escorts for only the most sensitive of these shipments. We have only enough safe-secure vehicles for weapons movements. In order to upgrade the vehicles, communications, and armed courier protection for other nuclear materials shipments, the Atomic Energy Commission is requesting $3.5 million in additional operating costs and $13.8 million in additional budget authority for equipment in fiscal year 1975. These funds will enable us to establish a secure transportation system for all shipments of strategic quantities of special nuclear materials. The Commission believes that this is the most urgent need to improve our safeguards program. We will be pleased to respond to questions. Senator STENNIS. All right, General Graves. General GRAVES. Yes. Senator STENNIS. Call out the page where you are going to start. General GRAVES. If you will go to the top of page 5, Mr. Chairman. [The chart follows:] IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS General GRAVES. I will turn now to improved safeguards for nuclear materials being shipped from one facility to another. As background. I should emphasize that the AEC has a large safeguards program designed to prevent any theft or diversion of nuclear material or any sabotage of nuclear facilities which would endanger the public. Activities under this program totaled some $79 million in fiscal year 1974, as you can see down here on the bottom line on the left of the chart, and are estimated to amount to $88 million from the fiscal year 1975 appropriation just passed by Congress. The program includes research and development to improve safeguards; communications for our security forces; transportation safeguards such as armed couriers and special security vehicles; physical protection of nuclear installations; control of and accounting for nuclear material; a capability to search for and recover any nuclear material which may be stolen or diverted; and staffing and contractual studies to regulate safeguards activities of licensees. SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS As Dr. Ray said in her statement, the Commission has greatly increased its emphasis on safeguards during the last year. Last May, having just completed a comprehensive review of its safeguards program, the Commission submitted to OMB a request for $87.6 million in supplemental funds. This request provided for additional effort in all six functional areas of the general manager's safeguards program and by the director of regulation. From this total OMB allowed $18 million-for communications and transportation only, as shown in the next to the last column of the chart. The Atomic Energy Commission had identified these two functional areas as the highest priority, and OMB approved only the highest priority items. [Deleted.] The $18 million is needed to improve safeguards for nuclear materials being shipped from one facility to another. We estimate that during fiscal year 1975 there will be some [deleted]. The shipments will be made to and from some 50 AEC-owned and AEC-licensed facilities located in 25 States and will transit all but 4 of the 48 continental United States. [Chart and illustration deleted.] Weapons parts containing enriched uranium or plutonium and assembled weapons are moved over the highway in armed convoys of three or more vehicles, including a specially designed and built safe |