there is no occafion for a Power to aggravate it, for the Law generally ordains it fevere enough: And where it is Capital, it admits of no Aggravation, for Death is the greatest natural Evil that can be inflicted. It may indeed be rendered more terrible by Torture, but that is so shocking to Human Nature, that it ought not to be permitted in a civilized Nation. In proportioning of Punishment, Magiftrates fhould chiefly have regard to the Intention of the Actor, as far as it is difcoverable; for Intention is the very Soul of Action, on which the whole Morality of it depends: fo that the most heinous Fact when wilfully committed, if committed by Accident or without Design, ceases to be criminal. For this reason Ideots, Lunaticks, and Infants, who like Brutes are incapable of directing their Actions by their Understanding, are likewife incapable of Offence, and confequently of Punishment. It should likewise be confidered, whether the Offender was ignorant of the Law; for though he is not altogether excufable, because he ought to be better informed, yet he is much less criminal than one, who willingly tranfgreffes it. In wilful Crimes, the Age, the Fortune, and Quality, both of the Offender and Party injured, the Time, the Place, and the Manner of committing the Fact, are all circumstances which ought to have their due weight with Magiftrates in proportioning the Punishment. Another effential part of Government is the Power of rewarding, without which the Publick Good cannot be fufficiently advanced, or the State be put in a flourishing Condition. For although Punishment may restrain Men from evil Actions, it is Reward alone that ftirs them up to those that are laudable: the first may may keep them Innocent, but it is the laft, that makes them ufeful Members of the Commonwealth. Without a Power of rewarding, Civil Authority would be very defective; for there are many things conducing to the Publick Good, which Governours cannot command, that they may lead Men to by a Profpect of Advantage: They cannot command a Man to be a skilful General, Mathematician, or Artifan; but, by propofing fuitable Encouragements, they may tempt him to employ his Talents to become fo; or, by rewarding those who are already eminent, may excite others to emulate their Perfections: for however publick Men's Profeffions may be, their Views are generally private; and very few promote the Publick Good fo much from a Sense of their Civil Obligations, or Benevolence to the rest of Mankind, as from an expectation of a Recompence of fome nature or other to themselves. Much of the Reputation of any Government depends on a prudent distribution of their Favours: for if they bestow them on worthless or vicious Perfons, they will fall under the cenfure of either not being competent judges of men's Qualifications, or (which is much worfe) of intending to use fuch Instruments to carry on some unjustifiable Defign. Public Merit is the Standard, by which not only particular Perfons, but also the different Claffes and Profeffions of men are to be estimated and rewarded: therefore next to thofe who are immediately affistant to the Sovereign Authority in the Adminiftration, are to be confidered fuch as have been moft inftrumental in defending, improving, or inriching their Country. The General, who by his prudent Conduct has faved it, the Soldier who has chearfully expofed his Life in defence of it, thofe Lights and Ornaments of it, who by their Learning or Piety have contributed to make others wifer or better, thofe who have invented or refined Arts and Sciences of use and convenience to mankind, ought to have the foremost Rank in the Honour and Efteem of their Country, and in the Favour and Countenance of a Government: Nor is the Husbandman to be forgot, who increases the natural Product of his Nation; nor the Merchant, who brings foreign Riches into it for they are not only the occafion that their Fellow-Subjects live in greater Plenty and Affluence, but, by increasing the Wealth of the State, add to its Strength and Security. To reward those who are eminent in any way, is the fure method to have a conftant fucceffion of Perfons who will be so. Where there is a Mæcenas, a Virgil will not be wanting. It seems therefore good Policy in a Government, to propose annual Rewards to those who fhall excel in fuch Arts and Sciences as they design principally to encourage and promote: for it would fet men's Heads and Hands more earnestly to work, if they were fure of a Recompence; especially if it were ascertained by Law, and not left to the Will and Pleasure of those who bestow it. Rewards are either Pecuniary or Honorary, that is, they are additions either to a man's Fortune or his Reputation. The first have the most influence on mean and fordid, the laft on generous and noble Tempers. In conferring pecuniary Rewards, let Governors fo qualify their Generofity, as not to be over-liberal to fome Subjects to the Prejudice of the rest; and let those who receive them confider, how much they lose of the merit of a good Action, Action, when they fet a Price upon it, and like common Labourers or Artifans ferve for hire. Praife, Honour, and Eftcem, are the Confequence and most natural Rewards of glorious Actions, and have always been coveted by the most deferving: for there is a Vanity in the Soul of Man, which courts Applause, and places much of his own Happiness in the good opinion of others: Nay, which extends his views beyond the Grave; and makes him wish to be remembered with Honour by Pofterity. Therefore whatever mark of Diftinction preferves the Memory of his Actions, and places his Merit in a fair view, is the most agreeable and flattering Reward; and however trifling in itself, may prove an incentive to the nobleft Atchievements. The Profpect of an Oaken Crown has faved the Life of many a Roman Citizen: and many a Roman Citizen has boldly expofed his Life in Defence of his Country, in hopes of a Statue or Monument of Marble to be erected to his Memory after his Death. If notions of Honour were duly encouraged, a distinction of Drefs, of Title, or Precedence, would lead men as far in the paths of it, as any prospect of Gain; and Place and Authority would have more Charms, than any Profit arifing from them. How much therefore is it the interest of every State to carry these notions as high in men's Conceptions as poffible? fince they may be made the inftruments of fo much Public Good; and fince they open fo large a Field for Governors to reward the Deferving according to their wishes, without any Expence to themselves or the Subject. Governments ought to be moft frugal of thofe Honours which are attended with Power and Prerogative; because they may fome time or other be turned to their difadvantage: as alfo of those which are hereditary; for they may defcend to a worthless Posterity. 3. There 3. There is a Power in every State to make War and Peace. For it little avails, that affairs be well administered within its own limits, if it be not alfo defended from outward injury and violence. As every Individual was in a condition of Nature with regard to the rest of Mankind, before he entered into Civil Engagements with them, fo is every State with respect to another before the intervention of Leagues and Compacts. And therefore fince the Laws of one can lay no obligation on the other, if any Injury is threatened or committed, the injured State may use Force to defend itself, or to obtain Reparation. On this account every Government has a right to arm fuch a number of the Subjects as it fhall judge necessary for these occafions: And it is the Duty of the Subjects to obey its Commands, and not to defert the Service without its permiffion; for the Nature of Society obliges every man to do his best in defence of it. And no Subject can refuse to take Arms on pretence of the Injustice of the Cause, for he has authorised his Governors to judge for him in public Exigencies; and if the Cause be unjust, the Crime must be imputed to them. Besides, fuch Pretences, if admitted, might leave the State naked and defencelefs, and often cover the basest Cowardice and Treachery. An Injury to a private Subject, by the public Authority of a Foreign State, is a justifiable Cause of War, and ought to be resented by the whole State of which he is a member; for the main end of establishing Civil Society was mutual Protection and Defence. But yet let the Caufe be ever fo juft, no prudent Government will draw the Sword without first endeavouring to obtain Reparation by Treaty: for if it can be so obtained, it would be madness |