framers of the document, but the reverse. One of their assigned motives for adopting the particular constitution which they select, is the desire of "perpetuating "the connexion of the colonies with the "mother country." And, in fact, the scheme which they have proposed is based on the continuance of the connexion, and, if it was removed, would necessarily fall to the ground. For no Executive government is provided but that which "is vested in the Sovereign "of the United Kingdom of Great Britain "and Ireland." It is true that this government is "to be administered "according to the well-understood prin"ciples of the British constitution ;" in plain English, that the name of the Crown or its representative is to be a mere mask, under which the real power is to be exercised by the heads of the dominant party in the colonies: but, as will appear hereafter, the mask is indispensable. Its removal would reveal what few would care to embrace. We do not propose here to discuss the political connexion of the colonies in general, or that of the North American colonies in particular, with the mother country. But, before the connexion is solemnly ratified anew, and the future prosperity of a great community built upon that foundation, let the question be fairly and manfully looked in the face. These colonies are separated from us by three thousand miles of ocean. They are inaccessible for the purposes of military co-operation during nearly half the year. They are brought into intimate relations, diplomatic and commercial, with the communities of a different continent from ours. Their fundamental institutions the principle of social and political equality, the absence of hereditary rank, of primogeniture and entails, their free churches and common schools, -are essentially those of the New, not those of the Old World. They are so far from being identified with us in commercial interest that they impose protective duties on our goods. At the present moment, both the mothercountry and the colony are brought by the connexion into gratuitous peril: for the angry Americans, though they have no desire for Canada as a territorial acquisition, are tempted to pick quarrels with us by its opportuneness as a battlefield; while the Canadians would be perfectly safe if they were not involved in the danger of a collision between us and the Americans. The hope of a Canadian force, able fairly to share with us the burden of defence, must by this time have passed away. The Canadians will not bear the taxation requisite for a regular army; and, in a country where the people are so thinly scattered and so much occupied, an effective militia or volunteer force is almost out of the question. On the other hand, supposing the political connexion to be dissolved, all the effective ties of kinship would remain; nor does there seem to be any objection to our abrogating, as against Canadians, all the legal and political disabilities of aliens, so that a Canadian coming to reside in England might be at once, in every respect, an English citizen. Under these circumstances, does not true wisdom, with which sound sentiment is never at variance, dictate the friendly and cautious termination of the present connexion? This is the question which it is the duty-the hard duty, no doubt-of those who have the destinies of the two communities in their keeping now to determine; and to determine with reference to the real interests of those concerned, not under the influence of mere tradition, mere phrases, or such empty fancies as the notion of prestige. Does the "prestige" of having the defence of Canada on our hands at this moment form a safeguard, in the opinion of any human being, against the danger which is present to every one's mind, and the occurrence of which was easily foreseen from the commencement of the great volcanic eruption in the adjoining States? To proceed to the projected constitution. The first clause proposes a federal union of the colonies; and the next clause speaks of the federation of the British North American Provinces. But the third clause avows the desire, in framing the scheme of Government, "to "follow the model of the British consti"tution, so far as circumstances will per"mit." Now the British constitution is not the constitution of a federal union, or of a federation, but of a kingdom. There is a good deal of local government exercised under the authority of the sovereign power; but Great Britain is, nevertheless, a kingdom and not a federation. If, therefore, the framers of the Canadian constitution really intend to create a federation, the model which they have chosen for their constitution would seem inapplicable to their case.1 The fact, however, seems to be, that they intend to create not a federation, but a kingdom, and practically to extinguish the independent existence of the several provinces. The governors of the provinces, instead of being elected like those of the American States, are to be appointed by the Central Government; the Central Government is to have the power of disallowing any Bills which the local legislature may pass : and though the powers bestowed on those legislatures are considerable, they are not very materially greater, in their practical scope, and regard being had to this central power of disallowance, than those delegated to local authorities in the United Kingdom. But the apprehension of some sentiment of independence in the several provinces, based, perhaps, on certain peculiarities of interest, leads the framers of the constitution to stop short in their work, and, instead of avowing and carrying out the design of an incorporating union, to adopt the phraseology, and, to some extent, the actual structure of a federation. They hope, no doubt, that the course of events will practically decide the ambiguity in favour of the incorporating union. So did the statesmen who formed the constitution of the United States. And the result is, that a large portion of the Southern people (those not immediately interested in slavery) are fighting like demons for State independence, not 1 They would do well to read the opening chapter of Mr. Freeman's History of Federal Governments, where the character of such Governments is thoroughly explained. without the sympathy of a considerable minority at the North, while the majority of the Northerners are struggling to put them down as rebels. The sentiment of provincial independence among the several provinces of British North America is at this moment merged in the desire of combining against the common danger, which their unwise exhibition of antipathy to the Americans, and their improvident encouragement of Southern refugees, have contributed to create. But, when the danger is overpast, divergent interests may reappear, and the sentiment of independence may revive. This will probably be the case, especially in the French and Catholic province. The framers of the constitution, therefore, ought not to evade the difficulty of deciding clearly between a federation and a kingdom, and thus to leave the object of the citizens' ultimate allegiance in ambiguity, in the confidence, based on the present state of feeling, that all will hereafter settle itself in the right way. If we look not to the mere tendency of the hour, but to the permanent interests of these colonies, there is, perhaps, not a little to be said in favour of a real federation, as a constitution for communities occupying a vast extent of territory, with necessarily a good many varieties of interest, and probably of character, but in need of mutual protection against enemies without, and of internal tranquillity and free trade. This arrangement combines independence, emulation, comparative experience, all that is valuable (or rather invaluable) in numerous centres of civilization, with all that can be rationally desired in a consolidated empire. It is not, like an empire, suited for the purposes of aggression, because, happily, a group of states have seldom a common interest in an aggressive enterprise, but historical experience shows that it is well suited for the purposes of defence; for the four great federations, the Achæan, the Swiss, that of the United Provinces, and that of the American colonies, all had their origin in memorable defences; and, if the Achæan League was not positively successful in repulsing the overwhelming power which assailed it, it was successful compared with the great monarchies of the time even the Macedonian-and enjoyed before it fell a period of happiness and glory. The tendency of the Teutonic race, as the stronger and more independent, has been, both in the old world and the new, towards federal government, though in the old world the tendency has been a good deal thwarted by the pressure of military necessities; while the tendency of the weaker Celt has been, and seems to be almost incurably, towards the centralization from which he derives collective strength, or rather force, at the expense of all the higher objects of human association. A federal union also most easily admits of the peaceful extension of territory, a prospect which of course opens before the North American Confederation as well as before the United States. Finally, it leaves everything more open and susceptible of modification; an advantage not apt to be appreciated by the framers of constitutions, but, nevertheless, a considerable one in the case of a continent which is still in course of settlement, and the final divisions and arrangement of which cannot at present be certainly foreseen. It would be somewhat rash, at least, to assert positively that Nature will finally ratify the political accident which has cut off from the rest of the continent the long ribbon of territory stretching from Nova Scotia to the British Colonies on the Northern Pacific. Hamilton, the principal framer of the Washingtonian constitution, was a man of great ability, and of great though honourable ambition, who had been accustomed through the Revolution to act upon an ample scene. He aspired to found a great national Government, the rival of the great national Governments of Europe, in the administration of which a first-rate statesman might find full scope for his capacity. He did not know, and could hardly be expected to know, that as civilization advances the importance and dignity of government, the function of which is compulsion, diminish, while those of voluntary association and spontaneous action increase. Nor, as the position selected for his national capital shows, did he anticipate the extension of the United States beyond the limits hitherto assigned by nature to a centralized nation. His destined capital, the "city of magnificent distances," stands a ghastly and ridiculous monument of his mistake. That his political structure was conceived in error is a fact not so palpable, yet, perhaps, not less certain. There is nothing in the world so sound as American society, with its intimate union of all classes, its general diffusion of property, its common schools, and its free religion. The danger of communism, or of anything like a war of classes, is never felt; and even strikes were almost unknown till the Legal Tender Act multiplied them by causing a frightful derangement of prices. The local institutions also, in which the people administer their own affairs, or elect officers to act under the eye of the constituency and in conjunction with it, are perfectly healthy, and form, in themselves and by their effect in training the political character of the people, the sheet-anchor of the constitution.1 But the central institutions are full of faction and corruption. In a busy community, which, happily for itself, has no idle class of hereditary 1 The municipality of New York is very corrupt but New York with its great Irish and German mob is quite an exceptional case, though regarded by newspaper correspondents and their readers as the type of America. proprietors, the most respectable citizens, under ordinary circumstances, when there is no great question on foot and no great call for patriotic exertion, are too much occupied in their own commercial and domestic concerns to be candidates for an office which would oblige them to reside at the capital. Their places are taken by a class of professional politicians, needy men for the most part, who too often go to Washington to make the fortunes which others are making through industry, by the trade of political intrigue. The character and habits of these men, the machinery of caucuses and wire-pulling by which their system is carried on, and the general tone of the newspaper, press which ministers to their competition for place, still further repel the best men from the political sphere. It is not astonishing that those who come in contact only with the politicians of America, or with what emanates from the politicians, should form, as they are apt to do, a ludicrously unjust estimate of the American people. The framers of the scheme before us style their work a copy of the British constitution; but, as a plan of a central government for a federation, it may be called rather a copy of the constitution of the United States. Ottawa, as a factitious capital, is the exact counterpart of Washington; and at Ottawa, as at Washington, we shall too probably see the least worthy citizens of the Federation collected together, during several months in each year, without even the tempering and restraining influences which the mixed society of a real capital affords, an unadulterated element of professional politicians, devoting their whole time to the undivided work of corruption and intrigue. If the Federation is to have a central government and a capital, the question should at all events be considered whether it is not desirable to place the capital in a city, such as Montreal, where there will be some social interests and influences, to temper the pursuits of which Willard's Hotel and the boarding-houses at Washington are the classic scene. Even the amenities of Washington debate might be a little controlled by the presence of a more enlarged and cultivated circle in the gallery. A writer, himself a colonist, and one who has had considerable experience in colonial politics, lays it down as one of a series of axioms for the guidance of colonial legislators, "that "it is a fallacy to assume that there will "be found in the colonies, as in England, "a class of statesmen sufficiently above "the influence of sordid motives to take "the management of public affairs from "public spirit and patriotic motives. "alone; or that men who, by securing "the votes of the majority of a colonial "legislature, can obtain the handling of "the colonial revenue, and the dispensing "of the patronage of office, in addition "to the distinction which it confers, "will scruple at any sacrifice of the "public interests which may be necessary "to secure those objects." If there is any truth in this somewhat plain-spoken summary of a colonist's political experience, it betokens no vice or malady in colonial society, but, on the contrary, a general prevalence of industry, and an equal diffusion of wealth. It does, however, make it desirable, before instituting a great central government with a vast amount of patronage, and an unlimited command of money, to pause and inquire, whether under the existing conditions of colonial society competent and disinterested candidates for the places in that government are likely to be found. likely to be found. If they are not, it might be a sounder, though a less imposing policy, to be content with a simple federation for the purpose of mutual protection, confining the Federal Assembly to purely federal functions, giving its members as little patronage as possible, and assigning to them only the power of calling for the necessary contingents from the different States in place of the power of raising taxes by their own authority, and expending them with their own hands. These reflections press upon us with peculiar force when we observe the extensiveness of the powers assigned to the General Parliament in relation to public works:-"Lines of steam or "other ships, railways, canals, and other "works, connecting any two or more of "the provinces together, or extending "beyond the limits of any province;" "lines of steamships between the federal "provinces and other countries;" "tele"graph communication and the incor"poration of telegraph companies." All these, and the patronage connected with them, together with an unlimited power of borrowing money, as well as of raising it by taxation, are to be assigned to that particular class of men who in America and the colonies seek their fortune in political life. And their powers are extended by a sweeping provision to "all such works as shall, although lying "wholly within any province, be specially "declared by the Acts authorizing them "to be for the general advantage." Either the Canadian press is extremely calumnious, or the apprehensions which on perusing these clauses reason suggests will not be dispelled by reference to experience. The members of the British House of Lords are not needy men, and their virtue is fortified by every safeguard which their own position or the sensitiveness of public opinion can afford; yet they and the county members used the political power entrusted to them in extorting "compensation" and other advantages from railway companies to an extent which reminded the world of feudal barons levying black mail on passengers along the Rhine; while the history of the Galway contract is a pretty strong proof that "lines of steam or other ships," as well as land communications, may produce political combinations not exclusively directed to the promotion of the public service. The apprehension that provincial intelligence and the interest of the companies will not suffice to secure connexion between lines of railroad without the control of a central authority, seems to be unfounded; since even the independent nations of Europe have managed to arrange an international system of railways, of which no great complaint is made; and the service between London and Paris is as speedy and convenient as though the line of road and packets had been laid down by an European Congress. Federal fortifications, and other military or naval defences, are, in truth, the only kind of public works which it is obviously necessary to place in federal hands. The advocates of a simple federation will probably be met by objections derived from the present state of affairs in Germany and the United States: but the first of these examples is, in truth, irrelevant, while the moral of the second, if it be closely looked into, is the opposite of that which, at first sight, it may appear to be. In the case of Germany, the federation is completely overridden and in effect destroyed by the domineering influence of two great military monarchies, the territories of one of which, Austria, are mainly situated outside of the confederacy, and form the fulcrum of a force external to federal interests, though exerted with tyrannical effect in the federal councils. There is no reason to believe that, abstracted from these alien elements, and considered in its natural operation, the federal compact fails to answer the purpose of its institution. As to the American Confederation, it may be thought, on a superficial view, that the present disruption is caused by the looseness of the tie; and such evidently is the prevalent notion among the Americans themselves, who are at this moment bent upon the abolition of State rights, and the exaltation of the Central Legislature and Government. But the fact is the very reverse. the United States been a simple federation, with a federal council limited in its functions to strictly federal subjects, Slavery, the subject on which they have split, never would have been a national question; nor would it have given rise to a struggle between national parties, culminating in a national election. Humanity can hardly deplore anything which has led practically to the destruction of slavery: but the moral to be deduced by the framers of Had |