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either some universally recognised rule of public law, or some fundamental principle of morality, or some undoubted right incidental to humanity, such as that of a nation to reject the yoke of a foreign government, has been broken, there can be no doubt that intervention would, on our present supposition that its object could be effected without expense and without war, be both lawful and desirable. But, in each instance, the double category to which such contests belong, and the degree in which they belong to each, must be taken into consideration in any question as to the right of intervention. In the contest, for instance, of Italy with Austria, the element of distinct nationality so far predominates as that the case may fairly be considered to come under the rules by which the right of intervention between separate nations is determined; and, judged by these rules, it is a case in which intervention, on the present hypothesis, might properly be exercised. As regards Poland, on the other hand, and as regards Hungary, the occurrences have in their nature more of insurrection against native rulers than of resistance to a foreign yoke, and in them therefore the right of a foreign state to pass judgment is less clearly assured.
We have hitherto considered the question as one respecting a single state acting by itself. It is evident, however, on looking to the grounds of the conclusions at which we have arrived, that the association with it of one or two other states cannot materially modify those conclusions. And, practically speaking, it is as concerning the action of one, or two, or at most three states, that the question presents itself; the conflicting interests, real or supposed, of nations in general rendering them, amongst other causes, unable in most cases to arrive at, and unwilling to attempt, a solution by means of a congress. But, in order that the inquiry may be complete, it is necessary to consider whether the case would be altered if the decision were to emanate from such a body. In events of such a character as to fall within the class with respect to
which we have found, as between distinct nations, that intervention was justifiable on the part of a single state, it is needless to observe that the interposition of a majority of states would be equally so; while it would be preferable as affording lees excuse for that sense of injustice which is sure to be felt by any nation coerced by the authority of one or two others. But would it not also be justifiable, in respect to events of that class in which it has been seen that the intervention of one or two states, or of a majority of them, would not be so? Those events were, to describe them in general terms, events in which the matter in dispute was one with respect to which two opposite opinions might fairly be held, there being on each side, as it is termed, a “colourable" case; and the ground on which it appeared that in such circumstances intervention was indefensible was the absence from the intervening power of three elements of qualification for judicial authority-constitution by the general body, special intelligence, and impartiality. Now of these qualifications, the first, though not literally, may be considered to be virtually possessed by a majority of states. To the second, though the misapprehension which prevails in every nation in regard to the affairs of other nations is such as in a great measure to disqualify even a congress for the purpose under consideration, a majority of states has necessarily more claim than a minority of them. As regards the third, that of impartiality, there seems no more to be said in favour of the former than of the latter; the strong personal interest of most nations in every international difficulty which arises being, as already observed, one of the chief causes which have led to the opinion that a congress is a futile expedient for their solution. On the whole, it may be concluded, as regards differences of this class, that even a majority of the states composing the general community, though less open to objection as an authority pronouncing judgment than one, or two, or a minority of them, would not be free from it; and that coercion by such a body would be a measure of doubtful justice. It is true that power to make laws for the community must be considered to reside in a majority of its members. But it is one thing to make laws, and another to apply them, when they are made, to particular cases in which the interest of the administrators is involved. Where the dispute is between two parties in the same state, the reasons which would condemn the intervention of a single state are valid also against that of a congress. In those extreme cases, in which only we have found that intervention would be defensible on the part of a single state, it would obviously be more easy to defend, because bearing a greater weight of judicial authority, if it were the act of a congress.
Having thus obtained an answer to the first question—viz. what are the cases in which, its own interests not being concerned, a nation would have the right to intervene, supposing that it could do so without expense to itself, and without actual war-we proceed to consider the second, viz. how far, in such cases, a nation is justified in intervening, if to do so successfully it must either incur the expense of irresistible armaments, or must engage in war, to its own detriment and that of the general community.
Now the proper objects of intervention are (as has been seen) first, to prevent or redress injustice; and, secondly, to prevent or put an end to violence and bloodshed. But, in order that the first of these objects may be attained, it is in many cases not only necessary, but desirable, to sacrifice the second. For it is obvious that, if the nation against which the intervention is directed is powerful, and that on whose behalf it is exerted is weak, the intervention, so far from preventing war or shortening its duration, will in all probability ensure and prolong it. Even, therefore, if the question was one affecting the general interest only, it is obvious that a nation should be cautious in entering upon such a war, and should carefully consider whether the case is
one of those in which the sacrifice referred to will be necessary to success, and, if so, whether success is desirable. But the question does not affect the general interest only. It concerns also in an especial degree the interest of the interposing state itself. By the supposition, that state undertakes the task not for its own advantage, but for the sake of justice or of peace-that is, for the general good. By the supposition also it incurs some expense and suffering for that object; and the question is, whether it is called upon to incur, or is justified in incurring them. In the community of nations, owing to the absence of established laws, each nation is charged with the defence of its own territory and the maintenance of its own rights, and is compelled to support for the purpose large and expensive armaments. If it voluntarily goes beyond this, and submits to further expense for the sake of preserving peace or of enforcing justice as between other countries, it does more than can reasonably be required or expected of it. The burden of self-defence is one of the necessary evils which anarchy imposes; the burden of defending others is gratuitous and self-imposed. It is certain that no nation can properly be condemned because it refuses to injure itself for the benefit of the rest of the community. But, though the refusal to adopt such a course may not be censurable, would not its adoption he justifiable and commendable? The answer is, that selfsacrifice is commendable only when the object in view bears a reasonable proportion to the amount of self-inflicted injury. Unless there is a due ratio between the suffering submitted to and the object to be attained, self-sacrifice is not heroism, but Quixotism. But, in counting the cost to a nation of any such act of generosity, it must be remembered that the cost falls with very different pressure upon the different classes of which the nation is composed. In almost every country there is a very numerous class of persons many of whom are undergoing the misery of absolute pauperism, and many more,
“pressing hard upon the limits of sub- dition to its fiscal burdens. If, on the sistence," who contrive to obtain the other hand, it can intervene, with a bare necessaries of life at the cost of probability of success, and without any unremitting labour. Now upon this such addition to its expenditure, there class, comprising as it probably does is no objection, on the score of a due the great majority of the “working regard for its own welfare, to intervenclasses,” any very considerable increase tion; and the self-sacrifice which such of taxation falls with disastrous and an act involved would then be laudable. terrible effect. It is indubitable that Such, for instance, might be the case any measure by which the national where the nation against which the expenditure is largely increased makes, intervention was directed was greatly especially in this country, to many the inferior in military strength, or where, difference between bare subsistence and by obtaining the assistance of other destitution, to many more the difference nations, the intervening state could between tolerable comfort and bare sub- bring against it a great superiority of sistence. It is a fact from which there force. It must be borne in mind, too, is no escape. Either in the enhanced that the increase of expenditure objected price of the commodities which they to is such an increase as would seriously consume, or, if the additional taxation affect the indigent classes, and that, is so adjusted as to fall in the first although every addition to taxation instance upon the richer classes, in a must in some degree affect then, it is reduction of the wages of labour con- only by a very large and decided adsequent on the diminution of the fund dition to it that they can be materially available for its employment, those to injured. whom the option is given of work, the A mere literal fulfilment, however, workhouse, or starvation, will bitterly of the condition here insisted on would feel the change; and, before the nation not be sufficient. For a nation may be determines to take a step which is not able to take up arms for the purpose of required of it, and largely to increase intervention without any addition to its its expenditure for the purpose of inter- expenditure, simply because it is in the vention on behalf of others, it is bound habit of supporting large armaments in to consider whether it has a right to order that it may be in a condition to inflict such an amount of suffering upon interfere whenever it pleases in the disits own poor. If the measure were putes of foreign states. For the due obdemanded by international justice--that servance of the rule it is necessary that is, by the duty which a state owes to the force to be employed should not be the general community-the case would considerably more expensive than that be different. But no such demnand (as which the nation is compelled to mainwe have seen) is made. The question tain for the defence of its own territory is one not of justice, but of generosity and the protection of its own rights and -of self-sacrifice not for imperative interests. The maintenance of large duty, but for gratuitous benevolence- armaments with a view to contingencies an object for which, it may safely be not affecting the national interests is in said, no nation has a right to inflict itself a violation of the rule. Thus, in acute misery upon a large part of its order to justify the late intervention of population.
France on behalf of Italy, it ought to be From these considerations it seems to shown not only that she made for the follow that any nation in which, as in purpose no such addition to her military this country, there is a class of any establishments as added largely to her numerical importance which is habitu- expenditure, but that those establishally on the verge of poverty, ought to ments were not habitually more costly abstain from all interference in inter than they would have been but for her national transactions not concerning general practice of interfering in quarrels itself which involves any material ad- in which she is not concerned.
It appears, then, that, in order to determine whether, in any given transaction of the class in which (as we have found in reply to the first question) the mere “right” of intervention exists, it ought, either singly or with other powers, to intervene, a nation has to consider, first, with reference to the general interest, whether its intervention would not occasion an amount of violence and bloodshed such as would be a greater evil than the wrongdoing which it is intended to prevent; and, secondly, with reference to its own interest, whether the proceeding would not involve so great an increase of taxation as would bring serious calamity upon a large number of its people. If these questions can be satisfactorily answered, intervention becomes in every such instance not only a right, but a duty.
In the preceding observations an attempt has been made to arrive at some intelligible and rational rule by which a nation may be guided in any question of armed interposition in international or civil dissensions which do not concern itself. It would seem, indeed, that in this country the difficulty has been summarily solved by the determination to abstain absolutely from all such interference. But, as this determination, in so far as it is not the product of mere selfishness, appears to rest on a very vague and indefinite foundation, it can scarcely be expected to be permanent. In the meantime, there is another kind of intervention, which appears to be tolerated by public opinion, and which, for want of a better term equally concise, may be called “ moral intervention ;" that is, interposition in the way of censure, protest, or remonstrance. This species of interference is the subject of much controversy. Some persons consider that a nation may properly and laudably exercise it in all instances of conduct on the part of one foreign state towards another, or of one party in the same state towards another party in it, of which that nation disapproves. Others are of opinion that such interposition ought
never to take place unless where the interposing state is prepared to follow up its remonstrances by war. Neither the one nor the other of these opinions seems to be founded in reason. With respect to the first, we have seen that it is only in a certain class of international dissensions, which it was the object of the first of the questions above proposed to define, that any state can properly claim to pass judgment, while in civil dissensions, properly so called, it has no right to pass judgment at all ; and, on on the other hand, there seems no reason why it should abstain from expressing its opinion, merely on the ground that, from considerations of its own and of the general interest, it would not be justified in a declaration or a menace of war. The only reasonable ground (as it would seem) on which such an expression of opinion could be considered inexpedient is, that it would be useless. But this is certainly far from being the case. The instances in which judgment would be given are those in which some generally admitted rule of public law, or some broad and elementary principle of justice, has been unquestionably violated ; and in these there can be no doubt that the influence of public opinion in other countries operates with a highly deterrent effect upon wrongdoers, or that a firm and temperate remonstrance on the part of any influential state may have the best effect, if not in preventing or mitigating the wrong, at least in preventing its recurrence. In evidence of this, it is sufficient to point to the circumstances attending the French occupation of Rome ; in which the wrong done was not only clear to all rightminded persons, but the wrong done, and the effect of public opinion in ultimately requiring its discontinuance, have recently been admitted by the perpetrator himself. The error so frequently committed by nations is not in protesting where they will not strike, but in protesting where they have no right to protest; that is, in cases not belonging to the category of those in which only they are entitled to pronounce an opinion. Upon the mischievous character of such
proceedings there is no need to dwell. If such remonstrances are wholly without they happen to be based on an erroneous preventive influence. judgment, they are, of course, directly “Intervention " has here been treated productive of evil. If not, the nation of in the more usual and limited sense whose conduct is condemned, firmly be- of the term, in which it does not include lieving, and not without some reason, either interposition for the purpose of in the justice of its own cause, and at protecting any rights or interests of the the same time feeling that, even if it were interposing state, or any action taken in the wrong, the dispute is not one on by a nation on account of the treatwhich its censor has a right to decide, ment of its own subjects in another. rejects them with indignation or with Such transactions fall within the scope ridicule, and the entente cordiale between of other branches of the general inquiry the two countries is endangered, to the as to the circumstances under which a prejudice of the cause of peace; while, nation is justified in making or in threatas regards the repetition of the same ening war, conduct by the same or any other nation,
DEAD MEN WHOM I HAVE KNOWN; OR, RECOLLECTIONS
OF THREE CITIES.
BY THE EDITOR.
REMINISCENCES OF EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY-PROFESSORS AND
Off one of the main streets in the Old Town of Edinburgh, at a spot where you would not be apt to look for it, lies the large block of building occupied by Edinburgh University. It is a modern structure in the Græco-Italian style, erected at very great cost between 1789 and 1834, in lieu of the older edifices which had served for the University from its foundation by James VI. in 1582. Entering from the street by a portico with Doric columns, you find yourself in a spacious, cold, grey, quadrangle, fringed round with a raised and balustraded stone walk, whence at various points doors and flights of steps give access to the library, the museums, and the class-rooms of the four Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, and the Arts. Into this quadrangle flock at the beginning of every November the students, to the number in late years of from 1,200 to 1,500 in all, who are then to commence, in one or other of the Faculties, their annual five months of attendance on the classes. For the
Scottish Universities differ from the English in this, that, whereas the English have three terms of study in the year, extending from October to June, the Scottish crush the entire work of the year (save that there are certain special summer-courses) into the five winter months between the beginning of November and the beginning of April. Of the students who thus every November appear in the University quadrangle, making it once more busy after its unearthly summer quiet, by far the greatest proportion are of that Faculty of Arts which is preliminary to all the three professions in common. Next in number are the students of medicine; then those of law; and the students of theology are much the fewest. The Professors in each faculty are in approximate, but not exact, proportion to its relative number of students. There are now 4 Professors in Theology, 6 in Law, 14 in Medicine, and 12 in Arts, making a total teaching body of 36 Professors, in