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We should not weep o'er these that sleep,

Their short, sharp struggle o'er,Under the rolling waves that break Upon the Afric shore.

God works not as man works, nor sees As man sees: though we mark Ofttimes the moving of His hands Beneath the eternal Dark.

But yet we know that all is well : That He, who loved all these, Loves children laughing on the moor, Birds singing in the trees;

That He, who made both life and death,

He knoweth which is best: We live to Him, we die to Him, And leave Him all the rest.

D. M. MULOCK.

ON "INTERVENTION," MATERIAL AND MORAL.

BY LORD HOBART.

In an ordinary community violence and bloodshed are prevented, and the rights of individuals so far as is possible secured to them, by legal institutions. Laws, and executive arrangements under the sanction of laws, are made for the protection of person and property; tribunals are erected, some for the trial of persons charged with offences against those laws, others for the settlement of disputes and conflicting claims which cannot be amicably arranged; and means are provided to prevent any attempt at a violent solution of such differences. These institutions depend for their efficacy mainly upon their fulfilment of two conditions,-first, that the tribunals thus created are impartial, that is, that they are composed of men who have no personal interest in the result of their decisions; and, secondly, that the community has at its disposal such an amount of physical force as precludes all chance of successful resistance to their decrees. If the first condition were wanting, such measures might prevent violence and bloodshed, but they would do so at the cost of justice, while they would entirely fail to afford security for just dealing as between the members of the community. If the second condition were wanting, they would accomplish neither one nor the other of these objects.

In a community composed of nations no such institutions are possible.

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bunals might indeed be established, consisting of one or more states, for the settlement of disputes and claims which did not admit of amicable adjustment, and for the trial of offences against the recognised rights of property or sovereignty resident in each state; but such tribunals would be inefficacious, because it would be in the power of any nation, unless to an exceptional degree deficient in physical force, to resist their decisions with more or less probability of success, and because the condition of international relations is such that, in almost every case brought before a state thus armed with judicial authority, its own interests would in some way or other be concerned. Thus the first of the conditions above mentioned, that of impartiality, as well as the second, that of sufficient coercive power, would be absent from such authorities. Regular executive arrangements for the preservation of order and the prompt suppression of violence are for the same reasons impracticable in such a society. Its members may, and do, agree among themselves, tacitly or explicitly, that certain proceedings on the part of one towards another, analogous to outrages upon person and property in an individual community, are crimes, and if possible to repress them; and they may agree, and have agreed, with a view to the general welfare, upon rules for the settlement of certain questions of inter

national equity which experience has shown to be constantly arising in their dealings with each other whether in But even these arrangepeace or war.

ments, expressed or understood, which are dignified with the name of "International law," and which, if enforced without resistance, would mitigate only to a small extent the evils consequent on the absence of legal institutions, they have no absolute power to enforce. Any nation may, if it pleases, resist to the utmost the application of such regulations to itself; and even in the event of a combination of powerful states to enforce them, which international jealousies make difficult and rare, an expensive and calamitous war might be necessary for the purpose.

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The community of nations, then, is a community in which law, in the ordinary sense of the term, the sense in which it subsists and is effectual in an ordinary society,-has no existence. The natural consequences of anarchy follow. The military power possessed by each nation being its only means of defence against aggression or insult, and of obtaining that to which it considers itself entitled, or which, without any such consideration, it is resolved to obtain, blood will from time to time be shed, and acts of injustice will be committed or contemplated, either by means of successful war, or, where there is a great superiority of force, without any disturbance of the peace of the world. it, then, or is it not, the right or the duty of a nation, besides providing for the defence of its own territory and for the maintenance of its own rights and interests, to interfere by force with the proceedings of one state towards another, or between two parties in the same state, for the purpose either of preventing bloodshed, or of securing justice, or for both these objects combined? Such is the question which the more powerful nations are perpetually called upon to solve, but of which, though it has become the battleground of conflicting opinions whose watchwords are "intervention and "non-intervention," very little attempt has yet been made at a scientific solution.

Now it is obvious that there are many cases in which a nation may, as it would ordinarily be expressed, have the "right" to intervene, but in which it may be deterred from doing so by the consideration that intervention could only be successful either at the cost to itself of irresistible armaments, or at the cost to itself and to the world at large of actual war. In order therefore to determine whether, in a given state of affairs, not requiring action on account of its own rights or interests, a nation ought to intervene, it is necessary to inquire, first, whether the case is one in which it might properly intervene supposing that it could do so without expense to itself, and without actual war; and, secondly, if so, how far it is justified in intervening, if one or both of these evils must be the consequence of the measure. If the distinction between these two questions had been borne in mind, much confusion of thought and misapprehension on this subject would have been avoided. It is objected, for instance, to the supporters of non-intervention, that they are advocating a "selfish" policy. It is clear, however, that the objection cannot possibly apply to an advocacy of it which is based upon the ground that a negative answer must be given to the first of these questions. It is only where non-intervention is the result of considerations such as those to which the second question relates, that any pretext whatever is afforded for imputing selfishness to the policy. How far such an imputation would be wellfounded we shall presently have occasion to consider.

First, then, what are the cases in which a nation would have a right to intervene, supposing that it could do so without expense to itself, and without having recourse to war? It seems probable that, in the general opinion, there would, on such a supposition, be scarcely any limit to that right, at least as between distinct nations. Yet it is certain that in a large class even of international dissensions no such right would exist. The disputes or conflicts in which any two nations may engage are, many of

them, of a kind in which a third nation, not itself concerned in the result, has no sort of qualification for passing judgment, and therefore no right whatever to interpose. In general, it may be said that, where the subject-matter of the quarrel is one which, fairly considered, admits of dispute,-where the proceed ing which it is proposed to prevent is one of which the criminality or injustice is matter of question,-in other words, where the case is such as, if brought before a legal tribunal, would be decided upon, not as presenting no sort of doubt or difficulty, but only after discussion or deliberation, "intervention" is not justifiable. In such circumstances neither of the two nations concerned can be expected, or ought to be compelled, to accept the decision of a third, which is neither invested by common consent with judicial authority, nor is possessed of any qualities entitling it to decide. The tribunals by which, in an ordinary community, such differences are settled are deliberately selected by the society itself, and are supposed to be endowed with information or intelligence peculiarly fitting them for the purpose in view, and to be wholly free from personal interests in the questions submitted to them; in all of which qualifications (in two of them invariably, and in the third very frequently) an intervening state is deficient. As regards intelligence, not only is there no special qualification, but the dense ignorance which exists in all countries as to the political condition of others, and as to the views, opinions, and modes of thought prevalent in them, and the apparent impossibility which pervades a body-politic of looking at international questions from any point of view but its own, constitute a positive disqualification for judicial power. As regards impartiality, there is, by the supposition, no such direct interest in the issue as could be supposed to justify intervention; but the circumstances of the case are almost always such as to ensure a very decided bias in the judgment formed of them in a third country. Considerations as to the manner in which its own

trade will be affected, jealousy of the growing wealth and power of other states, historical associations, dynastic alliances, antipathies of race, and prejudices of education, as well as other causes, operate with nearly absolute certainty, where there is any doubt as to the justice of the case, to preclude impartial judgment. Accordingly, we find that the verdicts pronounced by nations upon the conduct of their neighbours have, in by far the greater number of such instances, been wrong. "In the "large volume of human folly there is

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no page longer or more discreditable "than that which contains the judgments "of nations upon each other." Even if this were not the case, the enforcement of such judgments would be indefensible, the objection to it being not only that they are frequently or generally wrong, but also that those against whom they are directed cannot fairly be expected to accept them. It may be said that, since the community of nations is one in which law, as ordinarily understood, does not exist, the world must be content with the best substitute that can be found for it, and that it is better that the peace should be preserved by the self-constituted authority of any one or more states, to whatever objection on the score of justice this may be liable, than that it should be perpetually broken for the purpose of deciding questions otherwise insoluble. But this argument proceeds upon a wrong estimate of the comparative value of justice and of peace. It is true that the question at issue is as likely to receive an unjust solution when it is settled by a trial of strength between the disputants, as when it is settled by the fiat of an authority incompetent to decide. But in the former case the nation which, being in the right, is compelled to yield, has at least had the opportunity of using its best efforts for the satisfaction of its claims, and the chance of successfully asserting them; in the other, it is allowed no voice whatever in the matter. In the one case there is the single injustice of 1 Sir G. C. Lewis, "Dialogue on the Best Form of Government."

a wrong solution; in the other there is the double injustice of a wrong solution, and of its enforcement by an unqualified authority.

It is, of course, possible to conceive a condition of affairs in which the rule here contended for must be exceptionally disregarded. A war, for instance, carried on with unusual ferocity, protracted beyond all ordinary duration, and of which the termination seemed still distant, might be an instance of the kind; for the necessity of putting an end to such a war might have become paramount to all other considerations. But, in order that a particular event may be entitled to such exceptional treatment, it must possess strongly marked features distinguishing it clearly from almost every recorded occurrence of a similar kind.

It appears, then, that there is a large class of international dissensions in which a state not directly interested in their issue could not, under any circumstances, justifiably interpose. But there is another class of them in which the interposition of such a state would, apart from all consideration of its cost in money and in human life, not only be justifiable, but desirable. A clear and unquestionable breach of any of the well-understood and generally recognised rules of international law (including among them the obligation of such treaties or diplomatic compacts as have not been invalidated by subsequent events or by the mere progress of civilization 1) would be one ground for such interposition. The reasons which we have found to exist against it, where the point at issue was one admitting of doubt and argument on the score of legality or justice, are here inapplicable. Not only a combination

1 Contingencies in which any nation is required by the stipulations of a treaty, either singly or with other countries, to interpose (among which some of the proceedings recently taken by Germany towards Denmark in reference to Schleswig-Holstein must, it would appear, be classed) are not here in question. The intervention considered in this paper is that to which nations are not bound by any special and explicit obligation.

of states, but, if that was impossible, any one state, would have the right, on the present hypothesis, to compel obedience to a rule which had been made by all of them for the general good. The want of those attributes (regular constitution, special intelligence, and impartiality) which, as already observed, justify the coercive action of legal authorities, does not in this class of cases, as it did in the former, disqualify a nation from acting as a substitute for such authorities. There being no reasonable doubt that the crime is being committed or is contemplated, and none at all as to the identity of the criminal, there is no question here of misjudgment either owing to ignorance, or to bias arising from personal interest for or against the accused. The defect of self-constitution is the only one of the three from which the intervening authority, if it consisted not of a general congress, but only of one or two or a minority of the whole body, would suffer; but this must be considered as a defect of little importance when set against the object of tho intervention. For the same reasons, the decided and obvious breach of any great principle of international justice. sanctioned by the moral sense of mankind, or the violation of any of those axioms of right and wrong, which, not falling within any positive rule of international law, are yet fully established and unhesitatingly appealed to by nations in their intercourse with each other, or which, though they may not be accepted by all governments, are so by the majority of educated men, would afford another ground on which intervention might be justifiable. The wholly unprovoked aggression of one state upon another, or the seizure of its territory without anything like a fair or rational excuse for doing so, would be obvious instances of such misconduct. The French occupation of Rome-one of the most lawless acts ever committed by a nation-and the suppression in 1849 by a Russian army of the Hungarian insurrection, are clear examples of it; for, in what

ever cases interference in the civil dissensions of foreign states may be justifiable, it is certain that to assist a government in crushing the liberties of the people over whom it rules is an act of flagrant immorality. The two latter instances are of value as illustrating with singular force the distinction between the two questions now under consideration; for they are of a kind in which, as regards the part to be taken by this or any other country, the duty of intervention considered apart from the price to be paid for it, and the duty of non-intervention in the actual state of the case, are equally clear.

Thus far with respect to "intervention" as regards the proceedings of one state towards another. Take next the contingency of a contest between two parties in the same state. It is It is easy to see that in this case the objections to intervention are far more cogent and comprehensive than when the quarrel is between distinct nations. The general body of states has obviously far less concern with the internal affairs of one of its members than with the proceedings of its members towards one another. The principle which in an ordinary community is fully recognised, that each of the individuals comprising it ought to be allowed to regulate his own concerns as he thinks fit, so long as he abstains from injuring others, holds good also for the community of nations; and this principle, superadded to the reasons which we have found to exist as against the right of interference in a large class of international transactions, tends to confine that right within the very narrowest limits as regards civil contests. Such interference is, as we have seen, justifiable, even as between distinct nations, only when some universally admitted rule of international law, or some great principle of justice or humanity, has obviously and undeniably been infringed. As between two parties in the same state, international law does not apply; and, as regards the great principles of justice or humanity, it is obvious that the case is very dif

ferent when they are contravened by a member of the community, not as against other members of it, but as against itself. Take the frequent instance of a people rising against tyrannical rulers. On which side justice lies does not admit of a doubt. Yet even in this case foreign intervention cannot be justified, and that for these reasons :— Firstly, That the wrong done is not done to any individual of the society of which the interposing state is a member, and as a member of which, and as such only, it has any right to interfere; and, secondly, because such intervention would violate the wholesome rule which, apart from all question whether it is on the right or the wrong side, condemns the interference of one state in the internal concerns of another. The justification of this rule as applicable to the contingency now under consideration is sufficiently evident. For a people which owes its freedom to foreign bayonets, and not to such a sense of the value of the possession as would give it courage and endurance sufficient to ensure the ultimate success of its efforts, will neither enjoy nor preserve it.

It appears, then, that, except in those rare and extreme cases in which, in political as in other sciences, it is sometimes necessary to set aside established laws, intervention in the civil differences of foreign states is, irrespectively of all question of all question as to the amount of resistance with which it will be met, unjustifiable. The conditions of the question are altered when one of the parties to the contest is of a distinct race, or has preserved a separate nationality, as, for instance, in the struggle of Belgium with Holland, of Poland with Russia, or of Italy with Austria. In so far as such conflicts are not between a people and its native rulers, but of a people against the superior power of foreign rulers, they fall within the rules which we have found to be applicable to quarrels between distinct nations. In so far then as they are of this character, whenever the justice of the case is palpably and wholly on one side, so that, by the conduct of the opposite party,

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