a group Mr. VINE. If I may go off the record ? Mr. FASCELL. All right. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. VINE. I have never seen any criticism whatsoever of this facet of our Government's operations. I would say that whenever a debate is taking place in the Chamber of Deputies on the larger measures of American forces in France and French aid—that is, American aid to France—the Chamber of Deputies has shown not only remarkable understanding but a great deal of appreciation for our efforts. Mr. May. In other words, you think our public relations are pretty good, as far as France is concerned ? Mr. VINE. That is a little difficult to answer, because the French, by and large, are people who are extremely proud of their nationality, their history, and their culture. I think that when one speaks of the French one never talks about how much they like foreigners. They do not like any foreigners. I think it is a case of degree. I think we fall at the top end of this scale. I think we are disliked less than any other foreign group. I do not want to be misunderstood on this. I do not mean this in a snide fashion, but I think that the Frenchman, as a general rule, is less receptive to foreigners than any other national I have ever come in contact with. General BABCOCK. May I make a statement there? My contacts have been primarily with the military, and I find there something which I think is a great deal more important than friendship. I am speaking only from my own personal point of view. They respect us tremendously, the French military. They have great respect for our military, and our relationships with them are awfully good. I think they have tremendous respect for us, and I think that that is very important. Mr. May. It certainly is. When you are going about your tasks on the more technical side of your operations, is the story of what you are doing told, at times, as well as getting their appreciation for what you are doing just through your efforts? Do you try to highlight important things that you feel you are accomplishing, so that they get a picture besides what they learn in the normal routine of your operations in working with them? Is there a public relations approach to it as well as the technical side? General BABCOCK. You better make a comment on that. I have some ideas for the future, but you tell them. Colonel EISENHART. The best salesmen for the United States are those people of the military forces who go to the United States for training. Unfortunately, not many Frenchmen have gone there. We have trained almost 1,300 pilots in the United States, and many technicians. All of those people that come back here and are then integrated spread out in the armed forces and they are our best salesmen. Those people have done a really fine job. The indirect benefits of this training are probably more than the direct benefits. Mr. MICHEL. Would the gentleman yield? Colonel EISENHART. It has averaged between 9 and 10 percent of their gross national product or overall budget. Defense is around 15 or 20. General BABCOCK. For 1957, the military expenditures were 29.5 percent of all Government spending. That was 9 percent of the gross national product. That is estimated for 1957. Mr. MICHEL. In the United States we are spending about twice as much of a percentage of our budget for defense as is France. Is that taken into consideration when we are determining their capabilities and potential as to what they might do? Mr. VINE. It certainly is. I think the point that you have made right now—as far as the percentage of the total budgetary spending is concerned, I think France rates the highest of all of the countries of the world outside of the United States. Mr. FASCELL. You are talking about percentages against the budget? You could probably make the same statement if you took percentages as against gross national product. If you relate percentages in the United States to the total budget, you get an entirely different picture than you do if you relate a military part of the budget to the gross national product of the United States ? Mr. VINE. That is true. I think both relationships fall in the same category. Budgetary spending in France is a much larger part of the gross national product, I think. It is a larger part of the gross national product than it is in the United States. It works out that the percentage of the gross national product and the relationship of defense spending to the total Government spending is also the highest. I want to make one point clear here: The figure that we use includes some items not included in the budget. I do not want to get into a complex discussion of that, but a good many extrabudgetary expenditures are in here. Mr. POLAND. When you say “total Government expenditures," does that mean what we would call Federal expenditures or does it include local expenditures, like police? I do not know how it is organized in France. Mr. VINE. It includes all Federal expenditures but the Federal expenditures in France include many expenditures that would be local in the United States. Mr. POLAND. Police, schools, and roads? Mr. VINE. To a large extent, police budgets, school budgets, and road budgets. The incidence of this on the national budget would be much higher than it is in the United States. Mr. MICHEL. Would you say that the Chamber of Deputies is fully aware of our contribution to France's defense effort and do they realize that it is mutual? Mr. VINE. Yes; I would say it is fully cognizant. Mr. MICHEL. More important, would you say that the French people are fully aware of what our contribution is ? Mr. VINE. I think there is no question about that. , Mr. FASCELL. I do not know that I would be quite as positive as you, Mr. Vine, in that last statement. I cannot really argue with you about it since you have been here and I have been in the United States. Mr. Vine. The question raised was whether the French people, as a whole, are cognizant of the American contribution to France. I do not think there is any question. I am not saying they are showing gratitude. Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you that these are factors that we have to change our thinking on in the United States in relation to this program, gratitude and friendship. I am afraid that too many people get the idea that we are buying friends when we are not buying friends at all. Mr. May. Did I gather that you have some ideas that you are going to try to promote here? You said that you have some ideas for the future. Mr. Fascell. The same thought flashed through my mind. We are going to be back here someday soon and I would like to find out about relationships then when the general gets through stomping around. General BABCOCK. I do not mean to imply Mr. FASCELL. I know that you did not, but the thought flashed through my mind. General BABCOCK. I have some ideas and they have only gone around in my own head and I would like to talk about them with my own people before I put them out. I think it would be rather impertinent now to discuss them at this time. Mr. FASCELL. One very important question has been suggested to us here. What is your opinion about the General Accounting Office recommendation that the military assistance program be programed on a long-range basis rather than on a year-to-year basis? General BABCOCK. Speaking without too much experience and purely from my own point of view, Mr. FASCELL. We understand that you will have the opportunity to modify your thinking as the days go by. General BABCOCK. Yes, as the days go by. "I do not know how feasible it is and I do not know just how far ahead the people in Washington can think, but that was not meant exactly as the words were said and there is no overtone. That is, how far is it possible to think ahead because the situation changes so rapidly. The international situation changes so rapidly. The types of weapons which can be made available change. It becomes possible, as time goes on, to make things available to countries we were not able to make available a few years ago and I do not know just how far we can think ahead in terms of modernizing some of these armies, navies, and air forces throughout the world. If it were possible to think in long-range goals, I think it would help tremendously. I think it would help me in my job, and I am sure it would help the country involved because it would know what it was working toward, and I think it would help tremendously to sell the idea to our own people at home if they knew what the ultimate, long-range program was and if they could think in terms of it being a long-range program. The President has stated, and it is the policy of the United States, that aid to the countries which are allied with us is essential. If it is essential, then it is something that we must do and it is not something that we are going to do this year and cut out next year or cut out 2 years from now. We are going to do it as long as it is essential. If it is not essential, then I question whether we should do it, but if it is considered essential, I think our people ought to think in terms of it being a longrange program, and that it is going to cost a great deal. Mr. MICHEL. General, is that not, then, an admission that we are committed to an infinite program of military assistance for an indefi a nite period of time? You see, the thing that concerns me particularly with recognizing the advantage to a long-range program is the fact that we speak in static figures for X number of years. What would the psychological effect be if our military assistance were tapered down for a period of years? General BABCOCK. You mean on the people involved ? General BABCOCK. I think it would have a serious effect on them. I think it would have a serious effect on NATO. Here is the way I think we ought to go about this thing: I think we ought to take a good look at what the countries whom we are now aiding would look lika if aid ended. Mr. MICHIEL. Today? General BABCOCK. If aid ended today or at a certain point in the future, and we ought to then, at the highest level, make a decision as to whether or not that is acceptable to the United States from the military and political point of view. If it is acceptable, then I think we should work toward it. If it is not acceptable, I think we should tell the Congress and the people that it is not going to be acceptable and that a certain level must be maintained, and then let us just be honest about it. We are going to have to maintain that as long as the threat exists. I think this whole answer would help a great many people. People have asked me when can aid end, and my answer is whenever proper authorities in the United States are willing to accept, in the case of a country like France, the contribution France can make without aid. If we can accept that, let us do it as soon as we can. If we cannot accept it, let us recognize it and stop talking about ending aid, but face the facts. Just on my own and in anticipation of future questions of this sort, I am now making a study to try to determine as best we can—it is going to be an educated guess what the French would look like if we ended aid and tried to figure out, let us say, the 1960 program, or something like that. Then Washington will have information on which to base this tremendously important decision which I think we ought to have go to the President. Then, when that decision is made, I think we should go to the people and say we cannot afford to give up aid. Our allies will be able to contribute sufficiently to enable us, the free world, to carry out our mission, or we can accept what is going to happen, taking into account the psychological effect on these countries and the fact that they are going to lose a lot of their enthusiasm, perhaps, for NATO if this aid is cut out, because of the feeling of weakness produced. We can either say, Yes; we will accept it and cut out aid and go to the Congress and say that by such-and-such a time we will cut out aid, or we can say that we are sorry and we have to face it. Whether that is the view of my colleagues or my superiors I do not know. It is purely my own thinking. . Mr. FASCELL. General, I think that you find a great deal of concurrence in the executive branch and outside of the executive branch and in the legislative branch on the ideas that you have just discussed. We started out here last year with all kinds of agonizing reappraisals of our mutual-security program, in all of its aspects. a In one year we got more reports than had been made in the whole history of the United States on international affairs. In fact, we got so many that now we are going to have a committee to reorganize what we have studied. Certainly, basically what we are going to need is a type of internal appraisal that you are discussing with recommendations from the top as to what realistically is the picture. The big assist is being made on this same point by the General Accounting Office because they are engaged in a worldwide survey of the entire program. As I read their report, they keep emphasizing over and over again a realist approach, facing-the-facts type of thing, to this whole problem. Do we have any other questions before we go into executive session! Mrs. HARDEN. General, how many members do you have on your staff ? General BABCOCK. Altogether? General, speaking for myself, and I have not seen the reports dealing with the subject matter here, but you have had only 2 months at this job and I hope that I have the opportunity in a short time to come back and take a look at what General Babcock and his staff have been able to do. I keep getting the feeling all morning long that there will be tremendous improvements as a result of whatever problems you may be faced with. I trust that you will get a kind reception from your superiors. General BABCOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I found this MAAG in very good shape. I do not want to leave the impression that they need any improvement at all. Mr. FASCELL. I understand. I think at this point we had better get into some specific details. I can vouch for all of my people here, General. General BABCOCK. I can vouch for my people, too. (Whereupon, the committee went into executive session.) |