Democrats and Republicains and the press of the country should be able to rally in support of this objection.

I would observe that the momentous issue of impoundment was not treated specifically in the drafting of the Constitution and it has not been satisfactorily resolved in the nearly two centuries of the U.S. Government.

NO CONCESSION OF AUTHORITY TO IMPOUND

By establishing procedures for Congress to review actual Executive impoundment actions, the bill in no way concedes that Presidents have authority for such actions beyond what Congress has explicitly provided in the antideficiency law.

Appropriation bills generally are not cast in arbitrary language mandating that every dollar appropriated be obligated in the time frame for which it was originally intended. There are, on the contrary, obvious circumstances under which Congress would expect and even has directed the Executive to impound.

I am not undertaking to gloss over any of the facts that appear to pertain to this problem before us today.

In some instances in recent years Congress has directed the Executive to impound funds in "not less than" stated lump-sum aggregates. This was done in the Johnson administration, I believe, on a couple of occasions. These actions left to him the decision as to the specific funds to be withheld. It did so in 1967 in House Joint Resolution 888 with respect to the fiscal 1968 budget, and in the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 with respect to the fiscal 1969 budget.

In my judgment, Congress should meet its responsibilities by making specific decisions up and down the line on the budget, and not in the lump-sum manner we used in the 1960's. But that is not the course a majority of the Members of Congress favored in these two instances.

THE ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT

More importantly, Congress in 1905, 1906, and 1950 enacted legislation, still in effect, which provides for the impoundment of funds by the President under certain special circumstances.

I underline "under special circumstances," not under all circum

stances.

The relevant language of the Anti-Deficiency Act is as follows: (2) In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the date on which such appropriation was made available. Whenever it is determined by an officer designated in subsection (d) of this section to make apportionments and reapportionments that any amount so reserved will not be required to carry out the puposes of the appropriation concerned, he shall recommend the rescission of such amount in the manner provided in the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, for estimates of appropriations.

That final provision of the law has been honored more in the breach by prior Presidents than by the present President in performance. In this language Congress essentially directed the Executive not to obligate appropriated money if it developed that the purpose of legislation could be achieved for less, or if developed subsequent to the appropriation act made the use of the money unnecessary.

ADMINISTRATIVE

DISCRETION IS

NECESSARY FOR RESPONSIBLE FISCAL

MANAGEMENT

I believe that it is fundamentally desirable for the Executive to have limited powers of impoundment in the interests of responsible financial management.

There are bills pending which would deny any right of impoundment for any reason or purpose by the Executive. I think that would be unwise. A certain degree of impoundment in the interest of financial management is, in my judgment, required.

This principle squares with common sense. Congress does not administer the Government. Those in executive capacities do bear a responsibility to achieve the purposes of appropriations at the least practicable cost. Some degree of administrative flexibility, such as that provided under the Anti-Deficiency Act, is essential to insure prudent management of the huge and complex Federal establishment, which involves hundreds of thousands of operations.

CURRENT IMPOUNDMENT SITUATION

The current impounding problem is acute, not so much because of the amount of funds impounded-funds have been impounded by Presidents since Thomas Jefferson and probably George Washington.

It is because of their nature and because of the intent behind the impoundment. The administration has argued that it must exercise. Executive discretion far broader than that ever contemplated in connection with the Anti-Deficiency Act-in order to pursue broad economic goals.

On this basis, there would hardly be any limit to Presidential powers over Government programs and spending. This would destroy the coequal status of Congress. It would be demeaning the Congress.

It would, in effect, reduce the Congress to a subordinate role in the area of its most significant power.

THE FISCAL CRISIS

It is incredible but true that about one-fourth of the Nation's halftrillion dollar public debt will have accumulated during the 4-year period ending fiscal 1974 under the present administration.

It does not follow that this very unacceptable fiscal situation has been brought about solely by the actions of Congress. It certainly is utterly ridiculous to say that Congress has misused its power and that it is therefore the mandate of the administration to impound funds and take over the functions of the legislative branch.

The facts simply do not support the view that Congress alone is responsible for our unfortunate fiscal situation. The chairman of the committee has pointed out that the Executive has submitted budgets providing for and estimating deficits of more than $100 billion over a 4-year period.

The Office of Management and Budget and those who submit the budget are certainly very heavily responsible in this field.

Why wasn't a better job done of presenting budgets nearer in balance? It is not up to the Congress to submit budgets. It is up to the administration, the executive branch, to submit budgets.

Why have these budgets been so badly out of balance?

The executive and the legislative branches in fact, Mr. Chairman, have walked hand-in-hand down this road and both must share the responsibility.

I repudiate any attempt to lay the responsibility for the fiscal situation solely upon the shoulders of the Congress. It simply is not correct. Had Congress for the last 5 years given the executive precisely what had been requested-not 1 penny more or 1 penny less-the fiscal posture would be about the same.

So why do we say that Congress is wholly responsible for the situation which confronts us? It is not.

Over the past 5 years Congress has provided about what the executive has requested in total spending authority doing this through regular appropriation bills and through bills which mandate spending otherwise, like the "back door" procedure.

During that period, in appropriation bills Congress has reduced the appropriations below the request of the executive by about $30 billion. In fact, Congress, through the appropriations committee process, has kept within the total requests for appropriations in each of the last 20 years. So this does not look like irresponsibilty on the part of Congress in its consideration of appropriation bills.

During the past 5 years Congress has offset reductions made in specific appropriation bills out of the committee which I head, by adding about $30 billion in bills which are not handled by the committee.

In fiscal year 1973, Congress did make substantial additions to the President's budget in nonappropriation bills for such items as social security, revenue sharing, black lung, veterans benefits, and others.

But what about it? In fairness to the Congress is must be said that the President signed into law the bills mandating this spending and even claimed credit for the major large increases.

So where is the culprit if we seek one?

It is also true that Congress and the Executive have acted together since 1962 to reduce available revenues in calendar year 1973 by about $50 billion, assuming the economy would have acted as it has acted. Again, the administration took credit for tax reductions as being a great accomplishment in the budget message of last year.

Clearly the administration's broad claim to impounding authority and some of the impoundment actions themselves have oversteppedputting it in the mildest terms-the bounds of reasonableness.

Hence, the necessity for the adoption by the Congress of an orderly system of dealing with impoundments, a system for today, tomorrow and for the future. It is a step that we should have taken before. It is an orderly step. It is nonradical. It makes sense.

I commend it to you for your consideration. I hope that you will find it possible, perhaps after making modifications, to approve H.R. 5193, a bill which was drafted by many hands and based upon many thoughts.

The proposal is direct and simple. The President will submit to Congress a record of impoundments within 10 days. Within 60 days we can nullify the impoundment in whole or in part or take no action whatever and permit it to stand.

We take action to nullify by a concurrent resolution. This bill provides, as a matter of law, that the concurrent resolution would have the effect of law in dealing with the impoundment issue.

In its present form this bill provides for no amendments to the concurrent resolutions relating to impoundments during floor consideration. But I don't think the House-nor would I want to deny any member the right to amend these impounding concurrent resolutions. So I think you will want to modify that.

Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to comment on any questions that might be asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I might say in order to be fair to all the members of the committee that, I believe, we should have two shifts of questioning so that each member will have an equal opportunity to ask whatever questions he desires. The first round will be a 5-minute period so that all members can have their turn to ask questions. When that is done, any member who has any further questions may proceed. We will limit the first round of questioning to 5 minutes.

I might say in connection with your remarks relative to how impounding worked out in the 1950 appropriation bill

Mr. MAHON. In the 1960 bill?

The CHAIRMAN. In 1950, I just wanted to call your attention to how it worked out where there is cooperation between the executive department, the budget and the Congress, in appropriations. I took it from the records of 1950 as an example of what you outlined in your statement.

The philosophy of cooperation between the executive and the Congress was in an omnibus appropriation bill and during the House debate in the legislation Representative Albert Thomas of Texas, a member of your committee, proposed that the President be authorized to cut the budget by an additional $500 million. To prevent the President from using this authority to eliminate or sharply curtail particular projects and activities, Representative Thomas further proposed that no domestic program could be cut by more than 15 percent. And an amendment by Representative John Taber called for a reduction of $600 million, limiting the President to ten areas in which cuts could be made and restricting reductions to either five or ten percent. To Mr. Taber, the Republican ranking member, and Thomas on the Democratic side, the Taber-Thomas proposal thus satisfied two Congressional needs: First, economy, and, second, retrenchment on the one hand and retention of legislative control on the other hand. That exemplifies how it worked out satisfactorily to the Congress and to the executive by arbitrarily handling the same with mutual amendments.

UNCONTROLLABLE PROGRAMS

Mr. MAHON. It is appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to point cut that in that faraway time-not so long in years, but long otherwise-a great percentage of the budget was not uncontrollable. Now under existing law about 75 percent of the budget is relatively uncontrollable under existing law. To limit program reductions to 10 percent, 20 percent or 5 percent today would involve cutting, in many instances, programs that are uncontrollable under existing law, such as social security, interest on the public debt and many others. The CHAIRMAN. I yield to Congressman Delaney.

ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS UNDER THE BILL

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Mahon, in a word, the situation is this: The Congress has authorized and appropriated moneys for specific purposes. Now, the President has chosen to take no action, and no action has been taken. So we are in a no-man's land. We are not moving. As a result, we have H.R. 5193. Can you tell us under your bill, and I have read it rather carefully, how you can enforce it in the event that the President decides he will take no further action than he has taken up to this date? What can the Congress do about it under your bill?

Mr. MAHON. On page 2 of the bill, I read line 15:

The President shall cease impounding of funds set forth in a special message if within 60 calendar days of continuous session after the date on which the message is received by the Congress the specific impoundment shall have been disapproved by Congress by passage of a concurrent resolution in accordance with the procedures set out in section 4 of this act.

In other words, if this becames a law, if the President signs it or it should be passed over his veto, then the President is required to cease an impoundment after both Houses of Congress have passed a concurrent resolution.

Mr. DELANEY. If he takes no action, what do you do about it? Mr. MAHON. This is all that can be done by Congress under the circumstances as they exist today.

Mr. DELANEY. And there is no enforcement in this bill, is there? Mr. MAHON. You can't go down and command the barracks and take over. There is no easy way to do this when a spirit of cooperation is lacking.

Mr. DELANEY. I agree with you.

Mr. MAHON. This is a moderate and commonsense approach to a very difficult problem. It depends somewhat upon good faith and cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches. This proposal, in my judgment, would tend to bring about better cooperation and understanding and more consultation between the executive and the legislative branches.

Mr. DELANEY. This is the crux of the entire problem, is it not? There is no way you can do it under this legislation even in the event it was passed.

Mr. MAHON. But under the present circumstances it is claimed by the administration that because he must pursue certain broad economic goals the President has complete authority over the programs and the expenditure of funds. That leaves Congress more or less out of the picture.

This bill reaffirms the general attitude, in my opinion, of most of the Members of the Congress and most of the people of the United States of America.

Mr. DELANEY. We know the attitude of Congress because they passed the authorization, and they have appropriated money for the purpose. Now it is before the President. He has the money, he has the authority. and he doesn't choose to go through with it. What can we as Members of Congress do? Outside of public opinion, is there anything?

Mr. MAHON. Public opinion would be a mighty force in connection with this.