I think we ought to forget the shadowboxing on this impoundment business and have it out once and for all on the question of one-man rule.

These Rules Committee hearings should greatly aid the American public on learning the true facts concerning the high cost of living. The legislation before us today will set a pattern of working relations between the Executive and the Congress during President Nixon's second term.

We are going to give him every chance, offer him every cooperation. We will not be bullied by an overly ambitious Executive. We will not permit one man to substitute his preferences for the carefully deliberated judgment of 435 Members of the House of Representatives and 100 Senators all elected by the people of this country.

It is up to Mr. Nixon at this time to show Congress and the Nation whether he wants a Government of cooperative but balanced powers, or whether he will leave the Congress no choice but to apply further checks to the overriding ambition and aggressiveness of the Executive.

Without objection, H.R. 5193 will be inserted in the record at this point. There were no objections.

[H.R. 5193, 93d Cong., First Sess.]

A BILL To require the President to notify the Congress whenever he impounds funds, or authorizes the impounding of funds, and to provide a procedure under which the House of Representatives and the Senate may disapprove the President's action and require him to cease such impounding

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) whenever the President impounds any funds authorized for a specific purpose or project, or approves the impounding of such funds by an officer or employee of the United States, he shall, within ten days thereafter, transmit to the House of Representatives and the Senate a special message specifying—

(1) the amount of funds impounded,

(2) the specific projects or governmental functions affected thereby, and (3) the reasons for the impounding of such funds.

(b) Each special message submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be transmitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate on the same day, and shall be delivered to the Clerk of the House of Representatives if the House is not in session, and to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is not in session. Each special message so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and each such message shall be printed as a document for each House.

SEC. 2. The President shall cease any impounding of funds set forth in a special message if within sixty calendar days of continuous session after the date on which the message is received by the Congress the specific impoundment shall have been disapproved by the Congress by passage of a concurrent resolution in accordance with the procedure set out in section 4 of this Act. SEC. 3. For purposes of this Act, the impounding of funds includes

(1) withholding or delaying the expenditure or obligation of funds (whether by establishing reserves or otherwise) appropriated for projects or activities, and the termination of authorized projects or activities for which appropriations have been made, and

(2) any other type of executive action which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of available funds or the creation of obligations by contract in advance of appropriations as specifically authorized by law. SEC. 4. (a) The following subsections of this section are enacted by the Congress

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such they shall be deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to

the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of resolutions described by this section; and they shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(b) (1) For purposes of this section and section 2 the term "resolution" means only a concurrent resolution which expresses the disapproval of the Congress of an impoundment of funds set forth in a special message transmitted by the President under the first section of this Act, and which is introduced and acted upon by both the House of Representatives and the Senate before the end of the first period of sixty calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which the President's message is received by the Congress. Where a special message specifies more than one impoundment of funds, the resolution may relate to any one or more of such impoundments; and the resolution with respect to any impoundment may express the disapproval of the Congress of any amount thereof and may set forth the basis on which the impoundment is disapproved.

(2) For purposes of this subsection and section 2, the continuity of a session shall be considered as broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of the sixty-day period referred to in paragraph (1).

(c) Any resolution introduced with respect to a special message shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be.

(d) (1) When the committee has reported a resolution with respect to a special message, it shall at any time thereafter be in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion shall be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(2) Debate on the resolution shall be limited to not more than two hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate shall not be debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution shall be in order, and it shall not be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to.

(e) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the consideration of a resolution with respect to a special message, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business, shall be decided without debate.

(f) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to any resolution referred to in section 4 hereof shall be decided without debate.

The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, I will yield to the minority leader of the House Rules Committee, Congressman Martin, of Nebraska.

Mr. MARTIN. First I would like to announce that Rov Ash, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, will be a witness before our committee. A week from Thursday on April 5, Mr. Ash will be the leadoff witness.

I would like to make a brief statement which will only take 2 or 3 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, the bill which we begin hearings on this morning provides that the Congress may veto cutbacks in Federal spending initiated by the President. The end effect of this legislation would simply be to increase the cost of the Federal Government to our taxpayers.

If the legislation is enacted, the probable outcome is an increase in Federal spending because of sectional desires and interests. This is due to the fact that 435 Members of the House each represent small districts or small segments of our total country and 100 Members of the Senate each represent one State.

The President, on the other hand, represents all 50 States, plus the Territories, and he is primarily interested in the overall picture. Because of sectional interests, it is practically impossible for the Congress to cut back on Federal spending.

The legislation which we have before us is one-sided. It simply provides the vehicle for the spending of more money, but nothing for the reduction of expenditures. Despite the statutory policy and fiscal necessity to protect purchasing power by avoiding intolerable inflation, the structure of Congress does not enable it to assume the executive responsibility for achieving this end. The harsh reality is that time and time again Congress has passed swollen appropriation acts and failed to levy the taxes necessary to avoid inflation.

Foreign countries and the central banks of major nations have lost confidence in the American dollar and the ability of the Government of the United States to balance its budget. This is witnessed by devaluation of the dollar twice within the last 14 months.

The inflationary spiral which has gripped this country since 1965 has been a direct result of the fact that our Federal Government could not balance its budget. The answer is simple, Mr. Chairman, we must either spend less or increase taxes.

A few weeks ago, my newsletter to 59,000 people in my district stated that I fully supported the President in his cutbacks in spending because they are being made all across the board in many departments of Government.

My district is practically 100-percent agriculture, but I also supported the four agricultural cuts recently announced by Secretary Butz. I further stated that we must reduce the cost of Government or increase taxes. It is that simple.

It is interesting to note that my mail has run 95 percent in favor of my position.

The American taxpayer is overburdened with taxes and cannot continue to carry the present tax load. This bill would increase Federal expenditures with the result that the Congress would have to increase taxes.

That concludes my statement. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Martin.

I might state that today we will probably confine our hearings to two witnesses. After these witnesses complete their statement they will be questioned by the various members of the Rules Committee.

I have applications for members who will testify tomorrow. We have Congressman Pickle. Congressman Culver, Congressman Eckhardt, Congressman Esch, Congressman Anderson, a member of our committee, and Congressman Conte.

I also have Congressman Ford, Congressman Harrington and Congressman Danielson. Also, Congressman Leggett and Congresswoman Abzug.

We will hold hearings tomorrow in the Foreign Affairs Committee Room on this floor, and then we will have the regular Tuesday hear

ings of the Rules Committee in our room in the Capitol. But the hearings tomorrow will be in this building.

Mr. MARTIN. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. When Mr. Ash, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget is here, it was my understanding that we would have a room such as this for the appearance of Mr. Ash. I understand that the TV networks would like to cover his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. They mentioned that to me. Speaker Albert may also be here that day when Mr. Ash testifies. I look forward to that gathering because we may get some firsthand information from these distinguished witnesses.

We will now proceed with our first witness, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Congressman Mahon, of Texas.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MAHON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. MAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say that there is considerable evidence of improvement in the Rules Committee because when I last appeared before you we were in a small, crowded room. It is remarkable to note how you have improved your environment.

The CHAIRMAN. I might interrupt to say that we are more or less a minor committee and we can't afford a large room like this.

Mr. MAHON. Well, we are all very economy-minded, though we are using a little additional electricity this morning. I hope the effort to televise these hearings will be in the public interest.

I am constrained to believe, Mr. Chairman, that out of all this discussion, this pulling and hauling, this expression of views, that something really worthwhile will develop. I would be happy, as I know you would, to be a part of improving the legislative branch and the Government of the United States.

We have not done a job that we have to apologize for in every respect. We have overstepped ourselves in some ways, as have the other branches of our Government.

But there is always room for improvement. I would be the last one, Mr. Chairman, to plead guilty to the incompetence of the legislative branch. I believe in the legislative branch and I believe we have the power and the will to improve our course of action.

PURPOSE OF BILL IS PROCEDURAL

I am proposing today an orderly approach to a very controversial issue which is of national interest and significance. What I say will probably provoke no headlines at all. I have nothing spectacular to present, and I hope it is not too controversial. I measure my words. when I say that.

I am not here to make a plea for more spending or less spending. I emphasize the point that the bill I propose is procedural. It does not undertake to grapple with the question of whether or not the President has the constitutional right to impound funds.

AUTHORITY TO IMPOUND CLAIMED BY PRESIDENT

The President has stated that it is absolutely clear that he has the constitutional right to impound funds if he believes that the expenditure of such funds would mean a general increase in prices or taxes.

I do not want, nor do you, an increase in prices or taxes, but Congress cannot concede that the President has the broad authority which he has claimed. To concede that would mean that we were practically out of business as a legislative branch.

If we should concede that, then the President would have the power of the purse which the Constitution gives to the legislative branch. Administration spokesmen state that Congress is fragmented, they poor-mouth the Congress. They say it represents special interests. Well, we do represent people in all segments of the land. Administration spokesmen say we are not equipped to cope with the fiscal issues confronting the country and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the administration to step in and assume the power of the purse.

Does that make sense? I don't think so.

Administration spokesmen, in effect, take the position that the American system is not operating effectively and that it is incumbent upon the administration to change that system.

I may say that is not the way to change the system. Change may be desirable, but how can it be argued that the executive branch has the authority to modify the system of Government which we have embraced for nearly two centuries?

A PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE IMPOUNDMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS

In the proposed legislation we do not undertake to deal with the question of whether the administration has the authority which it. claims. The proposal before us is a procedure for dealing with the impoundment by the Executive of appropriated funds.

How shall we deal with impoundment of appropriated funds? Shall we adopt some system to deal with it? We haven't had one in the past.

Has that been a mistake on our part? That is one of the things this committee will be evaluating. Funds have been impounded and are being impounded and it is up to Congress, not the Executive, to find an orderly way to deal with the realities of the situation.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that legislation of the type before you today is long overdue.

I propose that the President inform Congress within 10 days of the impoundment of funds and that Congress have 60 days in which to nullify, in whole or in part, the impoundment actions of the President.

There is nothing radical or undemocratic or irresponsible in my proposal.

The measure I propose is not temporary in nature. It is not designed to meet just an imminent situation. It gives Congress a present procedure to follow. And it gives Congress a long-range vehicle during administrations of both parties through which to assert its final authority with respect to the expenditure of public funds.