Accounting Office and that disbursements shall be made upon such warrants, and not otherwise.

What we need to do is to draft and interrelate our appropriation bills in such a manner that funds cannot be obligated, expended, or apportioned for the implementation of one Government policy unless funds are likewise obligated, expended or apportioned for the funding of other Government policies. The effect of this would be to prevent the Executive from practicing a selective, cafeteria-style, supplying or withholding of the funds needed to carry out the various activities of our national policy.

At this point I set forth an example of a paragraph which could be included in some, or all, of our appropriation bills in order to achieve the above purpose.

SEC. — Unless the Congress shall provide otherwise in language expressly made applicable to this section, at any time during the fiscal year 1974, the amount obligated or expended under this Act for any program or activity, expressed as a percentage of the amount appropriated by this Act for the purposes of such program or activity, shall be not more than (-16-) percentage points greater than the amount obligated or expended at that time during such fiscal year for any other program or activity authorized by Act of Congress, expressed as a percentage of the amount appropriated by the Congress for purposes of such other program or activity for the fiscal year 1974.

I am not wedded to this language. I am certain that this committee or some other committee may wish to alter the language to some extent. Likewise, I am attaching two sketches to illustrate my point. [The sketches referred to follow:]

Mr. DANIELSON. Under present practices the Executive can, selectively and at will, provide or withhold (impound) the funding of individual national programs, thus, for practical purposes, he can decide which policies will be implemented, and which will not be implemented, and to what extent.

Under my suggested language, so long as he uses public moneys for some of our programs, he must provide pro rata funding for all of them, or request a variance from the Congress.

What I would seek to do by this concept is to provide a coherent and orderly interrelationship in the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated by the several different appropriation bills.

The use of the foregoing concept would not bring about reckless spending; on the contrary, it would both permit and promote economy. I am sure that we all agree that Government spending should be reduced, that savings should be realized, wherever possible.

This language would also promote greater cooperation and harmony between the legislative and executive branches. Whenever the Executive, in the management of the Government's business, would determine that money could be saved, all he would have to do is notify the Congress and by resolution the Congress could provide for an appropriate change in the rate of expenditure or could terminate it altogether.

The Congress and the Executive, working together, could economize where an immediate need is removed, or could accelerate expenditure where a need is increased. Changing needs, based on changing circumstances, could be quickly accommodated.

Please note, also, that a reasonable amount of flexibility can be written into the language at the outset in order to fit the anticipated differing needs of the different appropriations.

I submit the foregoing for your consideration as an effective solution to the impoundment problem, and again urge that this committee exercise the greatest care before reporting a general antiimpoundment bill, so that it cannot be construed as a further delegation of an asserted power to impound.

Thank you, gentlemen. I would be pleased to try to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congressman Danielson.

You have a very precise, exhaustive, and extensive breakdown of this question, and I want to commend you.

Mr. DANIELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Delaney?

Mr. DELANEY. How would you enforce this in the event the President didn't think the same as you do?

Mr. DANIELSON. The Comptroller General is bound by law to first. audit, settle, and certify every warrant for the disbursal of public funds from the Treasury.

I have checked with the office of the Comptroller General and I am informed that, unequivocally, this law is rigidly enforced. The laws that are on our books, the laws of the land, prohibit the Treasurer from signing a warrant for the disbursal of funds in any way except following the certification of the Comptroller General.

This is critically important. There are most certainly some programs-most of the programs-that the President will wish to fund, he will wish to implement.

Mr. DELANEY. But we are talking about when the President doesn't wish to take action, exactly what he is doing now. He doesn't take any action.

How will this legislation force him to?

Mr. DANIELSON. Sir, it will force him to release funds for the programs on which he does not wish to take action because unless

Mr. DELANEY. HOW?

Mr. DANIELSON. That is what I am trying to say-because until and unless he does so, he cannot release funds for those programs which appeal to him.

Let us take an example. Suppose he wants to expend some money under the defense appropriation. He would not be authorized. This is a conditional appropriation. He could not disburse funds under the defense appropriation if it exceeded the rate by which he disburses funds under the program that you may have in mind.

Mr. DELANEY. Is there anything proposing a pro rata basis? Who has the authority and where is there anything in the law that so states?

Mr. DANIELSON. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the existing law. But I propose that we pass such a law, that it become a part of our appropriation bills.

Mr. DELANEY. But the passage of this bill wouldn't mean anything. There is nothing you can do about it if the President desires to remain as he is and take no action.

Mr. DANIELSON. I will submit that the President would have one of these choices: He must either fund all programs according to the formula that the Appropriations Committee in its wisdom provides, or he must fund no programs.

It is difficult for me to imagine the President impounding all programs, holding up on payroll, holding up on interest on the national debt, on social security benefits, on veterans pensions, on payroll, itself. He couldn't spend anything unless he opens the gates for all. Mr. DELANEY. That is not the law as it stands now.

Mr. DANIELSON. That is correct. That is very much correct, sir. The gentleman is absolutely correct. But I propose that it should be the law in the future.

Sir, maybe here is where we do not have a meeting of the minds. My proposal is prospective. It could not apply to the appropriations which are already the law of the land. It has to be built into forthcoming appropriations. The only way we could make this apply retrospectively would be to attach it onto a supplemental appropriation bill which could conceivably still be coming along the pipeline.

Mr. DELANEY. And make a supplemental for everything that has been passed?

Mr. DANIELSON. Something like that, yes. It is not retroactive. It is prospective.

Mr. DELANEY. But if we passed it, it would be a new law, wouldn't it?

Mr. DANIELSON. That is correct.

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin?
Mr. MARTIN. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisk.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify what my friend from New York has brought up.

As I understand, and I want to get it clear so it is understood, our colleague from California-representing the delegation from California and who has worked on this for a good while-takes the position against any of the present impoundment bills and actually is discussing language which would have to be attached to every appropriation bill or each continuing resolution.

Is that right? It could be attached to every one, or it could be. selective?

Mr. DANIELSON. Yes, that is correct. It would not have to be to every one. It could be selectively applied. I am informed, and I will defer to your greater wisdom, that almost 85 to 90 percent of the budget is almost untouchable anyway. I am referring to such things as interest on the national debt, social security and so on.

There isn't a tremendously large portion that is optional. It could be tied to any portion but you would not need to tie it to all.

Mr. SISK. George, read your proposal again and explain to me the application. Use the 16 percent. I understand that is flexible, it could be 10 percent, 5 percent, 25 percent, any percentage. Actually explain it.

I think there is some question on the issue for the law, as to how it would apply. I think it would be well for you to go a little further.

Mr. DANIELSON. Thank you, Mr. Sisk.

The language would read:

Unless the Congress shall provide otherwise in language expressly made applicable to this section, at any time during the fiscal year

For example, 1974–

the amount obligated or expended under this Act for any program or activity, expressed as a percentage of the amount appropriated by this Act for the purposes of such program or activity, shall not be more than

Sixteen percent, another arbitrary figure I have plugged in only for the purpose of illustration—

percentage points greater than the amount obligated or expended at that time during such fiscal year for any other program or activity authorized by Act of Congress, expressed as a percentage of the amount appropriated by the Congress for the purpose of such other program or activity, for the fiscal year

1974.

What that means is this: The equation that is described is simply this, thinking of a given program. Let's say the Defense Appropriation bill, since I referred to it before. At any time during the fiscal year the amount obligated or expended pursuant to that appropriation bill, expressed as a percentage, taking the total amount which has been obligated or expended as the numerator, over the total amount appropriated as the denominator, being one-third, one-half, or whatever the portion may be, cannot be more than 16 percentage points greater than the amount obligated or expended for any other program expressed as a percentage of the amount appropriated."

That fraction would be the same thing. Let's suppose you have income maintenance, the amount expended or appropriated being the numerator and the total amount of the appropriation being the denominator.

Let's suppose with this the fraction on the Defense budget is 50 percent, one-half. At that time the amount expended or obligated under the income maintenance program could not be less than 34 percent. In other words, the first could not exceed the second by more than 16 percent.

Let's not get hung up on the 16 percent. That is an arbitrary figure I have plugged in here only for the purpose of illustration. It could be different. It could be 5 percent, 10 percent, 16, 25, or zero.

The reason I put in 16 was to illustrate. It is relatively logical. That is one-sixth, which would be 2 months of a year. It gives some flexibility.

I will stipulate that in the implementation of any appropriation there has to be some flexibility. Things just can't go along rigidly like plate glass, everything exactly the same as everything else. That is basically the point.

Mr. SISK. Can I direct this question to you, George, in further explanation: What this actually amounts to, in a sense, is a limitation on an appropriation bill. In other words, you propose to put in language which becomes a limitation. Correct me if I am not right: If, for example, the President spends on elementary and secondary education programs $500 million, then he cannot expend an amount less than 16 percent below that amount on a manpower program, using that as an example, assuming you were getting into the HEW appropriation bill.