It is the policy of the U.S. Government not to disclose The effect of this policy is to extend those provisions of the Atomic Energy Act which require a congressionally approved government-to-government agreement to be in effect prior to foreign dissemination of Restricted Data to all naval nuclear propulsion technology, regardless of its classification. This policy was established in 1965 at the request of Congress and with the strong support of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and the Atomic Energy Commission. It was adopted because of the recognized importance of this technology to the national defense and, in particular, a grave concern that uncontrolled foreign access to such information could enable nations to acquire the kind of submarine capability necessary for a strategic missile weapons platform, thereby fostering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To make these controls effective, however, it is also necessary to control public disclosure, since public disclosure obviously results in foreign disclosure. The case of naval nuclear propulsion information also illustrates the problems involved in formal security classification. Such classification would require extensive physical modification to several hundred private industrial facilities now performing work under controlled but not classified conditions, a large expansion of security guard forces at many facilities, a large expansion of the need for security clearance investigations, etc. The cost of these measures, if applied to all program information for which protection from compulsory disclosure is necessary, would be prohibitive. Although no precise estimate is possible due to the wide geographic dispersion of the facilities and the numbers of components documents, and personnel involved, it can confidently be predicted that a great increase in overall program costs, amounting to many millions of dollars, would result from total classification of naval nuclear propulsion information. Even more critical would be the cost of classification in terms 2 of the time required to design, construct, and install our naval nuclear propulsion plants under fully classified conditions. Again, as a rough estimate, the delays which classified handling and control of program technology would cause in the utilization of information throughout the program conceivably could extend project times by as much as 25% to 50%. Under the Reagan Administration's program of fiscal constraint, such expenditures cannot be justified. In addition, the effect of the large additional administrative and physical burden of total security classification on the willingness of private enterprises to perform program work must be considered. Private firms are already reluctant to enter this field because of the stringent technical criteria and administrative requirements associated with this work; some are leaving the field for commercial work, largely for this reason. If these vendors were required to make extensive modifications to their facilities, subject their employees to government security investigations and otherwise meet the criteria for eligibility to perform classified government security work, it is doubtful that many would wish to participate. The effect of total security classification on our relationship with our private contractors is not susceptible to precise evaluation, but we know it would be very damaging. Finally, the proposed 11th exemption will not be utilized to restrict the flow of technological information which serves to promote competition among contractors of the Department of Defense where such restriction is not mandated by national security considerations. Court decisions have consistently held that agencies retain discretionary authority to release information subject to exemptions to the Act. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-94 (1979). Department of Defense Directive 5400.7-R, Section 1-300, (published December 1980), provides a liberal policy of discretionary disclosure which will permit the release of technological information under FOIA in instances where there is no national security risk. Further, contractors will continue to be able to obtain technological information in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.36, "Defense Scientific and Technical Information Program" (October 2, 1981). Generally, this directive permits certification of contractors and prospective contractors having a legitimate interest in such information to register to obtain and utilize such material from the Defense Information Technical Center in a manner which does not jeopardize national security. The foregoing discussion serves to illustrate the critical importance of enacting the proposed 11th exemption to the Freedom of Information Act. It will afford protection to sensitive technological information which may be subject to unrestricted dissemination without jeopardizing the competitive benefits resulting from its release to authorized defense contractors. 3 Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union by CASPAR W. WEINBERGER A few months ago a fisherman working off the coast of North Carolina picked up what turned out to be an intelligence gathering device neatly enclosed in a Soviet oceanographic current meter. This device and others like it are used to gather vital Information about the U.S. Navy's activi ties and could be extremely harmful to us if employed in war. At the heart of this device is a modern printed circuit board. It and several others have been brought to my office the past six months. Most were packaged for military purposes and all were designed for use in a wide variety of weapons systems, Including ballistic missiles, "fire and forget" weap ons, and guidance and control for aircraft, to name a few. the U.S. or those who participate in the In- ferret out items of interest. Neutral and present new evidence to our allies on how the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact are using Western technology to strengthen their offensive military capabilities. We, want to conclude at that meeting a redefinition of the COCOM international control program. I am also working to Involve NATO. system is that defense interests are poorly One of the peculiar aspects of the control represented. For example, only the United States sends Department of Defense experts to COCOM, even though COCOM's .main-purpose is to safeguard technology The Soviets have organized a massive, systematic effort to get advanced technology from the West. The sophisticated devices were not made in the purpose is to support the Soviet military buildup. What surprised me most was that these United States. Nor were they produced in at 3 Decor Be Specialists in the Department of De fer se tested these circuit boards carefully. They found many of the components, par ücularly the microcireults, to be exact cop ies of "chips" made in the United States. In fact, a US chip was put on the Soviet circuit board and worked properly. Such" microelectronic circuits are used extensively is our strategic and conventional weapons systems. Clearly the Soviets have made remarkable progress in being able to copy and manufacture advanced electronic equipment of this kind. Alarming Implications How the Soviet Union got the manufac turing know-how and circuit design infor mation to build these components is a story as complicated as its implications are alarmning. The simple answer is that the Soviets have organized a massive, systematic effort to get advanced technology from the West. The purpose of this is to support the Soviet military buildup. This unusual acquisition program fol lows two paths-openly whenever possible and clandestinely when not. The Soviets make a maximum effort to get technology from the West by claiming a need for equipment to be used in strictly civilian enterprises. An example is their effort to obtain modern medical equipment such as CAT scanners which require sophisticated computer technology to operate. Using civilian cover, during the 1960s and 1970s the Soviets moved quickly to purchase electronics technology. Our bureau. cracy was asleep to the danger of this, so nothing was done to prevent it. As a result, the Soviets were able to set up a number of specialized electronics factories - all of which are operated today as classified facilities. Where they were unable to get either from these complicated maneuvers. Each But the most significant and troubling An important part of our own national defense as well as the security of our allies and friends around the globe is the "quality edge" we have enjoyed for many years. This advantage is largely the result of the talent and skill produced by our free enterprise system. We have made use of this asset effectively in supporting our na tional defense programs. It is one of the pillars of our security. Unlike some, who from time to time criucize our defense programs, the Soviets understand how important the quality edge is to us. Their actions prove that they mean to benefit from our technology. Thus, it is clearly in our best interest to prevent them from doing so and that is what this administration is trying to do. President Reagan took the lead last July at the Ottawa summit conference when he appealed to our allies to tighten our international control system. We have worked hard to plan an effective high-level COCOM conference. The meeting, to be held in Paris next month, will be the first broad reconsideration of our technology control system in nearly 30 years. We will 7-F that can be used for military purposes by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. At the national level, only the U.S. and France at low defense specialists to review regularly. proposed technology exports to the Soviet Union. The result is that many judgments are made without expert participation, and a good deal of damage results, as in the case of highly advanced communication switching equipment obtained by the U.S.S.R. from Western Europe. Unfortu nately this equipment can also be used to add greatly to the Soviets' command and control abilities. My hope is that the NATO countries can work together to help change the reviewing procedures for technology transfer issues. Need Public Understanding We cannot, however, achieve all we. would like to without public understanding. In particular we need industry to take the lead and inform both management and employes of the dangers. In sensitive factories we need voluntary security committees to safeguard essential designs and manufac turing know-how. Industry associations can play an important part in protecting our national security by advising member companies on appropriate measures and internal safeguards. Businessmen, in general, can be more supportive by recognizing the fact that the long-term interests in peace and security they share with their stockholders far outweigh the short-term gains which the sales of certain equipment offer. If we ignore this and proceed with business as usual, current sales may please some but they will yield the most unpleasant dividends in the future. Mr. Weinberger is the U.S. Secretary of Defense. مريع 87-749 - 82 - 9 Senator HATCH. Our next two witnesses are Steven R. Dornfeld and Ted Capener, representing the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi. Mr. Dornfeld has been a Washington correspondent for KnightRidder Newspapers since October 1980. For the prior 10 years, he was a political writer with the Minneapolis Tribune of Minnesota. Mr. Dornfeld was a professional humanities fellow at the University of Michigan. He has served on the national board of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, since 1973 and is currently the national secretary of the society. He is nominee for president-elect of the society in 1981-82. I am proud to welcome Ted Capener to our committee as a fellow Utahan who is vice president of news and public affairs for Bonneville Broadcasting Corp. of Salt Lake City, Utah, which owns 13 radio and television stations across the Nation. Until his recent relocation to Salt Lake City, he was for 9 years Washington bureau chief of Bonneville Broadcasting. Prior to that, he was news director for 7 years of KSL television and radio in Salt Lake City, Utah. We are very proud to have you with us today and to have your testimony. Mr. Dornfeld and Mr. Capener are accompanied by Bruce W. Sanford of Baker & Hostetler, legal counsel to the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi. We are also happy to have you here as well, Mr. Sanford. We are well aware of your law firm and know what a fine firm it is. We are very pleased to have you gentlemen from the media here today. We look forward to hearing your testimony in whatever order you choose to present it. STATEMENT OF STEVEN R. DORNFELD, WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT, KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA DELTA CHI, ACCOMPANIED BY TED CAPENER, VICE PRESIDENT OF NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BONNEVILLE BROADCASTING CORP., SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, AND BRUCE SANFORD, ESQ., BAKER & HOSTETLER, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. DORNFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to be with you today and to participate in this opening day of legislative hearings on the Freedom of Information Act. For the record, my name is Steve Dornfeld. I am a Washington correspondent for Knight-Ridder Newspapers and national secretary of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi. I appear here today on behalf of the society which, as you may know, is the oldest, largest, and most representative organization of journalists in the United States. Founded in 1909, the society today has more than 28,000 members in all branches of the media-print and broadcast. As you mentioned, I am accompanied here today by Ted Capener, vice president of news and public affairs for Bonneville Broadcasting in Salt Lake City, and by Bruce Sanford of Baker & Hostetler here in Washington who is our society's first amendment counsel. If you will permit me, I will try to summarize my prepared testimony which has been submitted to you this morning so that we will have sufficient time to hear from Ted Capener, who is here to tell you how the FOIA has been used in one randomly selected State, the State of Utah. Senator HATCH. I take it he may have an opinion that might be decidedly different from my own. Mr. DORNFELD. It is possible. The society would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, if you would make our complete written statement a part of the record of this hearing. Senator HATCH. Without objection, the complete written statement and anything else that your society cares to contribute will be made a part of the record following your oral presentation. We have much respect for your society. Of course, being politicians, that respect is not always self-engendered. Mr. DORNFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The Society of Professional Journalists comes here today to document what we believe to be the public benefits that have flowed from access to information under the FOIA. Journalists use the act constantly, but no statistics can reflect the enormous amount of Government information received from the mere presence of the act on the books. Most agencies voluntarily disgorge information, sometimes reluctantly to be sure, at the mere mention of a possible FOIA request. Russell Roberts, president of the American Society of Access Professionals and Director of the FOIA/Privacy Division of the Department of Health and Human Services, recently confirmed that HHS personnel are encouraged to avoid formal FÓIA requests by providing requested material voluntarily. He tells us: We figure that we do not want to give the press two stories when we mess up. If we try to withhold information, they hit us with one story about our mistake and another about how hard we made it for them to do the story. Mr. Chairman, the bureaucratic reverence for secrecy is as old as ancient civilization when Roman soldiers returning from battle were prohibited from informing citizens of their occasional defeats. Our society believes it is the presumption favoring openness in Government, the presumption favoring disclosure by the civil service that in a historic sense strengthens our Nation at time when we rely as never before upon a Federal bureacracy to guide our destiny. The Reagan administration may well give us admirable improvements in the management and organization of the Federal Government, but this possible renovation cannot realistically alter the need for an act assuring Americans the access to information about governmental operations they need if they are to participate in the deliberations of a democracy. In short, the act is a two-edged sword for all seasons. It gives the public a weapon to prevent the bureaucracy from overwhelming it, and discourages lord knows how many public officials and bureaucrats from contemplated abuses of authority. The FOIA has always been and always will be a pain in the side of public employees. It was always meant to be. If the act is amended to increase delays or costs or otherwise discourage use of the FOIA, our society is convinced that the ramifications to the public will be devastating. |