[No. 272] INVESTIGATION OF CONGESTED AREAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAVAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, Hon. CARL VINSON, Chairman, Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. November 1944. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At this time last year, the Subcommittee on Congrested Areas made an over-all report to you on its investigation of the first five congested areas in the vicinity of naval establishments. Shortly thereafter, you directed this subcommittee to investigate three additional congested areas on the west coast in anticipation of the shift of the war effort to the Pacific. As in the case of the first series of the subcommittee's investigations, preliminary reports were made immediately following the completion of inspection of each of these three additional areas and hearings conducted in these westcoast centers. Findings and recommendations were made on the problems of housing, health, recreation, transportation, manpower, police and fire protection, food, and education in these areas. From October 22 to 28, 1943, an intensive inquiry was conducted in the Puget Sound, Wash., area with 50 well-informed witnesses testifying on the vital wartime problems of Seattle, Bremerton, Tacoma, Everett, and other municipalities in this area. A similar inquiry was pursued in Portland, Oreg.; Vancouver, Wash.; and other localities of the Columbia River area. Testimony was received from 33 area leaders of all segments. This second series of inquiries came to a close with the sessions in Los Angeles and Long Beach, Calif., for that area which has approximately 45 local governments. As in the other two areas, personal inspections were made of various war plants, facilities and establishments in the area. Through 45 local representatives public hearings on the problems of 10 of the leading municipalities from November 10 to 14, 1943. In summary, the subcommittee heard 128 witnesses from 18 localities, during 9 days of hearings in 4 cities. ACCOMPLISHED OBJECTIVES We found that these areas had the same general problems of the areas investigated in our first series of inquiries. Of course, each area had its own peculiar problems, but the most urgent need of each area was for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform the local authorities in as great detail and as far in advance as the interests of security would permit, of the demands to be created by this shift of the war effort to the Pacific. We urged realistic recognition of this by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since that time the end of the European war has appeared on the horizon and the full-fledged shift to the Pacific is imminent. Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have responded surprisingly well to the subcommittee's recommendation that they inform the local authorities in these areas as to what demand are to be made upon them by the Army and the Navy. Meetings have been held in Washington with top staff officers of the Army and Navy. Meetings have been held out in the areas attended by Army and Navy representatives. Because of the great reticence of the Army and Navy to speak on matters that they feel vitally affect security, these meetings have been strictly verbal and off the record. The Army and the Navy refused to confer in the field with anyone but the area or regional representatives of the Federal war agencies. However, this has worked out very satisfactorily from a practical standpoint as it has completely accomplished the objective of more orderly planning and scheduling. The representatives of the Federal war agencies are now in a position of knowing what is to be expected of the particular area or locality and frame policies on local request for materials and priorities without revealing the confidential information given to them by the Army and Navy. We are happy to report that these three west-coast areas, along with those areas of San Diego and San Francisco previously investigated, are now fully prepared to shoulder even greater burdens and responsibilities entailed by the acceleration and intensification of the Pacific This has come only through the unselfish sacrifices and patriotic cooperation of the people of the west coast and the armed services. What has been accomplished on our recommendations is set forth in the appendix of this report. It is more pointedly told from an over-all standpoint in the table below: Briefly, 87 percent of our recommendations have been accomplished or are being accomplished. Only 10 of the 130 recommendations have not been accomplished. It is obvious that this record would not have been possible without the efforts of the Federal agencies, the State and municipal authorities, and the Navy. Heading the list of merit is the President's Committee for Congested Production Areas, which, in its too brief tenure, has completed an almost insurmountable task with unexcelled efficiency and dispatch. Most satisfactory over-all progress has been made on housing in these areas. At the present time there is an excess of housing in the Columbia River area. This development has met the needs for servicemen and their families in those areas. It has relieved conditions created by the joint agreement of the Army, Navy, and National Housing Agency, which barred occupancy of public housing by servicemen and their families. It has benefited war workers and servicemen and their families as rentals have been reduced by the excess of supply over demand. However, many landlords justly deserving upward adjustments in rents because of extenuating circumstances but long denied by Office of Price Administration rent ceiling rulings, have been adversely affected. But of greatest satisfaction to the subcommittee is the successful culmination of the efforts of our chairman, Ed. V. Izac, to obtain decent housing for servicemen and their families, with the recent authorization of transfer of Navy funds to National Housing Agency for that purpose. This will particularly alleviate housing conditions of naval personnel in the San Diego area. Selective Service's policy of deferring men over 30 has greatly eased the manpower problems in health, transportation, and police and fire protection. The problem in these fields has become one of facilities and equipment, rather than personnel, as a result of Federal Works Agency rejections of applications. This, in turn, stems from the great reduction in appropriations authorized by Congress for such projects. Child-care centers have fallen short of expectations in accelerating the recruiting of women for war work. Mothers have not "taken to" child care centers. They would rather leave their children with a neighbor than at a center. On the other hand, some of those who do leave their children at these centers often fail to call for them for some time. MANPOWER As we repeated in our first over-all report a year ago, we again emphazise the manpower problem on the west coast. The then causes for the manpower problem, with high labor turn-over and absenteeism, have been "licked." The improvement of working and living conditions for war workers, as well as servicemen, in these areas has been greatly realized. Paradoxically, it is the winning of the European war with its attendant psychology that is the principal cause of the present manpower problems. The critical problem of the west coast is labor migration. It is fairly clear that the out-migration and turn-over at the present time is keyed to the impression that the war has been won and not to dissatisfaction with actual living conditions. Recent improvement on this problem is keyed to the developments in the European War. While many war workers are returning to their farms in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas, many are remaining in the west coast congested areas and merely shifting to peacetime positions. This is particularly true of the California congested areas. They are all looking ahead to the time of termination of war contracts and seeking to avoid the resulting risk of unemployment. There seems to be a feeling to "get a head start on the other fellow." LABOR MIGRATION Because labor migration is the most critical problem on the west coast, the subcommittee directs the emphasis of this report to this matter. Varying appraisals of the over-all situation in these areas with respect to labor migration, make it difficult to crystallize any irrefutable conclusions as to the supply and demand of war labor. However, all parties are of the opinion that the labor migration is of three types (1) migration out of the area, (2) migration from war production jobs to peacetime jobs, and (3) migration from one war plant to another war plant within the area. The older men and women (who were hired last) are being released as a result of the operation of seniority. This, coupled with the fact that there is no immediate critical demand for over-age men and women employees but rather that the most acute demand is for ablebodied men, results in the lack of availability of workers of the type needed. Recruiting of war labor has been aggravated by the fact that the various critical areas are competing with each other and actually recruiting in each other's section-rather than having an orderly system of confining their recruiting to within their own area. The terminations and cut-backs on certain war contracts have released some war workers and somewhat offset the trend of outmigration. This, coupled with the greater utilization of retained labor, appears to be barely matching the pace of out-migration. The limits of benefits from such release and greater utilization of labor are such that the out-migration cannot be expected to be offset in the future. The most acute labor shortage is in the rubber industry, particularly in the heavy-duty tire production. There is also a serious shortage of labor in construction trades. While there is a labor shortage in the shipbuilding industry, it appears that the more serious concern in this industry is one of the future. Although there does not appear to be a labor shortage in aircraft production, this fortunate condition is one merely of the present without any assurances for the future. In aircraft production it is solely a matter of offsetting the out-migration with the gains from terminations, cutbacks and greater utilization. CAUSES OF LABOR SHORTAGE The principal cause for the labor migration, and resulting labor shortage, is the general feeling of war workers and others that the war is almost over, that their services are no longer acutely needed, and that to remain in their positions will threaten the security of their future positions. Briefly, there is the general feeling that now is the time to shift from war jobs to peace jobs before "it is too late"-time for "self-reconversion." Another cause of the labor shortage in this area is the squandering of existing labor. There has been an alarming lack of placing of required labor on the most urgent jobs. Priorities for individual projects are of little value and have actually contributed greatly to the confusion. This is because so many projects have top priorities. This condition has been aggravated by contractors who have been assigned No. 1 priority projects-more accurately known as hunting licenses for manpower. They have diverted labor acquired for such top priority projects to other projects of deferable character. In spite of the extensive construction of housing in these areas during the period of full production and despite the recent labor migration, there still appears to be a lack of housing in the Los Angeles area. This phenomenon has completely perplexed the various authorities confronted with the problem because logically it would appear that much housing should be made vacant and available through the |