I wish to announce that there will be a hearing of the committee on the night of February 8. I want to say that on behalf of the Republicans on the committee, I had a conference with my good friends, Senator Murray and Senator Pepper, and asked for an extension of time beyond the February 10 date so that we might recess on the night of February 8, in order to attend the Dewey banquet. However, Mr. Murray and Mr. Pepper explained to me-and I accept their explanation; I understand the situation perfectly-that if they made an exception in this instance they would thereby, they felt, have to grant other exceptions, and that they feel the schedule ending these hearings on February 10 should be strictly complied with. They made the counter-suggestion to me that if we on the Republican side were to modify our list of witnesses to that extent necessary in order to dispense with the hearing on the night of February 8, which would mean cutting our witnesses, they would approve of that procedure. I have talked to my Republican colleagues in regard to that. I agree with my Republican colleagues that the invitations have gone out. The lists have been publicly announced. It would not be fair to witnesses who are already preparing material or planning to leave their homes to be here between now and February 10 to modify the order of witnesses to any extent. Therefore, the Republican side of the table accepts the suggestions of Senator Murray and Senator Pepper that we proceed with the hearing on the night of February 8. I do want to say-because I think I am the one that should say it— both Senator Murray and Senator Pepper expressed to me their personal regrets that they could not accommodate the Republicans in regard to this matter. I sort of feel that there was implied a goodnatured comment that maybe the Republicans ought to hear Mr. Dewey on the night of February 8. Be that as it may, we will meet on the night of February 8. The CHAIRMAN. As every Senator knows, when a chairman makes a ruling of any kind and it is not in keeping with the heart of the persons that hear, he is always leaning backwards to help the other side. On the night of Mr. Dewey's appearance here I assure all of my Republican brethren that I will take care of their interests in every way and try to see that nothing happens which will in any way be a detriment to their side of this story. A most interesting thing is happening, speaking as just a chairman who observes and listens, that fast this question is becoming divided, so that I am afraid before we get through with it, the TaftHartley law will be an industry law and the Thomas bill will be a labor bill. That, incidentally, would be most unfortunate, especially for some of the people who are going to vote crossways, but we will try our best to stay proper and fair. Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move, if Mr. Beirne is still here, that his mimeographed statement be printed in full in our record in addition to his oral statement. Senator PEPPER. We thoroughly agree. Senator DONNELL. I assumed it was, but I did not want any misunderstanding. Senator PEPPER. We may want to decide later about that. We certainly want to get the statement made last night by Mr. Goldberg in, too, but the agreement was we are going to decide all this at one time. Senator DONNELL. I would like to get my motion in at any rate; and my motion is that Mr. Beirne's mimeographed statement be printed in full. The CHAIRMAN. The motion is in order. All in favor say "Aye." (Chorus of "ayes.") The CHAIRMAN. Opposed? (No response.) The CHAIRMAN. The motion is unanimously carried. Senator PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to make a motion, I want to make the same motion with respect to Mr. Goldberg's statement last night. Senator MORSE. I think he is in error. Senator Murray last night ruled that the Goldberg argument, his written testimony, go into the record. The only thing that has been left pending is the appendix material. Senator MURRAY. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. I think the record will be full and complete. We stand in recess. Mr. Ching's replies have been given out to all of the Senators, and it is perfectly all right to make them public so that every Senator can use them. (Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 7:30 p. m. of the same day.) (Mr. Beirne submitted the following brief:) STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BEIRNE, PRESIDENT OF THE The Communications Workers of America (hereinafter referred to as CWA) is the successor to the National Federation of Telephone Workers (NFTW) and the dominant labor union in the field of telephonic communication. Its divisions have an aggregate membership in excess of 175,000 and hold collective-bargaining contracts for more than 230,000 telephone workers. The membership of CWA extends throughout the entire country and includes a wide variety of persons and jobs in all phases of the telephone industry. Its activities are not restricted to the larger companies which comprise the industrial empire known as the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (or the Bell system) but extend to many of the independent companies, large and small, which share the 10 percent of the national telephone business which is not enjoyed by the Bell system. The persons who make up our union are telephone operators, in both urban centers and widely scattered rural areas, telephone line construction and repairmen, inside plant craftsmen, commercial and accounting white collar workers, building maintenance and cafeteria workers, all types of electrical equipment manufacturing employees and research and engineering workers. Approximately 60 percent of our members are women. We understand that this hearing is for the purpose of securing testimony and comment on bill S. 249 (committee print, dated January 29, 1949). We specifically have limited this statement to endorsing the approach and method employed in S. 249 to restore this Nation's policy in labor-management relations to the philosophy of the Wagner Act; to comments regarding the "closed shop" issue; and to suggesting additional language to provide equal treatment for independent labor organizations in the application of the proposed National Labor Relations Act of 1949 and to strengthen the authority and powers of "emergency boards" created under section 302 so as to allow the summoning as additional parties to its proceedings any company, corporation, labor organization or individual which appears to control directly or indirectly, or to be responsible, in whole or in part, for the policies, activities and decisions of any of the parties to the dispute through ownership, stock ownership, stock control, membership, association, affiliation or other similar devices or agreements. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (TAFT-HARTLEY) The primary objective of the national labor policy under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) was to promote collective bargaining. This was accomplished by affirming and protecting the right of workers to self-organization, to establish and join labor unions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), on the other hand, has produced confusion in the labor relations field. The scope of collective bargaining has been limited and the right of workers to strike has been unnecessarily curtailed. In some instances, members of the same union have been forced to strike-break against their fellow union members by being forced to work on struck goods or services. In our opinion some of the important reasons why we believe the Taft-Hartley Act should be repealed are as follows: (1) The Taft-Hartley Act places unreasonable restraints on many phases of collective bargaining agreements. The check-off, for example, has been hedged with unnecessary procedural requirements and penalties, to the detriment of harmony between labor and management. The law removed the subject of welfare funds from free collective bargaining and surrounded it with rigid rules limiting purposes and administration under penalties including the use of the injunction to prevent violations. (2) The Taft-Hartley Act diluted the collective bargaining power of unions whose contracts provided for reopening on wages during a contract period, by prohibiting strikes (sec. 8d (4)) for 60 days following the notice of reopening or "until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." This result was occasioned because the authors of the act assumed that all union contracts were for a period of 1 year, automatically renewable from year to year and, therefore, did not consider the long-term contracts which provide for reopening during their term in drafting inflexible provisions which are conditions precedent to a resort to strike in support of collective bargaining demands. These provisions, coupled with the threat of loss of status as employees for those workers who might engage in strike in violation of the act, denied to workers any threat of strike in support of their demands. (3) The Taft-Hartley Act revived the evils of the labor injunction as an instrument to settle labor disputes. The abuses incident to the use of this legal device have been recognized in the past by Congress and outlawed in the NorrisLa Guardia Act. The use of the injunction by the Board was made mandatory under the act "against unions in cases invoking secondary boycotts which were so broadly defined as to include legitimate objectives of the workers." (4) The relations between employer and employees (and their unions) were kept in an unsettled and confused condition by the numerous elections provided under the act, namely: representation, union shop, and the last offer of the employer. The result is bound to be confusion instead of a condition of stability and confidence which is so necessary to free collective bargaining. (5) Under the Taft-Hartley Act, the employer, even though not faced with conflicting claims for recognition, may petition for an election at a time most advantageous to himself and on the strength of a "no union" vote obtain a year's freedom from union organization. (6) The Taft-Hartley Act denies the right of reinstatement to striking workers (which they had under the Wagner Act) and the right to vote in representation elections, while granting a vote to strikebreaker replacements. This is an invitation to employe.s to break the strike and oust the union by hiring sufficient nonunion replacements. Such a procedure can never produce stability and free collective bargaining. (7) The Taft-Hartley Act denied legitimate union security by providing that State laws should prevail where more restrictive than the Federal law, even though the employer was engaged in interstate commerce. (8) The secondary boycott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are so broad and extensive as to prohibit activities which are regarded as justifiable for the purpose of protecting the standards of union members in the industry. These and other objections which might be detailed have the effect of weakening collective bargaining, if not to destroy it altogether in some situations, with a resultant confusion which is detrimental to the Nation, the employee, and the employer. UNION SECURITY (CLOSED SHOP) The CWA is of the opinion that the present ban on the closed shop should be removed and that the necessity for conducting an election among employees to secure authorization to enter into a union-shop contract should be eliminated. In order that there may be no misunderstanding, the attention of the committee is directed to the union-security conditions existing in the telephone industry. There are no closed-shop agreements, insofar as we know, but there are a few union-shop agreements with the independent companies; none, however, with Bell companies. There have been a substantial number of contracts providing for maintenance of union dues. The greater portion of the contracts, however, provide only for voluntary dues-deduction systems upon presentation of a proper authorization or assignment by the union member to the management. The provisions of section 8 (a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) prohibiting closed shop and permitting a diluted form of union shop under certain narrow conditions go far toward eliminating or denying the union-security concept on which labor has to some extent relied for the maintenance of union conditions. Union security is the goal of all members of trade-unions. But union security is desirable not only from the union point of view; it is, or should be, recognized by management and by Congress as being desirable because it is essential to the existence of harmonious industrial relations. Without it, the workers are restive, the union officers are under pressure from their memberships, and minor points of irritation grow into incidents of great aggravation. Without it, managements are prone to be careless of the rights of labor, are callous in their relations with labor, and, being quick to take advantage of the superior bargaining position which they possess, oftentimes force upon labor agreements which bring about industrial unrest. Union securtiy takes away from labor unions the continued threat to their existence and makes it possible for the unions to spend their efforts in improving the conditions of workers, instead of wasting their time, efforts, and money in union organizing and dues collecting. Union security makes for union discipline. It is the most effective producer of union responsibility. Union security is the greatest single factor in the establishment of a true balance in industrial relations. If the management and the employees desire to enter into a closed-shop agreement, the parties should be left free to contract through the medium of collective bargaining. INDEPENDENT UNIONS Under the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) the application by the NLRB and its agents of different rules, theories, regulations, and procedures to petitioners in representation matters and complainants in unfair labor practice cases because of their predecessors, the scope of their organization, or the nature of their affiliation was the source of much complaint to the Board itself and to Congress. The position of the independent union before the National Labor Relations Board was precarious to say the least. Success in being chosen as the bargaining representative appeared to give rise to a presumption, as far as the Board was concerned, that the union was employer-dominated and thus began the tortuous and expensive procedure which required the union to justify its existence at every turn. This meant that an independent union must not only perform its functions as the bargaining representative of its members, but had to defend itself constantly from being disestablished on a charge of employer domination. It was an anomalous and vicious practice to subject only local unions which had not seen fit to affiliate with the AFL or CIO to company-domination charges or to charges that their predecessors were so tainted and that the fracture between the tainted organization and the new was not complete. In all fairness to the Board, the situation had improved at the time of the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act, but there is no basis whatsoever for such practices and they should continue to be illegal. Complaints to Congress in this matter resulted in the following provisions being included in the Labor-Management Relations Act: "SEC. 9. (c) (2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 10 (c). "SEC. 10 (b). Wherever it is charged that * Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge. "SEC. 10 (c). The testimony taken by such And provided fur ther. That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of section 8 (a) (1) or section 8 (a) (2), and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope. * These provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) should be continued in the law and S. 249 should be amended to include the abovequoted language. To repeat, there is no basis whatsoever for applying different rules, principles, regulations, and procedures to unions dependent upon their nonaffiliation or affiliation with the AFL or CIO. Equal justice under the law is the foundation of our system of justice. Equal justice before the National Labor Relations Board must be maintained and our national labor law must insure such equal treatment. EMERGENCY BOARDS Much has been said and written with respect to the merits and objections to industry-wide bargaining. We do not propose at this time to add generally to this picture, but believe that the committee should be informed with respect to the bargaining situation which exists in the telephone industry. When the expression "the telephone industry” is used the public immediately thinks of the Bell system or the group of companies associated with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., The Bell system operates in every State of the Union and enjoys a monopolistic place in the industry. In fact, some 90 percent of the telephone business is enjoyed by the Bell system, leaving the balance of 10 percent to be divided among more than 6,000 small companies unaffiliated with the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. In the Bell system, the basic wages, hours of employment, conditions of employment, pension rights, sickness, disability and death benefits, operating practices, and methods are controlled by the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. through agreements, stock control, ownership, interlocking directorates, and other monopolistic corporate devices. The National Telephone Panel established by the War Labor Board to meet the special wage problems of the telephone industry, in its Report on Wage Stabilization Problems and Recommended Policy in the Operating Telephone Industry, dated February 13, 1945, described the wage structure of the Bell system as follows: "The over-all wage structure of the Bell system reflects the centralized policies of the A. T. & T. Co. The unifying influence of the A. T. & T. appears in the close similarity of most nonrate aspects of the wage structures of the various associated Bell companies. Each Bell company, for example, has the same four major operating departments. Further, these same four departments in all companies carry almost identical job or task titles, and task routines. This same unifying influence is evident also in the existing interrelation of Bell system wage |