With these safeguards, and we realize that there is much need for improvement, there is less likelihood of a further loosening in the moral code of our young adults.

These beliefs are consistent with the views of practically every educator, psychiatrist, psychologist and sociologist who has made a study of drinking patterns and habits. They almost uniformly believe that the use of alcoholic beverages cannot be controlled by legislative fiat. Patterns of drinking are the result of and developed by many influences—home exposures, economic factors, social customs and environmental impacts. A legal denial of the right to drink will not change these patterns.

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, although indicating that he would sign a bill raising the drinking age, stated to us:

"* * * I am convinced that the mere raising of the drinking age alone will not provide the principal solution to the problem of drinking by young people. Accordingly, I have stated my intention to appoint a committee to make a more thorough study of the public aspects of the use of alcohol."

He has not done so, however.

Studies made previously do not in any wise establish that a 21 year drinking age is a deterrent to drinking. Evidence indicates that those under 21 years, in States having a 21 year minimum age, do not drink to any lesser extent than those in the same age group in our State.

We are sympathetic to the problems of our neighboring States. These problems merit serious consideration and warrant corrective action. However, despite our sympathy, we repeat that the prime consideration is the welfare of the State of New York. Problems of neghboring States can be solved, if not in whole at least in part, by legislation of such States. Perhaps their driving laws should be amended to prohibit their drivers under 21 years from crossing their State borders after night fall. This is within their legislative province.

We recognize that there is need for improvement in the enforcement of our existing laws. We urge that law enforcement officials and officials of State agencies take measures to strictly enforce both the Alcoholic Beverage Control Laws, Motor Vehicle driving laws and other applicable laws. We feel that there is need for such improvement in the area of education. A number of high schools throughout the State now teach Alcohol Education courses. We feel that these courses should be extended State-wide. Education can be of primary importance in the development of temperate use of alcoholic beverages.

We conclude that the proponents of an increased drinking age have not proved the need for a major and far-reaching change in our existing law. We conclude that raising the drinking age will create new problems in New York State and increase the intensity of existing problems.

We therefore recommend that New York State's minimum drinking age be retained at its present 18 years.

SENATE EXCISE COMMITTEE

ASSEMBLY EXCISE COMMITTEE

Abraham Bernstein, Chairman
Julian B. Erway
Thomas J. Mackell
Joseph E. Marine
Edward S. Lentol
Guy James Mangano
Paul Bookson
William Thompson
Frank E. Van Lare
William T. Conklin
John J. Marchi
Kenneth R. Willard

George Cincotta, Chairman
Orest V. Maresca
Thomas V. La Fauci
John T. Satriale
Jules G. Sattatino
Bertram L. Baker
Murray Lewinter
Jerome W. Marks
Bertram L. Podell
John F. Kirvin
Hyman E. Mintz
Edward F. Crawford
Prescott B. Huntington
John E. Kingston
Richard L. Marshall
James L. Emery

I should also like to offer for insertion in the record a study titled “Teen-agers, Drinking, and the Law" prepared by Muriel W. Sterne, Research Associate, Social Science Institute, Washington

Sociology, Social Science Institute, Washington University, and Thomas Coe, Research Assistant, Social Science Institute, Washington University. I should like to quote briefly from this study the following:

Since the ingestion of alcoholic beverages by youth does not invariably or even frequently have deleterious effects, why do most states forbid the sale of intoxicating beverages to anyone under twenty-one? Behind these liquor laws lie the assumptions of American prohibitionism; that the use of alcohol is sinful and dangerous, resulting in problem behavior and that drinking in any degree is equally undesirable, since moderate social drinking is the fore. runner of chronic inebriation. Therefore, legally blocking the young person's access to alcoholic beverages guards him from the damaging consequences of drinking before he reaches maturity, at which time he is expected to be fully responsible for his behavior. There are several fallacies in this approach.

As the Social Science Institute of Washington University, St. Louis, points out those State laws which prohibit the drinking of beer until one reaches the age of 21 are a throw-back to prohibition.

In striking contrast, at this point in my testimony I should like to name the States which allow those 18 years of age to drink not only beer, but also whisky. They are: New York, Louisiana, Mississippithis is liquor on local county option basis—and Hawaii, where the 18-year-olds drink whisky as well as beer. Those States which allow those 18 years of age to drink beer in excess of 3.2 beer are: the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Mississippi. The States which allow those 18 years of age to drink 3.2 beer are: Colorado, Kansas, Ohio, and Virginia. Oklahoma is 18 for females. That is rather amusing. Wisconsin, 20 for beer. South Dakota, 19 for 3.2 beer. West Virginia, 18 for 3.2 beer. No stronger beer is sold in West Virginia.

(The document follows:) [Reprinted with permission from the January 1965 issue of Crime and Delinquency)

TEEN-AGERS, DRINKING, AND THE LAW-A STUDY OF ARREST TRENDS FOR ALCOHOL

RELATED OFFENSES (By Muriel W. Sterne, Research Associate, Social Science Institute, Washington

University, B.A. (History), 1954, Hunter College, M.A. (Sociology), 1959, Trashington University, David P. Pittman, Director and Professor of Sociology, Social Science Institute, Washington University, B.A. (Sociology), 1949, M.A. (Sociology), 1950, University of North Carolina, Ph. D. (Human Develonment), 1956, University of Chicago; and Thomas Coe, Research Assistant, Social Science Institute, Washington University, B.A. (Sociology), 1961, University of Kansas; M.A. (Sociology), 1963, Washington University.)

(Not all alcohol-related offenses committed by youth are equally serious. Liquor law violations are largely an artifact of state laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to persons under twenty-one. Studies of teen-age drinking behavior indicate that these lau's fail to deter early experimentation with alcohol and often lack either parental or peer-group support. Lowering the age for legal purchase and consumption to eighteen would simplify liquor law enforcement, thereby releasing scarce police resources for the detection of serious crime. Juvenile arrests for other alcohol-related offenses rose 28 per cent in St. Louis in 1950–60, the increase suggesting the need for effective and intensive alcohol education in the secondary schools and cooperation between police and social work authorities for selective referral for treatment and reeducation of those whose offenses warn of later serious behavior disorders and criminality.)

The nation's perennial concern for the welfare of its youth is manifested in a variety of well-intentioned, if not always well-conceived, ways. In examining alcohol-related offenses committed by persons under twenty-one, we find a convergence of two sources of concern related to youth: a distrust of the effects of alcohol-especially, though not exclusively, on the immature and a concern for their law-abidingness. Focusing on alcohol-related offenses committed by juveniles and minors, this paper will present arrest statistics from the 1950's and 1960's for the city of St. Louis to assess whether all such offenses can be considered equally serious and whether the laws relative to teen-age drinking succeed in their intent.

By "alcohol-related offenses" we mean those offenses which are committed frequently by persons under the influence of alcohol ? or which by their very nature are associated with beverage alcohol. Examples of the first type are common assault, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy; of the second type, driving while intoxicated, public drunkenness, and liquor law violations. As a group, these offenses provide an estimate of the extent to which law enforcement agencies are involved with violations associated with the use of alcohol.

In judging the significance of alcohol-related offenses by youth, it is useful to distinguish between those offenses which, as an artifact of state liquor laws regarding access to alcoholic beverages, differentiate between adults and minors, and those offenses for which both age groups are equally liable to legal intervention. There is little argument about the socially undesirable aspects of the latter category of alcohol-related crimes, since offenses such as common assault, drunken driving, and vagrancy are obviously hazardous to the well-being of both the individual and the community. Since the ingestion of alcoholic beverages by youth does not invariably or even frequently have deleterious effects, why do most states forbid the sale of intoxicating beverages to anyone under twenty-one? Behind these liquor laws lie the assumptions of American prohibitionism; that the use of alcohol is sinful and dangerous, resulting in problem behavior, and that drinking in any degree is equally undesirable, since moderate social drinking is the forerunner of chronic inebriation. Therefore, legally blocking the young person's access to alcoholic beverages guards him from the damaging consequences of drinking before he reaches maturity, at which time he is expected to be fully responsible for his behavior.

FALLACIES IN LAWS ON ALCOHOL

There are several fallacies in this approach. The first is the belief that maturity (in reference to these laws) occurs at age twenty-one. Confusion as to when maturity begins is exemplified by the discrepancies in age at which different types of adult behavior are legally permissible. In Missouri, for example, a car may be driven by a person of sixteen; cigarettes may be smoked in public at eighteen; marriage without parental consent is legal for females at eighteen and for males at twenty-one; juvenile status ends at sixteen, and at seventeen the minor is tried as an adult for any offense he has committed. In Georgia and Kentucky the eighteen-year-old is allowed to vote but is barred from the purchase of spirits. Even more confusing to the young person is the fact that he may have to perform many of the duties of an adult before reaching the age of twenty-one. With parental consent a young man becomes eligible for military service at seventeen. While still in his teens he may have a full-time job and be the head of a household, indicating that he has shouldered the main responsibilities of adulthood. Under these circumstances, how incongruous to prohibit his purchase of alcoholic beverages until he is twenty-one!

The second fallacy is the belief that the law is an effective deterrent to early experimentation with alcohol. Teen-agers perceive alcohol predominantly as a beverage for use in social situations rather than as a drug; they associate drink

:D J. Pittman and C. W. Gordon, Revolving Door: A Study of the Chronic Police Case Inebriate (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1958).

Sociology, Social Science Institute, Washington University, and Thomas Coe, Research Assistant, Social Science Institute, Washington University. I should like to quote briefly from this study the following:

Since the ingestion of alcoholic beverages by youth does not invariably or even frequently have deleterious effects, why do most states forbid the sale of intoxicating beverages to anyone under twenty-one? Behind these liquor laws lie the assumptions of American prohibitionism; that the use of alcohol is sinful and dangerous, resulting in problem behavior and that drinking in any degree is equally undesirable, since moderate social drinking is the forerunner of chronic inebriation. Therefore, legally blocking the young person's access to alcoholic beverages guards him from the damaging consequences of drinking before he reaches maturity, at which time he is expected to be fully responsible for his behavior. There are several fallacies in this approach.

As the Social Science Institute of Washington University, St. Louis, points out those State laws which prohibit the drinking of beer until one reaches the age of 21 are a throw-back to prohibition.

In striking contrast, at this point in my testimony I should like to name the States which allow those 18 years of age to drink not only beer, but also whisky. They are: New York, Louisiana, Mississippithis is liquor on local county option basis—and Hawaii, where the 18-year-olds drink whisky as well as beer. Those States which allow those 18 years of age to drink beer in excess of 3.2 beer are: the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Mississippi. The States which allow those 18 years of age to drink 3.2 beer are: Colorado, Kansas, Ohio, and Virginia. Oklahoma is 18 for females. That is rather amusing. Wisconsin, 20 for beer. South Dakota, 19 for 3.2 beer. West Virginia, 18 for 3.2 beer. No stronger beer is sold in West Virginia.

(The document follows:)

[Reprinted with permission from the January 1965 issue of Crime and Delinquency)

TEEN-AGERS, DRINKING, AND THE LAW—A STUDY OF ARREST TRENDS FOR ALCOHOL

RELATED OFFENSES 1 (By Muriel W. Sterne, Research Associate, Social Science Institute, Washington

University, B.A. (History), 1954, Hunter College, M.A. (Sociology), 1959, Washington University; David P. Pittman, Director and Professor of Sociology, Social Science Institute, Washington University, B.A. (Sociology), 1949, M.A. (Sociology), 1950, University of North Carolina, Ph. D. (Human Development), 1956, University of Chicago; and Thomas Coe, Research Assistant, Social Science Institute, Washington University, B.A. (Sociology), 1961, University of Kansas; M.A. (Sociology), 1963, Washington University.)

(Not all alcohol-related offenses committed by youth are equally serious. Liquor law violations are largely an artifact of state laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to persons under twenty-one. Studies of teen-age drinking behavior indicate that these laus fail to deter early experimentation with alcohol and often lack either parental or peer-group support. Lowerino the age for legal purchase and consumption to eighteen would simplify liquor law enforcement, thereby releasing scarce police resources for the detection of serious crime. Juvenile arrests for other alcohol-related offenses rose 28 per cent in St. Louis in 1950–60, the increase suggesting the need for effective and intensive alcohol education in the secondary schools and cooperation between police and social work authorities for selective referral for treatment and reeducation of those whose offenses warn of later serious behavior disorders and criminality.)

The nation's perennial concern for the welfare of its youth is manifested in a variety of well-intentioned, if not always well-conceived, ways. In examining alcohol-related offenses committed by persons under twenty-one, we find a convergence of two sources of concern related to youth: a distrust of the effects of alcohol-especially, though not exclusively, on the immature and a concern for their law-abidingness. Focusing on alcohol-related offenses committed by juveniles and minors, this paper will present arrest statistics from the 1950's and 1960's for the city of St. Louis to assess whether all such offenses can be considered equally serious and whether the laws relative to teen-age drinking succeed in their intent.

By "alcohol-related offenses" we mean those offenses which are committed frequently by persons under the influence of alcohol? or which by their very nature are associated with beverage alcohol. Examples of the first type are common assault, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy; of the second type, driving while intoxicated, public drunkenness, and liquor law violations. As a group, these offenses provide an estimate of the extent to which law enforcement agencies are involved with violations associated with the use of alcohol.

In judging the significance of alcohol-related offenses by youth, it is useful to distinguish between those offenses which, as an artifact of state liquor laws regarding access to alcoholic beverages, differentiate between adults and minors, and those offenses for which both age groups are equally liable to legal intervention. There is little argument about the socially undesirable aspects of the latter category of alcohol-related crimes, since offenses such as common assault, drunken driving, and vagrancy are obviously hazardous to the well-being of both the individual and the community. Since the ingestion of alcoholic beverages by youth does not invariably or even frequently have deleterious effects, why do. most states forbid the sale of intoxicating beverages to anyone under twenty-one? Behind these liquor laws lie the assumptions of American prohibitionism; that: the use of alcohol is sinful and dangerous, resulting in problem behavior, and that drinking in any degree is equally undesirable, since moderate social drinking is the forerunner of chronic inebriation. Therefore, legally blocking the young person's access to alcoholic beverages guards him from the damaging: consequences of drinking before he reaches maturity, at which time he is expected to be fully responsible for his behavior.

FALLACIES IN LAWS ON ALCOHOL There are several fallacies in this approach. The first is the belief that maturity (in reference to these laws) occurs at age twenty-one. Confusion as to when maturity begins is exemplified by the discrepancies in age at which different types of adult behavior are legally permissible. In Missouri, for example, a car may be driven by a person of sixteen; cigarettes may be smoked in public at eighteen; marriage without parental consent is legal for females at eighteen and for males at twenty-one; juvenile status ends at sixteen, and at seventeen the minor is tried as an adult for any offense he has committed. In Georgia and Kentucky the eighteen-year-old is allowed to vote but is barred from the purchase of spirits. Even more confusing to the young person is the fact that he may have to perform many of the duties of an adult before reaching the age of twenty-one. With parental consent a young man becomes eligible for military service at seventeen. While still in his teens he may have a full-time job and be the head of a household, indicating that he has shouldered the main responsibilities of adulthood. Under these circumstances, how incongruous to prohibit his purchase of alcoholic beverages until he is twenty-one!

The second fallacy is the belief that the law is an effective deterrent to early experimentation with alcohol. Teen-agers perceive alcohol predominantly as a beverage for use in social situations rather than as a drug; they associate drink

D J. Pittman and C. W. Gordon, Revolving Door: A Study of the Chronic Police Case Inebriate (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1958).