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the Auditor for the Interior Department, as relates to the disallowance of voucher No. 1118, for $5, for two dozen time books furnished by E. Morrison on June 20, 1904, for the Government Hospital for the Insane.
“It appears from an examination of the time books in question, a sample of which is herewith transmitted, that they were prepared and printed by private parties for general use, and were for sale to the public, and were purchased by the Superintendent as printed matter, and that the purchase of the same comes within the purview of your decision dated September 22, 1904.
* In the event of your not receding from your decision of August 31, 1904, above referred to, I have to request to be advised whether such time books can be purchased through the Public Printer, pursuant to the provisions relating to public printing and binding contained in the sundry civil act approved June 28, 1902 (32 Stat., 481), reading as follows:
4. "The Public Printer is authorized hereafter to procure and supply, on the requisition of the head of any Executive Department or other Government establishment, complete manifold blanks, books, and forms required in duplicating processes; also complete patented devices with which to tile money-order statements or other uniform official papers, and to charge such supplies to the allotment for printing and binding of the Department or Government establishment requiring the same.'”
Section 87 of the act of January 25, 1895 (28 Stat., 622), provides that
"All printing, binding, and blank books for the Senate or House of Representatives and for the Executive and Judicial Departments shall be done at the Government Printing Office, except in cases otherwise provided by law."
In every printed book there is printing and binding, but it does not necessarily follow that the mechanical work on every book purchased for an Executive Department “shall be done at the Government Printing Office."
The printing and binding required to be done at the Government Printing Office under the terms of this act has reference to the mechanical work of printing and binding original manuscript or of reprinting or rebinding when ordered for the Government.
In 10 Comp. Dec., 322, it was held that:
“The prohibition is against the procurement of printing for the Executive Departments outside of the Public Printing Office, and is not to be construed so as to authorize such procurement indirectly by an agreement or understanding that the finished product, the printed matter, may be purchased if such printed matter or finished product represents and records acts required by law, regulation, or usage of the Executive Departments, even if such Executive Departments should adopt the thoughts and language of others represented by the finished product, except where authorized by law, such as executive advertisements, etc. The mere fact that dealers or others have, in the shape of printed matter, printing for sale which is clearly printing for the Executive Departments would not authorize the purchase of such printed matter on its mere adoption by the Departments.
It can hardly be contended that the Government Printing Office would not have been required to furnish the blank books in question if it had been called upon to do so, and that upon the ground that they were blank books for an Executive Department within the meaning of the act of January 25, 1895, supra. (5 Comp. Dec., 184.)
Being blank books for an Executive Department the work of their preparation was required to be done at the Government Printing Office, and it is immaterial whether such books are kept for sale by private dealers to the general public or not. • Blank books stand on a different basis from printed books, and are placed in the same class as printing and binding under the act of January 25, 1895, supra.
The same principle that was announced in 10 Comp. Dec., 323, 324, and 11 Comp. Dec., 150, supra, as to printing, applies to the purchase of blank books for an Executive Department. The fact (as was said in those cases, in relation to printed matter) that dealers may have for sale to the general public such blank books as the Government Printing Office are clearly required to furnish on demand of an Executive Department does not authorize their purchase of such private dealer.
The purchase of blank books for the Executive Departments contemplates more than the mere printing of the blank. It also contemplates the purchase of the paper and the expense of preparing and binding them.
You class the books in question as printed matter. This I do not think can be done. They are invoiced as “time books," and from an examination of them it is clear that their principal use and characteristics are that of a blank book to be filled in. The printed matter they contain would be utterly useless
except in connection with the blanks wherein the acts of the Department are to be recorded.
I am of the opinion that they are blank books for an Executive Department within the meaning of that term as used in the act of January 25, 1895, supra, and as such, the work of preparing them must be done at the Government Printing Office. My decision of August 31, 1904, disallowing the claim for credit for the amount paid therefor in the accounts of the Superintendent of the Government Hospital for the Insane is adhered to.
You request, in the event of my not receding from said decision, to be advised as to your right to purchase such books through the Public Printer pursuant to the provisions of the act of June 28, 1902 (32 Stat., 481) relative to public printing and binding. This act quoted by you has reference to the purchase of
complete manifold blanks, books, and forms required in duplicating processes; also complete patented devices with which to file money-order statements or other uniform official papers
The blank time books are not required in duplicating processes, and are not patented devices to file money-order statements or other uniform official papers, and the act of June 28, 1902, supra, does not apply to their purchase.
I am of opinion that the blank time books must be procured at the Public Printing Office, and paid for in the same manner as other blank books for your department and the bureaus and offices thereof.
TENURE OF OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN
A district attorney in Alaska, who was appointed under an act of Coa
gress which provided that he should hold his office for four years, and until his successor was appointed and qualified, will continue to hold said office until the actual appointment and qualification of his successor, notwithstanding his resignation had been accepted to take
effect at a prior date. (Comptroller Tracewell to A. C. Caine, disbursing clerk, Depart
ment of Justice, November 19, 1904.) I am in receipt of your communication, dated October 19, 1904, wherein you request my decision as follows:
“Melvin Grigsby, when serving as district attorney for the second division of the district of Alaska, resigned his office in the following terms:
" " WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30, 1904. “ * The Hon. THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
“ President of the United States. **DEAR SIR: I hereby tender my resignation as United States district attorney for the second division, district of Alaska, to take effect at your pleasure. “6 Letter of explanation herewith inclosed. "Very respectfully, yours,
66. MELVIN GRIGSBY.'
“This resignation was accepted in the following terms:
"MAY 2, 1904. "MELVIN GRIGSBY, Esq.,
" • Washington, D. C. "Sir: By direction of the President your resignation as United States attorney for the second division of Alaska, dated April 30, 1904, is hereby accepted to take effect at the close of business June 30, 1904. " Respectfully,
"P. C. Knox, "Attorney-General.'
“Mr. Grigsby had been appointed under the provisions of section 10 of the act of June 6, 1900 (Sup. R. S., vol. 2, p. 1198), which is as follows:
•Sec. 10. The governor, surveyor-general, attorneys, judges, and the marshals provided for in this act shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their respective offices for the term of four years and until their successors are appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed by the President for cause.
“The term of four years for which Mr. Grigsby was originally appointed was to run till June 24, 1906. Mr. Grisby's successor was appointed July 1, 1904, but did not qualify by taking the oath of office until the afternoon of July 29, 1904, and his salary has been paid from July 29, inclusive. Mr. Grigsby was in the district attorney's office in Nome, and assumed to be in charge during the period between June 30, 1904, and July 29, 1904, and now makes claim for salary to cover that period, and refers to the case of Badger v. United States (93 Ù. S., 599) in support of his claim.
“I have the honor to ask what my authority in the premises is."
From the language of the act (31 Stat., 325) it will be observed that the officers therein named, of whom the district attorney in Alaska is one, “shall hold their respective offices for the term of four years and until their successors are appointed and qualified
The question in this case, therefore, may be thus stated: Did all right of Mr. Grigsby terminate upon the date stated in the letter accepting his resignation, or is he entitled to the pay of the office after that date and regardless of that fact until the actual appointment and qualification of his successor?
In Mechem on Public Officers (sec. 416) it is said:
“Where the law expressly provides, as it does in many States, that an officer shall continue to hold his office until his successor is chosen and qualified, he will, notwithstanding the acceptance of his resignation, continue in office and be charged with all its duties and responsibilities until such successor is chosen and qualified.” (Citing Badger v. United States, 93 U.S., 599; Jones v. Jefferson, 66 Tex., 576; People v. Barnett, etc., 100 Ill., 332.)
In the Badger case cited by Mr. Mechem, supra, the statute not only provided that the officers should hold their offices until their successors were selected and qualified, but also stated that their resignations, when tiled in a certain manner and with a certain person, should take effect from that time. The officers in that case filed their resignations as required by statute. Their successors were not selected and did not qualify for some time afterwards. It was held by the Supreme Court that notwithstanding the fact that they had so tiled their resignations they were in office until the selection and qualitication of their successors.
In the opinion (p. 603) the court uses this language:
“The resignation may be made to and accepted by the officers named; but to become perfect they depend upon and must be followed by an additional fact, to wit, the appointment of a successor and his qualification. When it is said in the statute that his resignation may be thus accepted it is like to the expiration of the term of office. In form the office is ended, but to make it effectual it must be followed by the qualitication of a successor.” In State v. llermann (11 Mo. App., 43–48) the court said:
We understand the general purpose of this provision to be nothing more than the prevention of an interregnum be