Rereading Russell [electronic resource]: essays in Bertrand Russell's metaphysics and epistemologyC. Wade Savage, C. Anthony Anderson |
Contents
| 3 | |
| 24 | |
Russells Theory of Logical Types and the Atomistic Hierarchy of Sentences | 41 |
Russells Paradox Russellian Relations and the Problems of Predication and Impredicativity | 63 |
The Significance of On Denoting | 88 |
Russelling Causal Theories of Reference | 108 |
Russell on Indexicals and Scientific Knowledge | 119 |
SenseData in Russells Theories of Knowledge | 138 |
Concepts of Projectability and the Problems of Induction | 220 |
The Bayesian Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell | 234 |
Russell on Order in Time | 249 |
Cause in the Later Russell | 264 |
Portrait of a Philosopher of Science | 281 |
References | 297 |
Notes on Contributors | 305 |
Author Index | 311 |
Russells 1913 Theory of Knowledge Manuscript | 169 |
The Concept of Structure in The Analysis of Matter | 183 |
On Induction and Russells Postulates | 200 |
Subject Index | 313 |
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Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology C. Savage,C. Anderson No preview available - 1989 |
Common terms and phrases
abstract acquaintance Analysis of Matter argue argument atomic axiom belief Bertrand Russell causal theorists claim classes complex constituents construction contains contingent datum Dedefre defined definite descriptions denoting concepts empirical entities epistemology essay example existence experience expression fact future-moving given Human Knowledge hypothesis ibid impredicative indexicals induction inference instance interpretation involved judgment king of France language logical form mathematics Maxwell means monadic notion ontology ostensive definition paradox particular perception Philosophy of Science postulates predicate principles of evidence prior probabilities problem proper names propositional functions quantifiers question r-type ramification Ramsey rational credibility reference replaced Russell says Russell's later Russell's paradox Russell's theory Russell's view Russellians scientific second-order logic sensation sense sense-data sentence skepticism space-time statement structure symbols T₁ theoretical theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Knowledge theory of types tion true truth University variable wholly precedes Wittgenstein words
Popular passages
Page 138 - sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name "sensation" to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation.
Page 88 - But a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by the words.
Page 60 - I wish to suggest that, wherever there is, for common sense, a "thing" having the quality C, we should say, instead, that C itself exists in that place, and that the "thing" is to be replaced by the collection of qualities existing in the place in question.
Page 27 - B are not purely logical, and cannot be stated in logical terms alone ; for they all contain some reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms.
Page 6 - A philosophy which is to have any value should be built upon a wide and firm foundation of knowledge that is not specifically philosophical.
Page 186 - Science wants to speak about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the structure but to the material (ie anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive definition) is, in the final analysis, subjective. One can easily see that physics is almost altogether desubjectivized, since almost all physical concepts have been transformed into purely structural concepts. . . . From the point of view of construction theory, this state of affairs is to be described in the following way....
Page 105 - My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement. But if we understand the question in this sense, my answer to it may seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked 'What is good?
Page 142 - Accordingly the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply _ts that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with.
Page 165 - I think that this view underestimates the powers of analysis. It is undeniable that our every-day interpretations of perceptive experiences, and even all our every-day words, embody theories. But it is not impossible to whittle away the element of interpretation, or to invent an artificial language involving a minimum of theory.
Page 137 - consciousness," when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing "soul
