FEASIBILITY OF VAULT DESTRUCTION VIA NUCLEAR DEVICE

The Department of Army has provided me with a copy of each of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) reports. As I indicated during my testimony, vault destruction via a nuclear device would now be impracticable since the time available is not adequate to perform the pilot tests which I deem necessary for such a method of destruction.

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Doctor, very much for your testimony. We appreciate your appearance and your associates'.

The next witness is Martin Paul, Executive Secretary of the Division of Chemistry and Technology, National Academy of Sciences. We would like to apologize for the delay, Mr. Paul. We appreciate your patience.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN A. PAUL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DIVISION OF CHEMISTRY AND CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Dr. PAUL. I can only admire the patience of the committee.
Mr. LENNON. Do you have a prepared statement?

Dr. PAUL. I have something I wrote this morning. I don't have it with me.

Mr. LENNON. We will try to listen attentively to your remarks to follow.

Dr. PAUL. Mr. Lennon, distinguished members of the House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

I am Martin Paul, Executive Secretary of the Division of Chemistry and Chemical Technology of the Academy's National Research Council.

I was staff director last year of the Academy's report of the disposal hazards of certain chemical warfare agents and munitions. As you know, the National Academy of Sciences is not an agency of the Federal Government, but is a private organization having as one of its primary functions whenever called upon by any department of the Government to investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art, the actual expense of such examinations, investigations, experiments, and reports to be paid from appropriations which may be made for the purpose, but the Academy shall receive no compensation whatever for any services to the Government of the United States. I was quoting from the Academy's 1963 charter. In May 1969, the Academy was requested by the Department of Defense for an assessment of hazards involved in the execution of Operation CHASE and alternate plans for the disposal of certain surplus chemical warfare stocks of the U.S. Army.

An ad hoc committee of distinguished scientists and engineers was convened for the purpose under the chairmanship of Prof. George B. Kistiakowsky, of Harvard University, Vice President of the National Academy of Sciences.

Because of the request from DOD for an early response, the committee did not conduct an exhaustive study of all alternatives and factors involved.

It did conduct an intensive study and delivered a report to DOD on June 25, 1969, in which disposal hazards were studied and discussed and recommendations made for each of the five distinguishable categories of materials involved.

The committee was thereafter discharged. Therefore, I am not now in any sense speaking on behalf of the ad hoc committee, nor of any of its individual members, but wish to state what the Academy's role has been in this matter before you.

Mr. LENNON. At this point for the record, did you not serve, sir, as staff director of this ad hoc advisory committee of 12 scientists and engineers?

Dr. Paul. Yes, sir. The Academy has taken no part in the deliberations of the Gross Committee which was established by the Army pursuant to a recommendation of the Academy Committee for further study, specifically of the problem of disposing of one category of the materials, the so called coffins containing unserviceable M-55 rockets distributed in solid blocks of concrete.

The Academy Committee recommended that the Army convene a group of technically qualified individuals, including demolition experts, to consider whether a practically feasible way could be devised to dispose of these "coffins," on an Army establishment, and, failing that, two alternative sites for disposal at sea were recommended for the Army's consideration.

We understand that other recommendations of the Academy Committee relating to disposal of much larger quantities of surplus unserviceable materials, including the M-34 clusters of bomblets, containing "nerve gas," in storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and mustard, in storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and elsewhere, have been followed, but the Academy has not been involved in the implementation of these recommendations, nor indeed does it have that kind of responsibility.

The Academy does stand back of the recommendations contained. in its own committee's report as the considered advice of the best representative and disinterested group of scientists and engineers it could assemble.

I will be glad to answer any questions.

Mr. LENNON. The gentleman from Florida, any questions?
Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You really did not make an exhaustive study as you say-what was the time period which you devoted to this?

Dr. PAUL. We received the first request on May 14 and the report was delivered on June 25. So it occupied that period of time in which preliminary informaton was sent out to the members.

The committee itself met for 2 very intensive days of deliberations, 2 successive days, and that was fo'lowed up by a great deal of correspondence.

The Chairman drafted or made several drafts of the report. This was communicated back and forth by correspondence, and

Mr. ROGERS. Well, did the committee contact AEC and have them. come before you to see what they could do in disposal?

Dr. PAUL. No. I don't know for sure whether there was an AEC representative present or not.

Mr. LENNON. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. As I understand it, the Army was going to dispose of mustard gas and bomb'ets which contained nerve gas by dumping

them.

Wasn't that first proposed?

Dr. PAUL. Yes, that was the original proposal.

Mr. ROGERS. You told them not to do it and that there would be a better way to do it. You recommended that they burn off the mustard gas and demilitarize the bomblets. So you prevented at least, and I commend you for it, the dumping of mustard gas and the bomblets with your report.

Dr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask you this: Did they brief you on the entire problem? I understand that you were briefed on about how many of these caskets they had, that they had some 2,200 of them.

Do you recall that?

Dr. PAUL. I think it was 400 and something.

Mr. ROGERS. In this particular movement, it was 418. But in giving you the history of this, I understand they have briefed the committee, and said that 1,706 of them had been disposed off the coast of New Jersey?

Dr. PAUL. Yes, that is right.

Mr. ROGERS. And they were going to use 418 in this movement. Do you recall a figure of some 2,200 being referred to, the amount that they had on hand?

Dr. PAUL. You mean the total of those?

Mr. ROGERS. Yes.

Dr. PAUL. I don't quite follow you.

Mr. ROGERS. You have understood that the committee had been briefed on the fact that there were some 2,500 of these caskets, that 1,706 of them had been dumped off New Jersey?

Dr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. And they moved 418 in this one, which would leave about 500 or a little over 500 still to be disposed of. Dou you recall the briefing of those figures?

Would your notes indicate that? I realize you may not have them with you.

Dr. PAUL. No; I don't have the notes.

Mr. ROGERS. Could you review your notes and let us know if you had a briefing to that effect?

Dr. PAUL. You mean a discrepancy between the total we accounted for in the report?

Mr. ROGERS. No, what I mean, it is my understanding that there are then still about 500 caskets left that are not included in the 418. Could you refer to your notes and let the committee know what your recollection was of the briefing to that extent?

Dr. PAUL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. It would be helpful if we could have that sometime tomorrow, if that is not too much of an imposition.

(The following information was supplied for the record:)

The National Academy of Sciences has no information pertaining to additional rockets referred to by Congressman Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. So your recommendations, as I recall, said that it would be preferable to dump this material if it had to be disposed of this way, although you suggest alternative methods, but if they had to do this, that it should be dumped off New Jersey to keep it all in one spot.

Is that correct?

Dr. PAUL. Yes. Well, in all of these things, there is a balance of factors from the Kentucky location, the distance to Earle is greater and it also would have to go through populated cities.

On the other hand there are nearer ports on the Atlantic coast where these things could be handled. The operation would be a whole lot smaller than the Earle operation, originally contemplated. So it is a question of balancing off one consideration from another.

I would say that there is no one best way of doing a job of this kind. Mr. ROGERS (presiding). Did you pursue at all the specific alternatives in your committee?

In other words the atomic method or the burial method or any other alternative procedure?

Dr. PAUL. I believe some of these alternative possibilities were discussed in the committee, but with the time at our disposal we did not have enough time to explore them in any great depth and so what the report finally recommended was that the possibility of disposing of the "coffins" on site by demolition methods which of course could include all kinds of demolition was recommended.

But no specific attempt was made to study the implications of doing it by atomic energy other than to discuss that as a possibility.

Mr. ROGERS. Did your committee go into or were you asked to go into the time element involved in the disposal of the caskets?

Dr. PAUL. No. I think the way the problem was presented to us, and the reason we acted in such a short period of time as we did was they were getting prepared for the Earle operation and we were told that if you delayed beyond a certain time, it would mean canceling the operation.

So in order to give the Army time to consider whether or not the Earle operation should be canceled, we went into the requirement of getting an answer to them as early as possible.

Mr. ROGERS. What operation is that?

Dr. PAUL. The Operation CHASE of unloading all of these rockets from Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the bomblets from Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and unloading them at Earle for the sea dump, the operation planned for 1969.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Jonas?

Mr. JONAS. I do have a little question I should raise while the chairman is here. I don't believe this witness is the best one to answer it. It occurs to me, and I have been reminded of this, that I don't believe we have established in the record the thickness of the concrete and how much concrete is involved here.

Do you have any information on that? You used an expression that I have heard repeatedly during the hearings and we have come to assume that these rockets are buried in solid concrete. But do you know that?

Do you know the dimensions? We know, for example, that each one weighs 6.4 tons and contains 30 rockets. But we don't know the dimensions of the rockets or how much space within the casket these rockets consume or occupy, and whether they are encased in anything before they deposit them into the sea.

Do you have answers to those questions?

Dr. PAUL. I think perhaps the Army people who were responsible for them could answer that better. I have seen pictures.

Mr. JONAS. You have not been told anything about the dimensions or the extent, the thickness of the concrete?

Dr. PAUL. Yes, that is all well known.

Mr. JONAS. Would you mind stating that?

Dr. PAUL. I don't believe I have it here in my own notes.

Mr. JONAS. You used the word "imbedded in solid concrete."

Dr. PAUL. I understand that the way that they did this was to first pour some concrete into the bottom of the form.

Mr. JONAS. How much.

Dr. PAUL. I don't know. It might have been a foot or so.

Mr. JONAS. Two inches?

Dr. PAUL. No, more than that. But I don't know for sure.

Mr. JONAS. They poured the bottom of the casket full of concrete, a certain thickness?

Dr. PAUL. Yes.

Then they laid one layer of rockets in there.

Mr. JONAS. What is the height of the rocket? 2 inches, 4 inches, 6 inches, what I am trying to get, is really we don't know, I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, do we, or do you, how much concrete is involved in one of these caskets?

Mr. ROGERS. The caskets are 8 feet long and 4 feet high.

Mr. JONAS. They weigh 6 tons.

Mr. ROGERS. 6.4 tons. There are 2 inches of liquid concrete poured in the bottom and then the first layer of six of the M-55 rockets are laid in, and then there is another layer of raw concrete poured in, and that is permitted to settle and then another layer.

You find in the Gross report of July 25, 1969, on the first page: "Each vault consists of a one-quarter inch steel plate" and so forth. Mr. JONAS. That is the steel plate that surrounds the casket. That is only one-quarter inch thick.

Mr. ROGERS. Four feet wide, 8 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 3 feet high, and then containing 30 M-55 rockets.

Mr. JONAS. It does not say how much concrete, or the thickness of the concrete.

Mr. ROGERS. We will read on:

The total weight amounts to 6.4 tons. The rockets are in a ready-to-fire condition fused with a booster and a propeller attached.

The vaults were constructed by applying about two inches of concrete to the bottom of the steel, open-box. Six M-55 rockets with their individual fiberglass shipping and firing tubes were laid on the wet concrete. More concrete was added, about two inches on top of these rockets. The process was repeated until five layers of rockets were encased in the concrete with about two inches covering the top layer of rockets.

The concrete was allowed to cure for a minimum of 7 days. The one-half inch steel lead was then welded on to seal the vault.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. JONAS. I don't know how long these rockets are, but you put 30 of them in one of these cases with all of that concrete.

Mr. ROGERS. There are different layers, five layers of six in each layer. I am sure the gentleman from the Army could describe the rocket with the booster, with the charge and the fuse, and its approximate length and diameter.