The CHAIRMAN. Were you appointed by the President on some committee handling youth training problems? Colonel KNOX. Aviator training problems; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. When was that? Colonel KNOX. I cannot give you the exact date. It was about 6 weeks ago, I should think, or 2 months ago. The CHAIRMAN. That is an unpaid position, of course? Colonel KNOX. Pardon? The CHAIRMAN. That is an unpaid position? Colonel KNOX. Oh, yes; unofficial. The CHAIRMAN. What are the activities of that committee? Colonel KNOX. The committee was organized with the President's approval, to promote attendance upon a projected series of aviation training schools which were set up to train boys and young men to learn to fly this summer and next year throughout the school year. It was proposed to put into these schools a total of 45,000 young men. They did not know how much effort would be needed to get that number of students, so it was thought wise to organize an entirely unofficial, purely citizen movement made up of representatives of outstanding men, men of leadership in the various 9 corps areas. They selected 11 who, with myself, constituted the executive committee of this organization. We thought we were required to carry out quite a campaign of promotion, publicity, and public relations, and we got organized for that purpose. Before we quite completed our organization, as soon as the idea was made public, applications flooded into the C. A. A., the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and it became apparent that no effort was necessary at all. There was not a single school that did not have many more applications for places in its aviation training course than it had places to fill. So the committee had to do very little except to publicize at the outset to attract the young men to this training course. The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, I suppose you have discussed with the President your views in reference to the Navy and its future? Colonel KNOX. I have. The CHAIRMAN. Are you both in accord? Colonel KNOX. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question: Have you at any time, privately or publicly, urged or advocated giving military support to the Allies? Colonel KNOX. Never. The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all I desire to ask now. Does any member of the committee desire to ask any questions? Senator ELLENDER. Colonel Knox, when was the first time that the President approached you for membership on his Cabinet? Colonel KNOX. Last fall, in December, right after the Gridiron dinner. Senator ELLENDER. Was there any discussion about the third term? Colonel KNOX. Well, that was a personal discussion between the President and myself. My training is that under such circumstances I have nothing whatever to say about it. I would like to add this, since I know what is in your mind, that neither then nor subsequently were there any commitments made or promises made on either side. Senator ELLENDER. That was what I wanted to try to find out, because I saw it in the press on several occasions. Colonel KNOX. There were a lot of unwarranted rumors in the press. Senator ELLENDER. I thought so, too. Senator LUCAS. Colonel Knox, would you care to further elaborate on that conversation at that time, with respect to what you said to the President, if you did say anything to him, about any controversy that might arise in the future? Colonel KNOX. Before I get to that, the initial conference in December, when the proposal was made that I become Secretary of the Navy, was at a time when the war was at a stalemate. A good many people were calling it a phoney war. The initial alarm, that was widespread when the war first began, was quieted down, with no popular sense of crisis, impending crisis. I told the President under the present existing circumstances I did not think it would be wise for me to accept, but if the war took another turn and there came back to this country a sense of real crisis and a sense of danger impending, that I would be willing to do anything that he would ask me to do in an hour of danger. That ended that discussion. After the fall of France, a personal friend of the President came to see me within 2 or 3 days and renewed the discussion, and I sent a message back to the President that, in my judgment, we were in such grave peril and such grave danger that no matter what he asked me to do, from putting a gun on my shoulder and going out, I was ready to do, that I thought the danger was so great that partisanship should be subordinated rigidly. The next day I heard from the President. I repeated what I said to his friend, and the following day that announcement was made. Senator LUCAS. May I ask you if you made a statement for the press at that time that you accepted the appointment? Colonel KNOx. Yes; I did. Senator LUCAS. Will you look at this, which was recently clipped from one of the newspapers, and tell the committee whether or not that is what you said, and if so, would you mind reading it to the committee? Colonel KNOx. There was a lot of excitement at the time this announcement was made, and I thought it incumbent on me to make perfectly clear the purpose that animated me in accepting this appointment, and this is what I said: National defense is not a partisan question. It should have the united support of the people regardless of party. Congress in the past few weeks has acted with substantial unanimity on every national defense proposal. The administration of the Navy Department is in no sense political. The Navy knows no party. At a time of tremendous naval expansion it is vital. that its management shall be wholly nonpolitical. The President has asked me to serve as Secretary of the Navy on that basis and on that basis I have accepted. I firmly believe that in a time of danger to our country each of us must do whatever he can to meet that danger. As good citizens we must serve in whatever capacity is prescribed for us. We are in danger now because we are inadequately prepared. The President has said I can help him. If I can help him prepare us for any emergency I must do so. What happens to me is unimportant. If I should be cast into the discard a few months later, the only questions I must answer to myself are these: "Did I do my duty? Did I do it well?" The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? Senator BONE. Colonel Knox, in your editorial of May 11, you said we should not allow Japan to take the Dutch East Indies. What have you in mind the country should do to influence Japan not to take the Dutch East Indies? Would you have the country go to war? Colonel KNOX. No. Let me say this very definitely, that we must not adopt toward Japan a strong attitude which threatens war and then back down from it. If we are not going to insist on the status quo in the Far East, then we should withdraw from the Far East and say so. We must not threaten that we are going to enforce our will there and then fail to do so. Senator BONE. I am accepting your rather unequivocal statement that we must not allow Japan to do it. That implies use of force, if necessary, to prevent a consummation of such a thing as that. I ask that question because night after night I heard broadcasts from Berlin in which the German Government announced, through its radio spokesmen, that one of the reasons Germany has entered the war was because of the loss of some vital colonial possessions from which she obtained some vital raw materials, and Germany is using, as a portion at least, of her justification of war, the loss of access to these raw materials. I was wondering from your statement whether you thought that would also be a justification for the United States going into war, since our access to vital raw materials might be handicapped by the Japanese seizure of the Dutch East Indies. Colonel KNOX. Let me say this, that all through this whole period of strain I have been advocating a strong attitude toward the far eastern situation. The whole world situation has tremendously changed by what has transpired in the last 30 days in Europe. We have seen France collapse and become a vassal state of Germany; we have seen Great Britain engaged in a life and death struggle for her own independence and security; we are far more gravely menaced now than we were before in the Atlantic. I should like to be dogmatic, like anybody, in what I think is a wise course for us to pursue with respect to the Far East. I would think it would be unwise to precipitate war on both sides at the same time. I think, when there is a serious situation in the Atlantic, it would be very unfortunate if we had to face it in the opposite direction at the same time. Senator BONE. Of course, if we are not going to allow Japan to absorb these islands, the very suggestion implies the use of force. Colonel KNOx. I would like to call the Senator's attention to the fact that that editorial was written before the French collapse and before the very serious situation in the Atlantic developed. Again I want to repeat, so I will not be misunderstood, that I have been an advocate of a strong attitude toward the far eastern question, and insist upon our rights. Now, with this new situation in the Atlantic, we are bound to have to decide it with regard to the gravest menace to our safety and choose between the two, because I think obviously it is unwise to precipitate a situation in the Far East at the same time. Senator TYDINGS. Colonel, if I may interject right there, do you feel there is a difference between writing editorials for a newspaper, that you have a right to do, and expressing your opinion as a member of the President's Cabinet? Colonel KNOX. I am very glad you made that point, Senator. I certainly do, and I want to say this-this gives me a good opportunity I was not brought out here for the purpose of determining policy, I was brought down here because the President kindly thought I could put some driving force behind the accomplishment of the naval-expansion plan. My job will be to hasten our preparedness on the high seas in every possible way, and not have anything whatever to do with the determination of policy or establishing policy with respect to war. Senator TYDINGS. Even so, my question is that you recognize, do you not, the difference? Colonel KNOX. I do. Senator TYDINGS. Between speaking as a private citizen and as an official in the President's Cabinet? Colonel KNOX. Most emphatically. Senator TYDINGS. Therefore, if you had been in the President's Cabinet during this emergency, I take it that perhaps you would not have been as forthright and dogmatic, for reasons for policy, as you evidently seemed to be as a newspaper publisher? Colonel KNOX. That is quite right. Senator HOLT. Colonel, speaking of the Dutch East Indies, is it not a fact that you said to deny the Dutch East Indies to Japan might mean war? Colonel KNOX. Yes. Senator HOLT. Did you not also say that we should deny them to Japan? Colonel KNOX. Again I want to qualify by saying that we are now facing a new situation which might make a revision of judgment necessary. I have said all along repeatedly that we ought to take a very strong position in the Far East, not that I thought it would bring war but I thought it would preserve the status quo and take the chances of war. Senator HOLT. What do you mean by "strong policy”? Colonel KNOX. A very powerful declaration that we will not tolerate a change in the status quo. Senator HOLT. Did you not say that notes, warnings, and fleet maneuvers would not be of any use? Colonel KNOX. Unless we are ready to go through with it. Senator HOLT. In other words, it means war? Colonel KNOx. Possible war. Senator HOLT. Possible war? Colonel KNOx. Possible war. Senator HOLT. You are willing to take that chance? Colonel KNOX. I do not say that. Wait a minute. I said that was true before this crisis arose in the Atlantic. Senator HOLT. No; but at that time you would have been willing to take that chance? Colonel KNOX. I would have been willing to take a strong position, come what may. Senator HOLT. That is not answering my question, Colonel. Would you be willing to go to war to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies? 243706-40- -2 Colonel KNOX. I would have been willing to exert every powerful influence we could bring to bear upon it. Senator HOLT. That meant war, did it not? Senator HOLT. That meant a possibility of war? Colonel KNOX. A possibility of war. Senator HOLT. You would have been willing to take that position? Colonel KNOX. I said that repeatedly. Senator HOLT. How long have you held that position with reference to the Far Eastern affairs? Have you always maintained that same position? Colonel KNOX. I think so. I cannot be dogmatic about that, but for a long time. Senator HOLT. Do you remember an editorial you wrote in 1936 taking Mr. Stimson to task for putting us in a position where we would be left in the lurch by England? Colonel KNOX. No; I do not remember that. Senator HOLT. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to put that in the record. Senator LUCAS. I would like to have it read. Senator HOLT. I will be glad to read it right now. Senator LUCAS. I would like to have the editorial submitted to Colonel Knox. Senator HOLT. I want to say to the Senator from Illinois that I have a right to put it in the record, but I am perfectly willing to read it. Senator TYDINGS. It was in the Chicago Daily News? Senator HOLT. In the Chicago Daily News. Senator LUCAS. That is what I want to know. Senator TYDINGS. Is it signed or unsigned? Senator HOLT. No, it is not signed. I would like to make this point clear right here. Colonel Knox, how many editorials do you write in the Chicago Daily News? Do you write most of them? Colonel KNOX. No, indeed. I write those which appear on the first page. I have an editorial conference every morning at 10 o'clock. Senator HOLT. You approve the editorials that appear in the Chicago Daily News? Colonel KNOX. I stand behind everything written in the editorial column. it. Senator HOLT. You do stand behind it? Colonel KNOX. Yes. Senator HOLT. Either I or the secretary of the committee will read The CHAIRMAN. You may read it. Senator HOLT. This is entitled "They Left Us in the Lurch." Colonel KNOX. Entitled what? Senator HOLT. "They Left Us in the Lurch." Do you remember it? Colonel KNOx. No: I do not. Senator HOLT. September 21, 1936. It is again the fashion in certain quarters to attribute to the United States major responsibility for the present unhappy state of international relations. We are asked to believe that uncertainty as to what the United Staes may do |