the British fleet, treated the French van fo roughly, that 1781. they bore away, while de Graffe with the centre edged up in order to cover their retreat. The weight of the action fell principally upon the British van, the centre coming in for a more moderate fhare, and feven fail never being able to get within a proper gun-fhot distance of the French: from thefe circumftances Drake's divifion suffered severely. The engagement ended about fun-fet. The flain on board the British amounted to 90, and the wounded to 230. The Shrewsbury and Intrepid bore more than a proportionable share of this lofs. Capt. Robinson of the former loft a leg, and capt. Molloy of the latter gained great honor, by the gallantry with which he fuccoured and covered the Shrewsbury, when overborne and furrounded by the French. According to the French accounts, no more than 15 fhips on each side were engaged. Admiral Graves used all measures to keep up the line during the night, with the defign of renewing the action in the morning. But he discovered that several ships of the van, and the Montague of the centre, had suffered fo much in their masts, that they were in no condition for renewing the action, till the fame were fecured. The Terrible was fo leaky as to keep all her pumps going, and the Ajax was in little better condition. The hoftile fleets continued for five fucceffive days, partly repairing their damages, and partly manoeuvring in fight of each other; and at times were very near. The British were fo mutilated, that they had not speed enough to attack the French; and thefe showed no inclination to renew the action, though they had it often in their power, as they generally maintained the wind of Graves. De Graffe fearing left by

1781. under his command to the fouthward. The day before

he failed, de Graffe arrived in the Chesapeak. On his paffage the count fell in with and took a packet from Charlestown, having on board lord Rawdon, who was on his return to Great Britain.

The French admiral after blocking up York river, took poffeffion of James's, in order to cover the boats of the fleet, which were to convoy the marquis de St. Simon, with 3300 land forces from the West Indies, eighteen leagues up the river, to form a junction with Fayette. Graves received no intelligence of the French fleet (nor they of his approach) till they were discovered Sept, early in the morning of September the 5th, lying at 5. anchor, to the number of 24 fail of the line, juft within Cape Henry, and confequently the mouth of the Chesapeak. The French immediately flipped their cables, and turning out from the anchorage ground, Graffe threw out a fignal for the fhips severally to form the line as they could come up, without regarding particular stations. The British fleet amounted to nineteen ships of the line, and one or more of 50 guns. Through various delays the action did not commence till four o'clock, and then was partial, only the van and a part of the British centre being able to come near enough to engage with effect. De Graffe did not aim fo much at a close engagement, as at keeping poffeffion of the Chefapeak, and faving his fhips for that and all its correfpondent purposes. The abfence of 1800 of his feamen, and 90 officers, employed in conveying Simons's troops up James river, confirmed him in his avoidance of a hazardous action. Drake with the rear divifion, in confequence of the laft tack, becoming the van of

the

the British fleet, treated the French van fo roughly, that 1781. they bore away, while de Graffe with the centre edged up in order to cover their retreat. The weight of the action fell principally upon the British van, the centre coming in for a more moderate fhare, and feven fail never being able to get within a proper gun-fhot distance of the French: from thefe circumftances Drake's divifion fuffered severely. The engagement ended about fun-fet. The flain on board the British amounted to go, and the wounded to 230. The Shrewsbury and Intrepid bore more than a proportionable share of this lofs. Capt. Robinson of the former loft a leg, and capt. Molloy of the latter gained great honor, by the gallantry with which he fuccoured and covered the Shrewsbury, when overborne and furrounded by the French. According to the French accounts, no more than 15 ships on each fide were engaged. Admiral Graves ufed all measures to keep up the line during the night, with the defign of renewing the action in the morning. But he discovered that several ships of the van, and the Montague of the centre, had fuffered fo much in their mafts, that they were in no condition for renewing the action, till the fame were fecured. The Terrible was fo leaky as to keep all her pumps going, and the Ajax was in little better condition. The hoftile fleets continued for five fucceffive days, partly repairing their damages, and partly manoeuvring in fight of each other; and at times were very near. The British were fo mutilated, that they had not speed enough to attack the French; and thefe fhowed no inclination to renew the action, though they had it often in their power, as they generally maintained the wind of Graves. De Graffe fearing left by

1781. amples are never more neceffary in an army than upon

fuch dangerous occafions; and no example was ever more effectual. The general orders of Greene in confequence of this, reprefented the crime of the fufferer in such striking colours, as fully to justify the fentence of the court. Greene at the fame time paffed over the conduct of the Maryland troops (which was not public) in fuch a manner as to exonerate them from any participation of the crime. Speaking of unworthy characters he faid" One or two of artful difpofitions are fufficient to betray hundreds of well difpofed men into errors. But the general is happy to find, that the Ma ryland line has nobly withstood the fecret machinations of fuch as have attempted to mislead them; nor can he believe that foldiers who have fought fo bravely, and whose character is univerfally admired, will ever tarnish their glory by an improper conduct."

The gen. wrote on the 9th of November to gen. Gould-" I should betray my truft, and fail in my duty, was I to be filent upon the barbarous custom which prevails in your army, of burning houses and defolating the country. I am informed that a party under col. Brown and major Maxwell lately burnt all the buildings upon Hilton Head, The inftances of burning which have taken place are no less favage than unneceffary, and cannot be justified by the general principles of modern war, nor by the particular circumftances that mark your military operations. You have endeavoured to perfuade the world, that the body of the people are in your intereft. The cartel was an appeal to them, and it is from your disappointment, that the inhabitants feel the cruel strokes of pointed refentments.-I have made it my study

to

to conduct the war upon the moft humane principles, 1781. and it is my wish to continue it fo: but if your people continue in the practice of burning, I will change that plan, and let savage cruelty rage in all the horrors of war.-It is painful to contemplate the miferies incident to giving no quarter; but fhocking as it may be to humanity, we had better expose ourselves to this evil, where our enemies will feel it in common with us, than to fuffer them to inflict a punishment, little lefs fevere, from which they are fecure.-I wish you, Sir, to confider this matter feasonably, and put a stop to the evil we complain of, and not drive us to the difagreeable neceffity of adopting measures, no lefs repugnant to our feelings than our wishes."

The American army was too weak needlessly to risk another general action; but it was neceffary to move into the lower country, to cover the collection of pros visions for subsistence through the winter; and to improve any accidental opportunities. Greene therefore Nov. quitted the High Hills on the 18th of November. 18. Three days after, he wrote to gen. Washington-" I wifh fomething decifive may be done refpecting col. Hayne. I wish your excellency's order and the order of congrefs thereon; the latter have fignified their approbation of the measures I took. But as retaliation did not take place immediately, (nor did I think myself at liberty on a matter of fuch magnitude, but from the most preffing neceffity) and as the enemy did not repeat the offence, I have been at a lofs how to act, with respect to the original, not having any officer of equal rank with col. Hayne in my poffeffion. I am ready to execute whatever may be thought advisable."... On the