L (2) OVERSIGHT NEED FOR COMMITTEE REVIEW OF AGENCY PROGRAMS I believe that most committees have the desire and, as a matter of fact, the obligation to follow closely the progress in connection with the projects and programs that they have authorized. Such oversight is needed in order to determine whether the programs are being carried out as intended and whether they may need to be expanded, modified, redirected, or terminated. In order to meet this responsibility, many committees have included provisions in authorizing legislation which require reporting to the Congress or require that certain actions by the executive departments and agencies be withheld pending committee review. Some of these provisions simply prohibit action for a specified period following submission to the Congress, while others have given certain committees of Congress authority to approve or disapprove. In recent years the executive branch, under both Republican and Democratic control and upon advice from the Justice Department, has become more and more hostile to this type of provision in legislation. Some years ago, the executive branch took the firm position that any legislative provisions which gave a congressional committee the power to approve or disapprove actions of the executive branch were unconstitutional. This led to the adoption by committees of the type of provision which permitted the committees to disapprove the appropriation of funds needed to implement or carry out actions of the executive departments or agencies. This type of provision was reluctantly accepted by the executive branch until last year. However, last year such a provision in title II of the Water Resources Research Act was objected to by the President and he advised Congress that this title would not be implemented until the objectionable language was removed. If the President and the executive branch maintain this position and refuse to accept this type of provision in legislation, then there needs to be some procedure upon which the executive branch and the Congress can agree whereby the legislative committees can meet their oversight responsibilities. (3) DUAL MEMBERSHIP ON COMMITTEES This is a problem on which I imagine the joint committee will receive considerable comment and testimony. It is a problem which seriously interferes with my committee's conduct of business. It needs no further elaboration and I am listing it only as a matter which I believe your committee should consider. Mr. Chairman, I have no answers or solutions for the problems I have raised. I simply want to pass them on to you with the recommendation that they be studied and in the hope that improved procedures will be found. Sincerely yours, WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Chairman. OCTOBER 12, 1965. Mr. HERBERT DINERSTEIN, Head, Soviet Section, Department of Social Science, DEAR HERB: As you know, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress is concerned with a variety of problems that have implications for foreign affairs. Congress is particularly concerned about obtaining qualified experts who are more than just subordinate staff members committed to a particular chairman or individual Congressman or Senator. Therefore, the joint committee would greatly appreciate your views concerning the following subjects: (a) To what extent, if any, can the Congress more effectively employ independent, nonprofit corporations to conduct objective research that will allow the Congress to make intelligent decisions? (b) Do you feel the Congress should make more extensive use of temporary consultants, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, and if so, how would you suggest an agency such as Congress recruit such people? (c) Would you recommend any change in the present committee structure or jurisdiction, again particularly in the area of foreign affairs, that in your opinion would allow the Congress to make more effective and intelligent decisions? The joint committee is anxious to have your views concerning these important organizational matters. We would be delighted to hear from you at your earliest convenience. I understand Vernon Aspaturian had a very productive and interesting year at the Rand Corp. We all are, of course, delighted to have him back at Penn State. Research Consultant, Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. DEAR NICK: Thank you very much for your letter of October 12. I am flattered that you invite my views on the subject of obtaining qualified experts on foreign affairs for the Congress. My response will draw heavily on my own experience in Rand, but my views are my own and not those of the company. I insist on the private nature of my views not because the Rand management disagrees with them, but because I know that it has not considered your question of how the Congress can more effectively employ nonprofit corporations to conduct objective research on foreign policy questions. Let me first deal with your second question of the more extensive use of temporary consultants. As a specialist I assume that academic research on foreign policy is valuable to the executive and legislative branches of the Government. I believe, probably naively, that Gresham's law operates in reverse, that the good research drives out the bad and that the more research of various tendencies is available to the Congress, the better in the long run. Most people in research think along these lines, and most want to be effective so that prospective recruits are easy game for a determined committee assistant or consultant. The mechanics in the case of Rand people present no real barrier. Several years ago under the leadership of Robert Buchheim, Rand prepared the space handbook for the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration of the House of Representatives. I know you found "Program Budgeting * very useful for the joint committee's work. It was a self-initiated study, but it could have been sponsored by one of the committees of the Congress. Similar arrangements could be repeated several times, I dare say, before someone would raise the question of establishing a policy for the loan or temporary release of such personnel to the Congress. The general practice in the case of persons taking leave to serve in universities has been for the university departments to approach the individual directly who then has taken up the matter with the corporation. If the number of such temporary assignments grew rapidly, we would then be approaching the situation you describe in your first question-the problem of the employment of the corporation as such. This more formal arrangement would raise two different questions, both difficult. First, what kind of support is compatible with the maintenance of the quality of Rand work? Second, is a formal arrangement with the legislative branch compatible with Rand's relationship with its present sponsorsall of the executive branch? First, much of Rand's professional strength comes from the long tenure of many of its staff members. Particularly in the field of policy-oriented research on political matters, long experience is essential. This kind of constant application has been the hallmark of universities and Rand has been fortunate in being able to provide a similar atmosphere. Working on task order contracts, or might we say cash and carry, makes it well nigh impossible to develop and keep, or to attract and keep, persons with the highest professional abilities. The best personnel is able to insist when they bargain for employment that they be reasonably certain that they will continue their development in fields in which they have invested heavily. I know from members of other nonprofit research corporations that their biggest handicap in recruitment is their inability to provide a stable research environment precisely because they operate on a task order basis. Therefore, I would guess that nonprofit organizations would be attracted to research for the Congress in proportion to the broadness of the terms of reference and the stability of the arrangement. (I know from having visited Soviet specialists in West Germany this summer that German nonprofits are supported by the foreign office, by the Federal Parliament, by Lander (State) governments and by combinations of these.) Rand's fortunate position derives from its relationship with its chief sponsor, the Air Force, which permits us to work in a rather general frame of reference and in a stable financial environment. This leads into the second question: Is a formal Rand arrangement with a congressional committee compatible with its relationship to its present sponsor? Some of Rand's research has improved the state of the art (we like to believe); some has made recommendations, implicit or explicit, to our sponsors. During the years an informal, but genuine, fiduciary relationship has been established. Naturally Rand's recommendations have not always been accepted. In these cases Rand as an institution has not tried to force its opinion on its client by carrying the case to a higher level, to another branch of the Government or to the public. But individuals in Rand have differed and have on occasion permitted these differences to be exposed to public view. Uniformity and adherence to the organizational line are necessary in executive institutions but poisonous in research institutions. As you might expect, the public expression of these differences has caused some difficulties and some problems, but these have been accepted as a necessary feature of the research environment. Suffice it to say that dozens of Rand's people have testified before congressional committees on subjects of their competence and as far as I know have never been discouraged from doing so. But a formal Rand undertaking to do research on foreign policy problems for a committee of the Congress would involve adjustment of the fiduciary relationship with its present sponsors. I am not raising this problem in order to suggest that it would be a waste of effort to pursue the subject. Quite the contrary. I, as an individual, would welcome additional important audiences for our efforts. It is because I am positively inclined, and I know you are, that I raise the major difficulties at the outset. I have discussed your letter briefly with the president of Rand, Franklin R. Collbohm, who is very interested in opportunities to be of further service but, of course, alive to the problems that a new type of client would raise. My personal judgment is that if the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress were to reach the point of expressing an interest in a continuing arrangement with Rand it would receive a careful and sympathetic consideration. All my best, Hon. A. S. MIKE MONRONEY, HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., October 10, 1965. Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress of the United States, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR MONRONEY: In glancing over the first six parts of the hearings before your joint committee I am struck by the fact that there is an inadequate discussion of congressional committee investigations. The kind of investigations I have in mind are not those primarily intended to lead to legislation, but inquisitions into dark corners: for example the recent "Bobby Baker case". While examining your hearings I recalled that in 1950 I wrote three editorial page articles for the New York Herald Tribune (March 29, 30, and 31). Senator Irving M. Ives of New York had them reprinted in the Congressional Record (on his own initiative) and I send you the Congressional Record text because it is more legible than the newsprint one. Senator Ives and Senator Elbert Thomas (Utah) introduced a bill in the Senate (81st Cong., 2d ses., S. 3775) "to provide for the establishing of congressional investigating commissions." I have a hazy recollection that they made some remarks in the Senate discussing their bill, but I cannot turn up any sheets from the Congressional Record. Do you think the articles worth reprinting in your hearings? Certainly during the last 15 years congressional investigations have not inspired more public confidence than they did when I wrote the articles. The Democratic majority could not have been proud of its report in the Baker case. During the 15 years the British have used tribunals several times and in a couple of cases Parliament has charged a single jurist with the responsibility of making an inquiry and publishing a report. In no case has there been political party criticism of the reports of the commissions under New York State's Moreland Act. The most important British incidents that I have in mind are the Radcliffe Tribunal (Cmnd. 2037, September 1963) used "to inquire into the Vassall case and related matters" (espionage in the Admiralty), and Lord Denning's report (Cmnd. 2152, June 1963) on "the circumstances leading to the resignation of the former Secretary of State for War, Mr. J. D. Profumo, the operation of the Security Service and the adequacy of their cooperation with the police in matters 47-814-65-pt. 13-12 of security *** and any evidence there may be for believing that national security has been, or may be, endangered. Let me emphasize the fact that I am all for investigations. My only point is that investigations would be more efficient and inspire greater public confidence if Congress farmed them out as the British Parliament does or as is done in New York State under the Moreland Act. (As one of my Herald Tribune articles mentions, I was a Moreland Act commissioner in 1928 to investigate charges of fraud in the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation of New York State Department of Labor.) In 1939 I wrote an article for the Survey Graphic which made a strong defense of investigations by congressional committees. That article was written before the British had achieved outstanding successes with their tribunals and before there were so many congressional committee investigations that were incompetent and drew much deserved criticism. Hence I concluded that the British and New York procedures were better. With high regard, I am LINDSAY ROGERS. [From Survey Graphic of January 1939] THE INQUIRING CONGRESSMAN (By Lindsay Rogers) (As fact finder and opinion molder the Congressman or Senator is at his most effective on an investigating committee. Pujo, Teapot Dome, Nye, Black, La Follette, Dies, TVA and, Temporary Economic-all these inquiries except the Temporary Economic, which shares legislative laurels with administrative experts, follow an old tradition, uniquely American, mixed in method and result. Mr. Rogers' article is one of a Survey Graphic series on the Anatomy of Government.) Twenty-five years ago the late Prof. A. V. Dicey, whose name is still honored by students of political institutions, lamented the fact that "political inventiveness has in general fallen far short of the originality displayed in other fields than politics by the citizens of progressive or civilized states." The United States, however, can boast of at least two political inventions—that is, of two devices which have no counterparts in foreign governmental systems. One is the presidential press conference which, invented by Woodrow Wilson, has been so adapted and improved by President Roosevelt that it produces news which in importance ofttimes rivals the news that results from congressional deliberations or even from the relations of executive and legislature. The second invention is the congressional committee of investigation. This, to be sure, is nothing new. It has roots in 16th century England; the colonial legislatures set up committees to inquire into various matters, and the Congress at its second session asserted its prerogative of investigation. Since the war, however, congressional investigations have increased in number and importance. Nowhere else do investigations by committees of the legislature constitute a major and customary instrumentality of the government. In the United States within the last few weeks we have had the spectacle of these two inventions clashing with each other. President Roosevelt used one of his press conferences as a pulpit from which he lashed out at the Dies committee which, in its investigation of "un-American activities," has not paused to bother about what is relevant or to sift evidence from irresponsible hearsay, and which so timed its alleged revelations as to lay itself open to the suspicion of wishing to influence the recent elections. Representative Dies lashed back at the President. The spectacle was not edifying and enabled critics of Mr. Roosevelt who had no sympathy with the Dies committee to complain that the Executive was "impertinent" in interfering with what was none of his business. Any foreign chief of the executive who was similarly aggrieved at the activities of a group of legislators would have had to vent his spleen in a speech to a public gathering or to the legislature because, as I have said, foreign systems have not evolved the press conference. But no foreign chief of the executive could have had occasion to inveigh against a legislative inquisition of all and sundry such as the Dies committee has proved to be, because no other legislature gives a group of its members any such broad terms of reference. I refrain, for the moment, from suggesting whether in my opinion other governments without these devices are thereby fortunate or unfortunate. My subject is the place of the congressional committee of inquiry in the American governmental system. THE INTREPID SENATORS Given our form of government-the separation of the executive and legislature congressional committees of inquiry are absolutely necessary. The fact that, under a cabinet form of government, ministers must defend themselves in the legislature results in parliamentary knowledge of and control over administrative policy that is far greater than congressional knowledge or control can be. As Woodrow Wilson wrote a half century ago: "Congress stands almost helpless outside of the departments" with the result that "hostile or designing officials can always hold it at arm's length by dextrous evasions and concealments." The only whip that Congress has is investigation. That whip must be used by committees. But Mr. Wilson went on to say that "even the special, irksome, ungracious investigations, which it [Congress] from time to time institutes in its spasmodic endeavors to dispel or confirm suspicions of malfeasance or of wanton corruption, do not afford it more than a glimpse of the inside of a small province of the Federal administration." During the last 2 years of his Presidency, when the Democrats had lost control of Congress, Mr. Wilson had to submit to inquiries into many "small provinces" of his administration. Fiftyone congressional investigations were in progress at the same time. Manifestly a party which controls one or both branches of Congress wishes to use the power of investigation to hamper and discredit an Executive from the opposing party. But Congress declines to be incurious when the same party controls both the Legislature and the Executive. It is thus that the inquisitorial power of the Senate becomes more frequent and more formidable than that of the House of Representatives. There party control is more rigid than it is in the Senate. Representatives live in the shadow cast by the always imminent congressional election. Hence the majority party in the House is reluctant to probe for possibly embarrassing disclosures. The result is that when the same party is in control in Congress and in the White House, investigations are frequently asked for in the House and refused, but are allowed by the Senate. That the Senate and not the more popular branch of Congress should be more important as the grand inquisitor is somewhat ironical. But in the Senate, bondage to leaders is far less prevalent than in the House; because there are few limitations on debate, the need for investigations can be clearly set forth; and if the party steamroller is brought out, the minority may have an effective defense in a filibuster that can endanger the majority's legislative timetable. Thus, in the period which followed the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the Graham committee that scrutinized military expenditures (at a cost of half a million dollars), Senate committees conducted practically every important investigation. They inquired into charges of corruption in the Veterans' Bureau, the oil land leases, the Bureau of Internal Revenue and its tax refunds, Mr. Daugherty's conduct of the Department of Justice, the failure to prosecute the aluminum trust, and the internal workings of the Tariff Commission. Through its committees, the House investigated matters that were much less spectacular: the administration of the Stock Yards Control Act, the operations of the Army Air Service and the Shipping Board. It was during the Harding administration that the Senate became the grand inquest of the Nation and that congressional investigations were recognized as being a regular and highly important part of the governmental machine. When they probe into important issues and when they seem to be endeavoring to besmirch executive officers, senatorial investigations may encounter bitter opposition and severe criticism. Complaints are made that committees throw out their dragnets blindly and pry into irrelevant and innocent matters; that a wrong construction may be put on honest actions; that the course that investigations follow is determined by the idiosyncrasies of individual Senators; that those Senators are more concerned with securing headlines in the newspapers than they are in uncovering abuses. |