Railroad Shopcraft Dispute

RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1967.

Hon. RALPH YARBOROUGH,

Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Labor,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Numerous objections have been raised by railroad industry spokesmen and by high officials of the Executive Branch of the government to the proposal made by me, on behalf of the railway labor movement generally, and by Mr. Michael Fox, on behalf of the shopcrafts unions in particular, to transport all rail shipments essential to our nation's military effort and the public health, in event of a national strike by the shopcrafts.

This letter presents our answer to the more serious objections raised. We should appreciate it if you find it possible to insert this letter in your hearing record on this subject.

1. Determining essential shipments. I want to stress that what we have in mind is a voluntary plan for a partial strike, not something imposed by law. If this plan does not work, Congress can at any time suspend the shopmen's strike; you have already demonstrated how quickly you can act to do this; little as we might like it.

Our plan envisages that, under strike conditions, movement of essential freight would depend on approval by the railroad agents-the same men who now process the bills of lading for all railroad freight.

This approval, however, would not depend on the individual judgment of the railroad agents (most of whom, I might mention, are members of my own organization, the Transportation-Communication Employees Union).

In the first category of shipments, the cooperating railway labor organizations would issue instructions to railroad agents, before the strike, to approve all carload shipments: (a) Addressed to any federal, state or local government addressee, including military addressees; (b) addressed to any hospital, electric, gas or other public utility; (c) all perishable foods.

In the second category, our plan calls for the Department of Defense to prepare a listing, based either on categories of product or destinations or both, of shipments moving by rail that are deemed essential by the government to our military effort and the public health. No doubt the Department of Defense already has a priority system for ensuring prompt supply of raw and semi-finished materials and products to defense contractors; this priority system could be meshed into the new listing. The cooperating railway labor organizations, upon receiving this DOD listing, would forward it to the railroad agents with instructions to approve all such shipments.

In our judgment, continued movement of all items in our first category above would more than meet the nation's essential needs during the first two or three days of a railroad strike. We strongly believe that if Congress permits a national strike by the shopmen, the railroads will settle their dispute with the shopcraft organizations before such a strike occurs or in any event before it is more than 48 hours old. However, to prepare for a somewhat longer strike, we do think the Department of Defense should prepare the further listing I have suggested.

2. Clearing the yards. All freight in transit at the outset of the strike would be moved to destination, provided the shipper or consignee and the railroad wish it to be moved directly to destination without delay.

3. Transport of empties. We are prepared to issue instructions to the employees to transport all empty cars wherever the managements order.

4. Scheduling of trains. Most long-distance railroad freight moves by scheduled trains. There is absolutely no reason why such schedules should not be maintained for hauling essential shipments under our plan-except the fact that this would involve shorter trains which would not make so much money for the railroads as their present long trains. Railroad spokesmen have threatened to ignore their own schedules under our plan and wait until long trains are assembled, thereby creating "chaotic" conditions. They have said they would do this unless ordered by the government to keep to their schedules-in which case they have said they would sue the government for damages. This stand by the railroads clearly is a financial, not a practical, objection to our proposal.

5. Less-than-carload freight. Most railroads have already gone out of the lessthan-carload business largely or wholly, saying they would rather leave this busi

ness to the trucks. We would be prepared to handle normal less-than-carload freight shipments under our partial operation plan.

6. Passenger service. If the President informs us that either all categories or certain specific categories of railroad passenger and mail service, including commuter service, are necessary to the national interest during the shopmen's strike, such trains would be moved on a normal basis. However, if the President does make such a determination, we would not expect the government-after the strike is over-to allow the railroad corporations to abandon the very trains that have been found essential to the national interest, nor would we expect the government to take the mail off such trains, thereby encouraging the railroads to abandon them. We point out that since 1958 the railroads have already abandoned over 800 passenger trains on the ground that the public didn't need or want them.

I should like to state that the essential-shipments offer made by railway labor in this particular national dispute, and under the present wartime conditions, should not be considered a commitment for other times and other circumstances. In closing, I wish to emphasize our view that the offer we have made is not only patriotic but practical. We would either take down the picket lines to permit the necessary employees to enter railroad property or issue permits to such employees and picket lines would be opened to let them through. We have done this in the past on some occasions and the only difficulty has been with management, not with our pickets or the employees. We undertake to do this on June 19, under the conditions I have described, in order to help our fighting men in Vietnam and to preserve the public health.

Sincerely yours,

G. E. LEIGHTY, Chairman.

NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD,

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,

Washington, D.C., May 24, 1967.

Hon. RALPH W. YARBOROUGH,
Chairman, Labor Subcommittee,

Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
New Senate Office Building,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On May 16, 1967, in answer to a request made on the record by Senator Morse, we advised you that we were assembling such information as was available in in answer thereto.

Enclosed herewith you will find a compilation of the history of emergency boards created by Executive Order under Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act as they pertain to the railroad industry. We have also included data on strikes on carriers subject to emergency board jurisdiction.

As we previously informed you, parties to a dispute heard by an emergency board are not required to formally accept or reject a board's findings and recommendations. We have, to the best of our ability, ascertained the parties' reaction to each board's findings from such contemporaneous records as were available. Where no information was available to us, we have so stated.

Where emergency board numbers are omitted in this report, it indicates an emergency board in an airline dispute was created.

If we may be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call upon us.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS A. O'NEILL, Jr., Chairman. 419