agreement has some responsibility in implementing the mutual product.

Before I leave the subject of the court opinion, I want to comment on the newspaper coverage of the case. The Washington Post and one of the wire services reported the case as being a new threat to railroad labor peace and even raised strike possibilities.

Now I know this is standard news coverage procedure, but I protest that it inflames the present situation unfairly. We are not about to set up picket lines. We are trying our best to get Mr. Wolfe away from Congress and to the bargaining table, if such is possible.

Therefore, I want you to know that I am disturbed that news accounts of the recent court ruling would have a poor effect on your deliberations. I hope such is not the case.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Compulsory arbitration is never really "one shot" or temporary. After having to live with compulsory arbritration for 3 years-and it seems more like 30 years-I feel I am entitled to say, respectfully, that I told you so.

In 1963, the Commerce Committees of both the Senate and House were considering the administration's proposal for one-shot, temporary compulsory arbitration. I testified before both committees and I want to repeat here a very brief statement I made at that time. This is my statement:

I suspect that those who support this resolution know that it provides for compulsory arbitration, but they believe it to be just a little bit of compulsory arbitration. But even a little bit will be the hole in the dike. Introduction of compulsory arbitration, so history shows, protends the end of that kind of collective bargaining which government, industry and labor ought to promote that kind of bargaining which has become associated with and a part of our system of free enterprise. It marks the beginning of a process wherein one or both parties shuns responsibility and passes the buck to the arbitration tribunal to indicate the terms of the contract. That process, in my opinion, will be pursued in future contract negotiations, if the resolution passes, and Congress again will be confronted with identical problems.

The resolution passed in 1963. In the short span of 4 years, two more critical transportation labor disputes have been brought before Congress, including the present one. It bears out what I said, and what many Members of Congress said would happen.

I am not going to belabor this point, because I know the Congress is fully aware of the pitfalls of becoming a stop along the way in labor relations struggles. Also, it is clear that the railroad industry-which has been here twice in 2 years-is boldly using Congress as a weapon to throttle railroad employees.

Without fear of contradiction, I can say that railroad management will be back before you four, five, six even 10 times, with labor relations problems until it achieves its professed goal-final and binding arbitration in the Railway Labor Act.

The industry should be told now-in 1967-that Congress will not be part of railroad management's no-bargaining process; that Congress will deal harshly with those who try to use the legislative force for their own self-interest; and, that Congress will force collective bargaining, but will not force settlements.

B. Pitfalls of compulsory arbitration.

We have seen conclusively that there is no such thing as one-shot temporary compulsory arbitration. Its effect is not only sweeping but lasting, and the record shows the railroad industry keeps coming back for more.

Before closing I would like to list for the record some of the more obvious pitfalls of compulsory arbitration.

1. Rather than promote collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration destroys the climate or atmosphere conducive to meaningful negotiations. Indeed, just the consideration of compulsory arbitration by Congress precludes collective bargaining. It is used as an excuse not to bargain.

2. Compulsory arbitration-bad in itself-can be used or misused to mistreat, harass, and bait employees, and force them out of the industry; all under the guise that the compulsory ruling permits such inhuman and inhumane activities.

3. A "little bit" of compulsory arbitration breeds more. It also does nothing to solve the problem that first set it off. The fireman dispute is an example. After 4 years, the issue is as alive and the dispute as bitter as it was before the temporary settlement was forced by law.

4. In the long-range effect, compulsory arbitration in one industry is easily transferred or widened to include other industries, which are given an "emergency" tag by the public press. Notably, newspaper publishers think compulsory arbitration should prevent strikes in their industry, but Congress has yet to agree.

5. A series of one-shot compulsory arbitration resolutions would soon end with final and binding arbitration as part of the labor laws. As in countries that have such laws now, we find workers striking against Government, not industry. We do not want our Nation's workers to be placed in the category of criminals if they defend their jobs.

6. Lastly, compulsory arbitration in any industry will eventually cause nationalization of that industry. I cannot believe that the Congress would force a segment of workers to labor at a forced wage scale, under forced working conditions and then let the industry profit and operate as a free enterprise.

While I believe in the right to strike and it should be preserved if that is to be denied I would like to make some suggestions.

C. Recommendations.

In 1963, we asked Congress to take a hands-off attitude in the manning dispute and serve as a watchdog over the negotiations we hoped would be forthcoming. As you know that did not happen, but I would recommend the same general idea here today.

When a labor relations issue gets to Congress, the role of Congress is circumscribed to forcing a settlement. Although third-party recommendations are employed, it boils down to Congress setting up a compulsory arbitration board, and then putting the force of law behind the board's decisions. That is compulsory arbitration, pure and simple. Instead of forcing a settlement, why not force collective bargaining? That may sound strange, but I seriously propose that Congress create, by force, an atmosphere for collective bargaining and mediation.

The resolution you have before you is compulsory arbitration. Change it to make it compulsory collective bargaining.

I suggest that you consider the 90-day period contained in the resolution as a "collective bargaining period." In that period, the employees would be restricted from striking and the railroad industry would be restricted from activities before Government boards.

There would be a balance of economic impact on both parties. Mediation could then begin with both sides knowing that Congress is not going to force settlement, but instead, is going to force bargaining until the parties reach agreement themselves.

Some may call the restraints placed on the railroad industry a form of seizure. If it is, it is a mild but effective form. And, you must admit that taking away the employees' right to strike is also seizure of their rights.

I think it important that Congress not indicate what would happen if, after the 90-day period, no settlement had been made. The fear of an unknown solution is often the needed impetus to carry the situation to final agreement.

Congress must recognize that the railroad industry saves money every day it delays a wage increase. True, the increase will be generally retroactive, but just like a financial institution, the industry has use of the money to make more money until the wage increase is agreed upon and paid. Delay must be made unprofitable.

Whether or not my suggestion will gain consideration, I ask you not to approve Senate Joint Resolution 81 in its present form. The inequities of the 1963 law are in the present resolution, and more compulsory arbitration will further erode the bargaining process in the railroad industry.

Once the present dispute is settled, I hope that the White House and the Cabinet members involved will launch an intensive study and seminar among all involved in transportation labor relations.

While great attention is given during a crisis to the final outcome, there is little attention given to the tools with which we work in our day-to-day functions in labor relations.

This is an area that needs not only thorough study but frank and open discussion among all parties, neutrals included. I would hope that such a study or seminar will stop the regular rush to Congress for compulsion and restore the bargaining process to its rightful and useful place in our economy.

D. Defense transportation in a strike.

I am informed that the shopcraft unions have undertaken to discuss with the Secretary of Defense their intention to permit the opera-tion of all defense trains during a strike. On behalf of my organization, which is an operating union, I wish to say that the shopcrafts and Department of Defense will have our wholehearted cooperation. In March of 1966, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen struck eight railroads for 4 days. All defense trains that we were requested to move were moved. This is a matter of court record for carrier officials. Therefore, the shopcraft unions' promise of defense transportation is not an idle or empty one.

Thank you for permitting me to express these views here today. I have done so with a sincere interest in helping preserve and enhance the rights of free collective bargaining and free enterprise which have made this Nation so great.

Thank you.

Senator YARBOROUGH. Mr. Gilbert, while you were reading your statement I read your whole statement and went back and read Mr. Luna's statement. We have two statements in here that I think are outstanding in the light of these hearings. I want to comment briefly on them and ask you a question or two about them. One is where you say, "In March 1966 the eight railroads were struck for 4 days. All defense trains that we were requested to move were moved."

Was there chaos in all the roads during that time? Was it impossible to find out which trains were defense trains?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir.

Senator YARBOROUGH. By any chance did you hear the testimony yesterday by railroad management to the effect that there would be such chaos that it would be impossible to move the trains?

Mr. GILBERT. I am sorry, I did not.

Senator YARBOROUGH. Did you have difficulty moving the defense trains?

Mr. GILBERT. The records in Washington will show that upon questioning of the officials from these eight railroads as to whether or not we responded and moved all the defense materials that were so designated, they answered that they were moved.

Senator YARBOROUGH. What case was that?

Mr. GILBERT. That was contempt charges against me.

Senator YARBOROUGH. Will you supply that portion of the record here?

(The information subsequently furnished follows:)

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FURNISHED BY H. E. GILBERT, PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN

Hon. RALPH YARBOROUGH,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Labor,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, May 17, 1967.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor in opposition to S. J. Res. 81, on May 16, 1967 you requested of me further information concerning the operation of defense and food trains during the four-day strike of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen beginning March 31, 1966.

You will recall in my testimony that I stated that the Brotherhood members moved all defense and special commodity trains that they were requested to move. While there were a number of instances I repeat here the testimony of two (2) railroad officials before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on April 2, 1966.

"TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM J. AHEARNE, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD

"By Mr. RAUH (JOSEPH-BLF&E Counsel):

"Q. Mr. Ahearne, did your railroad get a notice from the General Chairman of the Brotherhood reading as follows-including the following statement:

"Striking employees have been instructed to handle and transport troop trains, hospital trains, milk trains, and cars loaded with priority materials or supplies designated by the government as essential to national defense.'

"A. We did.

"Q. Have you asked the Brotherhood to take any action to make possible the carrying of such trains? A. The only train-yes, we have, in one instance.

"Q. What was that instance? A. The night that the strike started we had a milk train en route from a point in New York State to Boston and we asked the

Brotherhood to permit the crews to set that milk at the milk company plants in Boston.

"Q. And they did so? A. They did so.

"Q. And have you made any other request under this willingness of the Brotherhood to make transportation where there was priority need such as this? A. No, we have not."

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS J. MELIA, VICE PRESIDENT, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

By Mr. RAUH:

"Q. Mr. Melia, I believe you testified that the Brotherhood had moved an A.E.C. train for you? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And I believe you testified they moved a prisoner train? A. That is right. "Q. I take it from that that they have met the requests you made for priority movements? A. In those two instances, and the only two we had.

"Q. In other words, you have not made any requests that were not honored in this regard? A. As far as I know, that is true.

"Mr. RAUH. Thank you."

Trusting that the enclosed information will complete the record in this regard. Very truly yours,

H. E. GILBERT,

President, Brotherhood of Locomotive, Firemen & Enginemen. (See also the railroad industry statements at pp. 429 433.)

Senator YARBOROUGH. Another question I want to ask you is that on page 21 you suggest to hold the parties even during this period, that in that period the employees not be permitted to strike and the railroad industry not be permitted to seek relief from Government boards. I assume you mean from ICC to change their rates and so forth. Mr. GILBERT. In effect, it would be a form of executive seizure. Senator YARBOROUGH. Rather than seizure, it would be a freeze order, it would freeze both of you. You could not strike and it would freeze them from raising their rates or merging.

Mr. GILBERT. In effect, it would deny them the rights of freedom before Government boards.

Senator YARBOROUGH. It is not a seizure, I would say it is a freeze. You maintain the status quo, in other words.

Mr. GILBERT. In a sense, that is contemplated; but I think in the final analysis some would call it seizure.

Senator YARBOROUGH. I do not think I would call it seizure. A seized railroad might apply for an increase in rates.

Mr. GILBERT. But the fact is, Senator, we have a very strong belief that the Government can't be half fair in these circumstances.

If you are going to take the right away from the employees to protect themselves against onerous working conditions or onerous wages, then serious consideration should be given to putting the industry for which we work in the same posture, that they can no longer operate as a free enterprise in this period during which their employees are denied their right in this Nation.

Senator YARBOROUGH. I think it is the duty of the Government to hold the scales of justice even between the employer and employee. That is pretty simple in a suit for damages, because you have set rules for procedure, something has already happened and you are trying to collect damages for past work. That is a past event so that is a matter for adjudication in the courts under a set of rules and by jury trial justice becomes relatively simple insofar as the effort to get fair results.