roads. A notable example of that occurred in the field of job security. Clearly the railroads are an industry affected with a public interest. The Railway Labor Act, and especially its section 10, recognizes that fact. We in railway labor recognize it also, and we have tried to cooperate in fulfilling the purposes of the Railway Labor Act.

What has developed in this industry, under constant use of section 10 of the act, is this: Collective bargaining has in most cases vanished, until after the appointment of an emergency board. Long delays are common. Even after the emergency board reports, there is usually only a modest amount of real bargaining; the board's recommendations, or something close to them, are usually the basis for settlement. I agree with the CED committee that this system has become far too rigid.

However, under our present system there do remain two areas of flexibility-and these are quite vital to any kind of social justice in this industry's labor relations.

First, railroaders still have the legal right to engage in a national strike. Of course, we are quite aware that the President and Congress have not allowed a national railroad strike to proceed at any time since 1922. But so long as we have the legal right to call a national strike, after authorization by our members, we have what amounts to a right of appeal against emergency board recommendations that are wholly inadequate and unacceptable.

That is what has happened in the current shopcraft dispute. In effect, this is a right to supermediation. Just how important this is, those of you who are lawyers can certainly recognize: how much justice would there be in our courts, without a right of appeal? Of course, the railroaders' right of national appeal is not to some court or to compulsory arbitration; it is to higher-level mediation; and so long as we retain our freedom, that is how it will remain.

And considering the number of national labor disputes in this industry, I don't believe any fair-minded person would say the railway labor organizations have abused this right of appeal. We use it only rarely only when an emergency board's recommendations, or the interpretation given them by the railroad negotiators, are grossly unacceptable.

Secondly, railway labor up to now has had both the legal and the practical right to strike one or a few railroads. We have used this right also only rarely. But it is essential to winning advances, and to preventing a breakdown of standard pay rates and working conditions, in the railroad industry.

In specific terms, how have we used these rights in the years since the Korean war seizure of the railroads ended? In those 15 years, as well as I can check, there have been 42 national movements for improvements initiated by the five "operating" organizations and the 11 principal "nonoperating" organizations, counting joint movements as one single movement.

Of those national movements, 39 were settled without a strike and without the kind of "crisis" that brings Congress into the picture. Three movements remain unsettled today, including the present shopcraft movement.

The one major national movement initiated by the railroads during these 15 years to slash the pay and gut the working rules of their

operating men-did bring Congress into the picture; it resulted in part in the 1963 compulsory arbitration law and in part in a negotiated settlement at the White House on June 25, 1964.

During these same 15 years, hundreds if not thousands of notices for improvements have been served on individual railroads by individual unions. In practically every case, these have been settled without disruption of service.

In the past 15 years there have been only five railroad strikes of any real importance or possibly six, if you count the 4-day strike by the Firemen & Enginemen last year on eight railroads. Three of those strikes were provoked by railroads resisting Emergency Board recommendations: the 1955 strike on the Louisville & Nashville, the 1962 strike on the Chicago & North Western, and the 1963 strike on the Florida East Coast, which still continues.

The Firemen & Enginemen's strike last year was provoked by the carriers' refusal to bargain. The two other strikes, on the Pennsylvania and the Long Island, both in 1960, were caused by other reasons.

I suggest to you that this 15-year record of the railway labor organizations is a record of extraordinary restraint. And this record has been written in an era of most exasperating delays and entanglements imposed by railroad managements.

Now, after 15 years, you have one single dispute the very first one initiated by railway labor-dumped like an unwanted baby in your laps by the administration.

You heard yesterday from Mr. Fox about how this dispute got here to you. You heard the grim and painful story of what the railroad corporations are up to, on this matter.

Is Congress now, after the record we in railway labor have written for 15 years, going to fall for the railroads' game? Are you going to set a precedent that will destroy, in practical effect, our right of appeal from unfair and unjust emergency board recommendations? Because that is the result that Senate Joint Resolution 81 or anything like it will have.

Congress made one precedent for compulsory arbitration in 1963. If you make another one now, you will rob the national handling of railway labor disputes of most of the little flexibility that remains in it.

In future, the railroads will simply dig their heels in. Whatever "give" there is in these national disputes, whatever small amount of collective bargaining remains, depends wholly and solely on our legal right to strike. That is the only way we get to what I have called supermediation. This is what the railroads want to destroy.

If Congress twice enacts compulsory arbitration, the next time an Emergency Board in a national dispute is unfair to the employees, or vague, or simply tells the parties to negotiate on certain general lines (as often happens), the railroads will try to force that dispute back up to Congress. And they will do it the next time after that. And however many times are needed to make you throw up your hands in despair and enact the law they really want a law depriving their employees forever of any right to strike over any dispute whatever. Gentlemen, I have held you a long time. I can only plead, in excuse. the immense importance of this matter to the Nation's railroad workers.

I do suggest, again, that the best way to proceed is to implement our proposal to Secretary McNamara. If the railroads absolutely refuse to cooperate in this approach and if you then feel that some legislation is vital against the shopmen's strike, an even-handed seizure bill would be, we think, the least destructive approach. We strongly urge that Senate Joint Resolution 81, and any bill like it, be laid aside. Before I conclude, I have a few comments to make. It is not quite accurate to say that all of the increases and settlements of all the organizations have been on a cents-per-hour basis.

In 1948, we inaugurated our 48-hour week movement. We asked for 48 hours pay, which the men were then receiving for 48 hours work, for 40 hours work instead.

That negotiation resulted in an increase of 20 percent, not a centsper-hour increase. Your wage rate did have a definite effect upon the number of cents per hour that were put into the hourly rate of the different classes of employees.

In that case, too, the railroads made settlements of 10 cents per hour with a number of organizations and they came before the 40hour week board, this was composed of Dr. Leiserson, Dr. Cole, and Mr. Cook who had formerly served on the National Mediation Board, contending that 10 cents sets the pattern, you can't give these people a 40-hour workweek, you have to make a recommendation for the 10 cents per hour.

We had two extremely capable neutrals on that Board. I would say that Mr. Cook had a lot of experience in mediation. In spite of the so-called pattern that the railroads said was established, they came up with a recommendation for a 40-hour week, 48 hours pay for the 40 hours plus an increase of 7 cents per hour. The total value of that increase in cents per hour was in the neighborhood of 25 cents. It was not the 10 cents that they claim was the pattern in that particular settlement.

So there we have two factors involved which disagree with the socalled pattern settlement as well as the claim that all of the increases of the nonops have been on a cents-per-hour basis, because that was one of the larger increases we received when we changed from a 48hour week to a 40-hour week and this was on a percentage basis.

Now getting back to our situation where we are confronted with compulsory arbitration on these Adjustment Boards, the Supreme Court decided that issue on what in our opinion was a case very poorly prepared. They said that under the law we were compelled to take our cases to the Adjustment Board and we could not strike over such cases.

Prior to that time, organizations when they had a large number of cases on a particular railroad, would request a conference with that railroad and in some instances set a strike date which resulted in immediate collective bargaining and practically all of those cases were settled without a strike.

At that time, the Adjustment Boards were fairly current with their work. Subsequent to the time the Supreme Court made its decision requiring compulsory arbitration of these disputes.

The First Division which handles cases of the operating employees is from 7 to 10 years behind in their cases. On the Third Division

which handles the Clerks, Maintenance of Way, Signalmen, Telegrapher, Train Dispatchers, Dining Car Employees and others, we are around 2,000 cases behind. We met with railroad management and were able to get them to go along with us in establishing a supplemental board. But even with that supplemental board we did little more than keep up with the current load.

Senator MORSE (presiding pro tempore). That was the result of the law last year?

Mr. LEIGHTY. No, that supplemental board was established prior to that time. The situation was critical when we established the supplemental board.

Senator MORSE. Let me interrupt. Senator Pell and I were very active on the bill involving the Adjustment Board. I am speaking from recollection now, but that provided for a supplemental special board. What has happened with the operation of that?

Mr. LEIGHTY. A number of boards are operating under that and it is going to be very helpful. The National Mediation Board had to promulgate rules under which they will operate. That took several months time. But there are 50 boards now operating under that arrangement.

Prior to that time, however, we could establish special boards by agreement. A number of special boards were established by agreement.

If you will check the figures you will find that the decrease in the number of cases coming before the Third Division was really occasioned by the number of cases that were taken from the Third Division by agreement and assigned to these special boards which were set up by voluntary agreement between the organization and the individual railroad.

Senator MORSE. What is the backlog before the third division now? Mr. LEIGHTY. The backlog before the third division is still almost 1,800 cases.

Senator MORSE. This 2,000 figure that you testified to a moment ago, that is before what division?

Mr. LEIGHTY. That was before we established the supplemental board.

Those figures are approximate. I can't give you the exact figure. I may be a hundred or so off. I am trying to give you the approximate relationship which you are interested in, as I understand, rather than the exact number.

Now insofar as Emergency Boards are concerned, I may say as chairman of the nonoperating group who has handled such disputes since 1946, the only time that an Emergency Board report was rejected was by the railroads in the Union Shop dispute.

Railroad management rejected the report of the Emergency Board, which forced us to make a regional agreement in the eastern region and individual agreements in the western and southeastern region.

That was the only definite rejection of an Emergency Board recommendation during the period and that, as I pointed out, was on the part of the railroads, not the organizations.

In addition to that however, the L. & N. Railroad which participated in the 1953 movement as well as several other southeastern railroads, participated in the Emergency Board handling, participated in

the negotiations. While we were trying to negotiate a settlement, when they learned what kind of settlement we were going to make, the railroads and the organizations these railroads-withdrew the authority from their committee and they did not accept the settlement that was made.

All of the other railroads except the L. & N. did dispose of the issue by agreement and along the lines of the national agreement which we had made with the carriers' conference committee.

But the L. & N. was persistent in refusing and we struck that carrier. We finally settled that through voluntary arbitration and in that arbitration the arbitrator ruled that the L. & N. could not take half of the cost of the health and welfare program away from their employees. We took the position that if they could not take half of it away, they could pay it all themselves and it was decided in our favor.

As a result, the railroads are paying the cost of the health and welfare programs on the railroads today.

But that was brought about by railroad action, not by our action.

The other case that was mentioned by Mr. Wolfe, we met in negotiations and, very frankly, the carriers indicated to us in those negotiations that they were not going to accept the Emergency Board report. Whereupon, another member of the committee and myself discussed the matter privately with one of the carrier negotiators.

We recessed the conferences for a few days and came back and made a settlement on the basis of the Emergency Board report.

So, our difficulties have not been with respect to the unions turning down Emergency Board proposals. I am speaking for the group I generally represent. It has been because of the action of the carriers in connection with the Board recommendations.

I will say, however, with respect to job stabilization, the agreement we eventually made with the railroads without any work stoppage did not follow the recommendations of the Emergency Board because we didn't consider they were practical.

Many of the recommendations made by emergency boards are not practical and that is proven by the fact that we both agreed that they were not practical and made agreements that were practical insofar as our particular groups were concerned.

Senator MORSE. You might also add under your Railway Labor Act neither party is under obligation to accept an Emergency Board recommendation.

In fact, following the handing down of the recommendations of the Board you have 30 days in which to seek to negotiate, among yourselves, modifications of the Emergency Board report if you can reach agreement.

Mr. LEIGHTY. That is correct. We realize that fact, Senator Morse. I would say that we have been very liberal.

It is true the law only requires us to hold still for 30 days to meet requests of the carriers so that they can comply with other commitments they have.

We have extended that 30-day period, in some instances for a considerable period of time as well as the time of the Emergency Board in hearing the dispute.

In one case I know the Emergency Board held hearings for a period of 8 months. When they came down with their recommendation it was another 3 months before an agreement was reached.