to the Corn Belt to fatten; we grow our sheep in the range States and ship them to the Corn Belt to be fattened and then to market; we raise our dairy cattle in the Midwest and ship them to the Atlantic seaboard. With this immense traffic, uncontrolled foot-and-mouth disease would become a problem of the entire country.

If the disease were spread by an enemy in biological warfare, drastic measures would be required to prevent a disruption of our meat supply, which is so essential for both civilian and military requirements.

The above quotation describes quite accurately the conditions under which an infection of foot-and-mouth disease could do an immeasurable amount of damage in this country. It has been 21 years since we have had an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States. We should remember, however, that all of the outbreaks in this country occurred before interstate travel for business and pleasure had reached such high rapidities as is common today. When one considers the millions of people moving by automobile, rail, and air travel and the impossibility of blocking all means of travel, there is every possibility that if foot-and-mouth disease should become established, especially in the heavily populated area of the Northwest, its spread would be a foregone conclusion.

The Bureau of Animal Industry has, until recently, always taken the position that the live foot-and-mouth disease virus should not be brought into the United States. In a statement before the House Committee on Agriculure on February 10, 1947, Dr. Simms made the following statement:

We are not doing any research with foot-and-mouth disease. It is so infectious that we have always taken the stand, long before I started working with the Bureau, which I think to be a wise stand, that it is too dangerous to work with in this country. I will state that we sent a commission to Europe which studied the hoof-and-mouth disease, but since that commission has come back, we have done no research with the disease. Now it is under discussion, and we are hoping if this disease starts in Mexico, that we can find it possible to do some active research work in Mexico, with the permission, of course, of the Mexicon Government, in this infected center; and then after Mexico stamps out the disease, we would automatically close the laboratory. We have such plans under way.

We know, however, that on March 12, 1919, speaking before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Dr. Simms modified his recommendation and qualified it by the following state

ment:

During the years, however, from the time that the Bureau first made this docision that it would not work with the virus in this country, we have been accumlating knowledge. The European laboratories have shown that they can work with safety. We still take the same attitude that we did 2 years ago, that we would not work with the virus in this country, we would not even suggest that we work with it under conditions that exist as at the present. It is only if we have special facilities, such as we are requesting here, so that we can take special precautions to control the disease, that we would be willing to undertake this work. But, during the years, there has been developed in the European laboratories and South American laboratories, and partly with our cooperation, enough knowledge so that we now feel safe in working with the virus, provided we have the proper facilities.

It is at this point that we disagree reluctantly with Dr. Simms, and we do so because we believe that the Bureau does not yet have sufficient knowledge to work safely with the disease in this country.

In the 2-year interval between the testimony of Dr. Simms in 1947 and his testimony in 1949, the only scientific basis for his change of thought has been built on ideas obtained from European and South American laboratories, and those bits of information supposedly have

been incorporated in the laboratories developed in Mexico. What concerns us most is that in these countries, where according to Dr. Simms, so much has been learned about the control of the disease, it is a fact that those countries have not been able to eliminate the infection for any considerable period of time. In the British Isles, for example, we know that the disease continues to break out at relatively short intervals, in England, regardless of the extensive research work done on the disease, and measures taken for its control. It is true that British authorities report that the disease usually spreads from meat imported from disease-infested countries, but there outbreaks occur in spite of the very drastic regulations which are enforced for the destruction of the virus. There are, however, outbreaks which are not traceable to any know scarce, and the burden of proof still rests on the research workers to show that the infection did not arise from a laboratory or other source. Ireland is clean and has been for several years. Scotland has had only one outbreak in the past 5 years. England, however, has outbreaks ever year. There are no foot-and-mouth disease laboratories in Ireland or Scotland, however, and England is farther from European sources of infection, across the English Channel, than our mainland is across the 2-mile channel from Prudence Island.

The Bureau of Animal Industry now claims that there are at least three different types of the foot-and-mouth disease virus, and they do not recognize the fact that outbreaks occurring in foreign countries are traceable to the same type of virus being used within a laboratory in that vicinity. By admission, however, the Bureau of Animal Industry does not know all there is to be known about the virus and how it may be spread. One of the objectives of the laboratory would be to study the different strains of the virus and their relation to one another. This fact gives rise to the possibility that those regnized strains of the foot-and-mouth disease virus may be related, and until more is known of the metamorphosis of the virus, it is not possible for scientists to say definitely that an outbreak in one area would have no relationship to the type of virus in a laboratory in that area.

While it is true that the spreading of the infection has been traced chiefly to affected animals and their body contents, it is known also that the infection has been traced to unsterilized garbage containing contaminated products. It is supposed that these methods of spreading the infection are the most prevalent ones; yet, it is possible the disease may be spread in many other ways and by many other agents. Since a filterable virus does not lend itself readily to microscopic study, the assumption that it can be controlled without complete knowledge of its characteristics, could be disastrous to our livestock population, if the virus should be brought to this country. If we had an example of an area under one government, such as the British Isles, where the disease had been eradicated, and the country kept clean for a period of years, and where a research laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease was located, then we would assume that a repetition of the experiment could be conducted successfully in this or any other country where equal laboratory facilities were available. Since no such example exists, however, we are definitely opposed to gambling with a future of our livestock industry by inviting the risk involved.

We recognize the fact that laboratory studies are made in this country involving many dangerous viruses. Most of these are the causes

of disease already prevalent in this country. We understand that in a very few cases the virus, not causing a disease at present in this country, has been introduced for laboratory study. It is our understanding, however, that in each case the ways of spreading were known and all efforts were aimed at either preventative methods or cures. Moreover, these studies were made in small laboratories where existing techniques could be carried out with precision which guaranteed safety. The very physical enormity of the proposed foot-and-mouth disease laboratory, however, associated with the large number of daily workers involved in its. operation, make it extremely doubtful that the Bureau of Animal Industry would be able to effectively control all conditions as perfectly as its theoretical definitions would indicate. To work with small animals in limited space where precise details may be carried out under the watchful eyes of a very few people is one thing, but it is impossible to duplicate a similiar quality of work in a structure covering many acres. When we consider that in the proposed laboratory probably more than 1,000 large animals will be kept, the problems of absolute control become enormous. From the very fact that truck-loads and even car-loads of feeding and bedding materials must be moved into such a laboratory daily, and that an almost equal amount of material must be disposed of daily in the form of manure and other waste products, it will be seen readily that the problem of absolute control of conditions will tax the ingenuity of the most able scientists. According to a bulletin issued by the Bureau of Animal Industry in May 1950, only about 1 out of 10 persons working in the laboratory will be highly trained scientists and only about 1 out of 5 will have any technical training. When we consider that approximately 200 people without technical training will be working with the animals, and that these people may be passing in and out of the most critical areas of the laboratory daily, the chances for the transportation of the virus must be considered a distinct possibility.

There is another and even greater danger associated with the maintenance of the live foot-and-mouth disease virus in a laboratory in this country. As mentioned by the Special Senate Subcommittee on Control of Foot and Mouth Disease, as early as 1948, there is the great danger of the foot-and-mouth disease virus in the hands of an enemy in biological warfare. Quoting from Senate Document No. 211, page 9, of the Eightieth Congress, second session:

if the disease were spread by an enemy in biological warfare, drastic measures would be required to prevent a disruption of our meat supply, which is so essential for both civilian and military requirements.

That statement was made when practically all of our public officials were of the opinion that war was not imminent. It was also made at a time when there was apparently very little concern about the possibility of sabotage by representatives and agents of foreign countries. Since that time much information has been brought before the public relative to the activities of foreign agents and their friends. Recognizing the fact that no more effective sabotage could be accomplished than the destruction of from 5 to 50 percent of our meat and dairy livestock, it is safe to assume that every effort would be made by an enemy agent to spread the foot-and-mouth disease virus in this country as a part of a germ-warfare program. When we admit the fact that certain German war prisoners were able to conceal, for weeks,

lethal doses of poison about their persons, we cannot defend the statement that, by requiring a shower bath and a change of clothing before persons would leave the proposed foot-and-mouth disease laboratory, an effective barrier could be maintained against the transportation of the live foot-and-mouth disease virus from the premises if only one person working in the laboratory was committed to the assignment of carrying the virus, in some form, from the premises.

Such things as germ warfare are not pleasant to contemplate as they may affect either our human or livestock populations. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that germ warfare could spread a lethal disease through our livestock population, and would also seriously affect our human population through the destruction of our food supply. Consider, for a moment, the necessity of absolute quarantine of populations and the discontinuance of any form of transportation to, or from, any considerable area of this country, due to a possible outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Opposed to this, consider the great necessity for the freest possible movement of transportation facilities, at a time when we are entering a long period of absolute need for the rapid transportation of supplies, and we must agree that we would be facing an impossible situation. Either our transportation system and the movement of people and goods would be stopped absolutely or, through the movement of peoples and supplies the foot-and-mouth disease would be spread rapidly throughout the entire country. We do not see how, under existing conditions, we can be asked to take such a chance of jeopardizing the national welfare. As we said in the beginning, we are very much in favor of continued and expanded research with foot-and-mouth disease. We believe it is essential that we learn everything possible about this disease. We agree with Dr. Simms that we need to know more about the mode of transmission of the virus, including the possibilities of unknown carriers. We need much more information relative to the different strains of the virus and their relation to one another. We need to improve our diagnostic methods and our methods of disinfection and eradication. We need to know whether or not there are strains of cloven-hoofed animals resistant to the disease. It is our studied opinion, however, that these investigations can be studied most efficiently and economically, and with no danger to our livestock population, in some country where there are laboratory facilities at the present time, and where the infection is already present in the livestock population. When Dr. Simms appeared before the annual meeting of the Purebred Dairy Cattle Association over a year ago, he stated that excellent cooperation was in effect between the research workers in this country and the workers in the foot-and-mouth disease laboratories in England, Holland, Switzerland, and Central and South American countries. He also stated that this good cooperation was secured, although we had not actually put funds into the laboratories of those countries, and only a limited number of our personnel were associated with any of these laboratories. We know that with a very small fraction of the funds requested for the construction and maintenance of a laboratory in this country, if used to supplement existing facilities in other countries, we could begin to get greatly expanded research results almost immediately. On the other hand, we are asked to spend at least $30,000,000 in construction (which would undoubtedly be increased to $50,000,000 since the $30,000,000 estimate is now 2 years

old), and we could not hope to have a laboratory in operation in less than 3 years. This laboratory could not possibly aid in combating the foot-and-mouth-disease infection now confronting us in Mexico. It is our understanding that the laboratories in Mexico are producing all of the vaccines needed to take care of the situation in that country, provided new outbreaks do not occur, or can be held to a minimum. In view of the facts we have presented, we respectfully suggest that the committee do not consider favorably the request for an appropriation to construct and maintain a foot-and-mouth-disease laboratory within the United States, or its coastal waters. We want to emphasize our desire that additional research work be continued with the foot-and-mouth-disease virus, and we are glad to join many other agricultural organizations in urging that research be continued and expanded. We also want to assure the members of your committee and the representatives of the Bureau of Animal Industry that, at the earliest moment, we are sure there is absolutely no danger of the spread of the foot and mouth virus from a laboratory in this country, we will support the requests of the Bureau for necessary funds for the construction of such a labortory. Until that time, however, we urge that our livestock population and our national welfare not be jeopardized by the importation of the disease into this country.

Again I want to thank the committee for its consideraion in permiting us to appear before it.

I would like to add that the association that I represent here is a member of the Purebred Dairy Cattle Association, which represents the five major breeders of dairy cattle in this country, and it originates some quarter of a million purebred cattle each year.

As breeders of dairy cattle, we represent the seed stock of the dairy cattle breeding industry, and we are particularly concerned about the introduction of the foot-and-mouth diseases into this country, because we know that once these purebred stock are destroyed, we cannot go back and build them up again.

It is especially important to us who are in the eastern and northeastern part of the country, since the major part of the seed stock of the dairy breeders are in the northeastern part of the country. There are other breeders, of course, in all of the States of the Union, but we have the problem of the seed stock in the eastern and northeastern part of the United States.

I would like to emphasize also that we are not opposed to research work on foot-and-mouth disease. I have been a member of agricultural experiment station staffs and I can appreciate the importance of research in animal diseases. I have come in contact with the need of it every day. And as members of the cattle association we appreciate the need for the necessary restrictions, rightfully imposed, as safeguards and for the protection of the health of the cattle in this country.

Mr. WHITTEN. Are you familiar with the operations of the Bureau of Animal Industry out at Beltsville?

Mr. BOWLING. Yes, I am.

Mr. WHITEN. Do you know if they have adequate plants and facilities for various experimentations of this kind?

Mr. BOWLING. Yes; they have very adequate facilities and they also have the cooperation of the 48 agricultural experiment stations. Mr. WHITTEN. All of which carry on some experimental work?